A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE judgment and the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.) at vadodara on 17th July 1979 in Special civil Suit No. 266 of 1977 are under challenge in this First Appeal at the instance of the original first defendant under Section 96 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 (the Code for brief ). Thereby the learned Trial Judge decreed the suit instituted by respondent No. 1 herein as the plaintiff. ( 2 ) AT this stage some events occurring during the pendency of this Appeal may have to be taken note of. Respondent no. 1 herein is a Public Limited Company and it was the plaintiff in the suit the decision of which has given rise to this appeal. It has already gone into liquidation and the necessary orders to that effect have already been passed under the relevant provisions contained in the companies Act, 1956. In that view of the matter Civil Application No. 2810 of 1992 in this First Appeal was moved for impleading the Official Liquidator as a party respondent. By an order passed by this Court on 3rd February 1993 in Civil application No. 2810 of 1992 in this First appeal, the Official Liquidator was impleaded as respondent No. 3 in this first Appeal. The notice of this Appeal to the Official Liquidator was issued on 10th June 1993 and it has duly been served to him on 15th June 1993. He has however chosen to remain ex parte despite the service of the notice of this Appeal as aforesaid and despite an intimation given to him with respect to this Appeal by and on behalf of the present appellant though his learned Advocate as stated as the Bar. Since respondent No. 1 has gone into liquidation, it was not necessary for its Advocate to remain present and to make submissions on its behalf. Shri P. C. Master who has filed his appearance for respondent No. 1 prior to its going into liquidation has however chosen to appear for it for the sake of assisting this Court in this Appeal. ( 3 ) THE facts giving rise to this Appeal are not many and not much in dispute. Respondent No. 1 was engaged in manufacturing cloth inter alia from staple fibre. ( 3 ) THE facts giving rise to this Appeal are not many and not much in dispute. Respondent No. 1 was engaged in manufacturing cloth inter alia from staple fibre. The appellant herein appears to have recovered from it octroi duty in the sum of Rs. 11,533. 57 on staple fibre in the years 1976 and 1977. According to respondent No, 1 herein, it was not liable to pay any octroi duty on staple fibre imported by it within the municipal limits of the city of Vadodara. It, therefore, issued a communication to the appellant herein on 26th April 1977 calling upon it to refund the octroi amount on staple fibre illegally collected by and on behalf of the appellant herein during the years 1976 and 1977. Its copy is at Exh. 40 on the record of the case. The Octroi superintendent of the appellant appears to have caused a reply on 28th June 1977 to the aforesaid letter of 26th April 1977 written to the appellant herein by respondent No. 1 herein. The original reply is at Exh. 42 and its copy is at exh. 49 on the record of the case. The author of that letter has clarified that the rate of octroi on viscose staple fibre is 30 paise per value of Rs. 100. Thereupon respondent No. 1 by its communication of 5th July 1977 addressed to the Octroi superintendent of the appellant herein sought refund of the excess amount of octroi paid at the rate of 2 per cent as against 0. 3 per cent payable. A copy of that communication of 5th July 1977 is at Exh. 43 on the record of the case. Prior to that respondent No. 1 herein served one statutory notice on 14th June 1977 through its advocate calling upon the appellant herein to refund the octroi on staple fibre collected illegally from it during the years 1976 and 1977. A copy of the statutory notice is at Exh. 46 on the record of the case. The statutory notice was not complied with. No reply appears to have been caused to the communication of 5th July 1977 at Exh. 43 on the record of the case. Respondent no. 1 thereupon instituted one suit in the Court of the Civil Judge (S. D.) at vadodara for recovery of Rs. 11,533. 46 on the record of the case. The statutory notice was not complied with. No reply appears to have been caused to the communication of 5th July 1977 at Exh. 43 on the record of the case. Respondent no. 1 thereupon instituted one suit in the Court of the Civil Judge (S. D.) at vadodara for recovery of Rs. 11,533. 57 towards the refund of the octroi collected by the appellant herein on staple fibre imported by respondent No. 1 herein within the municipal limits of the city of Vadodara during the years 1976 and 1977 and for other incidental reliefs. It may be mentioned that the relief of permanent injunction was also sought restraining the appellant herein from recovering any octroi on staple fibre imported by respondent No. 1 herein within the municipal limits of the city of Vadodara. The suit came to be registered as Special Civil Suit No. 266 of 1977. In the suit the appellant herein and respondent No. 2 herein were impleaded as the defendants. On service of summonses to them they appeared and filed their written statement at Exh. 9 on the record of the case and resisted the suit on various grounds. On the pleadings of the parties, the necessary issues were framed at Exh. 10 on the record of the case. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, by his judgment and decree passed on 17th July 1979 in Special Civil Suit No. 266 of 1977, the learned Trial Judge decreed the suit in toto. That aggrieved the present appellant as defendant No. 1 in the suit. It has, therefore, invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Section 96 of the Code for questioning the correctness of the decision rendered by the Trial Court in the suit as aforesaid. ( 4 ) THE controversy in this litigation centres round interpretation of entry 39 (2) in the Schedule annexed to the octroi Rules framed by the Baroda borough Municipality under Section 58 read with Section 61 of the Bombay municipal Borough Act, 1925, and adopted by the appellant on its establishment under the Bombay provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 as amended in 1976. For the sake of convenience I shall refer to the said rules as the Octroi Rules. The compilation of the Octroi Rules together with the Schedule annexed thereto as framed by the Baroda Borough municipality is at Exh. For the sake of convenience I shall refer to the said rules as the Octroi Rules. The compilation of the Octroi Rules together with the Schedule annexed thereto as framed by the Baroda Borough municipality is at Exh. 54/1 and the revised Schedule thereto after its amendment in 1976 is at Exh. 54/2 on the record of the case. ( 5 ) RULE (1) of the Octroi Rules clearly stipulates liability of all goods described in Schedule-A annexed thereto to octroi subject to the exemptions expressly specified in the Octroi Rules. Rule (15) thereto specifies the goods exempted from payment of octroi duty. Certain entries in Schedule-A annexed to the Octroi rules in the compilation at Exh. 54/1 deserve reference with the rates of octroi prescribed thereunder. They are 39, 166 194 and 195. They read as under:39. (1) Cotton piece goods. 1% ad valorem (2) Every other kind of cloth 1. 6% ad valorem166 (1) Staple fibre 0. 3% ad valorem (2) Teryne and Rayon fibres and their substitutes 1% ad valorem194 (1) All kinds of wool 0. 25% ad valorem (2) All kinds of woollen articles and woollen yarn 1% ad valorem195 (1) Every kind of yarn 1% ad valoremit appears that the appellant undertook revision of octroi rates on various articles/goods mentioned in Schedule A appended to the Octroi Rules. It appears that the prescribed procedure was followed for the purpose. The revised schedule of octroi rates as Schedule A to the Octroi Rules is at Exh. 54/2 on the record of the case. Entries 166 and 195 of the old Schedule appearing as schedule A in the compilation of the octroi Rules at Exh. 54/1 came to be deleted. Entry 39 came to be redrafted. It reads as under:39. (1) Cotton piece goods and yarn and threads 1% ad valorem (2) Every other kinds of cloth like silk, woollen, teryne, synthetic, staple fibre and its yarn and threads. 2% ad valoremthese revised rates appear to have come into force with effect from 24th June 1976 as appearing at the end of the Schedule at Exh. 54/2 on the record of the case. ( 6 ) ON interpretation of Entry 39 appearing in the revised Schedule at Exh. 54/2 on the record of the case, the Trial court has come to the conclusion that staple fibre was not liable to octroi thereunder. 54/2 on the record of the case. ( 6 ) ON interpretation of Entry 39 appearing in the revised Schedule at Exh. 54/2 on the record of the case, the Trial court has come to the conclusion that staple fibre was not liable to octroi thereunder. In the result, it came to the conclusion that the amount of octroi recovered from respondent No. 1 herein on staple fibre imported by it within the municipal limits of the city of Vadodara was illegal. It therefore decreed the suit instituted by respondent No. 1 herein in toto as aforesaid. ( 7 ) IT has been urged before me on behalf of the appellant that Entry 39 (2) is wide enough to cover staple fibre for the purpose of its liability to octroi. As against this it has been urged on behalf of respondent No. 1 that while revising the octroi rates the appellant thought it fit to exempt staple fibre from octroi, and that is why and how Entry 39 (2) has come to be worded in that fashion. ( 8 ) AS aforesaid Rule (15) in the Octroi rules specifies the goods exempted from payment of octroi. As pointed out hereinabove, Rule (1) of the Octroi Rules stipulates thai all goods imported within the municipal limits of the city of vadodara would be liable to octroi subject to exemptions therefrom granted thereunder. If the appellant wanted to exempt staple fibre from octroi liability, it could have very well added an entry in that regard in Rule (15) of the Octroi rules. It has not chosen to do so. The obvious inference would therefore be that the appellant did not want to exempt staple fibre from payment of octroi duty when imported within its municipal limits. With respect, the learned Trial Judge has proceeded on the footing that the appellant herein intended to exempt staple fibre from octroi liability by ignoring the relevant provisions contained in Rule (1) and Rule (15) of the Octroi rules. ( 9 ) ENTRY 39 as it originally stood took within its sweep cotton piece goods and every other kind of cloth. Its scope was thus contained mainly to cotton cloth and every other kind of cloth. For cotton cloth the rate of octroi was 1% ad valorem and for every other kind of cloth the rate was 1. 6% ad valorem. Its scope was thus contained mainly to cotton cloth and every other kind of cloth. For cotton cloth the rate of octroi was 1% ad valorem and for every other kind of cloth the rate was 1. 6% ad valorem. It did not take within its sweep cotton yarn or threads or any other kind of fibre or thread or yarn. For that purpose the entry was Entry 195 as it originally stood prescribing the rate of octroi at 1% ad valorem. So far as staple fibre is concerned the original entry was Entry 166 prescribing the rate of octroi at 0. 3% ad valorem. ( 10 ) AS pointed out hereinabove, Entry 39 came to be redrafted under the revised schedule. The first part thereof took care of cotton piece goods and yarn and threads and the prescribed rate of octroi duty was made 1% ad valorem. The second part mentioned every other kind of cloth like silk, woollen, teryne and synthetic. It also took within its sweep staple fibre and its yarn and threads. All these goods were made liable to octroi duty at the rate of 2% ad valorem. It may be mentioned at this stage that the learned trial Judge based his conclusions by emphasising on a coma inserted between the word synthetic and staple fibre occurring in the said entry. In this connection, a reference deserves to be made to the ruling of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Dadaji v. Sukhdeobabu reported in A. I. R. 1980 supreme Court at p. 150. In para 15 at page 156 it has been held:"it was well known that punctuation marks by themselves do not control meaning of a statute when its meaning is otherwise obvious:it appears that the learned Trial Judge unduly emphasised the punctuation mark of a coma between the words synthetic and staple fibre in Entry 39 (2) as revised in Schedule A annexed to the Octroi rules. ( 11 ) EVEN at the cost of repetition it may be reiterated that in the revised schedule Entries 166 and 195 came to be deleted. It is needless to repeat that entry 195 took care of every kind of yarn and Entry 166 of staple fibre and terylene and rayon fibres and their substitutes. The intention behind deletion of both these entries was too obvious to be stated. It is needless to repeat that entry 195 took care of every kind of yarn and Entry 166 of staple fibre and terylene and rayon fibres and their substitutes. The intention behind deletion of both these entries was too obvious to be stated. Revised Entry 39 (2) took within its sweep all these goods. As aforesaid, if any exemption with respect to any of the aforesaid goods from octroi liability was to be given, the necessary entry might have been added in Rule (15) of the Octroi rules. The obvious intention, therefore, was that the rates of octroi on these goods were revised by their insertion in Entry 39 rendering the original Entries 166 and 195 redundant and unnecessary. It appears that the learned Trial Judge, with respect, has not focussed his attention on this obvious intention behind revision of Entry 39 and consequential deletion of Entries 166 and 195 as they originally stood. It is true that the appellant has led no evidence in that regard at trial as submitted by Shri Master for respondent No. 1. However, no evidence was necessary for interpretation of entries in the Schedule annexed to the Octroi rules. The intention of the rule-making authority is found clearly manifested in the wordings of the revised entry itself and consequential deletion of two relevant entries, namely, Entries 166 and 195 as they originally stood. ( 12 ) IT is now time to concentrate on entry 39 (2) for the purpose of its true interpretation. It takes care of every other kind of cloth. In the first instance the words and terms occurring in that entry are not defined in the Octroi Rules. These words or phrases are quite familiar and known to practically all concerned. They denote marketable commodities and their meanings will have to be ascertained by their use in common parlance. It cannot be gainsaid that cloth is known by various prefixing terms like silk cloth, terylene cloth, polyester cloth, woollen cloth and the like. The words "silk, woollen, teryne, synthetic" after the word "cloth" in Entry 39 (2) as revised are illustrative of different types of cloth and are not exhaustive for the purpose of varieties of cloth included in that entry. It needs no telling that there is no cloth like staple fibre cloth. Staple fibre is obviously a raw material for manufacture of cloth. It needs no telling that there is no cloth like staple fibre cloth. Staple fibre is obviously a raw material for manufacture of cloth. It is, therefore, clear that staple fibre cloth could not have been intended to be included within the sweep of that entry. It will be stretching the entry too far to interpret the expression "staple fibre" occurring therein to mean cloth made of staple fibre. That would amount to addition or insertion of certain words therein. The Court is not empowered to do so in view of the ruling of the Supreme court in the case of Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal reported in a. I. R. 1992 Supreme Court at p. 96. Besides what follows after the term staple fibre is "and its yarn and threads". What was emphasised in the entry was every other kind of cloth and its yarn and threads. The idea is to include every other kind of yarn and thread for the purpose of payment of octroi duty if such goods are imported within the municipal limits of the appellant herein. Staple fibre is also a kind of yarn or thread though not a yarn or a thread stricto sensu. In order to avoid any kind of complication as to interpretation of the entry with respect of the octroi liability on staple fibre, the rule-making authority appears to have included the term "staple fibre" in Entry 39 (2) to make its intention manifestly clear. There is no other interpretation possible with respect to this entry. In that view of the matter, staple fibre is also liable to octroi duty at the prescribed rate under Entry 39 (2) in the Schedule as revised and annexed to the Octroi rules. The contrary view taken by the learned Trial Judge cannot be upheld. ( 13 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, i am of the opinion that staple fibre imported by respondent No. 1 within the municipal limits of the appellant was liable to octroi duty under Entry 39 (2) in schedule A annexed to the Octroi Rules. Its levy by and on behalf of the appellant herein cannot be said to be illegal or unauthorised. In this view of the matter, the judgment and the decree passed by the learned Trial Judge under challenge in this appeal cannot be upheld. Its levy by and on behalf of the appellant herein cannot be said to be illegal or unauthorised. In this view of the matter, the judgment and the decree passed by the learned Trial Judge under challenge in this appeal cannot be upheld. It deserves to be set aside in exercise of the appellate powers of this Court. ( 14 ) BEFORE parting with this judgment i shall be failing in my duty if I do not appreciate the assistance rendered in this matter by the learned Advocates, more particularly by Shri Master for respondent no. 1 though it was not necessary for him to appear on its behalf as it has now gone into liquidation. ( 15 ) IN the result, this appeal is accepted. The judgment and the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.), at vadodara in Special Civil Suit No. 266 of 1977 are hereby quashed and set aside. The suit filed by respondent No. 1 is dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. Appeal allowed. .