Mr. D. P. Wadhwa, J. ( 1 ) THIS is plaintiff s appeal. His suit for recoveryof Rs. 18. 000. 00 towards arrears of his salary and interest thereon was dismissed by the Commercial Sub- Judge, Delhi, principally on the ground that theclaim was barred by limitation. ( 2 ) THE facts are in brief. The plaintiff was appointed as Districtrent and Managing Officer-cum-Assistant Custodian in the office of therespondents-defendants and was posted at Ludhiana. There were threedefendants (now respondents), first defendant being Union of India throughthe Secretary in the Department of Rehabilitation, the second defendantbeing the Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi; and the third defendantwas the Regional Settlement Commissioner, Jullundur. The servicesof the petitioner were terminated on 23/05/1960. He, however, came toknow about this fact on 30/05/1960. On 19/12/1961 he filed a suitfor declaration challenging his termination. The suit was decreed in hisfavour on 28/02/1963 and subsequent appeals to the District Judge aswell as the High Court of Punjab were dismissed. The judgment and decreein the suit for declaration became final on 29/02/1964 when the Highcourt dismissed the second apdeal. Thereafter, the plaintiff was reinstatedand came to be posted at Jullundur on 27/04/1965. He made claim forhis salary for the period from 30/05/1960 till 26/04/1965. After hisrepresentations he was told by the defendants that his case was under consideration and that further communication would follow. On 4/05/1967the plaintiff was informed that the President was pleased to accept the periodfrom 31/05/1960 to 26/04/1965 as on duty subject to the conditionsthat (1) the plaintiff, would be paid arrears of pay and allowances for threeyears; (2) whatever he earned in the legal profession as a lawyer between theperiod of his termination and reinstatement would be deducted from thearrears of his salary; and (3) he would give his affidavit of that income duringthat period. Then plaintiff was paid pay and emoluments for three yearsperiod mentioned above and a sum of Rs. 2. 600. 00 was deducted being hisincome from lawyer s profession. It may be stated that during the periodfrom the termination of his services and till he was reinstated the plaintiffwas practising as an Advocate. Again the plaintiff represented and said heshould be paid his salary for whole of the period. Then he served a noticeunder Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 1 7/11/1969. It may be stated that during the periodfrom the termination of his services and till he was reinstated the plaintiffwas practising as an Advocate. Again the plaintiff represented and said heshould be paid his salary for whole of the period. Then he served a noticeunder Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 1 7/11/1969. Hesaid although his termination was found to be wrongful and illegal he wasmade partial payment for three years period from 27/04/1962 to 2 6/04/1965 and that his salary for the period from I June, 1960 to 26/04/1962had been wrongfully withheld. The plaintiff also claimed refund ofrs. 2,600. 00 which had been deducted from his salary and emoluments payableto him for the three years period. He, therefore, claimed Rs. 12,198. 98on account of arrears of salary and wrongful deduction of Rs. 2,600. 00. Theplaintiff also in this notice claimed interest of the rate of 6/o per annum onthe amount of Rs. 9,598. 98 being the arrears of his salary. He also claimedinterest on the amount of Rs. 2,600. 00 on equitable grounds. He said causeof action arose in his favour when he was reinstated, and again when he wastold that his case for payment of salary, etc. , was under consideration andyet again when he was told that he would be paid the arrears for three yearsby letter dated 4/05/1967, and lastly, in the year 1968 when his salary forthe earlier period was in fact refused. ( 3 ) PLAINTIFF then filed this suit on 29/01/1970. The defendantsfiled their written statement. They said the suit was barred by limitation asthe cause of action for recovery of salary accrued month to month. Theysaid the order of the Court declaring the order of termination of services ofthe plaintiff as illegal was of no consequence and that would not save limitation. It was also said that suit against defendants 2 and 3 was not maintainable as they were not juristic persons. Receipt of the notice under Section80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was admitted and so also the fact ofamount due to the plaintiff towards salary for the period from I June 1960to 26/04/1962 was admitted and also the fact of deduction of Rs. 2600. 00from the salary paid to the plaintiff after his reinstatement. Claim ofinterest was denied. Receipt of the notice under Section80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was admitted and so also the fact ofamount due to the plaintiff towards salary for the period from I June 1960to 26/04/1962 was admitted and also the fact of deduction of Rs. 2600. 00from the salary paid to the plaintiff after his reinstatement. Claim ofinterest was denied. ( 4 ) ON pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed : (1) Whether the suit is within time ? OPP (2) Whether the suit is maintainable against defendants Nos. 2 and3? OPP (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest ? If so, at whatrate ? OPP (4) Whether the defendant is entitled to deduct Rs. 2600. 00 fromthe arrears of salary already paid to the plaintiff as alleged ?opd (5) Relief. Addl. Issue: (5a) To what amount is the plaintiff entitled to recover on accountof arrears of pay ? OPPAs would he seen the issues are all legal and as a matter of fact there is nodispute on the facts of the case. The learned Commercial Sub-Judge heldfiriit issue against the plaintiff. He held on second issue that suit againstdefendants 2 and 3 was not maintainable. On third issue, he said that inview of his findin given on on first issue this usue did not require any finding, jon fourth issue also he held that the amount of Rs. 2,600. 00 was rightlydeducted from the arrears of salary paid to the plaintiff. He held that the Iplaintiff worked as an Advocate for about three years from 1962 to 1965 and jearned Rs. 2,600. 00. and as the plaintiff was a whole time employee of thegovernment, therefore, whatever earnings he had made during the saidperiod would have to he accounted for by him. The learned Commercialsub-Judge also held that Counsel for the plaintiff could not show any rulingunder which plaintiff could be entitled to recover the said amount ofrs. 2,600. 00. On issues 5 and 5a the Learned Commercial Sub-Judge said thatin view of his findings on other issues the plaintiff was not entitled to anyrelief. He left the parties to bear their own costs. 2,600. 00. On issues 5 and 5a the Learned Commercial Sub-Judge said thatin view of his findings on other issues the plaintiff was not entitled to anyrelief. He left the parties to bear their own costs. ( 5 ) IT would be Article 7 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963which would apply in the present case as it is in effect the arrears, of hissalary (wages) which the plaintiff is claiming in his suit after he is lold that hewould be treated on duty. Under this Article period of limitation is threeyears and the time from which period begins to run is when the w^ges accruedue. ( 6 ) NARRATION of events show that the plaintiff got a decree for declara-tion that termination of his services was illegal which decree became finalon 29/02/1964. The defendants could have saved the plaintiff fromfurther agony by making payment of all the salary due for the period whenhis services were terminated and when the decree became final and in pur-suance thereto he was reinstated, but that was not to be so. The plaintiffwent on fighting for his cause and ultimately he was told by letter dated 4/05/1967 of the dtfendants that though the period from 31/05/1960 to 26/04/1965 would be treated as on duty he would be paid salary only for thelast three years. This stance of the Government, to say the least, is incom-prehensible to us. Government who should supposedly set an example of anideal employer should not take shelter behind the law of limitation anddeprive its officer of his lawful dues which otherwise he was lawfully entitledto. The Supreme Court did not look with favour the tendency on the partof the State to lake the plea of limitation so as to deny the right to receivearrears of salary. It is by this letter of 4/05/1967 that right to sue wouldaccrue to the plaintiff as it is now that the Government considered theplaintiff to he on duty all this period when his services stood terminated. Itcould not be that while he was not in the employment of the Government hewould go on filing suit every month for salary due to him. The defendantscertainly cannot take this plea. How could it be so that though the plaintiffduring the relevant period was not in its ernyloyment yet he was to go onfiling suit one after the other to save the bar of limitation. The defendantscertainly cannot take this plea. How could it be so that though the plaintiffduring the relevant period was not in its ernyloyment yet he was to go onfiling suit one after the other to save the bar of limitation. We find whenth plaintiff filed the suit for a declaration he had obtained leave of the Courtunder Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to file a suit for a re-covery of salary. in Union of India v. Kewal Krishanmitlal,l 984 (2) SLR614 (DB), this Court held that when the termination was declared nullandvoid by the Court the Government was bound to follow the declaration andpay all the salary and allowances to its employee. In this case the Courtalso considered the provisions of the Bar Council of India Rules (Rule 51)and Fundamental Rules (Rule 54 ). In this case also an employee was engag-ed in legal profession during the term when he remained out of service as aresult of his order of termination. When his termination was declared nulland void the Government wanted to deduct from his arrears of salary theamount earned by him in the legal profession. Reliance was placed on F. R. 54 (3) (b) which is as under : "where the reinstated government servant has secured employ-ment during any period between the dismissal/removal/discharge/termination and reinstatement, the pay and allowances admissibleto him after reinstatement for the intervening period shall be reduc-ed by the emoluments earned by him, during such employment ifsuch pay and allowances exceeds such emoluments. If the pay andallowances admissible to him are equal to or less than the emoluments earned by him nothing shall be paid to him. "reference was also made to Rule 51 of the Bar Council of India Rules whichprovided as under : "an Advocate shall not be a full time salaried employee of anyperson, government, firm, corporation or concern, so long as hecontinues to practise and shall, on taking up any such employmentintimate the fact to the Bar Council en whose roll his name appearsand shall thereupon cease to practise as an Advocate as long as hecontinues in such employment. "the Court said this rule required an Advocate not to accept a full timesalaried employment from any of the categories mentioned in the rule. Thecourt said the rule enacted a prohibition. It was a principle of professionalethics now embodied in a statutory rule. "the Court said this rule required an Advocate not to accept a full timesalaried employment from any of the categories mentioned in the rule. Thecourt said the rule enacted a prohibition. It was a principle of professionalethics now embodied in a statutory rule. The Court said, as in the presentcase before us, that it was the Government s own case throughout that havingbeen dismissed from service the plaintiff was no longer in their employmentuntil the Court held that dismissal was wrongful and it did not lie in themonth of the Government now to take a contrary stand when it came topayment of arrears of salary which the employee (plaintiff), after years oflitigation, had become entitled to. The Court also said that F. R. 54 (3) (b)contemplated a situation where the reinstated Government servant hadsecured employment between the period of dismissal and reinstatement. Thecourt held that joining the legal profession did not mean getting securedemployment in the sense in which the expression was used in F. R. 54. ( 7 ) AGAIN in somewhat similar circumstances a Division Bench of themadras High Court in Union of India v. N. R. Venkatarama Naidu,l975 (1)M. L. J. 345, held as under : "in a suit for recovery of salary or wages, the Article in thelimitation Act of 1963, which would be applicable is Article 7,corresponding to Article 102 of the Limitation Act of 1908. Thethird column of Article 7 of the Limitation Act says "when thewages accrue due". This phrase has to be liberally interpreted in acase where an employee s services were wrongfully terminated andlater he was reinstated after the employer realised that such terminationwas unlawful or unconstitutional. During the interregnumhe is not entitled to any salary at all under any of the service conditions. When he is in service, obviously, the salary to a Governmentservant beconies due by the end of the month. But in a case wherehis services were terminated under a rule of service, which was laterdeclared by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional, then the ordiary rule of limitation to claim the arrears of salary cannot prevail. When he is in service, obviously, the salary to a Governmentservant beconies due by the end of the month. But in a case wherehis services were terminated under a rule of service, which was laterdeclared by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional, then the ordiary rule of limitation to claim the arrears of salary cannot prevail. If it were so, then in a given case, if it takes several years for theunfortunate employee to get redress and to get a pronouncement asto the invalidity of the order of termination and if as is conceivablethe litigation takes more than three years, for him to be reinstated ,is it necessary that he should file an empty suit for arrears of salaryfor the period when he was not in service and, when he is a dismissed servant or a servant whose services have been terminatedand get his suit dismissed only on the ground that he has not beenreinstated ? It would be an empty formality besides leading tounjust consequences because such a suit would automatically be dismissed as he would be confronted with the order of dismissal ortermination for which he cannot have any answer at all. In thelight of our observations as above, the third column in Article 7,when the wagt-s accrue due, in a case like the one with which weare faced, has to be interpreted, as we said, liberally and equitably. When an employee whose services have been illegally terminatedhas been reinstated and when he is informed that the period duringwhich he was off from service would be treated as if he was onduty, then a fresh cause of action would arise on the date when hewas reinstated and on the date when a communication to that effectwas issued to him. " ( 8 ) WE are, thus, of the opinion that cause of action for the plaintiffto file the present suit arose on 4/05/1967 when he was told that the periodfrom 31/05/1960 to 26/04/1965 was to be treated as his being on dutybut he was not to be paid his salary for whole of this period. Wages (salary)could not be said to have accrued when the Government was yet consideringwhether the period between the termination and reinstatement was to betreated as on duty and if the employee was entitled to arrears of salary forwhole or part of that period. Wages (salary)could not be said to have accrued when the Government was yet consideringwhether the period between the termination and reinstatement was to betreated as on duty and if the employee was entitled to arrears of salary forwhole or part of that period. Once the Government decided that the wholeof the period when services of the plaintiff stood terminated was to be treatedas on duty, the wages for whole on the period accrued from the date the saiddecision was communicated to the plaintiff. The suit having been filed on 29/01/1970 would be within the period of limitation. ( 9 ) AS we have discussed above, F. R. 54 (3) (b) is not applicable andthe defendants were not authorised to deduct Rs. 2. 600. 00 from the arrearsof salary paid to the plaintiff. This amount defendants must refund. ( 10 ) THEN there is question of interest as claimed by the plaintiff. Theinterest Act, 1978 came into force in 1982, This Act is not applicable to thepending proceedings as per Sub-section (2) of Section 6 which is as under : "the provisions of this Act shall not apply to any suit or otherlegal proceedings pending at the commencement of this Act and theprovisions of the corresponding law applicable immediately before?uch commencement shall, notwithstanding the repeal of such lawby Sub-section (1), continue to apply to such suit or other legalproceedings. " ( 11 ) IN Thawardas Pherumal and Another v. Union of India, AIR 1955s. C. 468, where the question was award of interest by the Arbitrator in hisaward the Court held that Interest Act, 1939, applied as interest was nototherwise payable by law in that kind of case and reference was made to adecision of the Privy Council in B. N. Ry. Co. v. Ruttanji Ramji, AIR 1938p. C. 67. The Court said interest could be awarded when following amongother conditions must be fulfilled : (1) there must be a debt or a sum certain; (2) it must be payable at a certain time or otherwise; (3) these debts or sums must be payable by virtue of some writtencontract at a certain time; (4) there must have been a demand in writing stating that interestwill be demanded from the date of the demand. ( 12 ) IN the present case before us all these elements are present. ( 12 ) IN the present case before us all these elements are present. Theinterest was demanded by means of notice under Section 80 of the Code ofcivil Procedure and interest would, therefore, become due from the date ofnotice which would be the date of the demand. Thus, the plaintiff would beentitled to interest on the amount of Rs. 12,198. 98 from 17/11/1969till the filing of the suit which is 29/01/1970. Interest pendents lite canbe awarded by Court under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus,issues Nos. 1, 3 and 4 are decided in favour of the plaintiff-appellant andagainst the defendants. There is no challenge to the decision on Issue No. 2in this appeal. ( 13 ) WE, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugnedjudgment and decree and instead grant a decree in favour of the plaintiffagainst defendant No. 1 for recovery of Rs. 12,198. 98 and interest on thisamount from 17/11/1969 till filing of the suit calculated at the rateof 6/o per annum. We further award interest pendent lite on the amount ofrs. 12,198. 98 at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of filing the suittill payment. Plaintiff will also be entitled to casts throughout on the amountdecreed. In case, however, the defendant makes payment of the decretalamount with pendente lite interest at the rate of 6% per annum instead ofl0% per annum within a period of two months from today, the whole of thedecree shall stand satisfied.