Judgment :- JAGANNADHA RAO, C.J. This Contempt Case has been filed on 10-3-1993 by the petitioner, who is a practising advocate, inviting the High Court's attention to certain remarks made by the respondent, Sri K. P. Viswanathan, Minister of Forests, Government of Kerala, on 6-3-1993 while inaugurating a seminar on 'Agastyavanam' biological park in Y.M.C.A. hall at Ernakulam. The function was organised by the Forest Department, Kerala Government. On the next day, i.e., 7-3-1993, the speech, as recorded by the news-reporters, was published in various newspapers. The 'Mathrubhumi', Malayalam Daily (Cochin Edition) in its report, Ext. P. 1, as explained in the Contempt Petition reported that 'the Minister and another person (said to be the Mayor of Cochin) were having grievance against High Court Judges, in that several decisions of the High Court Judges put the Forest Department to great trouble according to the strong language used by the Minister. In spite of deep thinking, he was not able to understand the motive behind these decisions and that what the Minister implied was that the decisions contravens justice'. 2. A Division Bench of this Court took up this matter on 12-3-1993 and first thought of verifying what exactly the Minister said. The learned Advocate General was to verify the particulars and file a statement as per R. 9 of the Contempt of Court Rules. Thereafter, the required statement signed by the Addl. Advocate General, Shri. Beeran, was filed on 1-4-1993. Then the Division Bench felt that 'considering the nature of the controversy and the seriousness of the matter, the Minister of Forests himself should file a detailed affidavit explaining his stand in the matter'. Thereafter, the Minister filed his affidavit on 3-6-1993, with Annexures. 3. The petition came up before us on 11-6-1993 when we heard the petitioner-Advocate in person and the learned Addl. Advocate General, Shri. V. K. Beeran. It may be noted that the Contempt Case was filed on 10-3-1993 and the Division Bench passed the first order on 12-3-1993 and then the Minister appears to have approached the paper on 16-3-1993 for a clarification which was published on 17-3-1993, as stated below. 4. In the counter affidavit, the Minister has stated that the report in the Cochin Edition of 'Mathrubhumi' dated 8-3-1993 is incorrect and misleading, that after coming to known of this, he got a clarification issued to the Editor on 16-3-1993 as per Ext. 4. In the counter affidavit, the Minister has stated that the report in the Cochin Edition of 'Mathrubhumi' dated 8-3-1993 is incorrect and misleading, that after coming to known of this, he got a clarification issued to the Editor on 16-3-1993 as per Ext. R1(a) and that as per the said clarification, a report was again published in Mathrubhumi on 17-3-1993 as per Ext. R1(b). According to the Minister, the correct report is as published in the Mathrubhumi on 7-3-1993 (perhaps, the other Edition), i.e., Ext. R1(c). It is stated in the counter affidavit that Ext. R1(c) does not show that the Minister used any offensive language against the Courts and that that should be preferred to Ext. P1 version of the same paper in the Cochin Edition. It is contended that he had not used 'storage language' nor did he use the word 'motive' (i.e., motive behind the judgment) but was only saying that he did not understand the 'logic' behind the judgment. He was, it seems, only mentioning about the difficulties faced by the Forest Department consequent to High Court orders in public interest cases. He states: "I mentioned two specific cases filed in the Honourable High Court, i.e., the case relating to the extraction of timber from the Ambalavayal Ex. Servicemen Colony in Wyned and the case relating to the extraction of timber from the submergible area of Chimony Dam Reservoir. In the first case mentioned above, as result of the case, the work of extraction and supply of timber had to be rendered and as a result of the retender, there was an increase of more than Rs. 1 crore in the tender amount. Thus apart from the delay in resource mobilisation Government will have to pay a higher amount to the contractor for the work of extraction and supply. In the second case mentioned above, the petitioner therein obtained an order restraining the Forest Department from cutting and removing the trees standing in the submergible area of the Chimony Dam Reservoir. At the same time, there was no prohibition against the construction of the Dam and its plugging. This resulted in the loss of valuable timber and the pollution of water in the Reservoir. At the same time, there was no prohibition against the construction of the Dam and its plugging. This resulted in the loss of valuable timber and the pollution of water in the Reservoir. Thus I was only explaining the difficulties faced by the Government on account of the action of some persons claiming to be lovers of nature and forests in filing some cases in the name of public interest. I was not complaining about or criticising the Honourable Judges or their conduct. It may also be noted that the abovementioned statements were made by me in a Seminar in which questions relating to protection and development of forests, preservation of nature and protection of environment were to be discussed. The petitioner failed to understand and appreciate the context of my speech." He then explained that he did not state anything which was calculated or intended to scandalise the Court or to undermine or lower the authority of the Court and there was no intention on his part to 'ridicule' the judiciary as alleged, that he has been misquoted, that the reporter added his own subjective inferences, that the petitioner's allegations are 'baseless' and that he 'would make it clear that if my speech created any such wrong impression and misunderstanding in the mind of the petitioner, I am genuinely sorry about it and I deeply regret that an occasion for such a misunderstanding arose'. He then stated that the allegations of the petitioner are 'baseless' and 'misconceived' and that further action be dropped. He also clarifies in his counter : "Similarly what I had said during the speech was that I had not understood the 'logic' (and not 'motive') behind a particular order (and not the judgments in general). I only said that my commonsense could not comprehend the logic behind ........". 5. The question is whether these remarks were justifiable or amount to contempt. 6. Before we go into the various aspects of the matter, we have to record that in recent times, there is a sudden spurt in the criticism of Judges by several persons belonging to various fields. All these are flashed in headlines in the Press. In out opinion, we have reached as stage where the criticism is intended for cheap popularity (populist) rather than being fair and/or constructive. All these are flashed in headlines in the Press. In out opinion, we have reached as stage where the criticism is intended for cheap popularity (populist) rather than being fair and/or constructive. No attempt is made to understand the working of judicial system and the tremendous problems of docket-explosion, lack of infrastructure and financial constraints under which it is working. In spite of all that is said, it is gratifying that the public in this country have the utmost faith in our judiciary and the rule of law. The tremendous increase in the cases in Courts and the cases involving public interest have been helping to remedy several individual and public grievances. It is, therefore, of importance that those in responsible position and also the Press should not shut their eyes to these realities and should think twice before they say anything bad against the Judiciary. 7. Frequently, it is said that Courts pass orders which create some problems for the administration. Here, it must be noted that both at the level of the High Court and the Subordinate Courts, hundreds of orders are passed every day. Ex parte orders are passed to prevent damages which cannot be remedied later. There is always scope for the opposite party to move the Court for modification or vacating the orders. Several orders, even thereafter, are appealable or revisable. Final orders passed by learned single Judges, even in interlocutory applications in writ jurisdiction are, as per the recent Five-Judge Full Bench, appealable to a Division Bench. Final judgments are also appealable here itself within the Court. Judgments of the High Court are appealable to the Supreme Court. In the context of these procedures which are plenty, and which are intended to correct any mistakes of law or fact committed by Judges - we fail to see why there should be a hue and cry and unwanted criticism about stay orders. We are not however stating that stay orders can be granted for the mere asking of it. 8. The State, in particular, has a large number of legal advisers in the Subordinate Courts and the High Court and a huge establishment. We are not however stating that stay orders can be granted for the mere asking of it. 8. The State, in particular, has a large number of legal advisers in the Subordinate Courts and the High Court and a huge establishment. All that is required is for the concerned officers of the Government or the Secretary or the Minister to direct the law officers to take appropriate measures to have any order, - which they consider to be wrong - to be corrected within the judicial process. Red tapism, bureaucratic procedures and various other factors plaguing the Government must be the reason for the remedial measures not being resorted to in time or immediately. In several situations, where time is of the essence, the Government machinery must act swiftly. While it is not perhaps possible to expect the same speed which a private litigant might rise up to, at least a genuine effort must be made by Government or the public sector before they think of accusing the judiciary of coming in the way of their actions. As long as judicial review of legislative and administrative action remains the hall-mark of our rule of law and our democratic constitutional set up, stay orders from Courts cannot be absolutely avoided. The system of checks and balances is basic to our system. When the judicial process itself provides for grant of stay orders and also for vacating the stay orders, there is no need to complain against the grant of stay orders by the Judges. This is not to say that stay orders can be mechanically granted by the Courts. There must be a prima facie case and balance of convenience. It is also the duty of the Courts to be circumspect and see that its powers are not abused by vexatious or dishonest litigants and that neither private nor public interest is put in jeopardly. In this context, preventive interim orders stand on a different footing as against the interim mandatory orders. The latter are not normally granted. 9. So much about the internal judicial mechanism and safeguards which, if resorted to in time, can correct the human error that may be committed at an interlocutory stage or at the final disposal by any Court. 10. We have also, at the outset, to refer to another aspect of the matter. The latter are not normally granted. 9. So much about the internal judicial mechanism and safeguards which, if resorted to in time, can correct the human error that may be committed at an interlocutory stage or at the final disposal by any Court. 10. We have also, at the outset, to refer to another aspect of the matter. Today we come across frequent denials by public-men as to what is reported in the Press as regards their public speeches. When a former Chief Minister of a State denied totally what was attributed to him in the Press, Chandrachud, C.J. adverting to the need to prepare written speeches, and observed : "But, whether he (the Chief Minister) speaks from a text or speaks extempore, it is unlikely, that a speech made by a Chief Minister on a formal occasion will not be taken down or tape-recorded. Also it is much safer for persons who have to make frequent public appearances to have their utterances duly put on paper, before or soon after the event." The reason is this : "For those who have nothing to conceal or fear, that is a prudent course of action. For the rest, a constant friction with law of contempt is inevitable. The former will lay their cards on the table and be cleared. The latter have to live in the hope that the rigorous standard of 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' will act as their saviour. The latter course of conduct leaves much to be desired from the point of view of men of honour." 11. For the purpose of this discussions, we shall assume that the version of the Minister as per Ext. R1(c) publication is the correct one and not the version in the Cochin Edition of the paper in Ext. P1. Ext. R1(c) has to be read with Ext. R1(a) letter to the Editor stating that Ext. P1 is incorrect in its inferences. 12. Ext. R1(a) refers to two instances of Court orders about which the Minister has a grievance. Here, though 'justification' is not a defence in Contempt jurisdiction, we are prepared to examine the matter even from the angle of 'justification'. 13. R1(a) letter to the Editor stating that Ext. P1 is incorrect in its inferences. 12. Ext. R1(a) refers to two instances of Court orders about which the Minister has a grievance. Here, though 'justification' is not a defence in Contempt jurisdiction, we are prepared to examine the matter even from the angle of 'justification'. 13. The first instance referred to by the Minister is that when, in accordance with the orders of the learned single Judge in a writ petition, the 'contract for cutting and transport of tress to Government depots from Ex-Servicemen Colony at Ambalavayal' and 'tenders were invited', 'there was an increase of more than Rs. 1 crore in the tender amount and that the Government had to give this additional amount to the contractor'. 14. Now, if the Government had any grievance about the orders of the learned single Judge, they could have come up writ appeal. In fact, Government did come up much later in writ appeal and were only aggrieved about certain 'observations' by the learned single Judge, but not about the direction. In writ appeal, this Court, in fact, expugned the observations. If, indeed, the Government was aggrieved about any directions, they could have moved this Court within 24 hours in appeal to get the orders stayed or modified. This was not done. The Minister has not explained in his counter as to what action he had taken to avail of the available legal remedies. Therefore, having not done what was expected of him, the remarks about so-called consequences of the order of the learned single Judge, are not warranted. Further, the Minister is impugning the correctness of the orders of the learned single Judge on the basis of the later events. Hindsight is always great. If he or his officers had expected such losses on account of the retender, they should have questioned the orders of the learned Judge immediately rather than take the chances of the Government incurring losses in the retender. Therefore, the remarks of the Minister were wholly unjustified. 15. We shall then take the second matter. That again relates to cutting and removal of trees submerged in the water of Chimony Reservoir. The PWD was allowed by the Court to complete the Dam and to plug it. Therefore, the remarks of the Minister were wholly unjustified. 15. We shall then take the second matter. That again relates to cutting and removal of trees submerged in the water of Chimony Reservoir. The PWD was allowed by the Court to complete the Dam and to plug it. But in regard to the orders preventing the Forest Department from cutting the trees, the Government never took any effective steps to have the orders vacated or reviewed before the Dam was plugged and before water started accumulating on this side of the Dam. After all, Governmental officials know that if water collected on this side, it might be difficult to cut those trees later. No serious effort was even made to take advantage of the corrective procedures available within the system. The Government cannot, therefore, blame this Court for the result of its own inaction, even in regard to the second issue. 16. We have, therefore, said enough to point out to the Minister that his remarks even as per the so-called correct publication, Ext. R1(c), were not warranted. He has in his affidavit said that he did not question the 'motives' of the judgments as published in Ext. P1, but had only wondered about the 'logic' of the Courts' orders. Assuming it to be so, and that the 'logic' was not within his understanding, nothing prevented him or his predecessors in office or his officers to take in-time measures to have the orders corrected. It is easy to make remarks long after the events. What is required is to try to understand what the Court, when it passed the orders, had in mind and what its 'logic' or purpose then was. It cannot be said that, in these two instances, the learned Judges did not have their own good reasons for passing the orders they did. Those reasons would have come out from the same learned Judges if an effort was made to move them in time. If the reasons were wrong, an appellate Court could have been approached to correct the mistake or review could have been sought, in time. 17. When criticism is made against the Judiciary in public, great care must be taken by the person who indulges in it. Fair criticism is not unwelcome. But, as said by Lord Atkin in Ambard v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago, (1936) AC 322 at 335 : ".... 17. When criticism is made against the Judiciary in public, great care must be taken by the person who indulges in it. Fair criticism is not unwelcome. But, as said by Lord Atkin in Ambard v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago, (1936) AC 322 at 335 : ".... no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising, in good faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice." Then comes the famous passage : "The path of criticism is a public way; the wrong-headed are permitted to err therein : provided that members of the public abstain from imparting improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justices, they are immune." and yet another famous passage : "Justice is not a cloistered virtue : she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men." Therefore, the path of criticism is a 'public way', and the wrong headed are however permitted to err. But if the error crosses the permissible limits, the law of Contempt will step in and vindicate the dignity of the Courts. 18. The Minister then refers to his 'commonsense' and want of 'logic' in the Court orders. In Ext. R1(a) clarification, the Minister, after referring to the two instances, says : "I also said that in this background, my commonsense cannot understand the logic of the Court verdict." The same sentence occurs in Ext. R1(b) clarification which was again published in the paper on 17-3-1993. He explains in his counter-affidavit (para 8) : "Similarly, what I had said during the speech was that I had not understood the 'logic' (and not 'motive') behind a particular order (and not the judgments in general)". and says : "I only said that my commonsense could not comprehend the logic behind an order ......" 19. It then boils down to this. He says that his commonsense does not enable him to understand the 'logic' of the Courts' orders. We can only be sorry for that. and says : "I only said that my commonsense could not comprehend the logic behind an order ......" 19. It then boils down to this. He says that his commonsense does not enable him to understand the 'logic' of the Courts' orders. We can only be sorry for that. Here we would like to refer to the Minister the opinion of great jurists as to how far 'logic' and 'commonsense' alone could not be depended upon for resolving issues arising in the Courts of law. Logic is not all. 20. If the Minister thinks that his commonsense and capacities for logic are superior than that of the Courts, he may indeed be wrong. It will be good to remind him that the Courts do pass orders or decide cases within the constraints of the Constitution and the laws, the precedents of the Court and of the Supreme Court, and also base their orders on various other relevant considerations. We do not always have the freedom which we would otherwise like to have or which the Minister has. 'Logic' in law has always been a controversial subject. 21. Justice Holmes, one of the greatest Judges who presided over the American Supreme Court said (see the Common Law, 1911, p. 1) : "The life of the law has not been logic : it has been experienced. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which the Judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men would be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics." Logic means differently to different individuals. Bertrand Russel has warned us (see Sceptical Essay (1928) c. 7 Behaviorism and Values 99) on 'logic' as follows : "When it is said, for example, that the French are 'logical', what is meant is that, when they accept a premise, they also accept everything that a person totally devoid of logical subtlety would erroneously suppose to follow from that premise. ....... ....... Logic was, formerly, the art of drawing inference; it has not become the art of abstaining from inferences, since it has appeared that the inferences we feel naturally inclined to make are hardly valid." If we construe the word 'logic' in the light of this warning, we may readily agree with Justice Holmes when he asserts that 'the whole outline of the law is the resultant of a conflict at every point between logic (viz. hasty generalisation) and good sense' (Holmes, Collected Papers (1920) (Agency) 49, 50). Adverting to some examples, Justice Cardozo says (The Nature of the Judicial Process, 1921 C1) that 'the logic of one principle' prevails over the logic of another. He even says that : "We in the United States have been readier to subordinate logic to utility." (Cardozo, the Growth of the Law, 1924, 77). In his 'Nature of Judicial Process', 1921 (C1), he has said that : "What is in question in the case proposed is not a logical problem or a choice of judicial methods but a conflict of social interests." 22. Cardozo's celebrated discussion of the four methods of judicial process (see Nature of Judicial Process the Method of Philosophy) speaks not merely of logic but also of custom, tradition, historical development, sociological utilitarianism, and ethics. All of them have their own part to play. Again, what is involved is not logical deduction in the strict sense but the rational use of analogy, whereby a case is compared with like and unlike, so as to determine the 'proper' scope of a legal rule. No analogy is compelling in a purely logical sense as leading to a necessary conclusion; but as a practical matter, human beings do reason any analogy, and find this in many instances a useful way of arriving at normative or practical decisions. Here again, even in what Cardozo characterises as the logical method, the basis of this approach is primarily 'human experience' of the efficiency and utility of analogical reasoning (Lloyds Introduction of Jurisprudence, 1985 p. 1142). Therefore it is that 'logic is only one of the factors and cannot be the sole basis for the Court. Again commonsense is not all. 23. Commonsense again is only one of the many tools. To go always by it in the Courts is in fact dangerous. The law says 'man' includes a 'woman', 'singular' includes 'plural' and so on. Therefore it is that 'logic is only one of the factors and cannot be the sole basis for the Court. Again commonsense is not all. 23. Commonsense again is only one of the many tools. To go always by it in the Courts is in fact dangerous. The law says 'man' includes a 'woman', 'singular' includes 'plural' and so on. 'May' means 'shall' and vice-versa in certain situations. The students of politics and Constitutional law know that though the Constitution says that the Cabinet shall aid and advice the Governor or the President, in fact, and in law, the aid and advice are almost always binding except in the rare situations laid down by the Supreme Court. This is what the Supreme Court has said long back in Shamshar Singh's case. Again principles of natural justice are implied even if the Statute is silent. When the statute says that a decision of a body is final and cannot be touched by the Courts on any ground, the Court can still examine it as laid down by the House of Lords in Anisminic's case. Arbitrators are safer when they do not give reasons than when they do. Examples can be multiplied. In this view, commonsense can never be the sole basis for the Courts. 24. By saying that the Judges who decided these two cases were not logical or that their commonsense was inferior to that of his, the Minister attempted to show the Judges in poor light and this cannot be doubted. He considered his capacities for logic and his commonsense as superior. This should not, in our opinion, have been done, particularly from what we have stated about 'logic' and 'commonsense'. Often, people try to speak of Judges and their judgments in poor light and then when they face action for contempt, they hasten to add that they never meant any disrespect. Considering the high position which Ministers and similarly highly placed persons occupy in public life of our country, their words and deeds 'have to be presumed to be intended'. The defence that what was said or done was not intended is not open and, prima facie, unbelievable. The formal expression of regard for the Courts, under pressure of a Contempt notice becomes a mere "escape", if speeches and writings betray defiance of judicial authority ...... The defence that what was said or done was not intended is not open and, prima facie, unbelievable. The formal expression of regard for the Courts, under pressure of a Contempt notice becomes a mere "escape", if speeches and writings betray defiance of judicial authority ...... M. R. Prashar v. Farook, AIR 1984 SC 615 : (1984 Cri LJ 337) at 616. 25. In the result, we say, taking an indulgent view of the matter, that the Minister's view as to his own 'logic' and 'commonsense' were not warranted and not justified. He has, in fact, based his conclusions on subsequent events, but claims that he is basing his conclusions on 'logic' and 'commonsense', which is not true. He has unnecessarily cast aspersions on the capacity of the Judges to 'logic' or 'commonsense'. He is pronouncing his verdict, by the benefit of after events or hind-sight, - having himself contributed to these results by not taking appropriate steps in time. His aspersions on the learned Judges must be termed as not warranted and not justified. 26. Therefore, assuming that the Minister's version of his speech as per Ext. R1(c) is correct, we hold that his remarks were uncalled for. Question arises as to what we have to do with Ext. P1 speech as reported in the Press ? 27. As regards Ext. P1, we have decided to drop the contempt proceedings not because we are satisfied with his counter affidavit, but because we feel inclined to give him 'benefit of doubt' (as in Farook Abdullah's case above referred to) particularly when he contends that the reporting of his speech is not accurate and that the reporter added some gloss to the effect that the Minister meant that the orders of Court contravened justice. 28. Before parting with the case, we would like to sound a warning. Of late, criticism of Judges is on the increase. It has reached a boring point. In as much as the Press is too fond and ready to publish about Judges, people who are fond of publicity have, in our humble view, resorted to uncalled for criticism. Several of the articles, criticising Judges, are pedestrian and unscholarly or are exaggerated. Judges do not, as per well established conventions, hit back by going to the Press. In as much as the Press is too fond and ready to publish about Judges, people who are fond of publicity have, in our humble view, resorted to uncalled for criticism. Several of the articles, criticising Judges, are pedestrian and unscholarly or are exaggerated. Judges do not, as per well established conventions, hit back by going to the Press. In fact, if Judges respond, they are likely to get embroiled in further controversy of a reply to a reply which, in fact, is what the critic or the publisher desires, for, that gives him greater publicity. Judges do not reply. That is not because the allegations cannot be denied and the untruth exposed, but because they are handcuffed by judicial convention, decorum and discipline. 29. Judges, by reason of their long training at the Bar and the Bench over several decades, have to develop and in fact develop tremendous powers of self-restraint and patience. They maintain their dignity by not getting easily disturbed by the remarks of all and sundry. In a classical statement in Regina v. Commissioner of the Metropolic, Ex parte Backburns, 1968 (2) WLR 1204, Lord Denning said : "Let me say at once that we will never use this (Contempt) jurisdiction as a means to uphold our dignity. That must rest on sure foundations." Surely, our dignity rests on surer foundations and will remain unshaken. The enlightened public - Judges of Judges - will have the last word. After all, there is an "end" to everything. The Contempt Case is disposed of with the above remarks. Order accordingly.