JUDGMENT : S.N. Jha. J. - This revision by the defendant-tenants under section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 ('the Act' in short) arises out of an order of eviction. The plaintiffs sought eviction of the defendants from the suit premises on the ground of personal necessity and expiry of the period of tenancy although, according to them, the defendants had committed default in payment of rent and were liable to eviction on that ground as well. 2. The suit premises comprise of two portions of a house situated at Machhuatoli in the town of Patna mentioned as Lot No. I and Lot No. II described in the second Schedule of the plaint. According to the plaintiffs' case, defendant no. I was inducted as tenant in the portion described as Lot No. I on 15.6.75 initially for a period of 11 months which was extended for fixed periods of 11 months each from time to time, the last tenancy being effective from 31.7.88 expiring on 31.7.88 at a monthly rental of Rs. 240/- under written agreement. It is said that later the defendants also orally took the other portion of the house described as Lot No. II for period of 11 months at monthly rental of Rs. 125/- agreeing to vacate the entire suit premises including the portion comprising Lot No. 11 on 31.7.88 i.e. on expiry of the 11 months period envisaged for the tenancy with respect to Lot No. 1. 3. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants failed to pay the rent with respect to the suit premise since February 1988 and had also failed to pay the electric bill for the said period. According to the plaintiffs further, on expiry of the period of tenancy on 31.7.1988 and the thereafter they asked the defendants to vacate the premises for plantiffs' own use and occupation. The defendants, however, did not oblige. Regarding personal necessity it is said that the plaintiff no. 3 Radha Devi is a widow whose husband had died only four days after the marriage and who had ever since been living with her parents and after their death with her brothers namely plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 as dependants. II is said that small income of plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 is not sufficient for the maintenance of plaintiff no. 1 and 2 as dependants. II is said that small income of plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 is not sufficient for the maintenance of plaintiff no. 3 and, therefore, the premises arc required so that plaintiff no. 3 may open a hotel therein with the help of plaintiff no. 4, who was due to attain majority in February 1989. It is also said that plaintiff no. 4, son of plaintiff no. I, is unemployed having no interest in educational activities and, therefore,' he also wants to open the hotel in the premises. 4. The defendants, after taking leave to contest, tiled written statement. According to them, the tenancy with respect to the two portions aforesaid being separate suit was bad for misjoinder of cause of action and not maintainable with respect to both. The allegation of defaults was denied. They also denied the plaintiffs' case of fixed term tenancy. According to them, the tenancy has always been month to month. They further denied the defendants' case of personal necessity stating that plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 were railway employees posted at Moghalsarai where they had been provided official accommodation in which all the plaintiffs were living. Regarding plaintiff, no. 3 it was said that she was more than (In years old having no experience of hotel business while as regards plaintiff no. 4 it was said that he was minor prosecuting his studies at Moghalsarai. According to the defendants the suit had been instituted on false and concocted grounds since the plaintiffs wanted to extract money as Pagari and enhance rent. 5. The trial court framed as many as 8 issues, I he material issues being whether the defendants arc tenants for fixed period for on monthly basis, vide issue no. 3; whether the plaintiffs have got personal need of the suit premises and are entitled to eviction of the defendants on that ground, vide issue no. 4; and whether the plaintiffs' alleged need can be satisfied by partial eviction of the defendants from the premises, vide issue No.5. It may be stated that although the plaintiffs sought eviction of the defendants only on the ground of personal necessity and expiry of the period of tenancy, vide paragraph 23 of the plaint, not with standing their case of defaulter, the trial court framed a separate issue, namely, issue no. It may be stated that although the plaintiffs sought eviction of the defendants only on the ground of personal necessity and expiry of the period of tenancy, vide paragraph 23 of the plaint, not with standing their case of defaulter, the trial court framed a separate issue, namely, issue no. 6 as to whether the defendants have defaulted in payment of rent. The court decided all the issues including the issue regarding defaulter in favour of the plaintiffs and passed an order of eviction of the defendants within 60 days of the order. 6. Mr. Arun Bihari Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioners, assailed the findings of the court below on various grounds. He submitted that the finding regarding default was not calling for, the suit having been tried as per the summary procedure laid down under section 14 of the Act. The finding that the defendants were fixed term tenants and the period of tenancy having already expired are liable to be evicted from the premises was, challenged on the grounds that the agreement creating lease with respect to the portion mentioned as Lot No. 1 being unregistered could not he looked into for finding out the terms of tenancy. The finding on the question of personal necessity was assailed on the ground that as per the plaintiffs' own evidence, vide P.W. 3, P.W. 4 and P.W. 5, rooms on the ground floor being vacant and in possession of the plaintiffs in which hotel business could he done, the need of the suit premises cannot be said to be bonafide. It was also stated that plaintiff no. 3 having admittedly been living with her parents and thereafter with her brothers (plaintiffs I and 2) for last over three decades as maintenance holder having no other interest in the premises she cannot he said to have any need of the premises for her own use. As regards plaintiff no. 4 it was pointed out that on the plaintiffs' own case pleaded in the plaint he had no independent need of his own since the premises were required for the benefit of plaintiff no. 3, who wanted to "open a hotel in the suit house with the help of plaintiff no. 4 who will be major in the month of February 1999". According to the counsel, in any view, the need of the plaintiff no. 3 being joint with plaintiff no. 3, who wanted to "open a hotel in the suit house with the help of plaintiff no. 4 who will be major in the month of February 1999". According to the counsel, in any view, the need of the plaintiff no. 3 being joint with plaintiff no. 4, once reasonable and bonafide need of plaintiff no. 3 is found to haw not been established, the alleged need of plaintiff no. 4 would automatically fall to the ground. Counsel further submitted that the minority of plaintiff no. 4 also stood in the way of his getting decree in his own right. Learned counsel for the' opposite party, on the other hand, supported the findings of the court below. Counsel for the parties referred to the evidence of the witnesses wherever necessary. 7. A landlord is entitled to eviction of the tenant on one or more of the grounds set out in clause (a) to clause (I) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act. Section 14 of the Act provides for a summary procedure for the trial of suit for eviction on the ground specified in clauses (c) or (e) aforesaid. Clauses (c) and (e) respectively contain the ground of personal necessity and expiry of the period of tenancy. Suit for eviction on any other ground as mentioned in section 11 has to be tried according to the procedure laid down for trial of ordinary suits. The ground of default is contained in clause (d). There cannot be any doubt, therefore, that where eviction is sought on the ground of default the suit has to be tried as per the ordinary procedure of trial of suits. In the instant case, the plaintiffs had themselves confined the ground of eviction to personal necessity and expiry of the period of tenancy as stated above. The plaintiffs, no doubt, stated about the default in payment of rent as part of their case but did not seek eviction on that ground. In that view of the matter, the court below was not required to either frame or decide any issue on the point of default. The aforesaid finding, therefore, must be held to be beyond the scope of the suit. Counsel' for the opposite party, as a matter of fact, very fairly did not controvert the aforesaid legal position. The finding on issue no. The aforesaid finding, therefore, must be held to be beyond the scope of the suit. Counsel' for the opposite party, as a matter of fact, very fairly did not controvert the aforesaid legal position. The finding on issue no. 6 as contained in paragraph 8 of the judgment is accordingly set aside. 8. Coming to the question of personal necessity, it would he useful to quote paragraphs 11 and 12 of the plaint in extenso : "11. That plaintiff no.3 is a widow and her husband died after four days of her marriage and since than plaintiff no. 3 is living with her parents but after the death of her parents plaintiff no. 3 is fully dependent upon the plaintiffs no. 1 and 2. That due to small income now the plaintiff no.1 and 2 are not in a position to look after the plaintiff no. 1 and hence the plaintiff no. 3 wants to open a hotel in the suit house with the help of plaintiff no. 4 who will be major in the month of February 1989) 12. That plaintiff no. 4 is unemployed and the plaintiff no. 4 did not take interest in education and hence the plaintiff no. 4 will open a hotel in the suit house and the suit house is in front of the main road of Bari Path near Machhuatoli a well known place suited for hotel. 9. The precise date of marriage of plaintiff no. 3 is not on the record. However, she being a lady of 55 Years as on the date of deposition, namely, 23.3.1990 it was a common stand at the Bar that she must have been married 30.35 year ago and, the death of her husband having taken place within four days of the marriage, she has always been living with her parent and the brothers. Counsel for the opposite party submitted that after the death of her parents she must he deemed to have her own independent rights and interest in the property left by the parents including the suit, house. However, it would appear that one of the brothers namely, Shambhu Nath (plaintiff no. 2 - P. W. 6) denied that the sister i.e. plaintiff no. 3 had any such right and interest in the house. Plaintiff no. However, it would appear that one of the brothers namely, Shambhu Nath (plaintiff no. 2 - P. W. 6) denied that the sister i.e. plaintiff no. 3 had any such right and interest in the house. Plaintiff no. 3 in her evidence stated that she had been living with her parents and, thereafter, with her brothers as dependents and that she was not aware of the fact that she had any share in the house or any other interest therein. She further stated that the entire rent from the house was being utilised by the two brothers. Almost all the witnesses including plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 (P. W.s. 6, 5 and 3) stated that plaintiffs 1 and 2 are in service posted at Moghalsarai. In this background it is difficult to appreciate the plaintiffs' case of bonafide need for the benefit of plaintiff no.3. In terms of clause (c) of section 11 (1) the need has not only to he reasonable but also bonafide. It is difficult to visualise how a person who has been living as a dependent with her parents or brothers for last well over three decades would suddenly have a separate need of her own. Nowhere it has been said, either in the pleadings or evidence, that plaintiff no. 3 was being ignored or neglected by her brothers or that any kind of strained relationship between them had set in. If plaintiff no. 3 had been living with her parents or brothers for such a long time and was being looked after, in the absence of any cogent circumstance, the plea that the small income of plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 was not sufficient to look after plaintiff no. 3 cannot be accepted. 10. In Suit. Sushila Devi v. Avinash Chandra Jain (AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1150), their Lordships observed : "While the landlord is entitled to the beneficial enjoyment of his property, the law still insists as a measure of social necessity that the court should he satisfied as to the genuineness of the requirement of the landlord under section 14(1)(e) ... The provision contained in section 16 (1) (e) is meant to subserve a public interest and to strike a just-balance between the competing needs of the landlord and the tenant. The provision contained in section 16 (1) (e) is meant to subserve a public interest and to strike a just-balance between the competing needs of the landlord and the tenant. It is axiomatic that when a landlord applied for eviction of a tenant under section 14 (1) (e), there is a duty cast on the court to consider the question on merits on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties. Again, there has to be in such cases an objective determination of the claim of the landlord." It is a well settled proposition that for the purpose of eviction on the ground of personal requirement, distinction had to be made between mere desire or wish and a genuine requirement. The expression bona fide' implies something done or claimed 'in good faith', 'honestly' or 'genuinely'. On the facts of the case the so called need of the premises for the benefit of plaintiff no. 3 does not appear to be anything more than wish or desire of the plaintiffs or even pretence. 11. From perusal of the paragraphs 11 and 12 of the plaint (supra) it is obvious that plaintiff no. 4 has no separate need of his own. Plaintiff no. 3, as alleged wants to open the hotel 'with the help of plaintiff no. 4, who is an unemployed having no interest in education. So far as plaintiff no. 4 is concerned, there is evidence to the effect that he is living with his parents and other family members at Moghalsarai doing studies there. Admittedly on the date of institution of the suit he was less than 18 years of age. It is difficult to visualise that plaintiff no. 1 who is himself in Government job would like his 18 years old son not to prosecute studies and instead do hotel business at Patna in which admittedly no member of the family has got any experience or expertise. The family of the plaintiffs appears to be educated. One can take notice of the fact that the persons have a desire to see that their children or wards are settled in secured jobs, unless there be some compelling reason or family background of any kind otherwise. Nothing of that sort has been brought to my notice. Therefore, in my opinion, the plaintiff's case that they wanted the plaintiff no. Nothing of that sort has been brought to my notice. Therefore, in my opinion, the plaintiff's case that they wanted the plaintiff no. 4, an eighteen year old student to do hotel business as 'helper' to her aunt describing him as unemployed cannot be accepted. I am of the considered opinion, therefore, that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that they need the suit premises reasonably and bonafide. The finding of the trial court to this effect cannot, thus, said to be in accordance with law. 12. I will now take up the ground of expiry of the period of tenancy. Learned counsel has impugned the order of the court in this regard on the ground that the agreement (Kirayanama) is an uregistered document and cannot, therefore, be taken into evidence in view of section 49 of the Registration Act and cannot, thus, form the basis of the finding that the period of tenancy with respect to Lot No.1 had expired on 31.7.88. It was submitted that the suit being composite with respect to both the portions, the order of eviction, if found to be bad with respect to one portion, cannot be upheld with respect to the other. 13. The moot point for consideration is whether the document was compulsorily registrable so as to attract the mischief of section 49 of the Registration Act. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act contains provisions in regard to creation of lease. There was divergence of opinion earlier as to whether the provisions of the T. P. Act are applicable to leases made under different State Rent Control Acts. Reference in this connection may be made to Bench decisions of this Court in Om Prakash v. Additional Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna (AIR 1956 Patna, 305) and Rabu Jagatanand v. Satyanarain ji and Laxmi ji (1961 BLJR, 219). In the former, view was expressed that the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act was a self-contained Act and the provisions of the T.P. Act are not applicable with respect to leases created thereunder. Contrary view was expressed in the latter. In the former, view was expressed that the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act was a self-contained Act and the provisions of the T.P. Act are not applicable with respect to leases created thereunder. Contrary view was expressed in the latter. The dispute has since been set at rest by the apex court in the case of V. Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yesndai Ammal (AIR 1979 Supreme Court, 1745) in which a seven Judges Bench of the Court held that although inroad has been made into freedom of contract and the rights of the landlord have been circumscribed and restricted by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Control Act in order to protect the needy, the lease comes into existence under the T. P. Act purely• as a matter of contract. Provisions of section 107 of the T. P. Act were noticed and it was observed "None of the State Rent Acts has abrogated or affected this provision." 14. In Balm Jagatanand's case (supra) a Bench of this Court, while dealing with the leases for a period of one year, held that all leases of immovable property, other than those from year to year or for any term exceeding one year, can be made either by registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Rajendra Behl v. Deshraj Singh (1989 PLJR, 1162) noticed the conflict between the aforementioned two Bench decisions and observed that normally the proper procedure in the situation would have been to refer the matter to a larger Bench but in view of the law laid down by the apex court in Dhanpal Chettiar (supra) did not feel the necessity of doing so. The learned Judge •applied the rule laid down in Balm Jagatanand even though the period of lease was 11 months holding that the contrary view expressed in AIR 1981 Patna 275 was not a good law the following observations of the learned Judge in paragraph 11 of the judgment may usefully be noticed : "Section 107 of the T.P. Act provides that a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases may be made either by registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. All other leases may be made either by registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. The latter-part of the Section gives option to the parties, either by registered instrument or by oral agreement. If the lease is made even for a period of one year or less by an instrument it shall have to be registered. And that is what has been held in Jagatanand's case." (Emphasis added) 15. Section 49 of the Registration Act, inter alia, precludes a document required by section 17 of the said Act or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act to be registered from being received as 'evidence of any transaction affecting such property' unless it has been registered. It would, thus, follow that if the parties opt to create lease with respect to immovable property under a written instrument the same is required to be registered under section 107 of the T.P. Act and in the absence of registration' cannot be received as evidence of transaction affecting the property. In Uma Devi v. Bimaldeo Narain (1966 BLJR 103) it was held that if a Kirayanama cannot be looked into as being inadmissible in evidence in view of section 107 of the T. P. Act, the contract may be deemed to be an ordinary contract of tenancy and the rent will be payable by the last day of the next following month and not the date mentioned in the document. Following the decision, in such a situation, the tenancy will be deemed to be, as per ordinary contract of tenancy, on month to month basis and for any fixed period. 16. I am conscious of the fact that according to the plaintiffs two separate tenancies are said to have been created with respect to portions mentioned as Lot Nos. I & II. 16. I am conscious of the fact that according to the plaintiffs two separate tenancies are said to have been created with respect to portions mentioned as Lot Nos. I & II. It has, however, to be kept in mind that although two tenancies are said to have been created with respect to two different portions, one under an unregistered instrument for a period of 11 months and the other under an oral agreement,- the period of which was also to expire with the expiry of the period of the other lease, a common suit has been filed with regulatory scheme governing admission in such respect to both.' The tenancy at least as regards portion of Lot No. I cannot be said to be for fixed period and that being so the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim eviction on the ground of expiry of the period under section 11 (1) (e). The suit as also the order of eviction being common to both the tenancies they are not entitled to partial eviction of the defendants from the other portion comprising Lot No. II. The finding of the trial' court in this regard, accordingly, cannot be sustained. 17. For the reasons stated above the impugned order of eviction has to be held as not according to law and is, accordingly, set aside. This revision, thus, succeeds. There will be no order as to cost.