Judgment S.N.Jha, J. 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for partition pure and simple. The plaintiff sought decree with respect to his 1/5th share in the land of plot No. 1259 measuring 1.33 acre or 2 bighas 2 katbas 11 dhurs fully described in Schedule Kha of the plaint. The suit having been dismissed, the plaintiff has come in appeal. 2. The common ancestor of the party was one Gobardhan Pandit. He died leaving behind widow Mostt. Budhlya and six sons, namely, Ram Kishun, Hari Kishun, Ram Das, Ram Charan, Raghunath and Raghunandan. The plaintiff is the son of Ram Charan while contesting defendants are of the branches of Ram Kishun and Raghunath. The sons of Hari Kishun and Ram Das are defendant Nos. 2 to 8 respectively. Except defendant No. 2, they supported the plaintiffs case-Raghunandan is said to have died issueless. 3. According to the plaintiffs case, the suit property belonged to Mostt. Budhiya until her death in 1948. It is said that the family was possessed of five Khaparposh houses. Mostt Budhiya during her life-time in 1936 allowed the aforesaid five Khaparposh houses along with the land over which houses stood to her five sons in the following manner. Ram Kishun was allotted house along with 2 kathas and 10 dhurs land comprising plot No. 518 ; Hari Kishun was allotted 2 kathas land comprising plot No. 532 and the house. Ram Das, Ram Charan and Raghunath likewise were allotted lands comprising plot Nos. 514, 529, 521 measuring 2 kathas, 2 kathas and 1 katha 5 dhuts respectively along with houses standing thereon. After death of Budhiya in 1948, the five brothers came in joint possession of the suit land which is agricultural in nature. However, as per their convenience, they occupied portion of the land, It is said that on account of the difficulties experienced in payment of rent demand for partition by metes and bounds was made which was refused. In the circumstances, the suit was instituted. 4. According to the case pleaded by the contesting defendants, the suit land though purchased in the name of Mostt. Budhiya on 5-2-1918 belonged to the six brothers, obardaan Pandit having died earlier. Since the property never belonged to Budhiya, there was no question of inheritance from her side. In the circumstances, the suit was instituted. 4. According to the case pleaded by the contesting defendants, the suit land though purchased in the name of Mostt. Budhiya on 5-2-1918 belonged to the six brothers, obardaan Pandit having died earlier. Since the property never belonged to Budhiya, there was no question of inheritance from her side. It is said that about 37-38 years ago partition had taken place in the family as per which Ram Kishun, Raghunath and Raghunandan (then alive) were allotted a Joint share comprising 1 bigha 8 kathas land along with houses as detailed in Schedule 1 of the written statement. Likewise, Hari Kishun and Ram Das are also, said to have been allotted 7 kathas land each along with ghouses as fully described in Schedules 3 and 4 of the written statement. It is said that Ram Charan, father of the plaintiff, was not allotted any land since he had boon allotted a house standing over 2 kathas lands, descrioed in Schedule 2 of the written statement. It would, thus, appear that as per the case of the contesting defendants white each of four brother except Ram Charan was allotted 7 kathas land along with separate house, Ram Charan alone was denied any share in the land on the specious plea that he had already been allotted house. The defendants heavily relied on a mortgage deed executed by Jangali Pandit defendant No. 1 and Raghunath father of defendant Nos. 9 to 11 dated 21-5-58 with respect to 16 Kathas land in favour of one Mostt. Halia on which the plaintiff as well as defendant Nos. 6 and 8 of the branch of Ram Das had put their signature as attesting witnesses. 5. The trial court on consideration of the evidence and materials on record held that in view of the case pleaded by the plaintiff regarding partial partition heavy onus lay on him to prove that no partition by metes and bounds had taken place which he had failed to prove. The court also held that in view of the attestation of the document, namely, mortgage deed dated 21-5-58 (Ext. A), the plaintiff was estopped from challenging the defendants case of partition. The court concluded that there was no unity of title and possession between the parties and, accordingly, dismissed the suit. 6. In the circumstances of the case, a close scrutiny of the document (Ext. A), the plaintiff was estopped from challenging the defendants case of partition. The court concluded that there was no unity of title and possession between the parties and, accordingly, dismissed the suit. 6. In the circumstances of the case, a close scrutiny of the document (Ext. A) is called for. The document, inter alia, states that branches of Ram Kishun represented by defendant No. 1 and Raghunath represented by defen dant Nos. 9 to 11 were joint along with the mother Mostt. Budhiya and Raghunandan (then alive). After death of Raghunadan, private partition took place on 29-10-43. In the said partition 7 kathas of lands were allotted to Hari Kishun, Ram Das and Ram Charan each while 21 kathas were allotted jointly to Ram Kishun, Raghunath and Mostt. Budhiya. But since Ram Charan (Plaintiffs father) had already been allotted a house, 7 kathas land allotted to his share was re-allotted to the joint share of Ram Kishun and Raghunath along with his mother. The trial court has held that in view of the clear recitals of the document giving details of previous partition between the parties to which the plaintiff is a witness, he is estopped from deying that partition had taken place in the manner stated above by the defendants. 7. Attestation in its primary meaning involves witnessing and witnessing only, and in the context of documents it involves witnessing to the writing. It is proof of the fact that the executant had signed in presence of the witness. Unless otherwise indicated in the recital of attestation or established by collateral evidence, it is no proof of the veracity of the contents of the documents, In other words, if the recital of attestation states that the person had gone through the contents of the document before putting his signature or if it is proved by evidence that before doing so that he had read the contents, the matter could be different. In that situation, it would not be attestation sim.pliciter. In the absence of any such proof or materials it cannot be regard ed as admission of the statements contained in the deed and cannot operate as estoppel against the person concerned. 8. The above legal position has been succinctly stated in various judicial pronouncements. In Pandurang Krishanajl V/s. M. Tukaram and Ors. In the absence of any such proof or materials it cannot be regard ed as admission of the statements contained in the deed and cannot operate as estoppel against the person concerned. 8. The above legal position has been succinctly stated in various judicial pronouncements. In Pandurang Krishanajl V/s. M. Tukaram and Ors. AIR 1922 Privy Council 20, the Judicial Committee held that the attestation of a deed by itself estops a man from denying nothing whatsoever excepting that he has witnessed the execution of the deed. It conveys, neither directly nor by implication, any knowledge of the contents of the document and it ought not to be put forward alone for the purpose of establishing that a man consented to the transaction which the document effects. This Court, following the said decision, in Mt. Jasodar Dusadhtn V/s. Mt. Sukurmanl Mehtranl AIR 1937 Patna 353 observed that there may be cases in which attestation is made in circumstances when, coupled with other evidence of consent and acquiescence in the execution of a document, it is relevant to the question whether the attesting witness had knowledge of the contents and agreed to them. The Nagpur High Court in Nainsukhdas Sheonarayan V/s. Gowardhandas Blndrabandas AIR 1948 Nagpur 110 stated the law in the following words : The attestation by a person of a document ordinarily proves no more than that the signature of an executing party had been attached to a document in the presence of a witness and it does not involve the witness in any knowledge of the contents of the deed nor does it affect him with notice of its provisions. An attestation may take place in circumstances which show that the witness did in fact know of the contents of the document but no such knowledge ought to be inferred from the mere fact of attestation. Reference may also be made to Rajamal alias Suudaramal V/s. Sabapathl Pillai AIR 1945 Privy Council 82. 9 It would, thus, appear that attestation cannot be a conclusive proof of knowledge of the contents of a document ; at best it can only be a circumstance. Such a circumstance by itself does not prove Knowledge of the contents. The person concerned, therefore, cannot be estopped from taking a stand contrary to the document. 9 It would, thus, appear that attestation cannot be a conclusive proof of knowledge of the contents of a document ; at best it can only be a circumstance. Such a circumstance by itself does not prove Knowledge of the contents. The person concerned, therefore, cannot be estopped from taking a stand contrary to the document. In the instant case there is no material suggesting that the plaintiff before putting his signature on the document (Ext. A) had gone through the contents of the document or that the same was explained to him or became known to him in any other manner. That being the position, the court below has been more than unfair to the plaintiff in holding him "estopped from challenging" the veracity of the defendants case of partition on the basis of the document. 10. The reason given in Ext. A for not allotting 7 kathas land out of suit land of plot No. 1259 to Ram Charan is that he had been allotted a house, I am not at all impressed by the aforesaid reason. On the own case pleaded by the defendents evidenced by the averments and description of the properties given in the schedules, each brother had been allotted a house, This is in consonance with the plaintiffs case that the family possessed of 5 houses which were allotted to each of the five brothers. In that view of the matter, I am pot able to appreciate as to how merely because a house had been allotted to the share of Ram Charan he could be denied his due share in the agricultural land. No cogent explanation had been given either in the document or elsewhere which could have satisfied my curiosity and conscience in this regard. I am, therefore, not inclined to accept the defendants case of allotment of kathas agricultural land to the plaintiffs branch and its re-allotment to the joint share of the contesting defendants on the ground that the plaintiff had already been allotted house. 11. Mr. S. K. Mazumdar, learned Counsel for the appellant, referred to certain contradictions in the case pleaded by the defendants in the written statement and the recitals of the document (Ext. A). Learned Counsel pointed out that according to the written statement :, the land did not belong to Mostt. 11. Mr. S. K. Mazumdar, learned Counsel for the appellant, referred to certain contradictions in the case pleaded by the defendants in the written statement and the recitals of the document (Ext. A). Learned Counsel pointed out that according to the written statement :, the land did not belong to Mostt. Budhiya and, therefore, there was no question of inheritance from her aide but in the document Mt, Budhiya had been shown to have had share in the pro perty. Counsel then stated that in the written statement, as amended, private partition is said to have taken place 37-38 years ago which comes to 1933-34 (written statement having been filed on 31-3-71) but as per the document, partition was effected on 29-10-43. Learned Counsel pointed out that according to the case originally pleaded by the defendants, the partition had taken place 27-28 years ago which comes to 1943-44. However, the date of partition was shifted back to 1933-34 presumably to make a case of previous partition in which Raghunandan also was given a share. This was done because in the partition of 1943, referred to in Ext. A, no share was allotted to him. Counsel submitted that in any view of the matter, if as per written statement partition had taken place in 1933-34 in which Raghunandan had been given a share, a second partition could not have taken place in 1943, to be precise, on 29-10-43. 12. Where a party pleads partial partition onus of proving that no partition of other properties by metes and bounds had taken place may be on him. However, mere allotment of separate houses for the purpose of separate residence does not amount to partial partition and, therefore, onus of proof that partition had taken place would lie, in the instant case, on the contesting defendants. Having examined the evidence on record I am satisfied that the defendants have failed to discharge the onus. The title and possession between the parties, as regards the suit property, being joint the plaintiff is entitled to decree of partition. 13. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial court is set aside. The plaintiff is held entitled to 1/5th share in the property described in Schedule Kh of the plaint. The suit is, accordingly, decreed. Let preliminary decree be drawn to this effect. 13. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial court is set aside. The plaintiff is held entitled to 1/5th share in the property described in Schedule Kh of the plaint. The suit is, accordingly, decreed. Let preliminary decree be drawn to this effect. In view of non-appearance of the respondents, I shall make no order as to costs.