JUDGMENT : A.P. Singh, J. In the present Writ Petition, Ram Pher Tiwari the Petitioner, who is a workman in the M/s. Kesarwani Zarda Bhandar Factory, Sahson, Allahabad, has prayed for quashing of the award made by the Arbitrator u/s 5B of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, being award No. 1 of 1977 dated 17-10-1978 published in the Gazette on 7th November, 1978. 2. The main ground taken in support of the Writ Petition is that the award of the Arbitrator suffers from the error of law apparent on the face of the record. 3. The brief facts, which are necessary for deciding the controversy involved in the Writ Petition may be stated as follows. 4. Petitioner was employed as a workman by Respondent No. 3, M/s. Kesarwani Zarda Bhandar Factory, Sahson, Allahabad (hereafter referred to as 'opposite party No. 3') oft 2nd July, 1975. His services were, thereafter terminated on 26th April, 1976. In respect of the said termination conciliation proceedings started and by an order of the Conciliation Officer, Allahabad dated 26th July, 1976 opposite party No. 3 was directed to take the Petitioner in service on 26th July, 1976. It was further directed that opposite party No. 3 shall pay half of the salary to the Petitioner for the period from 26-4-76 to 26-7-76. In pursuance of the said order of the Conciliation Officer Petitioner was given appointment older dated 24th July, 1976 in which he was directed to join the duty on 26-7-76. In the said order of appointment it was mentioned that appointment was being made on probation of six, months Ultimately, by an order dated 25th January, 1977, the' services of the Petitioner were terminated on the ground that his work was not satisfactory, Petitioner raised a dispute against the termination and on an agreement entered between the Petitioner and opposite-party No. 3 the dispute was referred for investigation u/s 5-B by an Arbitrator, The arbitration agreement entered between the Petitioner and opposite-party No. 3 was published in the Gazette dated 6th August, 1977 and it reads as under: It is hereby agreed between the parties to refer the following industrial disputes to the arbitration of Sri K.K. Pandey Addl. Labour Commissioner, U.P., Allahabad. Labour Commissioner, U.P., Allahabad. (i) Specific matter in dispute: Kiya Sewayojak ne apne pratisthan ke shramik Sarva Sree Ram Pher Tewari ko dinank 7 February, 1977 tatha Hiralal Kesarwani ko dinank I December, 1978 se anuchit abang abaidhanik dhang se karya se prithak kiya hai. Yadi han to shramik kiya Kshatlpurti pane ka adhikari hai tatha kiya anya bibaran ke sathi. 5. From the above it is clear that the specific dispute which was referred to the Arbitrator was as to whether the services of Ram Pher Tiwavi, the Petitioner, were illegally and 'improperly dispensed with effect from 7th February, 1977. 6. Section 58 provides that where an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the employer and the workmen agree to refer the dispute to arbitration, they may do so under a written agreement before the dispute is referred u/s 4-K to ' a Labour Court or Tribunal for arbitration by the Arbitrator. Sub-section (4) provides that the arbitrator or arbitrators shall investigate the dispute and submit to the. State Government the arbitration award signed by the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as the case may be. “Sub-section (5) excludes the applicability of the provisions of the Arbitration Act to the arbitration u/s 5B.” 7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has argued that although the dispute regarding the illegal and improper termination of the services of the Petitioner were referred by the Arbitrator under the arbitration agreement but the arbitrator did not perform it's duty and committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record by holding that the Petitioner's appointment was rightly terminated as it was on a probation of six months as; per the appointment letter dated 26-7-76, 8. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondents argued that the arbitrator had to decide the controversy brought before it through the written statements filed by the Petitioner and the opposite party No. 3 and the arbitrator could not by itself investigate and decide as to whether the services of the Petitioner were illegally terminated. It was further argued that the Petitioner's case in the written statement itself was' that he was re-appointed on 26-7-76, as such, the arbitrator could not and rightly did not examine as to whether the Petitioner's appointment on 26- 7-76 was by way of reinstatement or by way of fresh appointment. It was further argued that the Petitioner's case in the written statement itself was' that he was re-appointed on 26-7-76, as such, the arbitrator could not and rightly did not examine as to whether the Petitioner's appointment on 26- 7-76 was by way of reinstatement or by way of fresh appointment. Learned Counsel for opposite party No. 3 also cited a Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Shri Lachman Das v. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. 1977 (34) FLR 130. On the strength of the above judgment, it was argued, by the Counsel for the Respondents that what has to be decided by the Labour Court or Industrial Court is not on the term of the reference made to it but within the confined of the pleadings of the parties in their respective written statement filed before it. Learned Counsel further argued that the principle in respect of the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal is also attracted in the case of investigation by the arbitrator u/s 5B of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. It has been asserted that the arbitrator too cannot go beyond the pleadings of the parties in their respective written statements and since the Petitioner had not pleaded in his written statement that the termination of his service by the order dated 25-1-77 was in the breach of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act and, as such, the arbitrator was fully justified in not examining that aspect of the matter and it rightly rejected the Petitioner's claim, regarding improper and illegal termination of service on the finding that the Petitioner was given reappointment and it was within the power of Respondent No. 3 to terminate his services within the period of probation. 9. Sri Vijai Ratan Agarwal, Counsel for Respondent No. 3, has also placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shankar Chakravarti Vs. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. and Another, AIR 1979 SC 1652 , to substantiate his above argument. 10. To test the correctness of the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents, it is necessary to refer to the award given by the arbitrator which is under challenge in the present Writ Petition. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. and Another, AIR 1979 SC 1652 , to substantiate his above argument. 10. To test the correctness of the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents, it is necessary to refer to the award given by the arbitrator which is under challenge in the present Writ Petition. At page 33 of the paper book and internal page 4 of the award, arbitrator has given reference to the compromise affected between the parties on 26th July, 1976 before the Regional Conciliation Officer in respect of the earlier termination of the Petitioner made by the opposite party No. 3 on 26-4-76. 11. The Arbitrator has noted that the Petitioner was appointed on 26th July, 1976 in pursuance of the compromise arrived at between the Petitioner and opposite party No. 3 before the Regional Conciliation Officer on 26th July, 1977. What was required of the arbitrator was to examine the exact nature of the compromise and the nature of the consequential order of appointment which was passed by opposite party No. 3 as a result of the said compromise. In my opinion, the arbitrator was absolutely wrong in lebelling the appointment order dated 26th July, 1977, as an order of re-appointment on probation of six months. The appointment order dated 24th July, 1977 which was made elective from 26th July, 1977 was nothing but the order issued by the employer for giving effect to the order dated 26th July, 1977 passed by the Regional Conciliation Officer. Under the terms of the compromise reached before him Petitioner was to be given appointment by way of reinstatement which is clear from para 2 of the deed of compromise filed on record as annexure 3 to the Writ Petition and occurs, at page 21 of the paper book. The opposite party No. 3 was directed under the terms of the compromise to appoint the Petitioner on 26th July, 1976 and not to re-appoint him with effect from 26th July, 1976. Opposite party No. 3 was further directed to pay half salary of the petitioner for the period of his termination between 26-4-76 and 26-7-76. The opposite party No. 3 was directed under the terms of the compromise to appoint the Petitioner on 26th July, 1976 and not to re-appoint him with effect from 26th July, 1976. Opposite party No. 3 was further directed to pay half salary of the petitioner for the period of his termination between 26-4-76 and 26-7-76. Compromise read as a whole clearly proves the case of the Petitioner that he had been in service prior to the issue of appointment order dated 24th July, 1976 and the validity of his termination order dated 25-1-77 or 7th February, 1977 was, therefore, to be examined in the context of the fact that Petitioner was given reinstatement with effect, from 26-7-76 by the order dated 24-7-76. The wordings of appointment order dated 24th July, 1976 were, therefore, liable to be ignored, as the appointment order had to be read in the context of the compromise deed in Central Dispute No. 147 of 76 decided by the Regional Conciliation Officer which is annexure 3 to the Writ Petition. 12. Now I proceed to deal with the argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the arbitrator too like the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal could not go beyond the pleadings of the parties and since there was no pleadings in the....written statement of the Petitioner that his services were terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 6N of the Act, as such, the arbitrator was right in not examining that aspect of the matter. 13. It is true that the Petitioner in his written statement has himself taken the case that he was re-appointed with effect from 26th July, 1976 but the above pleading of the Petitioner has to be read with the compromise which was arrived at between the Petitioner and the opposite party No. 3 before the Regional Conciliation Officer on 26th July, 1976. It is not disputed before me by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that Petitioner was given appointment and became the employee of opposite party No.3 on 21-7-75 and his services were terminated on 26-4-76 and the said termination order was made ineffective under the settlement arrived at between the parties before the Regional Conciliation Officer on 26th July, 1976 under which the Petitioner had to be appointed on 26th July, 1976 and was to be paid half of the salary for the period during which he remained under termination. 14. With this undisputed state of affairs there is no room for the contention on behalf of opposite party No. 3 that Petitioner was given fresh appointment on 26-7-76 by appointment order dated 24-6-76, Whatever be the term of the order of appointment the fact remains, that the Petitioner was reinstated in service on 26th July, 1976 under the settlement arrived at between the parties before the Conciliation Officer oft 26-7-76. The order of six months probation which was put in the said appointment order, was, therefore, totally uncalled for, which deserved to be overlooked. The arbitrator was fully aware of the compromise reached between the parties before the Regional Conciliation Officer. The arbitrator, therefore, in my opinion, committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record by treating the reinstatement order of the Petitioner on 26-7-76 as the case of re-appointment on probation of six months. 15. The Petitioner, admittedly, had been in the service of opposite party No. 3 with effect from 2-7-75 and he continued in service till 6th February, 1977. He had thus completed more than 240 days of continuous service in a year and for that reason he had become entitled for the protection of the provisions of Section 6N of the Act and his services could not be terminated except after complying with the provisions of the said section. 16. The arbitrator completely lost sight of this aspect of the matter and totally ignored to examine the case on the premise of Section 6N of the Act obviously for the reason that he decided the case wholly on wrong assumption that the Petitioner was an appointee of 26-7-76 on six month's probation which conclusion was not at all warranted from the material available before him. In my opinion the Arbitrator decided the case on a wholly wrong perspective. 17. In my opinion the Arbitrator decided the case on a wholly wrong perspective. 17. The case law cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondents do not help him at all. The judgment of Delhi High Court in Lachman Das as well as of the Supreme Court relate to the adjudication of industrial disputes by Labour Court and by Industrial Tribunal u/s 10 of the Central Act and 4K of the Act whereas the present is the case of arbitration by the arbitrator appointed u/s 10A of the Central Act and Section 5B of the Act. There is substantial difference between the wordings of Sections 4K and 5B, relevant portions whereof are being quoted below: 4-K. Reference of disputes to Labour Court or Tribunal: Where the State Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute to a Labour Court if the matter of industrial dispute is one of those contained in the First Schedule, or to a Tribunal if the matter of dispute is one contained in the First Schedule or the Second Schedule for adjudication. 5-B. Voluntary reference of disputes to arbitration. (1) Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the employer and the workmen agree to refer the dispute to arbitration, they may, at any time before the dispute has been referred u/s 4K to a Labour Court or Tribunal, by a written agreement, refer the dispute to arbitration and the reference shall be to such person or persons (including the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court or a Tribunal) as an arbitrator or arbitrators as may be specified in the arbitration agreement. (4) The arbitrator or arbitrators shall investigate the dispute and submit to the State Government the Arbitration award signed by the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as the case may be. A reading of Section 4K will show that the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal is required to adjudicate the industrial dispute which has been referred to it whereas a reading of Section 5B (1) and (4) will show that the arbitrator is required to investigate into the industrial dispute which the workmen and the employer agree to refer to it for arbitration. In the matters of arbitration the law of pleadings have not much of relevance. The entire controversy which exists between the parties in the shape of industrial dispute before the arbitrator is required to be examined by the arbitrator on the basis of the materials placed before it either in the shape of pleadings of the parties or in the shape of documents filed by the respective parties. 18. There is significant difference between the scope of Sections 4K and 5B of the- U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and the jurisdiction and power of the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal u/s 4-K and jurisdiction and powers of Arbitrator u/s 5-B of the Act. The jurisdiction and power in the two sections, therefore, cannot be put at par. 19. As a matter of fact both U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and the Central Act envisaged three methods for resolving industrial disputes. First by conciliation between the parties before Regional Conciliation Officer-the second is by arbitration on the agreement of the parties by the arbitrator ; and lastly by adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal on a reference made by the' Government for adjudication. 20. The powers of Regional Conciliation Officer for arriving at a settlement and the power of arbitrator to investigate the dispute which on agreement of the parties had b:en referred to the arbitrator are different and distinct from the dispute which is referred to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the arbitrator is not permitted under the law to travel beyond the pleadings of the parties and he is bound to confine himself to the pleadings of the parties alone. The judgment in the case of Lachman Das and Shankar Chakravarti, in these, circumstances, have no relevance to the proceedings of arbitration by the Arbitrator u/s 5-B of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act which is comparable to the power of Arbitrator u/s 10-A of the Central Act. The judgments in both these cases were in relation to the adjudication by the Industrial Court which, as held above, has a limited scope of enquiry than the enquiry conducted by the Arbitrator which is much wider. 21. The judgments in both these cases were in relation to the adjudication by the Industrial Court which, as held above, has a limited scope of enquiry than the enquiry conducted by the Arbitrator which is much wider. 21. In view of the deed of compromise entered between the parties before the Regional Conciliation Officer on 26th July, 1976, it was established that Petitioner was in service of Respondent No. 3 from before 26th April, 1976 and as stated by the Petitioner which is not denied by the Respondent, he was initially appointed on 2nd July, 1975. The Petitioner had thus completed continuous service in excess of 240 days in a year. He had thus become entitled to the protection of Section 6-N of the Act and his services were wrongly terminated by Respondent No. 3 vide order dated 25-1-1977 which was without the compliance of the provisions of Section 6-N of the Act. I also do not find any merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the arbitrator by himself could not hold the order to be illegal for having been passed in violation of the provisions of Section 6-N of the Act. 22. The question whether the services of workman have been terminated in accordance or in violations of the provisions of Section 6-N is partly a question of law and partly a question of fact. The necessary facts which attracted the provisions of Section 6-N were already on record before” the arbitrator from which it was established that the Petitioner had been in service of the Respondent-employer from 2nd July, 1975 and his services were terminated by order dated 25th January, 1977. It is also established on record that the earlier termination order dated 26th April, 1976 passed by the employer terminating the services of the Petitioner were set-aside and the Petitioner was reinstated in service' from 26th July, 1976 and, therefore, there was no break in the service of the Petitioner and he had been continuously in service since his appointment on 2nd July, 1975. With these undisputed facts, there was hardly any requirement of making the plea of breach of the provisions of Section 6-N. The order of termination by itself did not show that the provisions of Section 6-N had been complied with. With these undisputed facts, there was hardly any requirement of making the plea of breach of the provisions of Section 6-N. The order of termination by itself did not show that the provisions of Section 6-N had been complied with. The argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondents, therefore, has no substance and is liable to be rejected. The arbitrator had before it all the facts necessary for deciding the question as to whether the order of termination was passed in violation of the provisions of Section 6-N. As already held above, the arbitrator did not advert to this aspect of the cases only because he proceeded to decide the case with the impression that the Petitioner's appointment on 26th July, 1976 was a fresh appointment and the Petitioner was not entitled to be given the benefit of his earlier service from 2nd July, 1975. 23. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner is right in his contention that the award made by the Arbitrator to the effect that the services of the Petitioner were rightly terminated is vitiated by the error of law apparent on the, face of the record. The award of the Arbitrator dated 17th October, 1978 is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 24. In the result, the Writ Petition succeeds and is allowed. The award of the Arbitrator dated 17th October, 1978 (annexure 6 to the Writ Petition) is quashed. The Respondents are directed to reinstate the Petitioner in service. They shall also pay him his back wages with continuity of service. The Petitioner is also entitled to costs which is assessed at Rs. 300.