K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) WHETHER a Government servant holding a particular post quite on ad-hoc and temporary basis could be compulsorily retired under clause (aa) (l) (A) of Rule 161 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959? This, in short is the question arising for determination in this writ petition. ( 2 ) FEW relevant facts which are not in dispute are- The petitioner C. D. Choksi, b. E. (Civil) was appointed as an Overseer (Class-III) by an order dated 5-5-1961. Thereafter he was promoted to the higher posts and ultimately promoted to the post of executive Engineer on ad-hoc and temporary basis by an order dated 18-10-1985. Thereafter the petitioner by an order dated 30-7-1988 (Annexure-Q) was compulsorily retired at once in the interest of public service. It is this order of compulsory retirement, which has given rise to the present petition. ( 3 ) MR. I. S. Supehia, the learned advocate for the petitioner while challenging the impugned order has raised several contentions in the memo of petition, however, at the time of final hearing, he has pressed into service only one contention, which according to him, goes to the root of the matter as the same is directly covered by the decision of the supreme Court Accordingly, it was contended by Mr. Supehia that though the petitioner was appointed on a promotional post purely on ad-hoc and temporary basis, for any alleged misconduct, he could be reverted to the lower post, but could not be compulsorily retired from the said post In support of this contention, Mr. Supehia has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Union of India vs. K. R. Tahiliani and anr. , reported in AIR 1980, S. C. 953, wherein in para-5, it has been observed as under :"an officiating hand has no right to the post and is perhaps a fleeting bird who may have to go back to the substantive post from which he has been promoted on an officiating basis. What is more to the point, a person who has been appointed de novo may begin his service on an officiating basis or on a temporary basis and it is obvious that he has no right to the post and cannot be strictly said to be in that service or post as a member of that service. What is more to the point, a person who has been appointed de novo may begin his service on an officiating basis or on a temporary basis and it is obvious that he has no right to the post and cannot be strictly said to be in that service or post as a member of that service. In short, an officiating Government servant does not really belong to Class I or Class II service until he acquires a right thereon. Even viewed closely and meticulously, the structure of the clause, namely, "if he is in class I or class II service or post" emphasises the nature of the service or post vis-a-vis the government servant concerned. We need not go into the semantic shapes, lexical nicetiesd or linguistic nuances but only go through the meaning and purpose of the provision. When a Government servant belonging to a Class I or class II service or post on a regular basis has to be retired compulsorily. Rule 56 (j) (i) comes to the rescue of the Government. But if he is only a temporary hand, he has no right to the post and can always be reverted to the post, if any, on which he has a lien. Similar is the position of an officiating hand. Thus, we have reached an inevitable conclusion that Rule 56 (j) (i) is meant to cover only those who are in a post on a regular basis, i. e. in a substantive capacity, and not an officiating basis only". On the basis of the above submissions, Mr. Supehia finally urged that the impugned order dated 30-7-1988 passed against the petitioner making him compulsorily retire be quashed and set- aside, and that the respondent be directed to reinstate the petitioner in service, with back wages. ( 4 ) MR. Tushar Sompura, the learned AGP when he was confronted with the above referred Supreme Court decision, he was simply unable to distinguish the same, and thereby to persuade this Court to take a view contrary to the one taken by the Supreme court. When such is an unescapable factual and legal position, there is no alternative left with this Court except to allow this petition. When such is an unescapable factual and legal position, there is no alternative left with this Court except to allow this petition. Accordingly, it is held that since on the relevant date when the impugned order came to be passed, petitioner was holding his promotional post on ad-hoc and purely temporary basis, he could not have been compulsorily retired, and therefore, to the said extent, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set-aside. ( 5 ) THAT takes us now to yet another important question about the reinstatement of the petitioner in service and his back-wages due. Now as far as re-instatement of petitioner in service is concerned, since the petitioner, at the relevant time, when he was compulsorily retired was holding ad-hoc temporary post of Executive Engineer, therefore, notionally he may be reinstated on the said post, but at the same time, so far as calculation of his back wages is concerned, it will be quite open to the State Government to calculate the same strictly on the basis of the post which the petitioner would have been otherwise holding, if instead of he be made compulsorily retired as Executive Engineer, he would have been ordinarily reserved to his substantive post. Mr. Supehia has vehemently opposed this view of the court as regards the back wages to be paid to the petitioner, but in fact there is no substance in it. It clearly appears to this court that to grant back wages to the petitioner on the basis of he holding the post of Executive Engineer for all these years, in the facts and circumstances of the case, would not be just, legal and proper. ( 6 ) IN the result, this petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 30-7-1988 is quashed and set aside. The respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service within one month from the date of receipt of this judgment, and so far payment of back wages are concerned, the same may be worked out on the basis of observations made hereinabove. The back wages so worked out are further directed to be paid to the petitioner within six months from the date of receipt of this judgment Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent. .