Mr. P. N. Nag, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition has been tiled against theorder dated 16. 7. 1988 passed by Shri V. K. Jain, Additional Rent Controller,delhi whereby he has allowed the eviction petition of the respondent-landlady for bonafide requirement under Section 14 (l) (e) of the Delhi Rentcontrol Act (hereinafter referred to as the act ). ( 2 ) THE relevant facts set out in the pleadings of the parties necessaryfor determining the point in controversy are that the respondent, who hasstated herself to be the owner of Flat No. 6-B, Raj Hans, 33-Prithvi Raj Road,new Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the premises), let out these premises tomilk Food Ltd i. e. , the petitioner-tenant for the residence of its Managingdirector Shri K. S. Jaiswal at a monthly rent of Rs. 2. 000. 00 plus Rs. 600. 00 forfixtures (in all Rs. 2. 600. 00 per month ). The respondent s husband, viz. , Majorsatish Khanna who had been in military services was getting subsidiary fromthe Government under the rules of Military services for the accommodation;he and the respondent were living in a house in Delhi on rental basis while inmilitary service. However, the respondent s husband had been retired andrelieved from military service w. e. f. 30. 11. 1980 and his accommodation inthe military service stands withdrawn. The respondent, therefore, requiredthe premises for occupation as residence for herself and for the members ofher family dependent upon her. According to the respondent-landlady, shehas no other accommodation in Delhi except her own house/flat in dispute inwhich the petitioner-tenant is residing. ( 3 ) THE petitioner-tenant has not disputed that the premises were letout to it for use for residential purposes but not for the residence ofmr. K. S. Jaiswal only by the respondent-landlady. However, it has beenemphatically denied that she is the owner of the premises and according torecords of the L. and D. O. Shri R. K. Gupta, father of the respondent, is theowner of the premises. According to the petitioner. Shri R. K. Gupta hadsimilar accommodation in Flat No. 4-A, where the respondent was residing,but in the name of another daughter, namely, Miss Savitri Gupta as per then. D. M. C. records. According to the petitioner. Shri R. K. Gupta hadsimilar accommodation in Flat No. 4-A, where the respondent was residing,but in the name of another daughter, namely, Miss Savitri Gupta as per then. D. M. C. records. The husband of the respondent was not dependentupon the respondent and it could not be said that she required the premisesbonafide for occupation as residence for herself and the members of herfamily dependent upon her. The petitioner has also denied that the respondent-landlady did not have any other reasonable suitable accommodation. ( 5 ) THE respondent-landlady, in order to succeed, has to prove: (i) thatshe is the owner of the property; (ii) that the premises in question were letout only for residential purposes; (iii) that she requires the premises bonafide for occupation as a residence for herself or for any member or herfamily dependent upon her; and (iv) that she has no other reasonable suitableresidential accommodation. ( 6 ) MR. L. R. Gupta, Senior Counsel for the petitioner, has endeavoured to assail the impugned order/judgment of the Additional Rent Controller on two counts- (i) that the respondent-landlady has not proved thatshe is the owner of the premises; and (ii) that she has no reasonable suitableresidential accommodation. ( 7 ) I will deal with first the argument of the learned Counsel for thepetitioner-tenant on the question whether or not respondent-landlady hasbeen able to prove/establish that she is the owner of the premises in dispute. ( 8 ) ACCORDING to Mr. L. R. Gupta, no doubt the respondent appearingas AW 1 has deposed that she is the owner of the property in dispute throughagift deed-Ext. CW 1/1 (objected to), made by her father on 26. 3. 1974. but the same is an unregistered deed. According to him, the gift deed shouldbe registered and since the present gift deed is an unregistered one, the samecannot be looked into for establishing the. ownership. According to L and D. O. and other records the owner his Shri R. K. Gupta, the father of the respondent, and, therefore, the respondent cannot be considered as an owner of thepremises. He submits that on this ground alone, the petition requires to bedismissed. ownership. According to L and D. O. and other records the owner his Shri R. K. Gupta, the father of the respondent, and, therefore, the respondent cannot be considered as an owner of thepremises. He submits that on this ground alone, the petition requires to bedismissed. ( 9 ) THE word "owner" as defined in the present context under Delhirent Control Act, 1959 has been interpreted to mean something more thana tenant by the Supreme Court in Smt. Shanti Sharma and Others v. Smt. Ved Prabha and Others, ( AIR 1987 SC 2028 ). In paragraph 14 the Supremecourt has held that it could not be doubted that the term owner, has to beunderstood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection ofthe tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord undercertain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bonafide requirement isone of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted tohave eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase owner thereof has tobe understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where theperson builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequentlyneeds it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree foreviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove is bonafide requirementand that he is the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be themeaning of the term owner is vis-a-vis the tenant i. e. the owner should besomething more than the tenant. In this context, the case of Rameshwarnarain (Deceased) through LRs. v. Sarla Sarin (1992-46 DLT 70) decided bys. C. Jain, J. may also be noticed. In that case the interpretation of the word owner has been explained in paragraph 7 and it has been observed that "thisinterpretation of the word owner has been accepted by Hon ble Supremecourt in Smt. Shanti Sharma and Others v. Smt. Ved Parbha and Others, air 1987 SC 2028 . Under the Delhi Rent Control Act, the word owneroccurring in Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) is not used inthesense of absolute owner. It is only used in contradistinction with a landlordas defined, who is not an owner but who holds the property for the benefit ofanother person. Under the Delhi Rent Control Act, the word owneroccurring in Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) is not used inthesense of absolute owner. It is only used in contradistinction with a landlordas defined, who is not an owner but who holds the property for the benefit ofanother person. A landlord as defined, who is holding the property for himself and for his own benefit and not for the benefit of another person iscertainly the owner/landlord. This is the view which has already been takenby the Court in Kanwal Kishore Chopra v. O. P. Dwivedi and Others, AIR1978 Delhi 53. ( 10 ) THE respondent-landlady appearing as AW 1 has clearlydenied the suggestion that she is not the owner of the premises and herfather is the owner of such premises. She has clearly stated that she is theowner of the property and in May, 1976 she let out this property to therespondent for residential purposes and a lease deed was also executed at thetime of letting out of the premises to the tenant and that she has been issuingthe rent receipts to the petitioner-tenant and she had let out the premises asthe owner of the premises. Further, the petitioner-tenant has never challengedthe ownership rights of the respondent-landlady til! date. Furthermore, Shrir. K. Gupta, the father of the respondent appearing as Court witness hasclearly stated and admitted that after the gift was made by him in favour ofhis daughter, i. e. , the respondent, the respondent herself is looking after theproperty and dealing with the tenants in her own rights as an owner and sheherself is receiving the rent and issuing rent receipts and he has no concernwhatsoever with the property. In these circumstances it is clear that therespondent/landlady has been holding the property for herself and for herown benefit and not for the benefit of another person. ( 11 ) MAJOR Satish Khanna, respondent s husband, appearing as AW 2has also deposed that his wife is the owner of the property and dealing withthe premises as owner. ( 12 ) THE petitioner-tenant appearing as RW 1. has admitted that thepremises were taken at a monthly rent of Rs. 2,000. 00 from the respondent-landlady in May. 1976 and on the respondent s asking for increase in the rentit was settled at Rs. 2. 600. 00 in 1979. The addition of Rs. 600. ( 12 ) THE petitioner-tenant appearing as RW 1. has admitted that thepremises were taken at a monthly rent of Rs. 2,000. 00 from the respondent-landlady in May. 1976 and on the respondent s asking for increase in the rentit was settled at Rs. 2. 600. 00 in 1979. The addition of Rs. 600. 00 to be shownas higher charges for furniture and Rs. 2,000. 00 were to be paid as monthlyrent. In other words it has not been disputed by anybody that the premiseswere not taken from the respondent-landlady and negotiations for taking thepremises on rent did not take place with the respondent-landlady. Thepetitioner is even paying rent to the respondent-landlady and getting rentreceipts from her. ( 13 ) IN the context of the interpretation of the word owner given bythe Supreme Court in Smt. Shanti Sharma s case (supra) and our High Court,the respondent has certainly to be held as the owner of the property as in thefacts and circumstances of this case the respondent-landlady is certainly theowner vis-a-vis the tenant as her status vis-a-vis the petitioner is more than atenant. Further, in the present case it has come on the record that therespondent-landlady has let out the premises herself being the owner of theproperty and is holding the property as such for herself and for her benefitand not for the benefit of other person. Therefore. certainly she is the ownerand landlady of the premises. Therefore, she has to be held as the owner/landlady. ( 14 ) IT was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that awitness Shri Ramji Lal. U. D. C from the L and D. O. was examined as RW-4who stated that at present the leasehold rights of the property vested in thepresident of India as the lease was determined on 25. 11. 1972. In this connection it is suffice to say that this witness himself has stated that 33. Prithviraj Road is in the name of Shri R. K. Gupta, the father of the respondentlandlady. Further, it is clear from the statement of this witness and appearsthat Shri R. K. Gupta had to challenge the proceedings of eviction initiatedagainst Shri Gupta under the Public Premises Act by way of writ petitionbeing CW 473/74 in the High Court of Delhi in which absolute stay ofdispossession has been granted on 6. 5. 1974 till disposal of the writ petitionand that order is operative. 5. 1974 till disposal of the writ petitionand that order is operative. Nothing has been shown to the contrary thatshri R K. Gupta was evicted from the premises in dispute and the termination of lease has been upheld by the Court. No doubt Shri R. K. Gupta wasthe original leesee but he has gifted this property to her daughter, the presentrespondent, by way of gift deed which of course is not registered. Therefore. this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner must fail. ( 15 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has next assailed the findingof the learned Additional Rent Controller that the respondent even otherwisehas perfected and acquired title to such property being in adverse possessionfor more than 12 years and she has become owner, on the ground that theplea of adverse possession has not been taken in the pleadings by the partieswhich is necessary under the law. In this connection, learned Counsel for thepetitioner has relied upon S. M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina, (AIR 1964 SC1254, wherein it has been held that adverse possession must be adequate incontinuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to showwhen possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitationagainst the party affected can be found. A mere suggestion in the reliefclause that there was an uninterrupted possession for several 12 years orthat the plaintiff had acquired an absolute title was not enough to raise sucha plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession. ( 16 ) IN the present case. no doubt such a specific plea could not beraised in the pleadings as at the time when the petition was filed the respondent-landlady had not perfected her title of adverse possession as the 12 yearsperiod had not expired, which expired during the pendency of the proceedings before the Trial Court. However, there is no dispute that in pleadings,the question of ownership of the landlady has been raised and she has claimedownership on the basis of gift deed dated 263. 1974. The starting point oflimitation when possession of the respondent became adverse starts from26. 3. 1974 when the gift deed was executed and the possession thereof wasdelivered to her on 26. 3. 1974 itself. In these circumstances to say that thereare no pleadings at all to this effect is not correct. 1974. The starting point oflimitation when possession of the respondent became adverse starts from26. 3. 1974 when the gift deed was executed and the possession thereof wasdelivered to her on 26. 3. 1974 itself. In these circumstances to say that thereare no pleadings at all to this effect is not correct. ( 17 ) HOWEVER, the question that remains to be considered is that isthat in the absence of a specific plea of adverse possession can these subsequent events be taken into consideration by the Court in revision petition fordetermining whether the respondent-landlady has become owner by virtue ofadverse possession. ( 18 ) IN my opinion in view of the latest pronouncements specificallycovering the case of bonafide requirements under the Act to be discussedhereinafter such facts can be taken into consideration by this Court. ( 19 ) IN Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders. ( AIR 1975 SC 1409 ) the Supreme Court has clearly held that it is basic to ourprocessual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as onthe date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principlethat procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamentalimpact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is broughtdiligently to the notice of the Tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind toevents which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifiesbending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play isviolated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, tothe absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can wecontemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts toconfine it to the Trial Court. If the litigation pends. the power exists, absentother special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of thisequitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making theright or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally andfactually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in manycases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequentto the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to bothsides are scrupulously obeyed. We affirm the proposition that for making theright or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally andfactually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in manycases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequentto the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to bothsides are scrupulously obeyed. ( 20 ) THIS judgment in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor andgeneral Traders, (supra) was followed by the Supreme Court in M. M. Quasimv. Manohar Lal Sharma and Others, ( AIR 1981 SC 1113 ) and the later casewas followed in M/s. Variety Emporium v. R. M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina, (AIR1985 SC 207 ). ( 21 ) IN view of these aforementioned judgments there remains nomanner of doubt that if certain facts about which there is no dispute andwhich have material bearing on the case and the relief asked for, such factscan not only be taken into consideration in revision by this Court but also thecourt is duty bound to take note of subsequent events in such proceedings. Inview of the admitted facts as stated above the question whether or not therespondent-landlady has perfected her title of possession can be gone into,more particularly pleadings to this effect whether one is owner or not wasalready there and the parties were alive to the point in controversy and theevidence has been recorded on behalf of both the parties in this connectionand no prejudice would be caused to either party. At the cost of repetitionsince the respondent-landlady after the gift made on 26. 3. 1974 has enteredinto possession and claimed the property as her own not only against thedonor but against all the persons and she let out the same as owner to thepetitioner-tenant and such a position was never disputed by anybody she hasperfected her title during the pendency of the proceedings as has held by thetrial Court. My view stand fortified by a decision in Rameshwar Narain (Deceased) through LRs. v. Sarla Sarin (supra) decided by S. C. Jain. J. ( 22 ) IN N. Varada Pillai and Another v. Jeevarathnammal, (AIR 1919pc 44) wherein in similar circumstances it has been held that where the donordid not effect a registered gift deed but allowed donee to enter into possessionof the gifted property and the donee thus remained in possession for over 12years, his title became perfected as against donor s heirs. ( 23 ) IN this connection the case of Venkatryadu v. Subbamma andothers. (Vol. Madras Journal Reports 302) may also be noticed wherein ithas been held that when an oral gift is made by the last male owner to hisdaughter and the latter remained in possession for over 12 years, she wasthe owner by virtue of the gift; she perfected her title by adverse possession. ( 24 ) I find the approach of the learned Additional Rent Controller ascorrect and the finding to the effect that the respondent-landlady is theowner of the property is just and reasonable and cannot be interfered with inrevision. ( 25 ) THE next argument advanced by Counsel for the petitioner wasthat admittedly Shri R. K. Gupta has expired during the pendency of theproceedings and there is no will. Therefore, the property has devolved on allthe children of Shri R. K. Gupta, including the present respondent-one ofthe children and the present respondent has become a co-owner of the flat inwhich she is presently residing. After the death of her father, her statushas ceased to be a tenant and she has become a co-owner. Unless there ispartition and Flat No. 4-B, Raj Hans is allotted to her sister Miss Savitrigupta, the respondent continues to be the owner and, therefore, it cannotbe said that she has no other reasonable suitable accommodation. ( 26 ) THIS argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner can alsonot be accepted. Rather if this argument is accepted, it goes against thepetitioner. In Shri Kishan Lal. v, Shri Rajan Chand Khanna, (AIR 1993 Delhi,1) it has been held by me in paragraphs 35 and 36 that A. C. Khanna theoriginal owner was deed and his sons were naturally being heirs would be oneof the co-owners of the property and shall be entitled to file petition foreviction under Section 14 (l) (e) of the Act. The respondent, therefore, isentitled to maintain the petition. ( 27 ) HOWEVER, anticipating that the aforesaid argument of the learnedcounsel for the petitioner, if accepted, would demolish the very case whichthe petitioner has tried to set up that the respondent landlady is not theowner of the premises in dispute. Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, didnot press this argument. ( 28 ) IT was next contended by Counsel for the petitioner that the flatno. Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, didnot press this argument. ( 28 ) IT was next contended by Counsel for the petitioner that the flatno. 4-B, 33 Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi where the respondent-landlady isat present residing on rent is adjacent to the flat in dispute and is in occupation of the petitioner, i. e. Flat No. 6-B, 33 Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi andboth these flats have same accommodation and are in the same locality. According to learned Counsel, it has not been shown that eviction proceedings have been initiated or decree has been passed for eviction againstthe present respondent by her landlady, namely. Miss Savitri Gupta or thatthe accommodation in occupation of the respondent-landlady is muchsmaller or insufficient in comparison to the accommodation in occupation ofthe petitioner of which the respondent is the owner. Therefore, in thesecircumstances it cannot be said that the respondent has no other alternativesuitable residential accommodation. ( 29 ) I am afraid I am unable to accept this contention. It has come onrecord by way of evidence of the respondent appearing as AW 1 andcorroborated by her husband s (Major satish Khanna) statement appearingas AW 2 that Major Satish Khanna was in military service and that therespondent along with her husband and two children came to Delhi indecember, 1978 when Major Khanna was transferred to Delhi and lived withthe respondent s father. She lived there upto the end of February 1979 andthen she took the present accommodation, viz. . Flat No. 4-A, Raj Hans, 33prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi on rent at the rate of Rs. 2,225. 00 from Misssavitri Gupta, her sister. Thin Premises No. 4-A Raj Hans was withdrawnby the army authorities on 29. 1. 1981 from Major Satish Khanna on hisretirement, from military service. It appears, the respondent was allowed tooccupy the same premises by Miss Savitri Gupta on the same amount of rent,i. e. . Rs. 2. 225. 00 p. m. which was being paid earlier. Thin Premises No. 4-A Raj Hans was withdrawnby the army authorities on 29. 1. 1981 from Major Satish Khanna on hisretirement, from military service. It appears, the respondent was allowed tooccupy the same premises by Miss Savitri Gupta on the same amount of rent,i. e. . Rs. 2. 225. 00 p. m. which was being paid earlier. It has also been provedfrom the statement of AW 1 and other evidence on record that the respondent had asked the petitioner to vacate the premises time and again but thepetitioner had failed to vacate the premises in spite of assurances given tothat effect and since there was no other accommodation available with therespondent, there was no option left to the respondent but to persuade hersister Miss Savitri Gupta to allow her to continue to live in the samepremises, i. e. , 4a Raj Hans. 33 Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi on the sameamount of rent of Rs 2. 225. 00 p. m. . it appears temporarily, as thereafter shefiled the present eviction petition against the petitioner for possession forbonafide requirement. This itself shows that the respondent does not havealternative suitable residential accommodation. I am fortified in taking thisview by a judgment in a case R. B. Kapoor v. Nanik N. Dastoor (1991- 43dlt 127 ). In that case, Sunanda Bhandare, J. has held that when the landlord takes another accommodation on rent for compelling reasons during thependency of the eviction petition, that itself shows that the landlord doesnot have other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. In such a case,whether the landlord can afford to pay the rent or whether there are enoughnumber of rooms to accommodate his family is irrelevant. ( 30 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner while relying heavily on acase reported as Rakesh Kumar Sehgal v. Nem Chand, (1987-2 RCJ 571)decided by N. N. Goswamy, J. , has strenuously argued that in the presentcase it has not been shown that the present accommodation in the tenancy ofthe respondent is insufficient for her residence and that merely that she wantsto shift to her own house is not sufficient to enable her to seek the order ofeviction against the petitioner. ( 31 ) I am afraid such a contention of the learned Counsel for thepetitioner is not acceptable as the case relied upon by him is distinguishable. ( 31 ) I am afraid such a contention of the learned Counsel for thepetitioner is not acceptable as the case relied upon by him is distinguishable. In the present case, as already stated, respondent had to take the premises onrent from her sister Miss Savitri Gupta under compelling reasons as she hasno other house to live in except the one which is in occupation of thepetitioner as otherwise she would have been put on the road. Therefore, thepresent case is covered by the decisions reported as R. B. Kapoor v. Manikm. Dastoor and Rakesh Kumar Sehgal v. Nem Chand (supra ). ( 32 ) FURTHER the very fact that the respondent has tiled the evictionpetition against the petitioner coupled with the fact that Miss Savitri Guptabeing sister allowed the respondent to occupy the premises on the same rent,i. e. . Rs. 2,225. 00 p. m. after the withdrawal of accommodation of her husbandby the Army Authorities when the same premises could fetch much moremarket rent shows that there seems to be some understanding between therespondent and Miss Savitri Gupta that the respondent would vacate theflat in case her own flat is vacated by the petitioner. In this connection Fullbench decision of this Court in Mohan Lal v. Tirath Ram Chopra and Another, (1982-2 RCJ 161) may also be noted wherein it has been held that if anowner, who is residing in tenanted premises, makes a commitment to returnthe premises to his landlord, and that commitment is genuine one and notsham or fraudulent, then it cannot be argued that the need of the said landlord for recovery of possession of residential premises from his tenants is nota bonafide need. ( 33 ) THIS argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is furthernot tenable as the flat which the respondent is occupying is of Miss Savitrigupta and there is nothing on record to show that their relations are strainedand that Miss Savitri Gupta would institute some litigation against therespondent to take back the possession of the flat, particularly when therespondent landlady and Miss Savitri Gupta are sisters. ( 34 ) IT was further contended that the respondent is in a happy rentposition that she has to pay Rs. 2,225. 00 as monthly rent to the landlady Misssavitri Gupta whereas she receives Rs 2,600. 00 p. m. ( 35 ) NO doubt the respondent is getting Rs. 2,600. ( 34 ) IT was further contended that the respondent is in a happy rentposition that she has to pay Rs. 2,225. 00 as monthly rent to the landlady Misssavitri Gupta whereas she receives Rs 2,600. 00 p. m. ( 35 ) NO doubt the respondent is getting Rs. 2,600. 00 p. m. as rent butshe must be paying property taxes etc. and there is left not much differencebetween the rent she is receiving and the rent she is paying to Miss Savitrigupta. ( 36 ) THE finding of the Trial Court that the respondent has no reasonably suitable residential accommodation is neither perverse nor unreasonableand is hereby affirmed. ( 37 ) IN view of the above the revision petition is dismissed. However,in the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.