This second appeal is directed against the judgment dated 19.8.1977 of learned Subordinate Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur in Title Appeal No.5 of 1976 by which judgment the judgment of learned Munsiff, Belonia dismi­ssing the suit of the appellant was affirmed. 2. The suit which has given rise to this appeal was instituted on 23.11.1972 by the present appellant against the respondents for declaration of his korfa right (possessory right as under-raiyat) over a plot measuring 3.43 acres appertaining to Khatian No.441/173 of Mouja Hicha Cherra, correction of record of rights and a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from entering into the suit land. 3. The substance of the plaint-case is that one Kshirode Chandra Tripura was the owner of the aforesaid 'land measuring 3.43 acres (hereinafter referred to as suit land) and sometime in the year 1955 AD the appellant took korfa settlement of the aforesaid land by an oral, agreement on condition of paying rent at the rate of Rs,5/- per kani, per annum. Thus on taking the korfa settlement of the suit land the plaintiff-appellant started possessing the land by growing crops thereon after reclamation of the land at a huge expen­diture. While the appellant was possessing the land in suit, Kshirode Chandra Tripura sold the suit land to proforma defendant Kumbhiram Roaja. This sale, however, did pot change the position of the appellant as he had been possessing the suit land as an under-raiyat under the proforma defendant on paying the rent as usual. But this proforma defendant again sold the suit land to the principal defendant who also accepted the appellant as his korfa rajyat. But during last survey settlement operation the land in suit being wrongly recorded in the name of proforma defendant, the defendant taking advantage of this wrong entry in the record of right threatened the appellant to dispossess him of the suit land on 14.11.1972 when appellant went to the suit land to see the standing crops which were grown by him. The appellant, therefore, filed the instant suit seeking relief as stated above. 4. Both the principal defendant and proforma defendant resisted the suit by filing separate written statements. The principal defendant, however, admitted in his written statement that the plaintiff-appellant was a korfadar (under-raiyat) under him and as per the condition the appellant was to give 2 ari 8 shares of paddy or Rs. 4. Both the principal defendant and proforma defendant resisted the suit by filing separate written statements. The principal defendant, however, admitted in his written statement that the plaintiff-appellant was a korfadar (under-raiyat) under him and as per the condition the appellant was to give 2 ari 8 shares of paddy or Rs. 5/-as its price per kani i.e. 8 ari 12 shares or Rs. 17.50 paise to him as annual rent for the suit land. As the price of the paddy increased, the plaintiff-appellant promised to pay the rent at a higher rate to the answering defendant. But the appellant did not pay him the rent at a higher rate. It was further averred that since the suit land required reclamation the answering defendant allowed the plaintiff to possess it for 2 (two) years without payment of any rent. But as the appellant failed to pay the rent at a higher rate to the answering defendant, the plaintiff-appellant is not entitled to get any sort of relief as prayed for. 5. The proforma defendant who also resisted the suit by filing a separate written statement denied all the material averments of the plaint and conten­ded further that sometime in the year 1968 AD Kshirode Chanura Tripura got land measuring 8 kanis 14 gandas 1 kara and 6 dhurs appertaining to Khatian No.441 from the Government of Tripura by way of allotment as a landless person and after this allotment the aforesaid land was posted in the name of Kshirode Chandra Tripura. Thereafter on 23.11.1966 AD this answering proforma defendant purchased land, measuring 3 kanis 10 gandas from Kshirode Chandra Tripura by dint of a registered kabala and the present suit land is a part of that 3 kanis 10 gandas. It was further contended that after purchase of the land the proforma defendant was possessing the suit land and as he suddenly fell in need of money he mortgaged the suit land to the appellant on taking a sum of Rs.l,000/-from him. But although the answering proforma defendant mortgaged the suit land to appellant, the answering proforma defendant retained the possession of the suit land on condition of paying 10 katha paddy to the appellant as interest of the amount of Rs.1,000/-. But although the answering proforma defendant mortgaged the suit land to appellant, the answering proforma defendant retained the possession of the suit land on condition of paying 10 katha paddy to the appellant as interest of the amount of Rs.1,000/-. But as there was some legal bar for making any such contract with non tribal, the answering proforma defendant being a tribal executed a deed of sale in respect of the suit land in favour of the defendant. Factually the proforma defendant did not sell the suit land to the defendant. The sale deed is nothing but a paper transaction and it was made only to avoid the legal complication. It was also contended that the suit land was all along in possession of the answering defendant and that appellant never possessed or exercised any sort of possession over the suit land It was, therefore, prayed that the suit should be dismissed with costs. 6. Upon the pleading the learned trial Court framed 5 (five) issues. After discussion of the evidence on record, the learned trial Court arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff-appellant failed to prove his possession over the land in suit since 1955 AD and that he did not pay any rent to the defendant. With this finding, the learned trial Court arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff-appellant was not under-raiyat. The first appellate Court also held the same view. Hence the second appeal. 7. It would, however, be apparent from the facts narrated above that the suit land originally belonged to Kshirode Chandra Tripura, The plaintiff's case was that while he was an under-raiyat under Kshirode Chandra Tripura the latter sold the jote right of the suit land to proforma defendant and proforma defendant subsequently again sold the jote right of the suit land to the principal defendant and these sales did not change his position of under-raiyat. The principal defendant Mathu Mog Chowdhury also admitted that the plaintiff-appellant was an under-raiyat under him and the proforma-defendant also admitted in his written statement that he sold the suit land to the principal defendant by executing the deed of sale. It was, however, contended by proforma defendant that although he executed a sale deed in respect of the suit land in favour of the principal defendant, the sale was nothing but a paper transaction. 8. Mr. It was, however, contended by proforma defendant that although he executed a sale deed in respect of the suit land in favour of the principal defendant, the sale was nothing but a paper transaction. 8. Mr. S. Deb, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has, at the very out-set, submitted that the findings of the Courts below are erroneous not only in view of the facts but also in law. It is argued by Mr. Deb that a bare perusal of the written statement that has been filed by the principal defendant will show that principal defendant admitted that plaintiff was a korfadar under him and he was also in possession of the suit land. So, according to him in face of this admission it was not incum­bent upon the plaintiff to prove that he was in possession of the suit land. It is true that the principal defendant in his written statement admitted that the appellant was a korfadar under him, and he was in possession of the suit land. His only contention was that the appellant did not pay him rent at the higher rate. Section 58 of the Evidence Act envisages that no fact need be proved which the parties thereto admitted by any writing. The written statement filed by the proforma defendant shows that he sold the suit land to the principal defendant by executing a sale deed. On examination of Ext. Al sale deed I find that this proforma defendant sold the suit land to principal defendant on 27.1.70 at a consideration price of Rs. 1,000/-. It was, however, averred by the proforma defendant that this sale was nothing but a paper transaction as he never delivered possession of the suit land in favour of principal defendant. But on perusal of the recitals of this Ext. A1 sale deed I find that it was quite clearly stated in the sale deed that possession was also delivered in favour of principal defendant and proforma defendant divested himself of all rights on the suit land. Mr. Deb has also quite fervently argued that while the document shows that it was an out and out sale, section 92 of the Evidence Act operates as a bar to showing that it was a loan transaction or mortgage. 9. I find much substance in the contention of Mr. Deb as a perusal of Ext. Mr. Deb has also quite fervently argued that while the document shows that it was an out and out sale, section 92 of the Evidence Act operates as a bar to showing that it was a loan transaction or mortgage. 9. I find much substance in the contention of Mr. Deb as a perusal of Ext. Al document I find that it was an out and out sale and proforma defen­dant not only delivered possession of the suit land in favour of principal defendant but also divested himself of all rights on the suit land. The question which, therefore,, posses for consideration is whether in view of section 92 of the Evidence Act, a party is entitled to lead extrinsic evidence to ascertain the true intention of the parties. In this context decision rendered in the case of Raj Kumar Rajindra Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & others, reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1833 may be referred to. In the aforesaid judg­ment Supreme Court held : "If the terms of the document are clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence to ascertain the true intention of the parties is inadmissible because section 9 mandates that in such a case the intention must be gatherer from the language employed in the document. But if the language employed is ambiguous, admits of a variety of meanings, 6th proviso the section can be invoked which permits tendering of extrinsic evidence as to acts, conduct and surrounding circumstances to enable the Court to ascertain the real intention of the parties. In such a case such oral evidence may guide the Court in unravelling the true intention of the parties. The object of admissibility of such evidence in such circumstances under the 6th proviso is to assist the Court to get to the real intention of the parties and thereby overcome the difficulty caused by the ambiguity. In such a case the subse­quent conduct of the parties furnishes evidence to clear the blurred area and to ascertain the true intention of the author of the document." 10. In the instant case the recitals of Ext. ] document would very clearly show that proforma defendant not only sold the suit land to principal defen­dant but he also delivered possession thereof divesting himself of all the rights of the suit land. In the instant case the recitals of Ext. ] document would very clearly show that proforma defendant not only sold the suit land to principal defen­dant but he also delivered possession thereof divesting himself of all the rights of the suit land. It is, however, true that the proforma defendant asserted in his written statement that the transaction was a mortgage. Under proviso 6 to section 92 of the Evidence Act a party who asserts the transac­tion to be loan is required to prove how the document was related to the existing circumstances and in the process extrinsic evidence is permissible to determine as to the true nature of the deed. But in the instant case proforma defendant adduced no evidence in support of his such assertion. It is also not the case of him that the price of the land covered under the ostensible document of sale was much more than Rs. l,000/-. The proforma defendant asserted that he purchased the suit land from Kshirode Chandra Tripura on 23.11.66 AD but he did not file the kabala to show his such purchase. In this context it may also be mentioned that right of intermediaries vested in the Government on 15.4.19o4. The Courts below made the finding that the plaintiff-appellant could not prove that he paid rent to the principal defendant. But the written statement of principal defendant shows that the plaintiff appellant did not pay him rent at a higher rate. There is no specific denial that appellant paid no rent for occupation of the suit land. The principal defendant did not dispute that the plaintiff-appellant was not in possession of the suit land. 11. For the reasons stated above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order and judgment of the Courts below are set aside and the suit filed by the appellant for declaration that he was a korfadar under principal defendant stands decreed and defendants-respondents are perpetually restrai­ned from interfering with the possession of the appellant. The record of right in respect of the suit land shall accordingly be corrected. The appellant shall be entitled to cost.