DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) ). The judgment and the decree passed by the learned Extra assistant Judge of Junagadh on 22/10/1991 in Regular Civil Appeal no. 134 of 1987 are under challenge in this appeal preferred by original defendant No. 1 under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the code for brief ). Thereby the learned Lower Appellate Judge dismissed the present appellants appeal against the judgment and the decree passed by the learned 2nd Joint Civil Judge (S. D.) at Junagadh on llth September, 1987 in Regular Civil Suit No. 126 of 1979. It is needless to say that the trial court decreed the suit filed by respondent No. 1 herein as the plaintiff. ( 2 ) ). The facts giving rise to this appeal move in a narrow compass. The appellant is a University established under the Gujarat Agricultural university Act, 1969 (the Act for brief ). It appears that by the Government resolution of 25/06/1973 at Exh. 43 on the record of the trial Court, certain activities relating to Research, Education and Extension Training programme facilities pertaining to the Department of Agriculture and Animal husbandry of respondent No. 2 herein came to be transferred to the appellant. This was obviously done under Sec. 51 (5) of the Act. One of these schemes transferred to the appellant University thereunder was the scheme for distribution of Ammonium Sulphate. It was transferred with certain staff of the scheme namely 4 (four) Analysers and 1 (one Laboratory boy. They were to be treated as on deputation. The transfer was to be made effective from 1/07/1973. The staff transferred with the aforesaid scheme included transfer of respondent No. 1 herein in his capacity as an Analyser. His service was also placed under the control of the appellant university. It appears that by its order passed on 30/05/1974 at Exh. 44 on the record of the case, he was promoted as Agricultural Officer on ad hoc basis and appointed as the Principal of Agricultural College at Junagadh. It appears that it was brought to the notice of the appellant university that he was not its permanent employee and was transferred to it on 1/06/1972 and he was wrongly given promotion. Thereupon, by its order passed on 22/04/1976 the promotion given to him by the order at Exh. 44 came to be cancelled. It appears that it was brought to the notice of the appellant university that he was not its permanent employee and was transferred to it on 1/06/1972 and he was wrongly given promotion. Thereupon, by its order passed on 22/04/1976 the promotion given to him by the order at Exh. 44 came to be cancelled. A copy of the order passed on 22/04/1976 is at Exh. 45 on the record of the case. This order was implemented by the order of 27/04/1976 at Exh. 46 on the record of the case. It appears that the idea to retransfer the scheme for Distribution of Ammonium Sulphate to respondent No. 2 was under consideration. It appears that a decision in that regard was taken and the necessary notification was issued by the appellant university on 2/08/1977 inter alia for recommendation of retransfer of the scheme for Distribution of Ammonium Sulphate. It appears that this recommendation was accepted by respondent No. 2 and the necessary resolution in that regard was passed on 31/05/1979. Its copy is at Exh. 56 on the record of the case. It appears that prior to that the Director of Education issued one office order infer alia promoting respondent No. 1 herein to the post of Agricultural Officer on ad hoc basis pending availability of the candidates for the post selected by the Public Service commission or for a period of six months whichever eventuality occurring earlier. A copy of that office order of 28/03/1979 is at Exh. 47 on the record of the case. It appears that in the mean time respondent No. I herein filed one suit in the Court of the Civil Judge (S. D.) at Junagadh questioning the correctness of the reversion order on the ground that he was an employee of the appellant University and was therefore, entitled to promotion to the post of Agricultural Officer. He also prayed for a mandatory injunction for his promotion to and reinstatement on the post of agricultural Officer with full back wages and for a permanent injunction restraining the appellant herein and respondent No. 2 herein from issuing any order, instruction or direction to revert him or to repatriate him from the services of the appellant University. It came to be registered as Regular civil Suit No. 126 of 1979. The appellant herein was arraigned as defendant no. It came to be registered as Regular civil Suit No. 126 of 1979. The appellant herein was arraigned as defendant no. 1 and respondent No. 2 herein as defendant No. 2 in that suit. The appellant as defendant No. 1 filed its written statement at Exh. 12 on the record of the case and resisted the suit on various grounds. Respondent No. 2 herein as defendant No. 2 does not appear to have filed any written statement in the suit. It appears to have been assigned to the learned 2nd joint Civil Judge (S. D.) at Junagadh for trial and disposal. On the pleadings of the parties, the issues were framed at Exh. 15 on the record of the case. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, by his judgment and decree passed on llth September, 1987 in Regular Civil Suit No. 126 of 1979, the learned 2nd Joint Civil Judge (S. D.) at Junagadh accepted the suit in toto and passed the decree as prayed for. That aggrieved the present appellant. It carried the matter in appeal before the District Court of junagadh. Its appeal came to be registered as Regular Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1987. It appears to have been assigned to the learned Extra Assistant judge of Junagadh for hearing and disposal. By his judgment and decree passed on 22/10/1991 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1987, the learned Extra Assistant Judge of Junagadh dismissed the present appellants appeal. The aggrieved appellant has thereupon invoked the further appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Sec. 100 of the Code by means of this Second Appeal. ( 3 ) ). The Courts below have held respondent No. 1 herein to be a permanent employee of the appellant University under the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 52 of the Act. This conclusion reached by the Courts below is challenged before this Court by way of a substantial question of law. ( 4 ) ). It cannot be gainsaid that the scheme for Distribution of ammonium Sulphate was a part of the Department of Agriculture and animal Husbandry till it was transferred to the appellant University under the Government Resolution of 25/06/1973 at Exh. 43 on the record of the case. It is not in dispute that the transfer of the said scheme became effective from 1/07/1973. The Government Resolution at Exh. 43 on the record of the case. It is not in dispute that the transfer of the said scheme became effective from 1/07/1973. The Government Resolution at Exh. 43 clearly speaks that the transfer was under the relevant provisions of the Act. It would obviously be under Sec. 51 (5) of the Act. I am unable to accept the submission urged before me by Shri Shelat for the appellant University to the effect that such scheme cannot be considered as an Institution for the purpose of sec. 51 (5) of the Act. The word institution has not been defined under the Act. It is a term of common parlance. Its meaning can therefore be ascertained from a dictionary. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (3rd Impression 1992) published by Oxford University Press defines it inter alia to mean a society or Organisation founded especially for charitable, religious, educational or social purposes. This scheme was with respect to some activity for distribution of Ammonium Sulphate. It was admittedly an activity relating to Research, Education and Extension Programme pertaining to the Department of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry. Keeping the dictionary meaning of the word institution in mind, the scheme can certainly be said to be an institution within the meaning of Sec. 51 (5) of the Act. ( 5 ) ). At this stage it would be quite proper to look at Sec. 52 of the act. Sub-secs. (1) and (2) are not material for the present purpose. The material provisions of Sec. 52 of the Act are sub-secs. (3) and (4 ). They are reproduced below :" (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. ( 5 ) ). At this stage it would be quite proper to look at Sec. 52 of the act. Sub-secs. (1) and (2) are not material for the present purpose. The material provisions of Sec. 52 of the Act are sub-secs. (3) and (4 ). They are reproduced below :" (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1), every officer or servant of the State Government taken over by the University shall, within a period of two years, from the date he is so taken over (or such further time, if any as the State government may decide), give notice in writing to the State Government - (a) that he should be permitted to retire and thereupon he shall be permitted to retire from Government service and shall be entitled to such terminal benefits as compensation, pension or gratuity, or the like, as may be prescribed by the State Government, or (b) that he should be permanently absorbed in the service of the University and thereupon the University shall absorb him permanently in its service and any service rendered by him under the State Government shall be deemed to be service under the University, and he shall be entitled to receive from the University such terms and conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension, and such rights as respects disciplinary matters or rights similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit as are not less favourable than those to which that person was entitled to immediately before he was taken over by the University, or (c) that he should be permitted to revert to Government service and thereupon he shall be permitted to revert to the service on the same terms and conditions of service applicable to him immediately before he was taken over by the university. (4) If any officer or servant of the State Government tails to give notice under sub-sec. (3) within the time referred to therein, he shall be deemed to have opted to be permanently absorbed in the service of the University under clause (b) of sub-sec. (3 ). (4) If any officer or servant of the State Government tails to give notice under sub-sec. (3) within the time referred to therein, he shall be deemed to have opted to be permanently absorbed in the service of the University under clause (b) of sub-sec. (3 ). "it becomes clear from bare perusal thereof that a duty is cast on every officer or servant of the State Government taken over by the University to give notice in writing within two years from the date he is so taken over (or such further time, if any, as the State Government may decide) inter alia if he wanted to be permanently absorbed in the service of the University or if he wanted to be repatriated to the Government service. Sub-sec. (4) creates a deeming fiction of option to be permanently absorbed in the service of the University if no written notice is given under sub-sec. (3) within the time referred to therein. In the present case, the Scheme for Distribution of Ammonium Sulphate was transferred to and taken over by the appellant University with effect from 1/07/1973. The period of two years would expire on 30/06/1975. It is not the case of the appellant University or respondent No. 2 herein that this period of two years was further extended for the purpose of Sec. 52 (3) of the act. It is not in dispute that respondent No. 2 has given no notice in writing either under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 52 of the Act. In that view of the matter, on and from 1/07/1975, the deeming fiction of his absorption in the service of the University under Sec. 52 (4) of the Act would come into play. He will be deemed to have been absorbed in the service of the University by operation of law. ( 6 ) ). In order to wriggle out of the rigours of Sec. 52 (4) of the Act, shri Shelat, for the appellant has urged that the entire scheme in question has been retransferred to the State Government leaving no vacancy for respondent No. 1 for the purpose of his absorption in the service of the university and as such it should be held that the retransfer of the scheme in question was with the entire staff attached to that scheme. It is not possible for me to accept this submission for one very good reason that no administrative action de hors any statutory provision can come into play against operation of law. The scheme in question was transferred to the appellant University with effect from 1/07/1973 under the Government Resolution at Exh. 43 on the record of the case. On expiry of the period of two years as contemplated under Sec. 52 (3) of the Act, the deeming fiction under Sec. 52 (4) of the Act would come into play. Such deeming fiction cannot be permitted to he defeated by some administrative action. ( 7 ) ). Shri Shelat for the appellant has urged that, since respondent No. 1 was appointed for the purpose of that particular scheme and the scheme is now to be transferred to the State Government, the appellant University will not be in a position to provide any work to him. I think the University should be in a position to find out how his services can best he utilised. It is possible that the appellant University might have recruited some persons for the purpose of that scheme. Retransfer of the scheme under the resolution at Exh. 56 on the record of the case would not mean retransfer of the entire staff in view of clause (3) thereof. The government has unequivocally clarified therein that, if any new staff is appointed for the purpose of any of the scheme under retransfer, the appellant University will have to retain such newly appointed staff. The government has thereby meant that it would be for the University to utilise services of such newly appointed staff for its own purposes though appointed for the purpose of a particular scheme under retransfer. Besides, it is not the function of this Court to advise the appellant University as to what it has to do if no work is available for respondent No. 1 herein on retransfer of the scheme in question. ( 8 ) ). The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagdip singh, reported in AIR 1964 SC 521 is of no avail to the appellant University in the present case for the simple reason that in that case, certain employees were confirmed on non-existing vacancies. It cannot be gainsaid that there can be no confirmation in absence of any available vacancy. It cannot be gainsaid that there can be no confirmation in absence of any available vacancy. In that case, the Supreme court found that creation of supernumerary posts for absorption of confirmed employees was not justifiable on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. I do not think that this ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdip singh (supra) can come to the rescue of the appellant University in the present case. The facts before me are quite different. The transfer of the scheme in question under the Resolution at Exh. 43 on the record of the case was quite just and legal. Such transfer was not effected with a view to accommodating some people in the employment of the University. No supernumerary posts were created for the purpose of accommodating the staff transferred to the appellant university along with the transfer of the scheme in question. In that view of the matter, I think the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of jagdip Singh (supra) will hardly be of any assistance to the appellant University in the present case. ( 9 ) ). In view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that no error whatsoever has been made by the Courts below in holding that respondent no. 1 herein has become a permanent employee of the appellant University by operation of law as provided in the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 52 of the Act. ( 10 ) ). No substantial question of law has been raised with respect to the declared illegality of the reversion order at Exh. 45 on the record of the case at the time of admission of this Second Appeal for hearing. Shri Shelat for the appellant university has however questioned the conclusion reached by the Courts below regarding its illegality and invalidity. I do not think the conclusion reached by the lower Court in that regard deserves to be upset. The case of the appellant university is to the effect that promotion to respondent No. 1 was wrongly given under mistaken belief that he was a permanent employee of the University with effect from 1/06/1972. According to Shri Shelat for the appellant University, it has corrected its error. ( 11 ) ). It is true that a person, whether natural or artificial, is entitled to correct his or its errors or mistakes. According to Shri Shelat for the appellant University, it has corrected its error. ( 11 ) ). It is true that a person, whether natural or artificial, is entitled to correct his or its errors or mistakes. It is however a settled principle of law that, if such correction visits the person in respect of whom such errors or mistakes are made with adverse financial consequences, an opportunity of hearing has to be given before the alleged errors or mistakes are corrected or rectified. In this connection reference deserves to be made to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Divisional superintendent, Eastern Railway, Dinapur v. L. N. Keshrl, reported in AIR 1974 SC 1889 . In that case, the pay and the pay scale of the concerned employees were reduced on the ground of correction of some error or mistake in fixation of their pay and grant of the pay scale to them. Such errors or mistakes were corrected without affording an opportunity of hearing to the employees. In that case, the Supreme Court has held that it cannot be done without giving an opportunity of hearing to the effected parties. This ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of L. N. Keshri (supra) is binding to this Court. It is on all fours applicable in the present case. It is needless to reiterate that the promotion given to respondent No. 1 herein was sought to be cancelled under the impugned order at Exh. 45 on the record of the case on the ground of correction of the error or the mistake made in granting such promotion without giving an opportunity of hearing to him. This cannot simply be permitted to be done in view of the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme court in the case of L. N. Keshri (supra ). ( 12 ) ). Practically to the same effect is the ruling of this Court in the case of S. H. Shirekar v. Union of India, reported in 1985 (1) SLR 144. In that case, refund of salary was ordered on the ground that the promotion given to the concerned employee was irregular. No opportunity of hearing was given to the concerned employee before passing such order. In that context this Court has held that such order cannot be passed without observing rules of natural justice. In that case, refund of salary was ordered on the ground that the promotion given to the concerned employee was irregular. No opportunity of hearing was given to the concerned employee before passing such order. In that context this Court has held that such order cannot be passed without observing rules of natural justice. Sitting as a single Judge, this ruling of this Court in the case of S. H. Shirekar (supra) is binding to me. Even otherwise I am in respectful agreement with the principle of law enunciated therein. It is in consonance with the principle of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of L. N. Keshri (supra ). ( 13 ) ). In the result, this Second Appeal fails. It is hereby dismissed however with no order as to costs on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. ( 14 ) ). Civil Application No. 752 of 1992 has been made for stay of the judgment and the decree passed by the trial Court as affirmed in appeal by the lower appellate Court pending hearing and final disposal of this Second appeal. Since this Second Appeal has been finally disposed of today, this civil Application no longer survives. It is hereby disposed of accordingly. Rule is accordingly discharged however with no order as to costs on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. The interim relief granted therein is hereby vacated. ( 15 ) ). At the oral request of Shri Shelat for the appellant University, operation of this judgment and order is stayed for a period of eight weeks from today to enable the appellant University to challenge this judgment and order of mine before the Apex Court on condition that an application for its certified copy on payment of urgent charges is made on or before 25/07/1993 and that no extension will be granted except on the ground that the certified copy has not become ready for delivery a week prior to expiry of the time limit, set down herein. .