Judgment A.B. Srivastava, J. 1. This revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act is directed against a Judgment and decree dated 23-12-1985 of the I Additional District Judge, Bijnor, exercising powers of J.S.C.C whereby he dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-revisionist for ejectment, arrears of rent and damages. 2. The suit was filed by the plaintiff-revisionist alleging that he is landlord of the accommodation in suit in which the defendant was a tenant at Rs. 600/- per month rent, in addition to electricity charges. The accommodation in question being a November 1973 construction, it had not completed 10 years when the suit was filed, as such it was not governed by U.P. Act 13 of 1972, the plaintiff served a notice under section 106 of the T.P. Act terminating the tenancy of the defendant and on expiry of the period of notice filer the suit. Allegation of the defendants having committed nuisance and the plaintiff requiring the accommodation for his own use was also made. The defendants opposite party contested the suit with allegations that the suit as framed is not maintainable, the accommodation in question was constructed in 1970 and as such, lis governed by U.P. Act 13 of 1972. No notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act was given, alternatively the notice given is illegal the defendant has not blocked any passage nor committed any nuisance. 3. The learned J.S.C.C held that the 10 years' period from the date of construction having completed in 1983 during pendency of the suit, Act 13 of 1972 became applicable to this accommodation Relying on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 1985(1) ARC 215, he held that the defendant tenant being a public sector corporation the suit was not maintainable because the protection granted to such corporations by section 2(1)(a) and 3(o) as amended by U.P Act 28 of 1976 was retrospective in application. He found that the a plaintiff did not require the accommodation for his own use no material alteration or nuisance was committed by the defendant, the notice was duly served on the defendant and was not illegal. Further he held the frame of the suit to be defective in so far as it was not dear whether the corporation was sued through the Divisional Manager or the Chairman. With these findings he dismissed the suit. Aggrieved, this revision. 4. Further he held the frame of the suit to be defective in so far as it was not dear whether the corporation was sued through the Divisional Manager or the Chairman. With these findings he dismissed the suit. Aggrieved, this revision. 4. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and the record gone through. At the very out set it may be mentioned that the question of bonafide requirement or otherwise of tike building in question by the revisionist landlord was not at all a relevant: question in an ejectment suit. Such question would be relevant when a release application is filed under section 21 of Act 13 of 1972. Learned J.S.CC thus was not justified in raising an issue or deciding this question. 5. The main question in the Suit was whether the building in question having not completed 10 years from the date of its completion was outside the purview of Act 13 of 1972. It was not the finding of the learned J.S.C.C. that the building was constructed prior to November, 1973. He rejected the plaintiff's plea on the ground that the building came within the purview of Act 13 of 1972 in 1983 when it completed 10 years period during the pendency of the suit. It has,, however, been laid down in Ramesh Chandra v. Ill Additional District Judge, JT 1992 (1) SC 3S6, that in a case where 10 years period from the date of construction of a house had not completed on the date of filing a suit for eviction, the suit has to be disposed of without reference to the U.P. Act 13 of 1972. Under these circumstances, the view of the learned J.S.C.C. that the building in question came under the purview of Act 13 of 1972 during the pendency of the suit, so as to attract the protection given to the tenants under the said Act, is against law and deserves to be set aside. 6. Once it is held that the building in question was not governed by U.P. Act 13 of 1972, the termination of lease and eviction will be governed by the Transfer of Property Act. 6. Once it is held that the building in question was not governed by U.P. Act 13 of 1972, the termination of lease and eviction will be governed by the Transfer of Property Act. It being the finding of the learned J.S.C.C. himself that a valid notice under Section 106 T.P. Act was served, the tenancy of the defendant stood determined and Irrespective of any other requirement the plaintiff became entitled to seek a decree of eviction. Even if it may be assumed for arguments' sake that ten years' period since construction of the building in question had completed prior to the institution of suit, it will not make the protection under Section 20 of Act 13 of 1972 available to the defendant opposite parties on the facts of this case. 7. The view of the J.S.C.C. that protection against eviction available to a tenant was available also during the relevant period to a public sector corporation, like the defendant based on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 1985 (1) ARC 215, is also not sustainable, in view of the fact that the said Full Bench decision has been overruled by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Malik Zarid Khalid, AIR 1988 SC 132 , by laying down that between the period 5-7-1976 and 18-5-1983 a building taken on lease by the State Government or any public sector corporation shall fall squarely within the definition of public building' and therefore exempt from the application of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 by reason of section 2(1) of the said Act as amended in 1976 by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976. Consequently in such a case, landlord's remedy to recover possession would be under the general law. 8. The dismissal of the suit of the plaintiff on the ground of the frame of the suit being defective Is also unsustainable in view of the fact that the tenant was the corporation and not any of its officers. What was required was to sue the corporation through its Chairman. Even if besides the Chairman, the corporation was sued through its Divisional Engineer and service Engineer also, neither the frame of the suit became defective nor the decree would be inexecutable. What was required was to sue the corporation through its Chairman. Even if besides the Chairman, the corporation was sued through its Divisional Engineer and service Engineer also, neither the frame of the suit became defective nor the decree would be inexecutable. Under the above circumstances, the findings and the judgment of the JSCC being against law deserves to be set aside and the plaintiff revisionist's suit for ejectment and arrears of rent decreed. 9. The revision is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned JSCC is set aside Plaintiff's suit is decreed for ejectment of the defendant corporation and also for recovery or arrears of rent and mesne profits, less the amounts, if any, withdrawn by the plaintiff out of the deposits made by the defendant. The defendant corporation is allowed three month's time to vacate the premises in question. 10. There shall be no order as to costs. Revision allowed.