A. K. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) - The only point emerging for consideration in the instant Revisional Application filed by the accused-petitioners for quashing the relevant proceedings, being Case No. C-118 of 1991 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate of 24-Parganas at Alipore, is whether it was competent for him to take cognizance of the alleged offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter shortened into Act) on the petition of complaint filed by the complainant-opposite party No. 1 beyond the period specified in section 142 (6) thereof, in the facts and circumstances hereinbelow indicated. To put it somewhat differently when had the cause of action for the relevant complaint had arisen, in the facts and circumstances thereof? ( 2 ) ON account of goods supplied by the O. P. No. 1-complainant to the petitioners-accused persons on or before 16. 10. 90, they had handed over a cheque for the sum of Rs. 50,000/- only, being Cheque No. 374629 dated 12. 9. 90, drawn on State Bank of India, Chowringhee Branch, Calcutta, to him (O. P. No. 1) on 12. 9. 90 in discharge of their liability in port. The same was presented (by him) before the Bank on the same very day, to be dishonoured. The complainant had again presented the said cheque before the Bank on 20. 11. 90 on the request of the accused persons, which had again been dishonoured, intimated by the Bank to him on 15. 12. 90 ; whereupon his Advocate had sent registered notices/letters with A/d to the petitioners-accused Nos. 2 and 3 on 28. 12. 90 at their residential addresses for making payment of the said amount within fifteen days of the receipt of the same. Since the A/d cards (acknowledgement thereof) had not reached him till 24. 2. 91, his learned Advocate had sent a letter to the Postal Authority on 25. 2. 91 enquiring about the delivery/service of the aforesaid notices sent by registered post to the petitioners-accused Nos. 2 and 3. On the following day, on 26. 2. 91, he (complainant), however, had received the said A/d cards and came to know that the notices had been received by the accused persons on 1. 1. 91 and 3. 1. 91. The relevant petition of complaint had been filed by the complainant on the very next day, 27. 2. 91. On the following day, on 26. 2. 91, he (complainant), however, had received the said A/d cards and came to know that the notices had been received by the accused persons on 1. 1. 91 and 3. 1. 91. The relevant petition of complaint had been filed by the complainant on the very next day, 27. 2. 91. The learned Magistrate upon examination of the witnesses and perusal of the record appears to have taken cognizance o the alleged offence and directed issue of summons upon the petitioners-accused by his order dated 4. 3. 91. ( 3 ) A petition had thereafter been filed on behalf of the accused persons before the learned Magistrate on 14. 11. 91 for dropping the proceedings and discharging them for the reasons stated therein under section 258, Or. P. C. on the plea that the petition of complaint had been filed beyond the Prescribed period, rejected by him (learned Magistrate) by his impugned order dated 6. 12. 91 for the reasons recorded therein. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by the order so passed by the learned Magistrate, the accused-petitioners have exercised this Court in Revision for appropriate relief. ( 5 ) AS already indicated, on the relevant cheque being dishonoured twice, the complainant had sent notices by Registered Post with A/d to the accused Nos, 2 and 3 through his Advocate by letters dated 28. 12. 90 demanding payment of the said amount of money. The accused No. 1 had received the aforesaid notice on 1. 1. 91 and the accused No. 3 had received the notice sent to him on 3. 1. 91. In terms of clause (e) of section 138 of the Act the cause of action (for the complaint) should be deemed to have arisen on 18. 1. 91. The complaint was to be filed within one month from 18. 1. 91 under section 142 (6) of the Act, i. e. by 18. 2. 91. But the relevant complaint had been filed by the complainant before the Court on 27. 2. 91, a little beyond one month from the date on which cause of action for the relevant complaint apparently arose. The relevant complaint was prima facie time barred as such. 91 under section 142 (6) of the Act, i. e. by 18. 2. 91. But the relevant complaint had been filed by the complainant before the Court on 27. 2. 91, a little beyond one month from the date on which cause of action for the relevant complaint apparently arose. The relevant complaint was prima facie time barred as such. But the question which crops up for consideration in the instant proceedings is whether the relevant complaint would indeed be time barred, in the special and peculiar undisputed facts and circumstances of the instant case, as indicated above. No decision on the point calling for consideration could be cited by the learned Advocates of any of the parties. ( 6 ) UNDER the provisions of clause (c) of Section 138 of the Act the cause of action for such-like complaint arises on the failure of the drawer "to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of the said nonce" given under clause (b) thereof ; and not before that. No such complaint can, therefore legally be filed before the aforesaid period. That being so, the material and relevant date for accrual of cause of action for such-like complaint is the date of receipt of notice by the drawer. The complainant being the sender of the notice cannot clearly receive the same. The recipient of the notice under clause (b) of section 138 of the Act must invariably be the drawer of the cheque, to whom it is given. Knowledge of the sender about the date of receipt of the notice by the drawer is, therefore. very much material as regards accrual of the cause of action for making such-like complaint. The sender of the notice could clearly have no personal knowledge about the date of receipt of the same, unless the notice is sent by messenger and the receipt thereof is duly acknowledged by the person to whore it is sent. very much material as regards accrual of the cause of action for making such-like complaint. The sender of the notice could clearly have no personal knowledge about the date of receipt of the same, unless the notice is sent by messenger and the receipt thereof is duly acknowledged by the person to whore it is sent. But in cases (as in the instant case), where notice is sent by registered post A/d, which is the usual mode of service ; which could, in particular, hardly be avoided if the parties do not belong to the same place or near about places, the knowledge of the sender (complainant) about the date of receipt of such notice would invariably be dependent upon other agencies, namely, the Postal Department, which is obliged to return back the A/d card to the sender of the registered notice. But the promptitude and efficiency of the Postal Department is a matter which is an everybody experience for the people at large. More often than not, A/d card is hardly returned back to the sender (of registered notice) in lime. Not infrequently, A/d card never reaches back the sender, necessitating correspondence with the Postal Department as to the delivery/service of the registered notice or the date of delivery/service of such notice. Not unoften, the somnolence of the Postal Authority could hardly be shaken within reasonable time in answering such query when the A/d card does not reach back the sender. In such cases, such-like complaint is likely to fail for no fault of the complainant, but for the failure/laches on the part of the Postal Department. The purpose of the Act is, therefore, likely to be frustrated, in such circumstances, which could never possibly have been intended by the makers thereof. The question which thus naturally arises for consideration is whether the literal and mechanical way of construing clause (c) of section 138 of the relevant Act would be justified in law, in such circumstances. The knowledge of the sender of the notice about the date of receipt of the same being an essential requirement of fair-play and natural justice, the expression "within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice," used in the aforesaid provision, should clearly mean the date when the sender acquires the knowledge about the date of the receipt of the notice given by him under clause (b) of the relevant provision. If a person is given a right to resort to a remedy within a prescribed time, limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew about the date of accrual of cause of action for making a complaint before the competent court for seeking redress therefore, or else, it might be an absurd and unreasonable application of law. On the analogy of the decision of the Supreme Court in K. P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Anr. AIR 1981 SC 1922 , we must, therefore, eschew literalness in the interpretation of clause (c) of section 138 of the Act and "try to arrive at an interpretation which avoids such absurdity and mischief and makes provision rational and sensible, unless of course, our hands are tied and we cannot find any escape from the tyranny of literal interpretation. " It is now well-settled rule of construction that where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result, which could never have been intended by the legislature, the Court may modify the language used by the legislature, or even "do some violence" to it, so as to achieve the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a rational construction. The Court may also in such a case read into the statutory provision a condition which, though not expressed, is implicit as constituting the basic assumption underlying the statutory provision. It, therefore, seems to me that having regard to this well recognised rule of interpretation, a fair and reasonable construction of clause (c) of section 138 of the Act should be read into it so that the expression therein "within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice" should be made to mean within 15 days from the date of knowledge of the sender about the receipt of the notice so that such-like complaint may not fail for default on the part of the Postal Department, without any fault on the part of the complainant. On such construction, cause of action for such complaint, so far as the complainant is concerned, would accrue on the failure of the drawer to make payment within fifteen days from the date of knowledge of the complainant about the receipt of the Notice by the former (drawer), which would neither be prejudicial to him (drawer/accused), rather beneficial to him as he would get longer time to make payment of the amount and thus avoid criminal liability for non-payment. It would indeed be in the interest of such-like complainant to file complaint for such offences within the prescribed period so that the same may not be turned down for having been filed beyond the prescribed period resulting in failure of the remedy available to him under the law on such technical ground. Such-like complainant would invariably be interested in seeing that the court takes cognizance of the offence and issues process because that would be the culmination of the petition of complaint filed by him on the allegations made and could hardly allow his petition of complaint to be time barred to his own prejudice. At the same time, however, the complainant should exhibit due diligence and promptitude in securing knowledge within a reasonable period about the date of receipt of the notice, sent by registered post A/d, without sleeping over the matter for an unreasonable period, in case of failure of the Postal Department to send back the A/d card and/or intimate the date of receipt of notice by the addressee within a reasonable period. ( 7 ) IN view of the discussions above, I am clearly of the view that cause of action for the relevant complaint, so far as the complaint is concerned, muse on the expiry of fifteen days from 26. 2. 91, the date of knowledge of the complainant about the receipt of notices by the accused persons, sent under clause (b) of section 138 of the Act. The filing of the petition of complaint by the complainant within one month there from cannot therefore be held to be beyond the period specified in section 148 (b) of the Act. There is, therefore, little point to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate. The Revisional Application fails in the result. ( 8 ) THE interim stay granted by this Court by order dated 20. 12. 91 stands vacated. There is, therefore, little point to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate. The Revisional Application fails in the result. ( 8 ) THE interim stay granted by this Court by order dated 20. 12. 91 stands vacated. ( 9 ) SINCE the relevant proceedings had remained stayed for so long a period in view of the aforesaid stay order of this Court, the learned Magistrate is hereby directed to proceed with the trial of the relevant case with utmost expedition. He should seek to conclude the trial and dispose of the case, as early as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order. Application fails.