JUDGMENT : S. N. Jha, J. - This appeal by the Plaintiff arises out of a suit for specific performance of contract. The subject matter of the suit is 22086 sq. ft. of land with a pucca house and trees standing thereon in the town of Bhagalpur. According to the plaintiff, the original defendant, since dead and represented by legal heirs, had agreed to sell the property for a consideration of Rs. 55,000/- besides Rs. 1520/- being the amount of arrear rent due from the tenants in occupation of the house. According to the plaintiff, he performed his part of the contract but the defendants refused to oblige and execute the sale deed. According to the defendants, no concluded contract had been arrived at between the parties. The suit was dismissed holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of any agreement between the parties which could be enforced in law and thus he had failed to establish his entitlement to get any decree for specific performance of contract. 2. I have, refrained from setting out the details of the case of the parties, the evidence on record and the findings as, in my opinion, the dismissal of the suit has to be maintained and this appeal has to be dismissed on a very short point. 3. It is well settled by series of judicial pronouncements that existence of contract and subsequent refusal by one of the contractees is not sufficient for the plaintiff's success in a suit for specific performance. The plaintiff has to aver and prove that he had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Reference may straightway be made to the provision contained in Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which reads: "Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person- (a) .... The plaintiff has to aver and prove that he had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Reference may straightway be made to the provision contained in Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which reads: "Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person- (a) .... (b)••• (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant." Form 47 of Appendix A of the First Schedule to Civil Procedure Code (applicable in the case of agreement not in writing) provides for a special form of pleading, the material part of which reads as follows : "The plaintiff has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his part of which the defendant has had notice." 4. Way back in 1928 the judicial committee of the Privy Council in the celebrated case of Ardeshir H. Mama Vs. Flora Sassoon (AIR 1928 Privy Council 208) stated the law on the subject in the following words : "In a suit for specific performance on the other hand, be treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit." (emphasis added) At another place in the same judgment at page 217 their Lordships observed : "Although so far as the Act is concerned, there is no. express statement that the averment of readiness and willingness in an Indian suit for specific performance as necessary as it always was in England, it seems invariably to have been recognised, and, on principle their Lordships think rightly, that the Indian and the English requirements in this matter are the same." The aforesaid decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Prem Raj v. The D. L. F. Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd. and another (AIR 1968 Supreme Court, 1355). After quoting the relevant passages from Flora Sassoon (supra) including the passages extracted above, their Lordships ruled : "In the present case there is absence of an averment on the part of the plaintiff in the plaint that he was ready to perform his part of the contract. In the absence of such an averment it must be held that the plaintiff has no cause of action so far as the relief for specific performance is concerned." (emphasis added) I do not wish to multiply decisions on the point except to refer to Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley (1969) 2 Supreme Court Cases, 539, and Abdul Khader Rowther v. P. K. Sara Bai & ors. (AIR 1990 Supreme Court, 682). The following observations occurring in the former case may be noticed : "In a suit for specific performance it is incumbent on the plaintiff not only to set out' agreement on the basis of which he sues in all its details, he must, go further and plead that he has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement pleaded by him but the defendant has not done so., He must further plead that he has been and is still ready and willing to specifically perform his part of the agreement." The same view was reiterated in the latter case in these words : "His plaint does not contain the requisite pleadings necessary to obtain a decree for specific performance. This equitable remedy recognised by the Specific Relief Act cannot be had on the basis of such pleadings and evidence." 5. In the aforesaid background I shall now consider whether in the instant case the pleadings are in conformity with the requirement of law. The averments in regard to the readiness to perform plaintiff's part of the contract are contained in paragraph 13 of the plaint. It would be useful and indeed fair to quote the paragraph in extenso : "That, though at the inception of the contract no fixed date was stipulated for the performance of the said contract, yet the defendant by his letter dated 23.4.69 hereinbefore mentioned for the first time pointed out that the sale deed would be executed and registered on any day between 7th and 10th day of May, 1969, on receipt of the consideration money. The plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and as a matter of fact performed his part of the contract even agreed to get the sale deed executed and registered after payment of the consideration by a fixed date. As he found that, it would not be possible for him to reach Uttarpara before the morning of eleven, he sent a wire to the defendant which will prove his bonafide. As soon as the plaintiff could arrange leave from Law College, he with his friend Shri Bijoy Kumar left Bhagalpur, with the money and saw the defendant in the morning of 9th May, 1969 and requested him to get the sale deed executed and registered. Thus, the plaintiff was even ready to perform his part of the contract even within the period mentioned in the defendant's letter of 23.4.69 and as such the defendant had no justification to refuse to perform his part of the above contract and as such' the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance of contract aforesaid against the defendant as also other reliefs". (emphasis supplied) Counsel for the plaintiff was not in a position to point out any other averment in the whole of the plaint evidencing the plaintiff's continuing readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. 6. A bare perusal of the averments contained in paragraph 13 makes it clear that readiness, if any, continued only upto the period mentioned in the letter dated 23.4.69 i.e. between 7th and 10th of May 1969. No averment has been made showing a continuing- readiness, on the plaintiff's part, till the institution of the suit and thereafter till the hearing of the suit as held in Llora Sassoon (supra). 7. Counsel for the appellant stated that the necessary facts constituting cause of action have already been stated, only the word 'still' is missing. He contended that it is not a case where there is complete absence of cause of action. Counsel, accordingly, submitted that the pleadings as they stand cannot be said to be defective so as to entail dismissal of the suit on that count. 8. There is no magic in the word. That is true. It is also true that the court should not insist upon literal compliance of the requirements if the provisions have been substantially complied with. 8. There is no magic in the word. That is true. It is also true that the court should not insist upon literal compliance of the requirements if the provisions have been substantially complied with. Whether a particular word is missing or not, continuous readiness to perform the plaintiff's part of contract must be expressed, or at least gathered from the contents of the pleadings to have existed in the part and continued ever since till the hearing of the suit. That readiness must appear from the pleadings. In the instant case the plaintiff averred his readiness to perform his part of the contract upto a certain stage in the past and not thereafter. He did not do so even at the stage of hearing. 9. Counsel contended that the plea of this kind was not taken by the defendants in the written statement and, therefore, there was no occasion for the plaintiff to indicate, his continued readiness ill presenti during course of hearing. He also submitted that in the absence such a plea by the defendant the plaintiff cannot be non-suited. I am afraid, the submissions are wholly misconceived. In a suit for specific performance the averments in regard to plaintiff's readiness to perform his part of the contract constitutes cause of action for the suit. Absence of pleadings as to the cause of action goes to the root of the matter. Without it, the plaint cannot be said to be complete. Therefore, even if such a plea or objection is not taken by the defendant, the court is not absolved of its duty. It is the duty of the court to see that the plaint is in order. This question, in my view, can be raised at any stage. 10. Faced with this difficulty counsel took - the stand today when the judgment was to be dictated that if the Court comes to the conclusion that no decree of specific performance of contract can be granted to the plaintiff on the pleadings as they stand, leave should be granted to him to amend the pleadings. Counsel referred to Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi Vs. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar [(1990) 1 SCC 1661 in support of his contention that in order to complete the averments regarding cause of action in a suit for specific performance the pleadings should be allowed to be amended by supplying the missing averments. 11. Counsel referred to Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi Vs. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar [(1990) 1 SCC 1661 in support of his contention that in order to complete the averments regarding cause of action in a suit for specific performance the pleadings should be allowed to be amended by supplying the missing averments. 11. In this connection, I may point out that this appeal was heard for a good deal of time on two days including yesterday. The entire argument was confined to the maintainability of the suit on the ground of defective pleadings. After hearing the parties, the case was posted for judgment today. It was open to the plaintiff to take steps for amendment of the plaint, during pendency of this appeal earlier, or at least when the defects came to light during course of hearing. However, no petition for amendment of plaint was filed even today. At the stage of judgment giving any leave would not be a sound exercise of discretion. That will be giving premium to the laches of the plaintiff. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to discuss the question as to whether after lapse of more than 24 years, prayer for amendment, even if such petition had been filed, could have been allowed by this Court., It should be kept in mind that relief of specific performance is in the nature of equitable relief and in appropriate cases, the conduct of a party may disentitle him to this relief. I am conscious of the legal position, as enunciated in M/s Ganesh Trading Co. v. Maja Ram (AIR 1978 Supreme "Court, 484) that defective pleadings are generally curable if the cause of action sought to be brought out was not ab initio completely absent. However, as observed in that very case, if lapse of time has barred an action by law of limitation, the court should ordinarily refuse to any indulgence in the matter of amendment of pleadings at belated stage. 12. In the above premises, I am firmly of the view that the plaintiff is not entitled to any decree of specific performance of contract. Since I am deciding this appeal on a short point I have refrained from going into the question as to whether the parties had entered into for the sale of the property at all. In fairness to Mr. Since I am deciding this appeal on a short point I have refrained from going into the question as to whether the parties had entered into for the sale of the property at all. In fairness to Mr. S. C. Ghose, learned counsel appearing for the defendants, however, it may be stated that the plaintiff's case of agreement for sale of the double storeyed pucca house along with appurtenances situate over about 22 kathas of lands in the town of Bhagalpur for a sum of only Rs. 55,000/- without any prepayment of a single paisa to the defendant was seriously challenged. However, since I have not gone into the merits of the plaintiff's case otherwise it would not be fair to give my opinion on the defendants' case either. 13. Before I part with this case, I would like to mention that respondent no. 3 Subhendu Roy Choudhary, one of the sons of the original defendant, died on 17.2.92 during pendency of this appeal leaving behind two sons, a daughter and a widow. No step for substitution of the said heirs was taken within time not even after copy of the affidavit to that effect was served on the counsel for the appellant on 28.6.93. During hearing of this case yesterday counsel for the appellant wanted to file some kind of affidavit. It is obvious that in the circumstances what the appellant was required to do was to file a proper application with prayer for condonation of delay and substitution after setting aside abatement. Admittedly, the affidavit did not and could not have contained such prayer. I, accordingly, refused to entertain the said affidavit which would have served no purpose. It may also be stated that the appeal was heard yesterday in the presence of the appellant, who is a practising lawyer of Bhagalpur, and who participated in the hearing of the case for some time. He accepted the plea of the respondents that by reason of non-substitution of the heirs of the said deceased respondent, the appeal has abated as a whole. 14. In the result, the decree of the court below, dismissing the plaintiff's' suit, is affirmed but for different reasons. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with cost.