Judgment :- T.S.Arunachalam, J. Petitioner-Lakshmi is the mother of Velu alias Boopalan, alleged detenu, for whose production before this Court, for being set at liberty by issue of a habeas, this petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred. Petitioner has stated in her affidavit that from 11. 1992 her son has been detained under Secs.3,4,5 and 6 of TADA Act and is facing his prosecution in C.C.No.3 of 1993, on the file of designated court No.2, Madras. According to the petitioner, detention of her son is illegal, for the material placed before the designated court is devoid of substance to connect him with Secs.3,4, 5 and 6 of the TADA Act. Statement of witness Chinnaswamy and confession of a co-accused without an identification parade, cannot be held to be a sufficient material and even if explosives had been seized from the detenu, if he cannot be connected with Terrorist Act, he will not be liable to be taken to a designated court. If the offences punishable under TADA Act are excluded, the detenu would have had to be released on the expiry of 90 days, since by then, final report had not been laid. 2. Mr.R.Sankarasubbu, petitioner’s counsel submitted that refusal of bail by the designated court was an order interlocutory and since no appeal has been provided to challenge the said interlocutory order, petitioner will be justified in invoking the powers of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India to obtain necessary relief. Petitioner’s counsel has placed before us certain decided cases in support of his submissions, which include the averments in the writ petition referred to earlier. .3. After thoughtful scrutiny and meticulous audit-ingof the submissions made by Mr.Sankarasubbu, we are satisfied that this habeas corpus petition is the outcome of total misconception of the provisions of law and its applicability to the facts summarised. .3. After thoughtful scrutiny and meticulous audit-ingof the submissions made by Mr.Sankarasubbu, we are satisfied that this habeas corpus petition is the outcome of total misconception of the provisions of law and its applicability to the facts summarised. An application for bail was preferred before the designated court, almost on identical grounds, argued in this habeas corpus petition, and the designated court has carefully taken note of the submissions made and applying the law laid down to the facts available, held against the detenu, on the ground that there was prima facie material sufficient to prosecute the detenu under the provisions of TADA Act and at this stage there was no scope for arriving at a conclusion that the ordinary law would be sufficient to prosecute the detenu and that recourse to the provisions of TADA Act was not called for. 4. Mr.R.Sankarasubbu, contended that the designated court cannot surrender its power at this stage and must weigh the materials placed before it fully and squarely and cannot on mere satisfaction of availability of prima facie material, discard the plea for bail made on behalf of the detenu. .5. Even at this juncture we are bound to state that the availability of power to be exercised in deserving cases to uphold the majesty of justice is different from mechanical interference in every instance, irrespective of the facts, merely because the constitutional power has been sought to be invoked. The designated court while narrating the facts had referred to the prosecution case detailing the meeting of this detenu along with two others at Kamalapuram on to night of 2nd October, 1992, apparently for the purpose of hatching a criminal conspiracy to manufacture country bombs for blasting the railway station Bridge at Dhar-mapuri and Palacode railway stations, with a view to overawe the Government and strike terror in the people. These acts were intended to support the claim directly or indirectly, for the secession of Tamil Nadu from Indian Union and with intent or knowledge that such an act was likely to cause the death of persons travelling in the train, passing through the said bridge. Preparatory to the commission of the Terrorist and Disruptive Act, detenu and two others are stated to have manufactured ‘country bombs’ for blasting the railway bridge. On 10. Preparatory to the commission of the Terrorist and Disruptive Act, detenu and two others are stated to have manufactured ‘country bombs’ for blasting the railway bridge. On 10. 1992 detenu and one Sundara Moorthy planted the said country bomb on the southern end of the girder bridge No.165 at Kms.267/ 56 which resulted in the rail to a length of about 2 feet being shattered away resulting in the guard raii getting lifted upwards due to explosion. Two sleepers and be last retaining wall were damaged. Further on 11. 1992 detenu was found in possession of 30 ordinary detonators kept in his shirt pocket, 20 gelatine sticks, 2 kgs., of blasting salt and two rolls of fuse wire kept in a Khakki hand bag behind the steel bureau inside the bed room of the detenu at his residence. That the recoveries made from the detenu were explosive substances were certified by scientific experts. Chinnaswamy, in whose shed country bomb was manufactured, is the main witness seeking to connect the detenu with the grave crime, apart from the consessional statement of co-accused Sesubalan, leave alone the seizure of explosive substances, which the prosecution would allege was so possessed in pursuance of the conspiracy, for the purpose narrated earlier. One other accused in this crime is stated to be absconding. 6. While citing the authorities, Mr.Sankarasuhbu contended that the detenu has challenged the illegality of his remand by a separate writ petition which is pending disposal and that, therefore, this habeas corpus petition should also be tacked on to the already pending proceeding in this Court. We do not agree for if the petitioner is entitled to be set at liberty, due to illegality if any, in his remand, pending proceeding will take care of it. If the petitioner is not entitled to the said relief, that can have no bearing on the issue involved in this habeas corpus petition. 7. In Sunil Batra a. Delhi Administration, I97S Crl.L.J.1741:A.LR. 1978S.C. 1675, reference was made to pronouncement in Coffin v. Rcichard, Substantive Criminal Law, P.14, which reads as follows: “When a man possesses a substantial right, the courts will be diligent in finding a way to protect it. The fact that a person is legally in prison does not prevent the use of habeas corpus to protect his other inherent rights.”. The fact that a person is legally in prison does not prevent the use of habeas corpus to protect his other inherent rights.”. On this basis, it was contended, that the petitioner has a right to challenge the illegal dismissal of the bail plea of the detenu under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, for an appeal has not been provided, under the Act against interlocutory orders. That bail orders are interlocutory in nature, can admit of no doubt, for the Supreme Court has stated in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat, 1988S.C.C 318, that order granting or refusing to grant bail under Sec.20(8) of TADA ACT was an interlocutory order, not appealable before Supreme Court. It is not the pronouncement of law that the detenu in such cases has no right whatever to seek relief for under Art.226 of the Constitution, Supreme Court has exercised its powers though those occasions may be rare and few. The absence of a provision for an appeal against interlocutor)‘orders does not, as a logical consequence, permit the High court to exercise its constitutional powers, as though it is a routine matter. We cannot lose sight of the observation of the Supreme Court in Usmanbhai’s case, 1988 S.C.C. 318, that TADA Act being special Act, must prevail in respect of jurisdiction and power of the High Court to entertain an application for bail under Sec.439oftheCodeorby recourse to its inherent powers under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. Under the scheme of the Act, there is complete exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court in any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence punishable under the Act or any rule made thereunder. There is contrariety between the provisions of the Act and those contained in the Code. If exercise of jurisdiction to grant bail is prohibited under the TADA Act an indirect approach to obtain the said pro-t.ihited relief in an attempted garb change, cannot be entertained. 8. Of course as rightly pointed out by petitioner’s counsel, Bakthavatsalam, J. of this Court, exercised the constitutional powers under Art 227, to direct release of a practising advocate of this Court who was charge-sheeted under the TADA Act. The learned Judge went into the factual details and arrived at an irresistible inference that there was no material to rope in the petitioner therein under TADA Act. The learned Judge went into the factual details and arrived at an irresistible inference that there was no material to rope in the petitioner therein under TADA Act. The learned Judge has observed as hereunder: “On the facts and materials available on record, 1 have no hesitation to hold that no offence is made out against the petitioner prima facie under the TADA Act. So prima facie, 1 am fully satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of any offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” This pronouncement of Bakthavatsalam, J. is stated to be under scrutiny of the Supreme Court, though the grant of bail in favour of the petitioner therein has not been set aside. Bakthavatsalam, J. further made it clear, that his pronouncement shall not be treated as a precedent in all cases where bail has been refused by the designated court under the TADA Act. We have to only recapitulate our earlier observation that the exercise of power in the interests of justice would always depend upon the peculiar facts of each case which may be placed for our scrutiny. 9. Reliance placed on the decision of the Supreme Courl’mSunilBatrav. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1980. S.C. 1570, cannot help the petitioner in the instant case. The emphasis of the law laid down in the said case, was that a prisoner was entitled to invoke Art.21 of the Constitution of India for protection of his rights, for the dignity of the human inmate cannot be allowed to be defiled and go berserk. It is true that the dynamic role of judicial remedies imparts to the habeas corpus writ,aversatilevitalityandoperational utility. But the issue of a habeas will certainly depend on the factual details’ in every case. In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1980. S.C. 1570, it was held that the healing presence of the law will have its entry even within the secrecy of the hidden cell, since it has to live upto its reputation as a bastion of liberty. Here is a case where application of judicial mind by the designated court to the overwhelming facts placed before it, had resulted in negation of bail to the detenu. Here is a case where application of judicial mind by the designated court to the overwhelming facts placed before it, had resulted in negation of bail to the detenu. At this juncture we must state that if no appeal has been provided against an interlocutory order of bail, apart from the constitutional remedy open to the detenu, it cannot be gainsaid that a plea for bail can always be renewed as and when change in circumstances exist, giving rise to a need for reconsideration of the earlier order by the very same court. 10. There cannot be a discordent note, that to protect the liberties of inmates of a prison, a habeas can be issued and that is exactly the ratio reiterated in K. Valambol v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 1981 L. W. (Crl). 58, by a Division Bench of this Court, following the principles enunciated in SunilBatra v. Delhi Administration. A.I.R. 1980. S.C. 1570. 11. All that the Supreme Court has stated in Lakshmana Rao v. Judicial Magistrate, 1971. M.L.J. (Crl) 608, while considering ‘remand’ under Scc.344, Crl.P.C. (old Code) corresponding to Sec.309 of the new code, is that the order of ‘remand’ is subject to judicial discretion and is also subject to review by superior courts in accordance with law. In that case it was observed, that detention pursuant to an order of remand which appropriately fell within the terms of Sec.344 was accordingly not open to challenges in habeas corpus. As we have observed earlier, if the remand is illegal, the other habeas corpus petition stated to be pending in this Court, will take care of it. 12. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, 1991 S.C.C. (Crl). 147, will be particularly relevant. “Therefore, when a law visits a person with serious penal consequences extra care must be taken to ensure that those whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the express language of the statute are not roped in by stretching the language of the law. But that does not mean that the judicial officer called upon to decide whether or not a case for fram-inga charge under the Act, is made out, should adopt a negative attitude. But that does not mean that the judicial officer called upon to decide whether or not a case for fram-inga charge under the Act, is made out, should adopt a negative attitude. He should frame a charge if the prosecution shows that the material placed on record and the documents relied on give rise to a strong suspicion of the accused having committed the crime alleged against him.” It is apparent that if a prima facie case stands made out, that would suffice. In the present case, designated court has given enough factual details on which it was satisfied prima facie, about the existence of material to connect the detenu with various offences under the ADA Act and that therefore, he was not entitled to be released on bail. 13. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Mohd.Ilyas v. State of U.P., 1974 S.C.C. (Crl). 704. and Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), 1988S.C.C. (Crl.) 711, do not have any bearing on the issue involved in this habeas corpus petition. Those were cases decided in appeal after trial on sufficiency of facts to attract the offences for which the accused therein were convicted. 14. We are unable to appreciate how the decision of the Supreme Court in Icchu Devi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, would help the petitioner. All that the Supreme Court has stated is, that in case of an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Art.32 court need not have to follow strict rules of pleadings. The Supreme Court was considering a case of preventive detention under the COFEPOSA Act. We sec no need to say any more, on the basis of this case. 15. The decision of the Gujarat High Court in Ayubkhan Kalandarkhan Pethan v. State of Gujarat, (1990)1 Crimes 183 , relates to the exercise of power by the High Court, to examine the question, as to whether the provisions of TAD A Act apply or not, when a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution was maintainable, to protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution, before those were violated, since TADA Act was a drastic measure, which should not ordinarily be resorted to, unless the Government’s law enforcing machinery failed. 14 and 21 of the Constitution, before those were violated, since TADA Act was a drastic measure, which should not ordinarily be resorted to, unless the Government’s law enforcing machinery failed. A writ of mandamus was prayed, for issue of directions to the 2nd respondent therein, to treat as cancelled the offences/violation of provisions of Secs.3 and 4 of TADA Act. Here is a case where a final report has been filed and on the basis of material available, the designated court has refused to release the detenu on bail. This decision will not help the petitioner, on the factual details available, and the detailed order passed by the designated court. 16. The decision of the Gauhati High Court in Shri Sampatmall Jain v. The State of Assam, (1991)3 Crimes 319, has to be merely stated, for what was s decided therein, was that powers under Art.227 of the Constitution can be exercised when the Chief Judicial Magistrate sought to add Secs.3 and 4 of TADA Act to other sections of Indian Penal Code on an application made by the investigating agency. Obviously Chief Judicial Magistrate was not the designated court and therefore it was held, that High Court was justified in interfering in such a case. All that Mr.Sankarasubbu stated on the basis of this decision was, that initially crime was registered for offences other than TADA Act which were later added. The designated court was fully aware, that soon after the blast of railway bridge, the first information report was preferred under Sec.l50(2) of the Indian Railways Act and thereafter investigatio a was taken up by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ‘Q’ Branch, C.I.D. Dharmapuri, on 11. 1992 which investigation revealed commission of offences under the TADA Act. The designated court has power to scrutinise, if prima facie, offences under The TADA Act are discernible. If the designated court was satisfied that offences under TADA Act, were not made out, position would be different, for the ordinary law would then become operative, such a contingency does not arise. 17. We have carefully scrutinised the impugned order passed by the designated court and we are satisfied that no ground has been made out to exercise our constitutional powers. This habeas corpus petition shall stand dismissed.