S. NAINAR SUNDARAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 5155 of 1991. The petitioner in the Special Civil Application is the appellant herein and the respondent in the Special Civil Application is the respondent herein. ( 2 ) THE appellant at the relevant point of time was working as Public Hall Manager in the Estate Department of the respondent-Municipal Corporation. In the course of discharge of his duties it was found that he was involved in serious misconduct of gross negligence in discharge of his duties conniving with anti-social activities being conducted in the Rest Houses illegally accepting gratification and misusing his post and permitting the premises of the respondent-Municipal Corporation for being used for anti-social activities by encouraging prostitution and thereby harming the reputation of the respondent-Municipal Corporation. On 12. 5 a charg-sheet was issued to the appellant. The appellant replied the charge-sheet on 22-5-1988. A regular departmental enquiry followed and the enquiry report was submitted on 3 The findings of the Enquiry Officer was that the appellant was guilty of the substantive charges. A second show cause notice was issued on 20 The appellant replied the second show cause notice on 24-5-1989. On 6-6-1991 the appellant was dismissed from service. The appellant preferred a departmental appeal and the departmental appeal was rejected. Ultimately the appellant put his ousting from service as above in issue in the Special Civil Application. ( 3 ) BEFORE the learned Single Judge who heard the Special Civil Application five points were urged on behalf of the appellant the petitioner before the learned Single Judge as follows : (1) The chargesheet given to the petitioner was absolutely vague and not giving any necessary particulars which resulted in denying reasonable opportunity to defend himself inasmuch as the petitioner never knew the exact nature of the charges he was required to meet with and therefore the entire enquiry was vitiated. (ii) The order of dismissal was vitiated inasmuch as statements which were recorded by the Vigilance Officer during the course of preliminary enquiry were not supplied to the petitioner nor was report of the preliminary enquiry supplied to the petitioner which has resulted into denying the opportunity of effective cross examination of the witnesses to the petitioner and that has prejudiced the defence of the petitioner. (iii) From the report of the enquiry officer as well as the finding reached by him and the disciplinary authority it was clear that it was a case of no evidence whatsoever against the petitioner and therefore the order of dismissal was arbitrary and suffered from vice of non-application of mind. (iv) Assuming without admitting that the petitioner was guilty of some of the charges levelled against him the main charge was that of negligence in the discharge of his duties and for such charge of negligence penalty of dismissal from service was excessive and too harsh. In the alternative the penalty of retiring the petitioner compulsorily from service would have been just and proper looking to the fact that the petitioner has put in 28 years of continuous service. (v) The illegal activity of prostitution was going on in the rest house of the Municipal Corporation since 1982 within the knowledge of all concerned and therefore action should have been taken against the higher officers like the Estate Officer or the Municipal Commissioner and the petitioner and other employees cannot be punished for such illegal activities". The learned Single Judge adverted to each of the five points and found no substance in them and as a result rejected the Special Civil Application. ( 4 ) BEFORE us Mr. C. L. Soni for Mr. P. B. Majumdar learned counsel appearing for the appellant would urge substantially the same points which were repelled by the learned Single Judge. ( 5 ) FIRSTLY the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the chargesheet was vague and was lacking in requisite particulars and this amounted to denial of a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to effectively defend the disciplinary action. That the charge memorandum has got to be specific and unambiguous so as to apprise the servant proceeded against in disciplinary action as to what he should answer is a proposition countenanced by a catena of decisions both at the level of the Apex Court in the land and the High Court. That the charge memorandum has got to be specific and unambiguous so as to apprise the servant proceeded against in disciplinary action as to what he should answer is a proposition countenanced by a catena of decisions both at the level of the Apex Court in the land and the High Court. But it is not possible to lay down a rigid and an inflexible formula in this regard to apply to all situations and as to when the charge could be charcterised as vague so as to give room for a complaint of denial of reasonable opportunity to defend would depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is not expected in a domestic enquiry that the charges should be framed with the precision of a charge in criminal proceedings. The true test is whether the charges has conveyed to the servant the exact nature of lapses alleged so as to enable him to answer it. In the present case as pointed out by the learned Single Judge the involvement of the appellant was a continuous activity spread over a fairly long time involving large number of persons and it was a systemic and continuous activity. It is not possible to capsule the entire gamut of the allegations into the chargesheet. But we find that the report of the preliminary enquiry and the statements of witness recorded during the preliminary enquiry supplied to the appellant along with the chargesheet amply brought out the gravamen of the charges levelled against the appellant. If the appellant had felt any difficulty with reference in answering the charges he would have certainly hastened to raise a voice of protest that he stood disabled from answering the charges. Certainly this was not the concept entertained by the appellant either at the time of giving the reply to the chargesheet or during the enquiry or at the time of answering the second show cause notice. No disability as such obviously had been experienced by the appellant in answering the charges and he did effectively defend the disciplinary action during the course of the enquiry; but unfortunately the result thereof was not favourable to him. It has been countenanced by pronouncements that in the absence of prejudice made out any vagueness in charge would not vitiate the departmental action. It has been countenanced by pronouncements that in the absence of prejudice made out any vagueness in charge would not vitiate the departmental action. Having demurred not all along it is not permissible for the appellant to voice forth this grievance assuming it is tenable for the first time before this Court in writ jurisdiction. On the facts and circumstances of the case we are not in a position to say that there was denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant to defend himself in the disciplinary action on account of any vagueness or ambiguity in the chargesheet. ( 6 ) SECONDLY the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that it is a case of no evidence and hence the learned Single Judge ought to have interfered in writ powers. This aspect has been adverted to by the learned Single Judge and he points out that a grievance was expressed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant petitioner before him that wo of the witnesse who were stated to have carried on the business of prostitution were not examined. Certainly the non-examination of a witness or witnesses would not militate against the cumulative assessment of the other eivdence and the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority. This Court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction in these matters. There will be interference by this Court when there is commission of manifest error of law or the finding is arrived at without any evidence. But when there is evidence the adequacy or otherwise of it could not be the subject matter of assessment by this Court exercising writ powers. That is the subjective satisfaction to be arrived at by the departmental authority and unless this Court is impressed that the finding arrived at is totally perverse and has been arrived at in the total absence of evidence there would not be any warrant for interference in writ jurisdiction. Rightly the learned Single Judge discountenanced this contention and we affirm the view of the learned Single Judge. ( 7 ) THIRDLY the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that all the factors ought to have been considered and in the present case such could not be stated to be the position when the appellant was visited with a penalty of dismissal from service. ( 7 ) THIRDLY the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that all the factors ought to have been considered and in the present case such could not be stated to be the position when the appellant was visited with a penalty of dismissal from service. This submission is in the abstract level and we are not enlightened as to what factors were omitted to be taken note of which could have been spoken in favour of the appellant. Thus we are obliged to eschew this contention. ( 8 ) FROTHILY the learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the appellant could not be attributed with any misconduct as such because at the worst it could be only negligence in performance of duty of lapses in performance of duty and hence they would not constitute misconduct and he would say that the consequences could not be directly attributable to such negligence or lapses. In this behalf the learned counsel for the appellant would place reliance upon the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. J. Ahmed AIR 1979 SC 1022 . We are not able to draw any parity between the facts of the case dealt with by the Supreme Court and the facts of the present case. That was a case of Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate being hauled up for misconduct and there considering the nature of the post and the duties annexed to the post it was opined on facts that the consequences could not be directly attributed to the administrative negligence or lapses. Here in the present case the allegations against the appellant have been established in the course of disciplinary action which entailed the dismissal of the appellant from service. The consequence could be only directly attributed to the negligence and the lapses of the appellant. There could not be a second opinion over this aspect. In the said circumstances we are not able to accept this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. ( 9 ) FIFTHLY the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that his client alone has been penalised while the higher officials have been allowed to go scotfree. Such a contention would not at all lie in the mouth of the appellant. ( 9 ) FIFTHLY the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that his client alone has been penalised while the higher officials have been allowed to go scotfree. Such a contention would not at all lie in the mouth of the appellant. His culpability having been found and proved against him he cannot escape the wrath of the disciplinary action by pointing out that no disciplinary action has been taken against the higher officials. In this arena it is not possible to bring in a theory of discrimination at all. Thus we negative this contention put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant. ( 10 ) LASTLY and sixthly the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that his client has put in 28 years of service and instead of meting out to him the punishment of dismissal from service a lesser punishment ought to have been meted out to him Relevantly while dealing with this contention the learned Single Judge points out that nefarious activities having been found to have been carried on in the premises of the respondent-Municipal Corporation with the connivance of the appellant it is not at all possible to come down to any sympathetic level of treatment and that would practically amount to misplaced sympathy shocking the conscience of the right-minded and the right spirited citizens. We fully endorse the view of the learned Single Judge that it is not a case of unconscionable or onerous punishment disproportionate to the charges levelled and proved against the appellant. ( 11 ) NO other point was urged. ( 12 ) REPELLING all the contentions raised before us we dismiss this Letters Patent Appeal. Appeal Dismissed. .