This revision is directed against the judgment and order dated 21.4.87 passed by the Ex-Officio Assistant Commissioner and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Naharlagun in Case No. GR 48 of 1983, discharging the accused persons from charges under sections 120B/409/477A IPC for want of prior sanction as required under section 197 CrPC and special procedure under the Arunachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1978 (for short, the Act). The State of Arunachal Pradesh has filed this application ageist the said order. 2. The facts of the case may, briefly, be state J as follows: On the basis of a First Information Report dated 30.6.81, Shillong Branch of CBI (SPE Division) registered a case and commenced investigation. On completion of investigation a charge sheet was submitted against the opposite party under sections 120B/409/468/477A IPC. On the basis of the charge sheet a case (OR 48 /93) was started against the opposite party in the Court of Ex-Officio Assistant Commissioner and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Naharlagun. The charge was read over to the opposite party to which they pleaded not guilty. The prosecution story is that the opposite party misappropriated 106,27, 500 Kgs. of various pulses under two challaus (Challan No. 1524 dated 16.5.80 and Challan No. 1531 dated nil) worth Rs. 31,882.50 approximately calculating at the rate of Rs. 3/- per Kg. 3. The Ex-Officio Assistant Commissioner and the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Naharlagun by his judgment and order dated 21.4.87 discharged the accused/opposite party for want of sanction as envisaged under section 197 CrPC and also for violation of special procedure under the Arunachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1978. According to the prosecution, sanc­tion was not at all required inasmuch as the members of the opposite party are not entitled to get such protection in view of the fact that while they were not engaged in the performance of their official duties. Besides, they are removable by the Registrar of Co operative Societies and not by the State Government of Arunachal Pradesh. Hence, the present petition. 4. According to the petitioner the Court below misconceived the provi­sions of law and most erroneously dismissed the complaint. The prosecution having proved all the ingredients necessary for prosecution, the order of discharge is contrary to the provisions of law and liable to be set aside. Hence, the present petition. 4. According to the petitioner the Court below misconceived the provi­sions of law and most erroneously dismissed the complaint. The prosecution having proved all the ingredients necessary for prosecution, the order of discharge is contrary to the provisions of law and liable to be set aside. The offences alleged are - misappropriation of properties belonging to the State, criminal conspiracy, forgery and falsification of accounts misusing of public office. The alleged offences not being connected with honest and legitimate discharge of official duty, the accused persons are not entitled to get protection under section 197 CrPC. 5. I have heard both sides. 6. Mr. A. Roy, learned Public Prosecutor for the State of Arunachal Pradesh has strenuously argued that the trial Court committed manifest error of law by holding that the Court cannot take cognizance of the offence without prior sanction as required under section 197 CrPC as the opposite party were officers under the State Government and the act was done in the discharge of their duty. 7. Mr. AK Bhattacharyya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party, on the other hand, raised a preliminary point regarding maintainability of this revision inasmuch as this revision has been filed by the State of Arunachal Pradesh though the case was investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. Therefore, it is the Central Government who should instruct the Public Prosecutor to file the revision. As the Central Government has not come forward, the State Government has no authority and jurisdi­ction to file the revision petition. Secondly, the opposite party are officers of the State Government not removable from their offices save by or with the sanction of the Government. 8. On the rival contentions of the parties it is to be seen first whether the revision petition is maintainable in law or not as contended by Mr. Bhattacharyya. 9. Mr. Bhattacharyya submitted that though there is no provision in the CrPC in respect of filing of revision by the State Government in a case inves­tigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, there is a specific provision for filing of appeal against acquittal under section 378 CrPC. Bhattacharyya. 9. Mr. Bhattacharyya submitted that though there is no provision in the CrPC in respect of filing of revision by the State Government in a case inves­tigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, there is a specific provision for filing of appeal against acquittal under section 378 CrPC. I quote section 378 (2) :- "(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provi­sions of sub-section (3), to the High Court from the order of acquittal. " In this regard Mr. Roy had drawn my attention to a decision in Kheraraj vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1976 SC 173 . In the said case the Supreme Court held thus : "The word 'also' in sub-section (2) of section 417 is very significant. This word seems not to bar the jurisdiction of the State Government to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal even in cases inves­tigated by the Establishment. Sub-section (1) of section 417 is in general terms and would take in its purview all types of cases since the expression used in that sub-section is 'in any case'. We do not see any limitation on the power of the State Government to direct institution of appeal with regard to any particular type of cases. Sub-section (1) of section 417 being in general terms is as such of wider amplitude. Sub-section (2) advisedly uses the word 'also' when power is given to the Central Government in addition to direct the Public Prosecutor to appeal." Mr. Bhattacharyya made an attempt to distinguish this decision inasmuch as this decision related to the provisions of appeal against acquittal prior to 1973 Code. According to him,1973 Code has changed the law regarding appeal against acquittal to a great extent and, therefore, the aforesaid decision is not applicable. Mr. Bhattacharyya made an attempt to distinguish this decision inasmuch as this decision related to the provisions of appeal against acquittal prior to 1973 Code. According to him,1973 Code has changed the law regarding appeal against acquittal to a great extent and, therefore, the aforesaid decision is not applicable. Mr. Roy, on the other hand, submitted that though there have been some changes in section 378 CrPC, relating to the procedure for appeal against acquittal, but in substance it is more or less same and therefore this decision is applicable in the present case. The provisions laid down for appeal against acquittal under the old CrPC of 1898 was not at all comprehensive. Section 417 (2) related to an order of acquittal in cases investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment. I quote sub-section (2) of section 417 of the old Code : "(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establish­ment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 the Central Govt. may also direct the Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from the order of acquittal." A comparison of the provisions contained both in the old and the new Codes will only show that in the old Code the Central Government had also the power to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal only in those cases where the Delhi Sptcial Police Establishment investigated the cases. Other cases did not come within the purview of sub-section (2) of section 417. But the new Code has introduced some changes and by such changes the Central Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to prefer an appeal not only in cases investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, but also m cases investigated by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than the CrPC. From reading of the provi­sions of both the old and new Codes it does not appear that the power of the State Government has been taken away. In my view, the spirit of the aforesaid provisions shall be applicable in revision also. In this view I find that the decision in Khemraj vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) is applicable in the present case. In my view, the spirit of the aforesaid provisions shall be applicable in revision also. In this view I find that the decision in Khemraj vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) is applicable in the present case. Therefore I hold that the State Government may file a revision and the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Bhattacharyya is rejected. 10. The next contention of the learned Public Prosecutor was that the {revisions of section 197 CrPC would not be applicable as the members of the opposite party are removable by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and not by the State Government. In this regard I find that the learned Ex-Officio Assistant Commissioner and Judicial Magistrate did not deal with this matter and did not come to a conclusion on the point whether the members of the opposite party could be removed only by the State Government. Finding on this point is essential to consider the necessity of sanction under section 197 CrPC. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the matter requires proper scrutiny. Accordingly I set aside the impugned judgment and remand the case to the trial Court to decide whether the members of the opposite party are removable by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies as submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor. It after considering that aspect of the matter the Court comes to the finding that they are actually removable by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, no sanction will be necessary. Else sanction will be necessary.