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Gauhati High Court · body

1993 DIGILAW 29 (GAU)

Azad Ali v. Housefed & Others

1993-02-03

S.N.PHUKAN

body1993
This appeal is by the plaintiff against the order dated 3.1.91 passed in Misc. (J) Case No. 22/90 by the learned Asstt. District Judge No. 2, Gauhati. By the said order, the application filed by the plaintiff for injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C. was rejected as the plaintiff-petitioner was found absent on that date. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit, namely, T.S. No. 14 of 1990 before the above court impleading Housefed which is a State Level Cooperative Society with the object of providing houses to the houseless persons and three other persons as defendants. According to plaintiff he is a cultivator by profession and an area of 10-Bs and odd covered by Dag No. 92, Patta No. 36 of village Notbam, Mouaz-Beltola, Gauhati was in his possession since childhood and prior to that it was in occupation of his father Sri Nizamat Ali. It has been alleged in the plaint that they are cultivating the land for last 20 years without interruption from anybody and therefore, has acquired right, title and interest over the land. According to plaintiff the patta of the land is in the name of Late Bishnu Ram Medhi, but at no point of time it was in his possession. Plaintiff has alleged that on 28.2.90 some employees of Housefed, defendant No. 1 went to the land and measured the same and on being asked by the plaintiff he was informed that there was an agreement for sale of the land by defendant No. 1 from defendant Nos. 3 & 4 being heirs of late Bishnu Ram Medhi. The plaintiff was also informed that defendant No. 2 was a tenant and his name was duly recorded in the Khatian i.e. the revenue record and necessary arrangement for surrender of his tenancy right was being made. According to the plaintiff, the action of the defendants is illegal and defendant No. 1 has no right to interfere with the in session of the plaintiff on the alleged agreement for sale and that in the khatian, the name of the defendant No. 2 was illegally mutated as at no point of time he was in possession of the land. As the action of the defendants has clouded the right, title and interest of the plaintiff the suit was filed with a prayer for injunction. As the action of the defendants has clouded the right, title and interest of the plaintiff the suit was filed with a prayer for injunction. In the suit, it was prayed for a decree for declaration of right, title and interest and confirmation of possession and also for permanent injunction. 3. Before the learned trial court in the petition for injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C., it was further pleaded that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury if injunction was not granted. An objection was filed by defendant No. 1 and a separate objection was also filed by defendant Nos. 3 and 4. It may be stated that exparte injunction was granted on 7.3.90 directing the defendant-opp. parties to maintain status-quo which was vacated by the impugned order. According to defendant No. 1, after defendant No. 2 surrendered his right of possession to the patinas, namely, defendant Nos. 3 and 4, defendant No. 1 purchased the suit land from defendant Nos. 3 and 4 with delivery of possession and a registered sale deed was duly executed. It is the case of the defendant No. 1 that the possession of the land is with the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff was trying to disposes and thereby hampering the development activities on the suit land by the defendant No. 1. In the counter filed before this court by defendant No. 1, it has been stated that the sale deed was executed by defendant Nos. 2 and 4 on 7.8.89 for valuable considera­tion of Rs. 9,16,200/- with delivery of physical possession and since the date of purchase the defendant No. 1 is in possession of the suit land. After purchase the defendant No. 1 improved and developed the entire land by filling of earth, constructing approach road, erecting boundary wall, installing hand pump, erecting site office, labour camp etc. Defendant No. 1 has taken up a scheme for construction of 260 Nos. of houses for lower income group and middle income group under Flat Ownership Cooperative Scheme which would cost Rs. 4 crores financed and technically supported by the Housing and Urban Development Corporation which is a Government of India Undertaking. It has also been stated that defendant No. 1 has already invested a sum of Rs. of houses for lower income group and middle income group under Flat Ownership Cooperative Scheme which would cost Rs. 4 crores financed and technically supported by the Housing and Urban Development Corporation which is a Government of India Undertaking. It has also been stated that defendant No. 1 has already invested a sum of Rs. 40 lakhs towards development and for above constructions and as many as 9 contractors have been engaged to undertake the work. According to defendant No. 1, the plaintiff was never in possession of the suit land, but by obtaining status quo order is trying to occupy the suit land forcibly. 4. As stated above, the exparte status-quo order was passed by the trial court on 7.3.90 and it was vacated by the impugned order dated 3.1.91. The present appeal was moved before this court on 9.1.91 and by the impugned order passed on that date, appeal was admitted against the order of dismissal of the injunction petition and status-quo order was passed. On 13.11.91, the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution, as the appellant did not appear on 8.1.93, the said order was set aside and the above status-quo order was directed to be continued. The above order dated 8.1.93 was passed exparte after more than one year. According to defendant No. 1 if the work of the Project is stopped by issuing an injunction, public cause will suffer. Defendant No. 1 has further stated that the plaintiff is not a cultivator, but he is an employee of the State Electricity Board and in support has annexed a letter dated 28.1.93 issued by the Executive Engineer certifying that the plaintiff is an employee of the Board. The said letter is available at Annexure -F to the affidavit filed by the defendant-respondent No. 1 on 29.1.93. It may be stated that the defendant-respondent No. 2 has filed an affidavit in opposition before this court and in the said affidavit, it has been categorically stated that the plaintiff-appellant was never in possession of the land and that the defendant-respondent No. 2 was a lawful occupancy tenant and tenancy was surrendered on receipt of a sum of Rs. 2,000/-. 5. Heard Mr. J.N. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. D.N. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondents. 2,000/-. 5. Heard Mr. J.N. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. D.N. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondents. It may be stated that by order dated 19.1.93 this court appointed a Commission and Sri H.N. Sarma, learned Advocate of this court was appointed as Commissioner and the Commissioner was asked to find out as to who is in possession of the land and whether the appellant is cultivating the said land. It was also directed to find out whether respondents have started construction including a boundary wall and also improved the land. The report of the Commissioner has been received. 6. From the plaint, it is clear that the plaintiff is claiming title over the land by right of adverse possession. But except the statement in the plaint, there is no material in support of this statement. The tenancy khatian has been annexed as Annexures-I & II to the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 2. These khatians do not indicate that the plaintiff was a tenant in respect of this land or that he was the owner of the land. Rent receipts have also been annexed with the said affidavit vide Annexure - in to VI. In the counter of respondent No. 1 sale deed has been annexed as Annexure - A and also the order dated 25.2.88 passed by the Revenue Authority allowing mutation vide Annexure - B. The deed of surrender by the tenant, namely, defendant -respondent No. 2 has been annexed as Annexure -D. From these affidavits and documents prima facie it appears that the defendant respondent No. 1 has acquired right over the land. In view of the tenancy khatian, prima facie, it cannot be accepted that the plaintiff was in possession of the land. 7. Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant has urged that from the report of the Commissioner dated 25.1.93 it is clear that the plaintiff was cultivating the land. On perusal of the said report, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel inasmuch as if the entire report is read as a whole. I find that only last year, the plaintiff cultivated the land. The report also indicates that the defendant respondent No. 1 on the northern and western site constructed boundary walls and that filling of the land by earth was also done by respondent-defendant No. 1. I find that only last year, the plaintiff cultivated the land. The report also indicates that the defendant respondent No. 1 on the northern and western site constructed boundary walls and that filling of the land by earth was also done by respondent-defendant No. 1. In view of what has been stated above, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to show a prima facie case for granting of injunction. 8. Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the alleged surrender of the tenancy by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 is in violation of the provisions of the Assam Temporarily Settled Areas Tenancy Act, 1971. This point is not necessary to be considered at this stage. 9. Regarding irreparable loss from the facts stated in the counter as quoted above it is clear that if injunction is granted, the defendant-respondent No. 1 would suffer irreparable loss as the entire project for construction of houses for homeless persons would be frustrated. Balance of convenience is also in favour of the defendants-respondents as they have already started construction and have also appointed contractors. 10. Mr. Sarma has urged that the plaintiff appellant would suffer irreparable loss as after houses are constructed he would be deprived of his valuable land. As the plaintiff has failed to prove a prima facie case, I am of the opinion that the contention of Mr. Sarma has no force and if necessary plaintiff may ask for compensation in the alternative by amending the plaint. 11. Mr. Sarma has placed reliance on a recent decision of the Apex Court in Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 S.C.C. 719 . In that case it was held that prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established on evidence at trial Court, In the case in hand there is no confusion regarding prima facie case as while deciding this point, I have also taken into consideration other circumstances. 12. In that case it was held that prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established on evidence at trial Court, In the case in hand there is no confusion regarding prima facie case as while deciding this point, I have also taken into consideration other circumstances. 12. Reliance has been placed on two other decisions, namely, Aziz Traders vs. The Chairman, Gujarat Electricity Board, AIR 1986 Gujarat 145 and in that case the Court set aside the order on the ground that learned lower court failed to consider losses likely to be caused to the Board by such injunction order and Preeti Singha Roy vs. Calcutta Tramways Co., AIR 1986 Calcutta 305 wherein it was held that balance of convenience ought to be considered as a pre-eminent consideration in the matter of grant of an interlocutory injunction. These two decisions have been cited by Mr. Choudhury. 13. This court in a case reported in (1988) 2 G.L.R. (NOC) 38 held that in deciding the matter regarding injunction in addition to other factors public interest has to be looked into. In the case in hand defendant-respondent No. 1 has made out a case that if the injunction is granted, public interest would suffer inasmuch as the Housefed would not be able to continue the scheme for providing houses to lower and middle income groups. This is another ground for refusing to grant injunction. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit in the present appeal and accordingly, it is dismissed. No Costs.