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1993 DIGILAW 282 (GAU)

Ch. Manihar Singh : Pakhothang Haokip : Th Kriti Singh : N. Tomba Singh : S. Ranjit Singh : L. Panthoi Singh : N. Manaotom Singh : M. Yaima Singh : v. Chief Engineer, Irrigation and Flood Control Department, Govt Of Manfrur, Imphal and Ors.

1993-12-07

J.N.SARMA

body1993
All these Civil Rules are taken up together for hearing as they raise the common question of law and facts. 2. The reliefs prayed for in these writ applications are that all these petitioners were Muster Roll workers and their services were terminated on different dates. Now filing these writ applications they prayed that the order of termination passed by the authority on the different dates may be quashed and their services may be regularised. 3. I have heard Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioners in all the Civil Rules and the learned Advocate General for the State of Manipur for the respondents. 4. The brief facts are as follows : In Civil Rule No. 146 of 1987 the petitioner Ch. Manihar Singh was appointed as a Muster Roll Khalasi from 1.1.79 and his service was terminated on 23.3.83. Thus his approximate length of service was 4 years 3 months (4 years 2 months 22 days). His name is at Annexure A/2 to the writ application. It is admitted that he was not appointed under regular establishment. In Civil Rule No. 147 of 1987 the petitioner Paokhthang Haokip was appointed as Muster Roll Engine Operator on 1.6.82 and he served till 17.1.83. In the writ application appointment letter and termination order are enclosed. He served only 7 months. His name is not in the Annexure A/2. He was not appointed on regular establishment. In Civil Rule No. 148 of 1987 the petitioner Th. Kriti Singh was appointed as Muster Roll Engine Operator from 1.6.81 to 14.3.83. In the writ application there is no appointment letter has been enclosed. His service was terminated on 14.3.83. In the representation which was filed as Annexure A/3 to the writ application does not include his name. In Civil Rule No. 149 of 1987 the petitioner N.Tomba Singh was appointed on 15.7.82 and he worked till 17.1.83. The writ application does not contain the appointment letter and the termination order. The period of service is 6 months 3 days. His name is not included in the representation Annexure A/3 to the writ application. In Civil Rule No. 150 of 1987 the petitioner Keinu Kom was appointed as Muster Roll Tracer on 1.7.79 and he worked upto 15.3.83. Thus, he served for a period of 3 years 8 months and 14 days. His name is not included in the representation Annexure A/3 to the writ application. In Civil Rule No. 150 of 1987 the petitioner Keinu Kom was appointed as Muster Roll Tracer on 1.7.79 and he worked upto 15.3.83. Thus, he served for a period of 3 years 8 months and 14 days. In Civil Rule No. 151 of 1987 the petitioner W.Thoiba Singh was appointed as Muster Roll Road Mohorar on 1.9.79 and he worked upto 14.3. 83. Thus, he was in service for a period of 3 years 6 months 13 days. His service was terminated on 14.3. 83. His name is not included in the representation i.e. in Annexure A/3 to the writ application. In Civil Rule No. 152 of 1987 the petitioner Kaikhoun Haukip was appointed as the Muster Roll Engine Operator from 31.12.80. His period of service is 2 years 1 months and 17 days. His name in not included in the Annexure A/3 to the writ application. In Civil Rule No. 153 of 1987 the petitioner L Shamungou Singh was appointed as the Muster Roll Engine Operator on 18.6.82 and he worked upto 12.1.83. Thus his period of service was only 6 months 24 days. His name is not included in Annexure A/3 to the writ application. In Civil Rule No. 154 of 1987 the petitioner S. Tarun Singh was appointed as the Muster Roll Road Mohorar from October, 1977 and he worked upto 23.3.83. Thus his period of service is 5 years 6 months. His name is included in Annexure A/3 to the writ application. In Civil Rule No. 155 of 1987 the petitioner A. Shakhitombi Devi was appointed as the Muster Roll Tracer on 18.1.78 and she worked upto 15.3.83 and her period of service is 5 years 3 months. Her name is included in Annexure A/3 to the writ application. In Civil Rule No. 156 of 1987 the petitioner Md. Nasib Ali was appointed as Muster Roll Khalasi in October, 1977 and he worked upto 23.3.83 and thus his period of service is 5 years 3 months. His name is included in the Annexure A/3 to the Writ application. In Civil Rule No. 157 of 1987 the petitioner Mr. Tambailamani Mia was appointed as Muster Roll Chowkidar on 1.6.78 and he worked upto 14.3.83. Thus the period of service is 5 years 9 months. His name is not included in Annexure A/3. His name is included in the Annexure A/3 to the Writ application. In Civil Rule No. 157 of 1987 the petitioner Mr. Tambailamani Mia was appointed as Muster Roll Chowkidar on 1.6.78 and he worked upto 14.3.83. Thus the period of service is 5 years 9 months. His name is not included in Annexure A/3. In Civil Rule No. 158 of 1987 the petitioner L. Iboyaima was appointed as the Muster Roll Khalasi in the month of October, 1977 and he worked upto 23.3.83 and his period of service is 5 years 6 months. In Civil Rule No. 173 of 1987 the petitioner M. Yaima Singh was appointed a as the Work Charge Road Mohorar on 1.6.3 and he worked upto 21.3.83. He was in service as work charge for a period of 20 years 9 months and 20 days. In Civil Rule No. 174 of 1987 the petitioner N. Manaoton Singh was appointed as Work Charge Road Mohorar on 1.6.63 and he worked upto 21.3.83 and thus his period of service is 20 years 9 months. In Civil Rule No. 175 of 1987 the petitioner L. Panthoi Singh was appointed as the Muster Roll Peon in the month of October, 1978 and he worked upto 23.3.83. Thus his period of service is 5 years 5 months. In Civil Rule No. 172 of 1987 the petitioner S. Ranjit Singh was appointed as the Muster Roll Khalasi on 25.3.81 and he worked upto 9.3.83. Thus his total period of service is 2 years 10 months. 5. It is settled law that the Government must behave like a model employer. The Government is not expected to exploit the employees, nor it is expected that the Government should resort to a policy of hire and fire as convenient and suitable to it. But at the same time the question which arises in this case is that whether the Court can issue a blanket mandate to the Govt. to regularise the services of all the work charged employees. But at the same time the question which arises in this case is that whether the Court can issue a blanket mandate to the Govt. to regularise the services of all the work charged employees. Because in issuing such a mandate g the Court is to bear in mind the caution given by the Supreme Court in AIR 1992 SC 789 (Delhi Development Horticulture Employee's Union vs. Delhi Administration, Delhi & others) wherein the Supreme Court pointed out as follows : "(1) This country has so far not found it feasible to incorporate the right to livelihood as fundamental right in the Constitution. This is because the country has-so far not attained the capacity to guarantee it, and not because it considers it any the less fundamental to life. Advisedly, therefore, it has been placed in the Chapter of Directive Principles, Article 41 of which enjoins upon the State to make effective provision for securing the same "within the limits of its economic capacity and development. Thus even while giving the direction to the State to ensure the right to a work, the Constitution makers thought it prudent not to do so without qualifying it. (2) Not all those who gain such back-door entry in the employment are in need of the particular jobs. Though already employed elsewhere, they join the jobs for better and secured prospects. That it why most of the cases which come to the Courts are of employment in Government Departments, public undertakings or agencies. Ultimately it is the people who bear the heavy burden of the surplus labour. The other equally injurious effect of indiscriminate regularisation has been that many of the agencies have stopped undertaking casual or temporary workers though they are urgent and essential for fear that if those who are employed on such works are required to be continued for 240 or more days have to be absorbed as regular employees although the works are time-bound and there is no need of the workmen beyond the completion of the works undertaken. The public interests are thus jeopardised on both Court." 6. In AIR 1987 SC 2342 (Daily Rated Casual Labour Employees vs. Union of India) wherein the Supreme Court was considering the case of an casual labour. Th? The public interests are thus jeopardised on both Court." 6. In AIR 1987 SC 2342 (Daily Rated Casual Labour Employees vs. Union of India) wherein the Supreme Court was considering the case of an casual labour. Th? Supreme Court in paragraph 8 of the judgment pointed out inter alia as follows : "(1) Of those rights the question of security of work is of utmost imporatance. If a person does not have the feeling that he belongs to an organisation engaged in production he will not put forward his best effort to produce more. That sense of belonging arises only when he feels that he will not be turned out of employment the next day at the whim of the management. It is for this reason it is being repeatedly observed by those who are in charge of economic affairs of the countries in different parts of the world that as far as possible security of work should be assured to the employees so that they may contribute to the maximisation of production. It is again for this reason that managements and the Government agencies in particular should not allow workers to remain as casual labourers or temporary employees for an unreasonably long period of time. It is against this background that we say that non regujarisation of temporary employees or casual labourers for a long period is not wise policy. We, therefore, direct the respondents to prepare a scheme on a rational basis for obsorbing as far as possible the casual labourers who have been continuously working for more than one year in the........." 7. The next case is (1992) 4 SCC 465 (State of Rajasthan vs. Arun Mathur). In this case the Supreme Court was dealing with cases of some daily rated clerks recruited on purely temporary basis as stop-gap measure to tackle the volume of works for the time being with the express stipulation that their services could be terminated at any time without notice. Subsequently on availability of properly recruited persons, through Public Service Commission, the services of the daily rated clerks were terminated. In the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court held that any direction that they should he held to be in service and continuing as such not required to be issued by the Court. Subsequently on availability of properly recruited persons, through Public Service Commission, the services of the daily rated clerks were terminated. In the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court held that any direction that they should he held to be in service and continuing as such not required to be issued by the Court. However, the Supreme Court pointed out that they deserved a sympathetic consideration for appointment/regularisation against the existing vacancies if Qualified and eligible in recognition of their valuable services. 8. On the back drop of those laws enunciated by the Supreme Court, now let us have a look at the facts and circumstances of the cases. It is made clear that for the purpose of regularisation, I shall take two (2) years to be the period for regularisation. (i) In Civil Rule No. 146 of 1987 the petitioner served for a period of 4 years 3 months. So, he is to be regularised against an existing vacancy. So, this petition is allowed. (ii) In Civil Rule No. 147 of 1987 the petitioner worked only for a period of 7 months. So, his case does not require to be considered for regularisation. So, this petition is rejected. (iii) In Civil Rule No. 148 of 1987 the petitioner served for a period of one year 7 months. So, this petition is rejected. (iv) In Civil Rule No. 149 of 1987 the period of service of the petitioner ie only for 6 months. So, this petition stands rejected. (v) In Civil Rule No. 150 of 1987 the period of service of the petitioner is 3 years 4 months. So, this petition is allowed. He well be regularised in his service. (vi) In Civil Rule No. 151 of 1987 the period of the petitioner's service is 3 years 6 months. So, this petition is allowed. The petitioner will be regularised, (vii) In Civil Rule No. 152 of 1987 the period of service of the petitioner is 1 year 11 months. This is a marginal case, so this petition is allowed and he will be regularised. (viii) In Civil Rule No. 153 of 1987 the period of service of the petitioner is only 7 months. So this petition stands rejected. (ix) In Civil Rule No. 154 of 1987 the period of service of the petitioner is 5 years (7) months. So this petition stands allowed. The petitioner will be regularised. (viii) In Civil Rule No. 153 of 1987 the period of service of the petitioner is only 7 months. So this petition stands rejected. (ix) In Civil Rule No. 154 of 1987 the period of service of the petitioner is 5 years (7) months. So this petition stands allowed. The petitioner will be regularised. (x) In Civil Rule No. 155 of 1987 the petitioner served for 4 years 10 months. So, this petition is allowed. The petitioner's service will be regularised. (xi) In Civil Rule No. 156 of 1987 the period of service of the petitioner is 5 years 3 months. So, this petition is allowed. The petitioner service will be regularised. (xii) In Civil Rule No. 157 of 1987 the period of service of the petitioner is 5 years 9 months. So, this petition is allowed and he will be regularised. (xiii) In Civil Rule No. 158 of 1987 the period of service is 6 years 5 months. So, this petition is allowed. The petitioner will be regularised. (xiv) In Civil Rule No. 174 of 1987 the service is for a period of 3 years 9 months. So, this petition is allowed. The petitioner's service will be regularised. (xv) In Civil Rule No. 174 of 87 the period of service of the petitioner is 20 years 9 months. So, this petition is allowed. The petitioner's service will be regularised. (xvi) In Civil Rule No. 175 of 1987 the petitioner served for a period of 5 years 5 months. So, this petition is allowed. The petitioner will be regularised. (xvii) In Civil Rule No. 172 of 1987 the period of petitioner's service is 2 years 10 months. So, this petition is allowed. The petitioner's service will be regularised. 9. It is made clear that before making regularisation, the authority may consider as to whether the petitioners were duly qualified on the date of initial appointment to be appointed to their respective posts. If it is found that they were not duly qualified to be appointed to their respective posts at the time of their initial appointment, the question of regularisation shall not arise. 10. Accordingly, I give the following directions : (i) The orders of termination of the petitioner's whose petitions have been allowed stands quashed and he petitioned s services shall be regularised by the authority within a period of (4) four months from today. 10. Accordingly, I give the following directions : (i) The orders of termination of the petitioner's whose petitions have been allowed stands quashed and he petitioned s services shall be regularised by the authority within a period of (4) four months from today. But, it is made clear that the petitioner's shall not be entitled to any back wages. (ii) For the purpose of other benefits, their period of service shall be counted, from their initial appointment. (iii) The respondents are directed to prepare a scheme on rational basis for absorbing as far as possible the casual labourers/Muster Roll workers whose petition have been rejected by this Court on the ground of period of service put on by them. It is also made clear that in future if any Muster Roll workers are engaged/appointed, the cases of the petitioner's whose claims in these writ applications have been rejected shall be considered for engagement. 11. With the above directions, the bunch of Civil Rules are disposed of. I leave the parties to bear their own costs.