JUDGMENT - SIRPURKAR V.S., J.:—An interesting question of law crops up in this writ petition, to wit: As to whether when an individual office bearer becomes a defaulter within the meaning of section 73-FF of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, for declaring him to be so is the prior consultation under section 78(1) of the Act necessary? It has been the consistent view so far that an action under section 78(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter to be referred to as “the Act”) against the whole Committee as such for the defaults committed by them or for the irregularities committed by them has to be preceded with by a consultation with the Federal Society. The question now which has to be answered is whether such a consultation is necessary even when an individual member is to be deprived of his office for his defaults committed under section 73-FF of the Act? It is also a consistent view that section 73-FF does not apply independently and operates only via section 78(1) of the Act and the defaults named in section 78(1) also include amongst others the defaults committed and the disqualification incurred under section 73-FF of the Act. It is to be seen, therefore, whether even when an individual member is sought to be disqualified with the aid of the provisions of section 73-FF, is the prior consultation with Federal Society necessary? 2. The petitioner was working as an office bearer of respondent No. 5 Society — The Mouda Vikas Khand Sahakari Shetki Kharedi Vikri Limited, Mouda and he was a member of the society at respondent No. 4. It is found that the petitioner had taken a loan from the Maharashtra Co-operative Housing Finance Society Limited, Bombay on the basis of his membership of the respondent No. 4 society and he had defaulted by failing to return some instalments of the society. A notice came to be served to the petitioner dated 21-7-1989 in which it was claimed that the petitioner had failed to deposit Rs. 3960=60 as also he was liable to pay to the society Rs. 2511/- on account of his having taken the advances. This was a show cause notice and the reply was sought within 8 days from the service of the notice. 3960=60 as also he was liable to pay to the society Rs. 2511/- on account of his having taken the advances. This was a show cause notice and the reply was sought within 8 days from the service of the notice. Accordingly, a reply was given by the petitioner denying the liability to pay to the society and reiterating that he had in fact made payments of all the so-called defaulted amounts but was not given the regular receipts in respect of few payments though Kacha receipts were given. He also pointed out that there was not a single notice or a reminder sent to him in respect of the so-called dues. On the basis of this explanation, the District Deputy Registrar took a novel step of asking the explanation regarding this reply to the concerned society, i.e. the respondent No. 4 which again wrote back that the petitioner was in arrears of Rs. 471=60 and was a defaulter. On the basis of this, the District Deputy Registrar straightway came to a conclusion that the petitioner had incurred a disqualification within the meaning of section 73-FF and, therefore, under the powers under section 78(1)(b) of the Act, the petitioner was removed from his office. In this order, it was specified that he was being removed from the date of this order, i.e. 3-8-1989. The petitioner, therefore, lost his Chairmanship and his position in the Managing Committee. 3. An appeal under section 152 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 came to be filed by the petitioner to the Divisional Joint Registrar, Nagpur. He pointed out in his appeal-memo that a prior consultation with the Federal Society was a must before an action under section 78(1) of the Act is initiated and finalised and since that consultation was not admittedly made, the further order by the District Deputy Registrar was of no consequence. He also disputed his status as a defaulter as, according to him, the District Deputy Registrar had chosen to ignore the factual aspects of the repayments. He also reiterated that the action was tainted with mala fides and was at the instance of one Shri Kalmegh — the Manager of the society. He also disputed his status as a defaulter as, according to him, the District Deputy Registrar had chosen to ignore the factual aspects of the repayments. He also reiterated that the action was tainted with mala fides and was at the instance of one Shri Kalmegh — the Manager of the society. He also claimed that Shri Kalmegh had committed serious irregularities and bore grudge against the petitioner on account of the disciplinary action having been initiated by the petitioner against Shri Kalmegh and it was Shri Kalmegh who has got this action initiated. 4. The Divisional Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies dismissed his appeal by order dated 12-10-1989. Amongst other findings, firstly the Appellate Authority confirmed the finding of the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies that the petitioner was in fact a defaulter. He came to the conclusion that the petitioner had nowhere explained as to how he was not in fact a defaulter as there was nothing to indicate and support his plea in the written note of argument which was filed before him on behalf of the petitioner. Without any discussion regarding the plea, the finding was confirmed. As regards the question of consultation, however, it was found that the said consultation was not essential and was essential only when the action under section 78(1) of the Act was being faced by the whole Committee as such and not by an individual member. He came to the conclusion that in such specific cases there remains nothing to be opined by the Federal Society. He, therefore, came to the conclusion that where the disqualification is under section 73-FF and there is a consequent action under section 78(1) of the Act, then such consultation is not necessary. 5. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Revision before the State of Maharashtra. However, the State of Maharashtra by its order dated 5-11-1990 rejected the Revision without bothering to go into the question whether the prior consultation with the Federal Society was necessary at all. These three orders are being challenged by way of the present writ petition. 6. 5. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Revision before the State of Maharashtra. However, the State of Maharashtra by its order dated 5-11-1990 rejected the Revision without bothering to go into the question whether the prior consultation with the Federal Society was necessary at all. These three orders are being challenged by way of the present writ petition. 6. Shri Rohit Deo, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, strenuously pointed out that there was admittedly no consultation and in fact such consultation was sine qua non for the action under section 78(1) of the Act even if the action was against an individual member and not against the whole society and even if the action was on account of the disqualification incurred under section 73-FF of the Act. He relied upon various decisions holding the prior consultation to be mandatory. He also reiterated that in the absence of such consultation, the whole proceedings will suffer from the taint of illegality and the orders of disqualification would be rendered void ab initio. 7. Shri Bhoot, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 Society, equally strenuously and vehemently contended that such consultation was not essential at all nor was it contemplated under section 78(1) of the Act when the action is initiated for the disqualification incurred under section 73-FF as the Federal Society had no control as such on the action of the District Deputy Registrar. The consultation would only be an empty formality as there was nothing which the Federal Society could advise and, therefore, such consultation was meaningless. The further argument of Shri Bhoot is that the moment the concerned member commits any default and incurs the disqualification under section 73-FF, he loses his voice and the disqualification starts at that very moment as per the provisions of section 73-FF(2) of the Act. He, therefore, contended that if that position is obtained then there would be nothing required further including the consultation as contemplated in section 78(1) of the Act. Shri Bhoot also relied upon a reported decision of Supreme Court in (Pundalik v. District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Chandrapur and others)1, 1991(3) Bom.C.R. 154. 8. It is, therefore, to be seen as to what is the true import of section 78(1) of the Act and what is the effect if the consultation as contemplated in section 78(1) of the Act is not made prior to passing of the order. 8. It is, therefore, to be seen as to what is the true import of section 78(1) of the Act and what is the effect if the consultation as contemplated in section 78(1) of the Act is not made prior to passing of the order. It will be worthwhile to reproduce section 78(1) of the Act. It says: “S. 78(1) If, in the opinion of the Registrar, the Committee of any society or any member of such Committee makes default, or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it or him by this Act or the Rules or the bye-laws, or commits any act which is prejudicial to the interests of the society or its members, or wilfully disobeys directions issued by the State Government, or by the Registrar for the purposes of securing proper implementation of co-operative policy and development programme approved by the State Government or is otherwise not discharging its or his functions properly and diligently, or where a situation has arisen in which the Committee or any member of such Committee refuses or has ceased to discharge its or his functions and the business of the society has or is likely to come to a stand still, or where any member of such Committee stands disqualified by or under this Act for being a member, the Registrar may, after giving the Committee or the member, as the case may be an opportunity of stating its or his objections, if any, within 15 days from the date of receipt of notice, and after consultation with the federal society to which the society is affiliated, by order— (a) (i) remove the Committee, and —.......... (b) remove the member and appoint any person.........” (emphasis supplied) A mere reading of the section is clear enough to reiterate that whether it be a whole Committee or an individual member, when the removal of such Committee or member is sought, the prior consultation is a must. In fact, this section is not against a Committee only. It contemplates not only the defaults or the defects of the Committee collectively as such, but it speaks of the liability incurred by an individual member also. In fact, this section is not against a Committee only. It contemplates not only the defaults or the defects of the Committee collectively as such, but it speaks of the liability incurred by an individual member also. The language of the section is extremely clear and admits of no doubts that an action can be taken not only against a Committee for its defaults but an individual member can also be proceeded against by the Registrar for any disqualification incurred by him under this Act for being a member. However, the question is whether the consultation with the federal society is required prior to such removal. Now, it is an admitted position that such consultation with the federal society of the concerned respondent society was not made. The facts regarding the existence of the federal societies for the respondents Nos. 4 and 5 as also the fact that such federal societies were not consulted in this matter are not disputed by the parties before me. The question which is to be considered is whether such consultation is necessary when the member incurs a disqualification under section 73-FF and secondly, whether such consultation is necessary even when an individual member is being sought to be removed? Both the questions will be considered commonly. 9. As has already been stated, it is an established legal position that a consultation when an action under section 78(1) of the Act is sought against the Committee is sine qua non and that position is obtained from the reported decision of this Court in (Suresh Dyandeo Khumkar others v. State of Maharashtra and others)2, 1987(3) Bom.C.R. 211 as also the other case (Keshaorao Narayanrao Patil v. District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Akola and others)3, 1987(3) Bom.C.R. 225 . While in the first case, the consultation was held essential and it was held further that a mere sending of the copy of the notice to the federal society would not amount to effective consultation, in the second case, i.e. in Keshaorao's case the law is in respect of section 73-FF(2) of the Act. In Keshaorao's case what was sought to be decided was whether section 73-FF(2) operates automatically so as to result in incurring the disqualification and whether such disqualification calls for any opportunity being given to the person concerned to explain. This Court went on to hold that the provision of section 73-FF is undoubtedly mandatory. In Keshaorao's case what was sought to be decided was whether section 73-FF(2) operates automatically so as to result in incurring the disqualification and whether such disqualification calls for any opportunity being given to the person concerned to explain. This Court went on to hold that the provision of section 73-FF is undoubtedly mandatory. However, cessation of membership under section 73-FF(2) of the Act is not automatic unless an order is passed removing him with the aid of section 78(1) of the Act. The Court went on to hold that in fact section 73-FF of the Act could not be read in isolation and it has to be read with provisions of section 78 on the basis of the principle of harmonious construction of statutes. It is specifically reiterated in that decision that section 78 of the Act refers to the disqualification which means all varieties thereof and, therefore, there could be no exception in the disqualification incurred under section 73-FF(l) and, therefore, even if a disqualification is incurred under section 73-FF(1) of the Act, still a recourse will have to be taken to the modality provided by section 78(1) of the Act as it stood after its amendment by Maharashtra Act No. 20 of 1986. In Keshaorao's case the Court has also made reference to the other two decisions in (Roha Ashtami Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. v. Judge, Co-operative Court, Alibagh)4, 1977 U.C.R. 485 as also (Murlidhar Tukaramsao Bhandekar v. Nagpur District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd.)5, 1986 Mh.L.J. 599 which decisions were not in keeping with the ultimate opinion handed out by the Court in Keshaorao's case. It was further held in Keshaorao's case that the decision in Roha Ashtami Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd.'s case was per incuriam as the provisions of section 78 of the Act were not pointed out to the learned Judges in that case. Be that as it may the legal position obtained thus is that even if a disqualification is incurred under section 73-FF, the modality of section 78(1) is a must and indeed the legal position obtained by the operation of section 73-FF has to be translated into an order with the aid of section 78(1) of the Act alone. Be that as it may the legal position obtained thus is that even if a disqualification is incurred under section 73-FF, the modality of section 78(1) is a must and indeed the legal position obtained by the operation of section 73-FF has to be translated into an order with the aid of section 78(1) of the Act alone. The argument of Shri Bhoot as also the reasoning by the Divisional Joint Registrar that if the disqualification is incurred under section 73-FF, there is nothing which is to be done further and, therefore, the consultation is not necessary is thus not correct. If section 78(1) speaks of a consultation, then there cannot be any differentiation between a Committee and an individual member. Indeed there is nothing in the language of section 78(1) to mete out a different treatment to a whole Committee and to the individual member. The need of consultation is clearly manifested from the language of the section in respect of both. i.e. the whole Committee and the individual member also. If the section is read as it is a very careful reference is made in case of the Committee as a whole and an individual member. In so far as the earlier sentences are concerned, it is only at the end of the section that the clause regarding the consultation has been inserted and indeed the clause is commenting for both the Committee as a whole and an individual member as such. In the wake of careful language used making references to the Committee as well as the individual member, when the clause regarding the necessity of consultation is made commonly applicable to both, no unnatural exception can be carved out in respect of the member and it, therefore, could not be held that while consultation is essential when action is sought to be taken against the whole Committee, it is not so necessary when the action is being sought against an individual member. The view expressed by the two Authorities that the consultation is not necessary firstly because the action is against the individual member and secondly because it is in respect of a disqualification under section 73-FF of the Act is, therefore, clearly incorrect on the plain reading of section 78(1) of the Act itself. 10. The view expressed by the two Authorities that the consultation is not necessary firstly because the action is against the individual member and secondly because it is in respect of a disqualification under section 73-FF of the Act is, therefore, clearly incorrect on the plain reading of section 78(1) of the Act itself. 10. Shri Bhoot strongly relied upon the decision and the observations made by Supreme Court in the case of Pundalik v. District Deputy Registrar Co-operative Societies, Chandrapur and others, 1991(3) Bom.C.R. 154. This was a case where the Supreme Court had interpreted the provisions of section 73-FF(1) and (2) of the Act. The question in the present petition was not for consideration in that case. There were two questions which were answered by the Supreme Court in that case, firstly that even if a person stood disqualified with the aid of section 78(1) of the Act and that post being an elective post even if the concerned parties did not challenge the said election by way of an election petition as provided by the modalities of the Act, the said person loses his elective office because of the disqualification incurred. The Supreme Court answered the second question that there was no question of the provisions of section 73-FF operating only in praesenti and that it operates right from the date when the default is made and is continued day to day. Shri Bhoot more particularly relied on the following observations made in paragraph 13 of the judgment in support of his arguments. It will be better to quote the whole paragraph, which is as under:­ “13. What then would be the consequence of such a default. Sub-section (2) of section 73-FF says that a member who has incurred any disqualification under sub-section (1) shall cease to be a member of the Committee and his seat shall thereupon be deemed to be vacant. Therefore, the moment the appellant after election continued to be in default, and, therefore, must be taken to have made default, stood disqualified and thereby ceased to be a member of the Committee and his seat deemed to have fallen vacant. In this view of the matter the notice of the Deputy Registrar was in effect to say that the appellant had already ceased to be a Director and his seat already fell vacant. In this view of the matter the notice of the Deputy Registrar was in effect to say that the appellant had already ceased to be a Director and his seat already fell vacant. In Keshaorao Narayanrao Patil v. District Deputy Registrar, reported in 1987(3) Bom.C.R. 225 . Bombay High Court held that section 73-FF(2) did not operate automatically and that passing of an order of removal was necessary. This has to be interpreted in the context of the provisions in the section”. (emphasis supplied) Shri Bhoot very heavily relies on these observations and contends that if the default was proved as were the findings in the present case, then on the date of default itself the petitioner stood disqualified by section 73-FF(2) of the Act. His contention is that if the disqualification operated from the date of his committing default, then there is absolutely no necessity of any further formality under section 78(1) of the Act and, therefore, there was no necessity of any consultation. The argument of Shri Bhoot is not all that clear because if, according to him, the Supreme Court meant that the disqualification operates right from the date of default, then there would be no necessity of any notice or any modality under section 78(1) of the Act. If the argument is accepted, then it will have to be held that a mere notice by the District Deputy Registrar to the effect that the concerned member has incurred disqualification would be enough and there would be no further necessity of taking the procedure as prescribed in section 78(1) of the Act, but such indeed cannot be the import of both section 78(1) and section 73-FF(1) and (2) of the Act for in order to attract a disqualification under section 73-FF, the factual aspect as to whether really a person has incurred disqualification or not is also an extremely necessary finding. In fact, the decision in Keshaorao's case (cited supra) provided and held that before a disqualification in section 73-FF was attracted under the law of natural justice as also under section 78(1), an opportunity had to be given to the concerned member to explain as to whether it was established factually that he was a defaulter. Indeed, such opportunity would be a sine qua non before the axe of a drastic action under section 73-FF of the Act falls upon the helpless member. Indeed, such opportunity would be a sine qua non before the axe of a drastic action under section 73-FF of the Act falls upon the helpless member. Keshaorao's case, therefore, rightly proceeds that even if the vapours of disqualification were created under section 73-FF, their crystallisation was necessary as per the procedure in section 78(1) of the Act provided no other modality. It is in this light that the observations of the Supreme Court will have to be read. What is meant by the observations is that even if the order under section 78(1) of the Act is passed subsequently, even then the disqualification will be deemed to be from the date on which the default is committed. The Supreme Court has not in any manner commented adversely on the ratio as reached in Keshaorao's case though a specific mention to that case has been made in its judgment. On the other hand, it has very specifically stated that the said position has to be interpreted in the context of the provisions in the section. Thus, the true meaning of the observations in Pundalik's case (cited supra) would be that though the disqualification operates from the date of default, the said disqualification will have to be translated into an order by order under section 78(1) of the Act. 11. If this be so and if the modality of section 78(1) of the Act is sine qua non, then the whole procedure prescribed under section 78(1) of the Act and which is rightly held to be of mandatory nature will have to be followed before the axe of disqualification falls. As has already been pointed out, the prior consultation has been held to be a must before the order under section 78(1) of the Act is passed. By necessary logic, even if the disqualification is carved out via section 73-FF, before the order under section 78(1) of the Act is passed even in respect of an individual member, it will be necessary to consult the Federal Society. Indeed, this seems to be the correct position as the Federal Society may have something precious to advise in case it is consulted. The Federal Society would be in a position to search into the factual aspect regarding the accounts which may or may not be sent by the concerning officials who initiate the action under section 73-FF of the Act. The Federal Society would be in a position to search into the factual aspect regarding the accounts which may or may not be sent by the concerning officials who initiate the action under section 73-FF of the Act. It may be that the Federal Society would be able to search into the facts and to help the Authority to arrive at a correct factual position. After all, the disqualification under section 73-FF ensues drastic results and indeed before such drastic results follow, it is essential and right to have the factual aspects thereof correctly decided upon. The consultation was held to be a must in all the earlier referred cases. With this view, it is, therefore, clear that the Authorities below have erred in law in dispensing with the consultation which is held to be mandatory under the provisions of section 78(1) of the Act and on that count, the impugned orders will have to be set aside. 12. It is, however, made clear that if indeed there is material to hold that the petitioner has in fact incurred disqualification because of the defaults, the Authorities under the Act are free to initiate the proceedings under section 73-FF of the Act after following all the legal procedure. With these observations, the rule is made absolute. The orders of the Assistant Registrar declaring the petitioner to be disqualified, the appellate order passed by the Divisional Joint Registrar and the Revisional order passed by the State of Maharashtra dated 5-11-1990 are set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Order accordingly. -----