JUDGMENT 1. - In the present writ petition, the petitioner challenges the validity of the Notification dated January 13,1993 issued by State Government, withdrawing its earlier Notification of September 15, 1992, whereby he was appointed as Chairman of the Rajasthan Khadi & Village Industries Board (for short, 'the Board'). The principal questions for consideration in the petition may be formulated : (i) Whether the Chairman of the Board could be removed from his office by the State Government at its pleasure without assigning any reason or following the principles of natural justice; and (ii) Whether there are any limitations or restrictions on the power of the appointing authority in removing the Chairman of the Board ? 2. The facts of the case may be stated in brief : The petitioner was nominated as Chairman of the Board by the State Government vide Notification No.F. 29(26) Udyog/2/72, dated, September 15, 1992 in exercise of powers under S. 4(a) of the Rajasthan Khadi & Village Industries Board Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). After the promulgation of President's rule under Article 356 of the Constitution of India in the State of Rajasthan, the petitioner apprehended his removal. He, therefore, filed the writ petition on 21.12.1992 with a prayer to issue an order or direction or writ of appropriate nature, restraining the respondents to remove him from the post of Chairman without compliance of the provisions of the Act. The petition was listed on the same day before Hon'ble S.N. Bhargava, J., at his residence. After hearing the learned Advocate for the petitioner, Shri U.N. Bhandari, the learned Judge passed the following order: "My attention has been drawn to Sections 4, 7 and 13 of the Rajasthan Khadi and Village Industries Act and also to Rule 3 of the Rules of 1965 made under the above mentioned Act, which provide that the term of a member shall be two years. My attention was also drawn to Annexure 1, Notification dated 15.9.1992 appointing Shri Manak Chand Surana petitioner as Chairman of the Board. Reliance has been placed on AIR 1958 SC 36 ,1975 RLW 552, 1991 (1) RLR 218 and AIR 1992 SC 1872 . Admit Issue notice. Shri Garg learned counsel for the petitioner is directed to serve non-petitioners with the copy of the petition. Reliance has been placed on AIR 1958 SC 36 ,1975 RLW 552, 1991 (1) RLR 218 and AIR 1992 SC 1872 . Admit Issue notice. Shri Garg learned counsel for the petitioner is directed to serve non-petitioners with the copy of the petition. Put up on 4.1.1993 before the concerned bench and till then non-petitioners are prohibited from making any order dismissing petitioner in violation of the Act and the Rules. However, it will be open for the non-petitioners to take any action against the petitioner as envisaged in the Act and orders keeping in mind observation made in the above mentioned rulings." 3. The interim stay order was extended by this Court from time to time, but in the mean-time, the impugned order dated 13.1.1993 (Annexure 7) came to be issued by the State Government. The petitioner, thereafter, sought an amendment in the writ petition and challenged the above order/notification, removing him from the post of Chairman of the Board, on various grounds set out in the writ petition. 4. Before dealing with the rival contentions of the parties, it would be convenient at the out-set to note the relevant provisions of the Act. For encouraging and organising Khadi and Village Industries in Rajasthan, the Rajasthan Khadi & Village Industries Act, 1955 was enacted Section 3 of the Act provides the establishment of Rajasthan Khadi and Village Industries Board by the State Government for the purposes of the Act. The Board is a body corporate, having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property, both movable and immovable, to contract and to do all things necessary for the purposes of this Act and by the said name to sue and be sued through its Secretary. S. 4 states the composition of the Board. Originally, when the Act was enacted in the year, 1955, Section 4 provided the composition of the Board as under : "4. Composition-The Board shall consist of the following (a) The Minister-in-charge of Industries in the State Government for the time being who shall ex-officio be the Chairman of the Board, (b) Sixteen other members, to be appointed by the State Government of whom at least ten shall be non-official members." By the Rajasthan. Khadi and Village Industries Board (Amendment) Act, 1968 (Act No. 15 of 1968), S. 4 was substituted, namely; "4. Khadi and Village Industries Board (Amendment) Act, 1968 (Act No. 15 of 1968), S. 4 was substituted, namely; "4. Composition-The Board shall consist of the following (a) A Chairman, who shall be a non-official to be nominated by the State Government, and (b) Twelve other members, to be appointed by the State Government, of whom at least either (sic) shall be non-official members." section 6 states the functions of the Chairman. S. 7 provides that the term of office of members, other than ex-efficio members of the Board, shall be such as may be prescribed. In exercise of the powers conferred by S. 37 read with S. 7 of the Act, the State Government has made Rajasthan Khadi & Village Industries Board (Term of Office of Members) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1961') vide Notification dated 23.2.1961. By Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules of 1961, the terms of office of a member of the Board is now provided as two years from the date of his appointment subject to other provisions of the Rules of 1961. S. 8 empowers the Board to constitute an Executive Committee consisting of not more than five members to exercise such powers and discharge such duties as the Board may determine by regulations or as may be prescribed. It also provides constitution of other Standing Committees or ad hoc Committees for exercising any power of discharging any duty of the Board or for inquiring into or reporting any advising on any matter which the Board may refer to them. 5. All prescribed allowances to the Chairman and non-official members of the Board are paid from the fund of the Board as provided in S. 10 of the Act. S. 11 makes provision for resignation by any member other than an ex-officio member of the Board. Then, S. 12 deals with disqualification for being appointed or for continuing as a member of the Board. section 13 makes a provision for removal of any member of the Board, other than an ex-officio member on the ground enumerated in it. S. 11 makes provision for resignation by any member other than an ex-officio member of the Board. Then, S. 12 deals with disqualification for being appointed or for continuing as a member of the Board. section 13 makes a provision for removal of any member of the Board, other than an ex-officio member on the ground enumerated in it. S. 13 runs as under 'S.13-Removal of members-(1) The State Government may remove from the Board any member, other than ex-officio member, who, in its opinion (a) refuses to act; or (b) has become incapable of acting; or (c) has so abused his position as a member to render his continuance on the Board detriment to the interests of the public; or (d) is absent without permission from all the meetings of the Board for four successive months or for the period in which three successive meetings are held, whichever period is longer; or (e) ceases to reside in Rajasthan; or (f) is otherwise unsuitable to continue as a member. (2) The State Government may suspend any member pending as inquiry against him in connection with his proposed removal. (3) No order of removal under sub-section (1) shall be made unless the member concerned has been given an opportunity to submit his explanation to the State Government with reference to the grounds of his proposed removal. (4) A member who has been removed under sub-section (1) shall not be eligible for appointment as a member of the Board. (5) The State Government may declare under sub-section (1) shall not be eligible with which a member has been removed under sub-section (1)". Then, S. 17 empowerd the State Government to dissolve the Board, with the previous approval of the State Legislative Assembly by a Notification in the Official Gazette. Sub-S.(2) provides that on the Board ceasing to exist by dis;nlution, (a) the executive committee and all other committees of the Board shall cease to function; and (b) all members of the Board and of the executive committees and other committees of the Board shall vacate office as such members. The functions of the Board have been stated in S. 18. The functions of the Board have been stated in S. 18. They include the following functions, amongst others "(1)- to start, encourage, assist and run Khadi and Village industries; (2)- to help the people by providing them with work in their homes and to give them monetary accommodation; (3)- to organise co-operative societies for Khadi and village industries; (4)- to conduct training centres and to train people at these centres outside the State in Khadi and Village industries." By virtue of S. 36, the members, officers and servants of the Board, whether appointed by the State Government or by the Board, shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of this Act, to be public servants within the meaning of S. 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Rule making power has been given to the State Government under S. 37 of the Act. 6. A perusal of the provisions of the Act would make it clear that the Board is a creation of a Statute and is an autonomous body. It is a well settled that if a post is created by a Statute, the tenure of the post is also governed by the Statute, if any provision is made in it. It shall be seen later on whether the tenure of the Chairman of the Board is governed or not by the provisions made in the Act and the Rules governing service conditions of non-official members of the Board, as this is one of the vital questions which was extensively debated before me and a decisions on this question shall have an important bearing on the decision of the writ petition. Suffice it to say at this stage that the Board has been given an important social function which relates to the village upliftment. Its functions include to encourage, assist and run Khadi and Village industries and to help the people by providing them with work in their homes and to give them monetary accommodation. It also conducts training centres to train people in Khadi and Village industries. Its functions include to encourage, assist and run Khadi and Village industries and to help the people by providing them with work in their homes and to give them monetary accommodation. It also conducts training centres to train people in Khadi and Village industries. The establishment of the Board and its functions are a step towards Directive Principles of the State Policy, which contain one main objective, namely; the building of a welfare state and an egalitarian social order, to fix certain social and economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a non-violent social revolution. Through such a social revolution the Constitution seeks to fulfil the basic need of a common man and to change the structure of the society without which political democracy has no meaning. 7. Mr. U. N. Bhandari, assisted by Mr. R.P. Garg, appearing for the petitioner, vehemently contended that functions of the Board have a social and public element attaching to it and its activities are aimed to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people as provided in Article 38, as one of the Directive Principles of the State Policy contained in Part N of the Constitution of India. The Chairman of Board is primarily responsible to carry out the functions of the Board for which it is established, as such his office involves the duties of public nature and of vital importance to the public. According to Mr. Bhandari, Mr. Surana was nominated/appointed as Chairman of the Board on September 15, 1992 in view of his vast social and political background and his removal by the State Government in an arbitrary and unceremonial manner is contrary to all well established principles of democracy and public policy. Mr. Bhandari contended that after the nomination of the petitioner as Chairman of the Board, the State Government had no power to withdraw the same without assigning any reason and affording him an opportunity to show cause. The petitioner, after his nomination, has a vested right to hold the office of the Chairman unless he is removed under S. 13 of the Act. Mr. Bhandari submitted that the petitioner was fully qualified to be appointed and continue as Chairman of the Board. The petitioner, after his nomination, has a vested right to hold the office of the Chairman unless he is removed under S. 13 of the Act. Mr. Bhandari submitted that the petitioner was fully qualified to be appointed and continue as Chairman of the Board. Then, it was urged that the provisions of the Act, which apply to non-official members of the Board, equally apply to the Chairman of the Board as he is a member of the Board for all purposes, hence, he can be removed only in the manner provided in S. 13. It was also contended that principles of natural justice are extended even to administrative actions, and the State action in removing the petitioner is amenable to judicial review, as State has to work justly, fairly and reasonably even in contractual field. It was, then, argued by Mr. Bhandari that since the provisions for removal of a member are contained in S. 13, the provisions of the General Clauses Act would not be attracted, as the latter provisions would not apply if the relevant legislation exhibits a different intention. It was also contended that the post of the Chairman is a 'civil post' and the petitioner is entitled to have the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution. Lastly, it was submitted that the order of petitioner's removal was passed by the State Government inspite of the fact that stay order was in existence restraining the respondents from removing the petitioner. According to Mr. Bhandari, the respondents have showed utter disregard and disrespect to the stay order of the Court. 8. On the other hand, Mr. S.M. Mehta, learned Advocate General, with equal vehemence contended that it is a well settled rule of interpretation that a power to appoint ordinarily implies a power to determine the employment and this rule is also found incorporated in clause 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955. According to Mr. Mehta, the petitioner was a member of the Board by virtue of his office as a Chairman and if he is present in the Board, he acts as a Chairman. The provisions relating to the service conditions of a member of the Board, as contained in the Act or Rules are not applicable to the Chairman. According to Mr. Mehta, the petitioner was a member of the Board by virtue of his office as a Chairman and if he is present in the Board, he acts as a Chairman. The provisions relating to the service conditions of a member of the Board, as contained in the Act or Rules are not applicable to the Chairman. He also contended that no rules have been framed by the Government prescribing tenure of the office of the Chairman and in the absence of the Rules the power of terminating the service are without any fetters under S. 18 of the General Clauses Act. It was then contended that the office of the Chairman is a political post and by the change in the Government there appears no reason why political consideration should not be allowed to operate in terminating such appointment. According to Mr. Mehta, the provisions of the Act, especially section 13, have no application in the matter of removal of the Chairman. He also contended that the post of the Chairman is a pleasure post and a nominated Chairman holds office during the pleasure of the State Government, and, if he is removed by the State Government there is no violation of any principles of natural justice, nor Article 14 of the Constitution is attracted. 9. I find much substance in the contention of Mr. Bhandari that the provisions of the General Clauses Act would not apply if the relevant legislation exhibits a different intention. section 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act lays down that where, by any Rajasthan Law a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having, for the time being, power to make appointment shall also have power to suspend, remove or dismiss any person appointed by it, or any other authority in exercise of that power. It would, therefore, appear that these provisions are not absolute in terms but depend upon the provisions in the Act or Regulations which empowers the authority to make appointment. If such an Act or Regulation qualifies the power of the appointing authority to suspend or dismiss the appointee, then the appointing authority would have to exercise the power subject to such limitations and cannot exercise in the absoulte terms as laid down in section 18 of the General Clauses Act. If such an Act or Regulation qualifies the power of the appointing authority to suspend or dismiss the appointee, then the appointing authority would have to exercise the power subject to such limitations and cannot exercise in the absoulte terms as laid down in section 18 of the General Clauses Act. Let us, therefore, look at the provisions of the Act to see as to whether they apply to the petitioner or not, especially 5.13 which lays down the procedure and conditions for removal of a non-official member of the Board. 10. It may also be stated that S. 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act does not confer a new right. It only furnishes a rule of interpretation and enacts that a power of appointment includes and implies within itself the power of removal and wherever an authority is empowered to make certain appointment, automatically it gets authority to exercise the power of removal in respect of the person so appointed. In other words, S. 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act only enunciates the well-established rule of general law that an authority with power to appoint a person can also suspend or dismiss him, but in each case, we have to look to the Act or the rules under which an appointment has been made or conditions prescribed for an appointment, suspension or dismissal. Therefore, where a person holds an office under the provisions of a statute which fix certain modes and methods for appointment, dismissal or removal, such provisions must be complied with in regard to all these matters. The power of removal in the appointing authority is, therefore, subject to conditions of service prescribed in the Act or rules or guidelines and other consitutional protections available to the employee. 11. At the outset, it may also be stated that the post of the Chairman held by the petitioner is not a 'civil post' under the State of Rajasthan within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution as such he is not entitled to get protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as claimed by Mr. Bhandari.The term 'civil post' has not been defined in the Constitution, but is used in contradistinction to defence service, and a person who is serving in the State in a civil capacity is ordinary a person who holds a civil post. Bhandari.The term 'civil post' has not been defined in the Constitution, but is used in contradistinction to defence service, and a person who is serving in the State in a civil capacity is ordinary a person who holds a civil post. There should generally exist a relationship of master and servant between the State and the employee. The State Government does exercise some control over the Board by the authority given under the provisions of the Act, as there are many enactments under which the State Government exercises control over the statutory bodies or local authorities constituted by statutes. That does not, however, mean that persons who served under those statutory bodies or local authorities hold 'civil post' under the State within the meaning of Articles 311 of the Constitution. The employees of a statutory corporation/body are not entitled to invoke Article 311, but can invoke statutory regulations governing their conditions of service. That does not, however, mean that persons who served under those statutory bodies or local authorities hold 'civil post' under the State within the meaning of Articles 311 of the Constitution. The employees of a statutory corporation/body are not entitled to invoke Article 311, but can invoke statutory regulations governing their conditions of service. The status of the employees of a statutory corporation may be stated as under : (i) A statutory corporation has a separate and independent existence and is a different entity from the Union or the State Government within its own property and its own fund and the employees of the corporation do not hold civil post under the Union or the State; (ii) it makes little difference in this respect, even though the Union or the State voids the majority shares of the corporation and controls its administration by policy directive or otherwise; (iii) it also makes little difference if such a statutory corporation imitates or adopts the fundamental rules to govern the service conditions of its employees; (iv) although the ownership, control and management of the statutory corporation may be in fact vested in the Union or State, yet then in the eye of law the corporation is its own master and is separate entity and its employees do not hold and civil post under the Union or the State; (v) if, however, the State or the Union controls a post under a statutory corporation in such a manner that it can create or abolish the post or can regulate the conditions subject to which the post is or will be held and if the Union or the State pays the holder of the posts out of its own funds, then although the post carried the name of an office of the statutory corporation, it may be a civil post under the State or the Union. 12. In Dr. S.L, Agrawal Vs. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd. ( AIR 1970 SC 1150 ) , it was held that the Hindustan Steel Ltd. is not a department of the Government, nor its servants hold posts under the State. It has its independent existence and its employees are not entitled to the protection of Article 311. A distinction must be borne in mind between the two expressions 'a public office' and 'a civil post'. It has its independent existence and its employees are not entitled to the protection of Article 311. A distinction must be borne in mind between the two expressions 'a public office' and 'a civil post'. It is well settled that for the purpose of invoking Article 311 it is necessary that the person must be holding 'a civil post' either under the Union or under the State. 13. The Rajasthan Khadi & Village Industries Board is constituted under S. 3 and is an autonomous body. It is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property both moveable and immovable, to contract.and to do all things necessary for the purposes of this Act and by the said name may sue and be used through its Secretary. The functions of the Board are specifically described under S. 18. The Board has its own fund, separate budget and separate accounting. The Chairman and non- official members of the Board are paid their prescribed allowances from the Fund of the Board. It has also power to make regulations. Thus, it is clear that the Board has a separate and independent existence having its own property and fund. I, therefore, have no hesitation to reject the argument of Mr. Bhandari that the petitioner was holding a 'civil post' and was entitled to get protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 14. In the above background, the vital question, which calls for determination is: "Whether the tenure and conditions of service of the Chairman of the Board are governed by the provisions of the Act and the Rules." If they are held applicable, then the removal of the petitioner as Chairman of the Board can be only made in the manner provided in S. 13. For deciding this question, a critical analysis of the provisions of the Act and the Rules is necessary. S. 4 states the composition of the Board as (i) a Chairman, who shall be a non-official member, (ii) 12 other members of whom eight members to be non-official members. Thus, the composition of the Board includes 13 members in all, including the Chairman. It includes two categories of persons, namely; non-official persons and ex-officio persons and the Chairman is a non-official person. Thus, the composition of the Board includes 13 members in all, including the Chairman. It includes two categories of persons, namely; non-official persons and ex-officio persons and the Chairman is a non-official person. After nomination/appointment of a person as a Chairman, he is included in the composition of the Board and becomes a member of it. The Dictionary meaning of the word 'member' as per Black's Law Dictionary is as follows : "Member-One of the person consisting a family, partnership, association, corporation, guild, court, legislature of the like." Similarly, in the Random House Dictionary of the English Language (College Edition) the expression 'member' has been defined "any of the persons composing a society, party, community or other body. The expression 'membership' has been defined- "the state of being a member as a society, the status of a member, the total number of members belonging to an organisation, society etc." In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the word 'member' has been defined, amongst others : "as each individual belonging to a society or assembly", and the expression 'membership' has been defined-G) the condition or status of being a member of society etc. (ii) the number of members in a particulars body. In Word and Phrases' (permanent edition) by West Publishing Co. Vol.27, for the expression 'member, it has been stated at page 13 "The word "member" has been defined to mean a person considered in relation to any aggregate of individuals, to which he belongs, particularly one who has united with or has been formally chosen as a corporate part of an association or public body of any kind, as a church or society. Traders' Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 100 III App. 246. " It is further provided at the same page- "Under LSA-Const.art.6, $ 11, providing that the state board of health shall be composed of a president, who shall be designated as the state health I officer, and eight members, one from each congressional district, the president of the Board is a "member" thereof; hence Act No. 126 of 1928, ISA - RS. 40:1, 40:3, 40:18, declaring in its title that the object thereof is to provide for the appointment and qualifications of members of the board, is a sufficient indication of intention to provide for the appointment and term of office of the president within LSA-RS. art.3. $ 16. 40:1, 40:3, 40:18, declaring in its title that the object thereof is to provide for the appointment and qualifications of members of the board, is a sufficient indication of intention to provide for the appointment and term of office of the president within LSA-RS. art.3. $ 16. State excel Saint v. Dowling, 120 So.593, 596,167 La. 907 ." The analysis of the expression 'member' and 'membership' and from the wordings of section 4 of the Act making composition of the Board, it can safely be held that the Chairman is non-official member of the Board. 15. If the Chairman is a non-official member of the Board, then the provisions contained is Sections 7, 11, 12, 13 and 17 which relate to tenure and conditions of service of a non-official member will equally apply to him. section 7 states that the term of office of non- official members shall be such as may be prescribed. section 11 contains a provision of resignation by non-official members of the Board. section 12 deals with disqualification for being appointed or continuing as a member as the Board. Then, S. 13 provides the procedure and conditions for removal of a non-official member of the Board by the State Government. section 17 empowers the State Government to dissolve the Board and it also provides the effect of such dissolution. The effect of dissolution, amongst others, is provided (a) the executive committee and all other committees of the Board shall cease to function (b) all members of the Board and of executive Committee and other committees of the Board shall vacate office as such members. The provisions of Sections 7, 11 and 13 apply to non-official members only, while the provisions of Sections 12 and 17 apply to the member of both the categories, i.e. non-official and official. Sections 7, 11 and 13 cannot be made applicable to official members, as they relate to the term of office, resignation and the removal. For official members, these provisions are not needed as they remain member of the Board by virtue of their holding official posts. They cease to be members of the Board on vacation of their official post. Mr. For official members, these provisions are not needed as they remain member of the Board by virtue of their holding official posts. They cease to be members of the Board on vacation of their official post. Mr. Bhandari is right when he submitted that it cannot be the intention of the Legislature that even the provisions relating to disqualification of a member and dissolution of a Board contained in Sections 12 and 17 respectively, would not be applicable to the Chairman of the Board. He is also right that after the dissolution of the Board under S. 17 when all members of the Board vacate their office, the Legislature never intended that the Chairman shall continue to hold the post even without the existence of the Board itself. Only reasonable and plausible interpretation to S. 17 can be that the Chairman also vacates his office like other members of the Board. The words 'all members of the Board' contained in section 17(2)(b) shall include the Chairman of the Board also. Thus, a critical analysis of Sections 4, 12 and 17 leaves no doubt in my mind that on nomination/appointment, the Chairman becomes a member of the Board like other appointed members and provisions of Sections 12 and 17 will apply to him. As the Chairman is a non-official the provisions of Sections 7, 11 and 13 will also be applicable to him for his tenure and other conditions of service. 16. The matter may also be considered in the light of section 8 of the Act. section 80) provides constitution of an Executive Committee by the Board consisting of not more than five members. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Board have been included in the Executive Committee within the five members. This shows that the Chairman has been treated as one of the five members and in that capacity he was included in the committee. Similarly, a Standing Finance Committee under section 8 (3) has been notified by the Board with the approval of the State Government. It consists the Chairman, Vice-chairman and 3 other members. Sub-s. (4) provided that the Standing Finance Committee shall consist exclusively of members of the Board. The inclusion of the petitioner in the committee was possible only if he was taken to be a member of the Board. It consists the Chairman, Vice-chairman and 3 other members. Sub-s. (4) provided that the Standing Finance Committee shall consist exclusively of members of the Board. The inclusion of the petitioner in the committee was possible only if he was taken to be a member of the Board. Thus, the State Government and the Board have also treated the Chairman as a member of the Board for including him in the Executive Committee and the Standing Finance Committee. The provisions of section 8 and inclusion of the petitioner in the above committees also support my view that the Chairman is a member of the Board. 17. I, therefore, hold that after nomination/appointment of a person as Chairman, he becomes a member of the Board for all purposes. As he is a non-official member, the provisions contained in Sections 7, 11, 12, 13 and 17 would apply to him. He can, therefore, be removed from his office in the manner provided in 5.13 of the Act. I also hold that section 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act does not provide any assistance or power to the State Government to remove him from his office. 18. Mr. S.M. Mehta, the learned Advocate General, then strongly contended that no tenure of the office of Chairman is provided either in the Act or the Rules of l%1 and the intention of the Legislature could not be that the Chairman of the Board is not removable during the life of the Board. According to Mr. Mehta, the Rules of 1961 providing the term of office of a non-official member is not applicable to the petitioner, as Chairman has been distinctly defined in the Rules. This argument appeared to be appealing at the first instance, but on deep consideration it is found to be of no avail. Before the Amending Act of 1968, the Minister Incharge of Industries in the State Government was ex- officio Chairman of the Board as provided in section 4, and there was no need to provide the term of office of the Chairman like other non-official members of the Board. The Rajasthan Khadi & Village Industries Board (Term of Office of Members) Rules, 1961 were made in the year 1961 and were intended to provide the term of office of non-official members and to carry out the rules of retirement of one-third members every year in the year 1962 and 1963. The Rajasthan Khadi & Village Industries Board (Term of Office of Members) Rules, 1961 were made in the year 1961 and were intended to provide the term of office of non-official members and to carry out the rules of retirement of one-third members every year in the year 1962 and 1963. The Chairman was given the authority to carry out the retirement process of the non-official members, as such, a separate definition of Chairman was deemed necessary in the Rules. In 1961, the Chairman was to be an ex-officio member and admittedly the Rules of 1961 could not be applicable to him at that time. That is why, 'Chairman' and 'Members' were separetely defined in the Rules of 1961. After 1.4.1963, rule 4 to 8 of the Rules of 1961 have become redundant and irrelevant, as these provisions no more needed after the retirement process came to an end after 1st April, 1963. When Act No. 15 of 1968 came into force, rule 3 of the Rules of 1961 providing the term of office of non-official members was only relevant. By this Act, section 4 was substituted making a basic change in the composition of the Board. The first change was that in place of the Minister-in-charge of industries in the State Government as ex-officio Chairman of the Board, a non-official person is nominated by the State Government as the Chairman. The second change was that total number of members was reduced to twelve from sixteen out of which eight members at least to be non-official. Because of this change in 1968, a nominated Chairman is a non-official member of the Board. It appears that on account of this reason no necessity was felt by the Legislature to make specific provision either in the Act or in the Rules prescribing the tenure and conditions of service of the Chairman. It is true that rule 3 was not amended even after the Amending Act of 1968, but it shall not make any substantial effect. Firstly, a rule cannot over-ride the provisions of an Act and, secondly, the provisions of the Act and the Rule have to be given a harmonious interpretation keeping in view the effect of the Amending Act of 1968. Firstly, a rule cannot over-ride the provisions of an Act and, secondly, the provisions of the Act and the Rule have to be given a harmonious interpretation keeping in view the effect of the Amending Act of 1968. After 1968, a separate definition of Chairman given in Rules of 1961 has become irrelevant, as the provisions of Rule 3 containing the term of office for a non- official member also became applicable to him. Any other interpretation shall be inconsistent to the provisions of the Act. It is absurd even to think that the Legislature intended to make the office of the Chairman irremovable during the life of the Board. Therefore, a sensible and harmonious interpretation has to be given to rule 3 of the Rules of 1961. A harmonious and reasonable interpretation would be that rule 3, prescribing the term of office of a non-official member, shall apply to the Chairman and the term of his office shall be two years from the date of the appointment like other non-official members. This will also provide an answer to the query as to whether the post of the Chairman is a tenure post or not. 19. It is true that the scheme of the Act shows that it is on the basis of the subjective satisfaction on the part of the State Government that nomination of the Chairman of the Board is to be made. Neither any qualification nor any norms have been laid down in the Act to provide an objective criteria for the nomination of the Chairman. It is clear from clause (a) of section 4 that the entire matter has been left by the legislature on the discretion of the State Government to nominate a person of its choice to be the Chairman. Whether these powers of the State Government are constitutionally valid or not, is not a subject matter before me and I am not required to examine this aspect of the matter. But this unfettered and absolute discretion of the State Government to nominate a person of its choice does not mean that it can remove the Chairman after his nomination at its sweet will or pleasure. But this unfettered and absolute discretion of the State Government to nominate a person of its choice does not mean that it can remove the Chairman after his nomination at its sweet will or pleasure. After nomination a vested right is created in the person so appointed and he can be removed from his office in the manner provided in the Act and the Rules like other non-official members, who are also appointed by the State Government on its discretion. The provisions of the Act and Rules fix certain modes and methods for removal as discussed earlier, hence those provisions have to be complied with for the removal. The absolute and unfettered right of the State Government to nominate the Chairman does not ipso facto provide unfettered authority in the State to remove the Chairman at its discretion. 20. In Kanta Devi v. State of Rajasthan (1957 RLW 69) , the question before a Division Bench of this Court was : Whether the State Government having exercised its power of nomination under section 9 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act could pass a second order nominating some other person after cancelling the earlier order of nomination. The application of S. 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which is pari materia to the present section 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, was considered and it was held "We are, therefore, of opinion that the Government having exercised its power under Section 8 to make a nomination once exhausts that power and 2 1967 RLW 69, cannot nominate another person to the same seat. A second order nominating some other person and cancelling an earlier order of nomination would, therefore, be beyond the jurisdiction of the Government and the first order must take effect unless it is shown that the first order was issued under mistake of fact, as for example, where the Government nominates A and B as members and somebody in the office issues an order in favour of C and D. Barring such a case, where the first order would amount to no order at all, it is not open to the Government to change the order of nomination once made under Section 9. This is so because the person nominated immediately on the passing of such order becomes "a member nominated under this Act" and, thereafter, he cannot be prevented from taking his seat after subscribing to the oath and can only be removed under Section . This section clearly provides a different intention and, therefore, it is not open to the Government to exercise the power of removal implied in the power of appointment under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act without recourse to procedure under Section 14 of the Act." The aforesaid view was followed by a Division Bench of 'Patna High Court in Syed Shaukat Imam and others v. State of Bihar and others (AIR 1969 Patna 347) : 21. A Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Ramesh Bhauraoji Girde and another v. State of Maharashtra and another (AIR 1984 Bombay 200) , also followed the view taken by this Court in Kanta Devi's case (supra). In that case, the petitioners challenged the validity of the order of the State Government terminating their appointment as Director of the Board of Directors of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation. section 8 of the Act empowered the State Government to remove Chairman or a member of the Corporation in two contingencies specified therein. While considering the amibt and scope of section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 it was observed: "It would, therefore, appear that these provisions are not absolute in terms but depend upon the provisions in the Act or Regulation which empowers the authority to make the appointing authority to suspend or dismiss the appointee, then the appointing authority would have to exercise the power subject to such limitations and cannot exercise it in the absolute terms as laid down in Section 16 of the General Clauses Act." Then it was held as under : "It would, therefore, appear that the Act was not silent as regards the power of removal of the members nominated by the State Government. It did contain a provision for their removal and this power was a qualified power and could be exercised only in the two contingencies specified in old Section 8. In other words, old section 8 exhibited an intention as regards the power of removal different from the one coonferred by Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. It did contain a provision for their removal and this power was a qualified power and could be exercised only in the two contingencies specified in old Section 8. In other words, old section 8 exhibited an intention as regards the power of removal different from the one coonferred by Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. In the absence of old Section 8, the State Government would have the power to suspend or dismiss or in other words to remove any member nominated by it by virtue of the power conferred on it under section 16 of the General Clauses Act as the appointing authority. But old Section 8 has qualified this power by putting limitations on it, inasmuch as the power of removal can be exercised only in the two contigencies specified therein and not otherwise. In our opinion, therefore, Section 16 of the General Clauses Act would of no avail to the State Government in maintaining that apart from the provisions of the Act, it had the power to remove the petitioners." 22. In Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India and others, ( AIR 1992 SC 1872 ) , the effect of a tenure post came for consideration when the petitioner was permanently retired before the completion of his tenure. It was held : "Under the Recruitment Rules the post of Director of the AIIMS is a tenure post. The said rules further provide the method of direct recruitment for filling the post. These service conditions make the post of Director a tenure post. Simply because the appointment order of the Director, AIIMS mentions that "he is appointed for a period of five years or till he attains the age of 62 years', the appointment does not cease to be a tenure post. As such the question of superannuating or prematurely retiring the appellant-Director AIIMS could not arise." 23. I may refer to the decisions which were relied upon by the respondents. In Surjit Singh Sud v. State of Punjab (1971 (1) SLR 768) , the petitioner Surjit Singh Sud was appointed as a Chairman of Improvement Trust, Jullundar for a period of 5 years. Section of Punjab Town Improvement Act provided that the appointment of the Chairman of the Trust was at the pleasure of the Government. In Surjit Singh Sud v. State of Punjab (1971 (1) SLR 768) , the petitioner Surjit Singh Sud was appointed as a Chairman of Improvement Trust, Jullundar for a period of 5 years. Section of Punjab Town Improvement Act provided that the appointment of the Chairman of the Trust was at the pleasure of the Government. The removal of the petitioner before the expiry of the period of appointment by the State Government was held to be valid as the Government reserved the right to remove him at any time. This authority is distinguishable as the doctrine of pleasure is not available in the present case. 24. In Surya Narain Choudhary v. Union of India and others (AIR 1982 Rajasthan 1) the matter relates to the removal of the Governor of Rajasthan by the President in exercise of powers vested in him under Article 156 (1) of the Constitution. The judgment of this case is based on the interpretation of Article 156(1) of the Constitution which lays down that the Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. In S. Surjit Singh v. Union of India (1975 (1) SLR 424 , the matter before the Delhi High Court was whether the services of a civilian in Defence Services could be terminated by the President under Article 310 of the Constitution. It was held that the Protection available to the civil servants under Article 311 of the constitution was not available to the petitioner. It was also held that the pleasure of the President could not be curtailed by the rules framed under Article 309. In Hazara Singh v. Union of India and others, (1976 (1) SLR 340) , the petitioner was a Wing Commander in the Indian Air Force. He was dismissed by the President of India in exercise of power conferred by section 18 of the Air Force Act. It was held that Section 18 was not the foundation of the doctrine of 'Presidential pleasure' incorporated in Article 310 of the Constitution of India. He was dismissed by the President of India in exercise of power conferred by section 18 of the Air Force Act. It was held that Section 18 was not the foundation of the doctrine of 'Presidential pleasure' incorporated in Article 310 of the Constitution of India. It was also held that the Presidential pleasure, having its genesis in the constitutional provision and being constitutional power, would not be subject to any statutory constrains and could only be limited by the Constitution itself and the Constitution did not contain in constraints on the exercise of the Presidential pleasure in the matter of service to which Article 311 of the Constitution did not apply. In Bishambher Nath Nehru v. His Highness, Government of Jammu & Kashmir ( AIR 1958 J&K 6 ) , the petitioner was appointed as President of Municipal Council, Srinagar. Thereafter, he was removed from his office. He filed a civil suit challenging his termination to be illegal. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court. It was held by the High Court that the plaintiff held his office as President at the pleasure of the Government and there appeared no restriction by the Statute or by a contract imposed on the powers of the Government to terminate his services. In Tej Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil & others ( AIR 1966 SC 292 ) the petition was appointed as Manager under section 10(2)(b) of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. Thereafter, he was removed by the order of Deputy Custodian. In that contest, it was held that the power of appointment conferred upon the Custodian under section 10(2) (b) of the 1950 Act, also conferred upon the Custodian the power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed by him, as an argument was raised that he was not a proper authority to cancel the appointment. In Dr. D.C. Saxena v. State of Haryana (AIR 1987 SC 146) the appellant was appointed as Chairman of Haryana Board of School Education in the exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. (4) of section 3 of the Haryana Board of School Education Act, 1969. His original appointment was for two years. The aforesaid provision of the Act stipulates that the Chairman and Vice-chairman shall be appointed by the State Government upon such terms and conditions as it may think fit and they shall hold office at the pleasure of the State Government. His original appointment was for two years. The aforesaid provision of the Act stipulates that the Chairman and Vice-chairman shall be appointed by the State Government upon such terms and conditions as it may think fit and they shall hold office at the pleasure of the State Government. On a policy decision by the State Government dispensing with the services of non-official/non-M.L. As. as Chairman of the Board or Corporation, he was removed before the expiry of two years. The Supreme Court held the termination to be valid in view of the aforesaid provisions containing 'the doctrine of pleasure'. The last decision relied upon by the respondents is in the case of Narain Agarwal and others v. Nagar Palika, Shahjehanpur ( 1993 (1) SCALE 663 ). The question was whether nomination of two women members made by the State under section 9 of the U.P. Municiplities Act, 1916 could be cancelled by the State Government without' assigning any reason. After considering the relevant provisions of the Act, it was held that the nomination of members was at the pleasure of the Government as this doctrine was contained in 4th proviso to section 9 of the Act, as such, the cancellation of nomination was valid. 25. In all the judgments referred to by the learned Advocate General, the appointing authority acted on the basis of the doctrine of pleasure available either under provision of the Constitution or the Statute. These judgments, based on the doctrine of pleasure of the appointing authority, therefore, render no assistance to the respondents and they are clearly distinguishable. 26. I would like to say few words on the doctrine of pleasure which was argued at length before me. The rule that a servant holds office at the pleasure of the master has its origin in the Latin phrase 'duronte bone placito' meaning that the tenure of office of a civil servant except where it is provided by the Statute, can be terminated at any time without cause assigned. In England, except where otherwise provided by a Statute, all public officers and servants of the Crown holds their appointments at the pleasure of the Crown or 'durante bene placito' ('during good pleasure' or 'during the pleasure of the appointer'). In England, except where otherwise provided by a Statute, all public officers and servants of the Crown holds their appointments at the pleasure of the Crown or 'durante bene placito' ('during good pleasure' or 'during the pleasure of the appointer'). In English Law, Lord Diplock in Chelliah Kodeeswaran v. Attorney Central of Ceylon (1917 AC 1111) has stated the position as under "It is now well established in British Constitutional theory, at any rate as it has developed since Eighteenth Century, that any appointment as Crown servant, however, subordinate, is terminable at will unless it is expressly otherwise provided by Legislation." The Rule of English Common Law that an officer holds office during the pleasure of the Crown has not been fully adopted either by Section of the Government of India Act, 1935 or by Article 310(1) of the Constitution. The pleasure of the President is clearly controlled by the provisions of Article 311, and so, the field that is covered by Art. 311, on a fair and reasonable construction of the relevant words used in that Article, would be excluded from the operation of the obsolute doctrine of pleasure, but it has to be exercised in accordance with the requirements of Art. 311. Therefore, the true scope and effect of Art. 311 is determined, the scope and effect of Art. 310(1) must be limited in the sense that in regard to cases falling under Art. 311(2), the pleasure mentioned in Art. 310(1) must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of Art. 311. 27. However, as stated earlier, the petitioner was not a member of defence service or a civil service and was not holding any civil post under the Union or the State, the provisions contained in Article 310(1) or 311 (2) of the Constitution of India have no application to his service conditions. He was holding an office under the provisions of the Act and his tenure is subject to the conditions of service prescribed in the Act and Rules of 1961. The provisions have not incorporated the doctrine of pleasure in removing the service of the Chairman of the Board. On the other hand, I have held that the petitioner was holding a tenure post and the term of his office was two years from the date of his appointment as prescribed by rule 3 of the Rules of 1961. The provisions have not incorporated the doctrine of pleasure in removing the service of the Chairman of the Board. On the other hand, I have held that the petitioner was holding a tenure post and the term of his office was two years from the date of his appointment as prescribed by rule 3 of the Rules of 1961. I have also held that the provisions contained in section 13, which prescribe the procedure and grounds for removal of a non-official member of the Board, is applicable to the Chairman of the Board, as such, the doctrine of pleasure or section 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act cannot be resorted to remove the petitioner. 28. An alternative argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the availability of the protection on non- observance of the principles of natural justice in removing the petitioner may also be considered. It is now settled that it is the executive that lays down the conditions of service subject, of course, to a law made by an appropriate legislation. Similarly, the exercise of power by the State in terminating or removing an employee is an executive action and like other executive action it should also satisfy the test of reasonableness and natural justice. It is no more in dispute that an executive action is subject to constitutional protection. 29. In State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binpani Devi & others ( AIR 1967 SC 1269 ) it was held that even 'an administrative order which involves civil consequence must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. In Mohinder Singh W1 and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, Mew Delhi and others (1978) 1 SCC 405 ) the principles of natural justice were extended to administrative actions. Paras 43 and 44 of the judgment may be reproduced conveniently in this connection : "Indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens legislation, administration and adjudiction, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes it, applies when people are affected by acts of Authority. It is the hone of healthy government, recognised from earliest times and not a mystic testament of Judge-made law. It has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes it, applies when people are affected by acts of Authority. It is the hone of healthy government, recognised from earliest times and not a mystic testament of Judge-made law. Indeed, from the legendary days of Adam - and of Kautilya's Arthasastra - the rule of law has had this stamp of natural justice which makes it social justice. We need not go into these deeps for the present except to indicate that the roots of natural justice and its foliage are noble and not new-fangled. Today its application must be sustained by current legislation, case-law or other extant principle, not the hoary chords of legend and history. Our jurisprudence has sanctioned its prevalence even like the Anglo-American system. The dichotomy between administrative and quasi-judicial functions vis-a-vis the doctrine of natural justice is presumably obsolescent after Kraipak in India and Schmidt in England." In the case of Kasturi Lal Laxmireddy v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (AIR 1985 SC 1992) their Lordship have held that where governmental action fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness and public interest and is found to be wanting in the quality of reasonableness or lacking in the element of public interest, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid. 30. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others ( AIR 1981 SC 136 ) the facts were that in exercise of the powers conferred by section 12 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, the Lt. Governor by a notification appointed nine non-official members and four ex-officio members to the New Delhi Municipal Committee to hold office for a period of one year. However, well before the expiry of the term for which the members were appointed, Lt. Governor in exercise of the powers conferred by section 238(1) superseded the Municipal Committee with immediate effect and appointed an Administrator. It was argued before the Hon'ble the Supreme Court that the order of supersession was passed in complete violation of the principles of natural justice and in total disregard of fair play. It was also pointed out that no notice to show cause against supersession was ever issued to the Committee. It was argued before the Hon'ble the Supreme Court that the order of supersession was passed in complete violation of the principles of natural justice and in total disregard of fair play. It was also pointed out that no notice to show cause against supersession was ever issued to the Committee. Considering various earlier judgments for the Supreme Court, it was observed as under : "A Committee as soon as it is constituted, at once, assumes a certain office and status, is endowed with certain rights and burdened with certain responsiblities, all of a nature commanding respectful regard from the public. To be stripped of the office and status, to be deprived of the rights, to be removed from the responsibilities, in an unceremonious way as to suffer in public esteem, is certainly to visit the Committee with civil consequences. In our opinion the status and office and the rights and responsibilites to which we have referred and the expectation of the Committee to serve its full term of office would certainly create sufficient interest in the Municipal Committee and their loss, if superseded, would entail civil consequences so as to justify and insistence upon the observance of the principles of natural justice before and order of supersession is passed." (Emphasis provided)The argument of the learned Advocate General that S. 238(1) did not provide for an opportunity being given to the member concerned was rejected by observing : "It is not always a necessary inference that if opportunity is expressly provided in one provision and not so provided in another opportunity is to be considered as excluded from that other provision. It may be a weighty consideration to be taken into account but the weightier consideration is whether the administrative action entails civil consequence. This was also the view taken in Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi (1978) 2 SCR 272 : ( AIR 1978 SC 851 ) ." 31. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others v. State of U.P. and others ( 1991 (1) SCC 212 ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court after considering the entire law on the subject of the scope and power of judcial review, and the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, held that even in contractual service matters, the State is bound to act fairly and must not act arbitrarily. In this case the order of the State of U.P. terminating appointments of a Government Counsel in the Districts of the State was challenged. While considering the scope and applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution in such matters, it was observed : "The State cannot be attributed the split personality of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in the contractual field so as to impress on it all the characteristics of the State at the threshold while making a conract requiring it to fulfil the obligation of Article 14 of the Constitution and thereafter permitting it to cast off its garb of State to adorn the new robe of a private body during the subsistence of the contract enabling it to act arbitrarily subject only to the contractual obligations and remedies following from it. It is really the nature of its personality as State which is significant and must characterise all its actions, in whatever field, and not the nature of function, contractual or otherwise, which is decisive of the nature of scrutiny permitted for examining the validity of its act. The requirement of Article 14 being the duty to act fairly, justly and reasonably, there is nothing which militates against the concept of requiring the State always to so act, even in contractual matters. There is a basic difference between the acts of the State which must invariably be in public interest and those of a private individual, engaged in similar activities, being primarily for personal gain, which may or may not promote public interest. There is a basic difference between the acts of the State which must invariably be in public interest and those of a private individual, engaged in similar activities, being primarily for personal gain, which may or may not promote public interest. Viewed in this manner, in which we find no conceptual difficulty or anachronism, we find no reason why the requirement of Article 14 should not extend even in the sphere of contractual matters for regulating the conduct of the State activity." (Emphasis provided) It was also observed : "With the diversification of State activity in a Welfare State requiring the State to discharge its wide ranging functions even through its several instrumentalities, which requires entering into contracts also, it would be unreal and not pragmatic, apart from being unjustified to exclude contractual matters from the sphere of State actions required to be non- arbitrary and justified on the touch-stone of Article 14." It was again observed : "In view of the wide ranging and, in essence, all pervading sphere of State activity in discharge of its welfare function, the question assumes considerable importance and cannot be shelved. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State and we find it difficult to accept that the State can be permitted to act otherwise in any field of its activity, irrespective of the nature of its functions when it has the uppermost duty to be governed by the rule of law. Non- arbitrariness, in substance, is only fair play in action. We have no doubt that this obvious requirement must be satisfied by every action of the State or its instrumentality in order to satisfy the test of validity." Then, it was held as under : "In our opinion, the wide sweep of Article 14 undoubtedly takes within its fold the impugned circular issued by the State of U.P. in exercise of its executive power, irrespective of the precise nature of appointment of the Government Counsel in the districts and the other rights, contractual or statutory, which the appointees may have. It is for the reason that we have our decision on the ground that independent of any statutory right, available to the appointees, and assuming for the purpose of this case that the rights flow only from the contract of appointment, the impugned circular, issued in exercise of the executive power of the State, must satisfy Article 14 of the Constitution and if it is shown to be arbitrary, it must be struck down. However, we have referred to certain provisions relating to referred to certain provisions relating to initial appointment, termination or renewal of tenure to indicate that the action is controlled at least by settled guidelines, followed by the State of U.P. for a long time. This too is relevant for deciding the question of arbitrariness alleged in the present case." 32. In Manak Chand Jain v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. ( 1991 (1) RLR 218 ) , a Division Bench of this Court also considered the question as to whether the Public Prosecutor could be terminated by the Government before the expiry of the tenure without recording any cogent reason. Placing reliance on various judgments, including the judgment in Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra), it was held that the termination of the service of the petitioner Manak Chand Jain was illegal. 33. Applying the aforesaid principles as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the various judgments referred to above, the present case may be viewed from this angle also. The petitioner was nominated as Chairman of the Board vide Government Notification dated September 15,1992. On promulgation of the President's rule under Article 356 of the Constitution in Rajasthan on December 15, 1992, when the petitioner refused to resign from the post of 20 1991 (1) RLR 218 Chairman, he was removed from the office vide order dated 13.1.1993 (Annexure 7). From the reply of the State Government, it does not appear that the petitioner was not working satisfactorily as Chairman of the Board. No reason was stated in the reply, which made the State Government to terminate the service of the petitioner in an unceremonial manner and even without giving a show cause notice. The only stand taken by the State Government is that the post is a pleasure post and the Government was free to remove him without assigning any cause or giving any opportunity of hearing. The only stand taken by the State Government is that the post is a pleasure post and the Government was free to remove him without assigning any cause or giving any opportunity of hearing. However, during the course of argument, Mr. Mehta contended that the post of the Chairman of t;w lard Is a political post and there was nothing wrong in removing the petitioner on the promulgation of President's rule. 34. It cannot be disputed that the petitioner was holding a public office. Though it cannot be said that a public office is equated with a 'civil post'; but the office of the Chairman of the Board undoubtedly involves the duties of public nature and of vital importance to the public. The various functions of the Board illustrate the importance and public nature of the office. I have held in the earlier part of the judgment that the Chairman has a tenure of two years from the date of his appointment. Therefore, I am of the confirmed view that the action of the respondents terminating the service of the petitioner without any good cause and without following the principles of natural justice is arbitrary and invalid. I do not agree with Mr. Mehta that it is a political post and simply by a change in the Government, the holder of this post can be removed without assigning good cause and following the principle of natural justice. On the contrary, the functions of the Board and the nature of duties of the Chairman require a continuity on the post. After substitution of section 4 by the Amending Act of 1968, a whole time appointment to the post of Chairman of the Board is made, in view of vast functions and duties attached with this office. Therefore, judged from this angle also, the order of removal of the petitioner is invalid and cannot be sustanied. 35. The last submission canvassed with an emotional appeal by the learned counsel for the petitioner may now be taken. The submission is that the impugned order was passed by the State Government while the stay order in the writ petition was operating. It was contended that the respondents have tried to over-reach and showed complete disrespect to the order and the proceedings pending in this Court. The submission is that the impugned order was passed by the State Government while the stay order in the writ petition was operating. It was contended that the respondents have tried to over-reach and showed complete disrespect to the order and the proceedings pending in this Court. Counsel argued that even if there was any ambiguity in the order, it was just and proper for the State Government to have approached to the court, like a good Government, to seek a clarification or modification in the order. According to the learned counsel, the stay order dated 21.12.1992 does not admit any ambiguity and the non-petitioners were restrained from making any order to dismiss the petitioner in violation of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Therefore, after the stay order, the only option left with the State Government was to take any action, as envisaged in the Act. With utmost restraint I would say that I am extremely unhappy that such situation has arisen. When the matter was sub-judice in the writ petition and there was a stay order, then, it was expected of the respondents to have approached this Court if they were of the view that some clarification was required in the order or wanted any modification in the order or a vacation of the order. The stay order was passed by this Court on 21.12.1992. On 4.1.1993, the case was adjourned to 11.1.1993 and the interim stay order was continued. On behalf of the respondents, the reply to the stay application was filed on 4.1.1993 and vacation of the stay order was sought on the ground that the petitioner was Jiaving no prima fade case in his favour and that there was no term prescribed for the post of the Chairman. On 11.1.1993, Smt. Shashi lain appeared for the respondents and prayed for time. In her presence, the case was adjourned for 18.1.1993 and the ad-interim stay order was continued till further orders. In the meantime, the impugned order was passed on 13.1.1993. I am of the view that it would have been proper on the part of the respondents to have waited till final order on the stay application. Be that as it may, such situation should be avoided in future. The net result of the above discussions is that this writ petition succeeds. I am of the view that it would have been proper on the part of the respondents to have waited till final order on the stay application. Be that as it may, such situation should be avoided in future. The net result of the above discussions is that this writ petition succeeds. The impugned order dated 13.1.1993 (Annexure 7) removing the petitioner from the office of the Chairman of the Board is held to be illegal and void, and it is hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioner shall be allowed to function as the Chairman of the Board in accordance with law. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case, including the manner the imugned order was passed by the State Government when the matter was sub-judice and a stay order was in operation, I think it just and proper to award Rs. 5,000/- as costs to the petitioner to be paid by the respondents. Petition allowed with cost. *******