Order This criminal revision is directed for quashing the proceedings pending disposal before the Special Court in Case No. 1 of 1980 at Balurghat arose out of Hili P.S. Case No. 3 dated 2.3.77. 2. I am very much flabbergasted with the remissness of the prosecution to drag a case for more than a decade involving a paltry amount of Rs.1129.13. The lackadaisical attitude indulged in by the prosecution for such a course of action cannot and does not deserve any consideration from any quarter. 3. However, to appreciate the genesis of the occurrence, a brief synopsis of it is essential as the constitutional right to speedy trial as enshrined in the temple of Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been consciously flouted and the culpable delay accrued not on account of the accused or for any extraordinary or exceptional reasons. 4. Facts: The de facto complainant was directed to take charge of papers and amounts so far collected by the petitioner revisionist when he attended the office on 2.3.1977. 5. A sum of Rs.1129.13, however, the petitioner could not return, though directed and as a result whereof the allegations found their way in the complaint pending disposal before the Special Court. 6. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted on 16.7.80 and the charge was framed on 27.3.89. The offence was committed, as stated earlier, on 2.3.77. The accused surrendered on 18.2.1980. The inordinate delay of which the prosecution is the author preventing conclusion of trial, has denied the right to the accused to speedy trial. 7. It is a complete butchery on the fundamental right to speedy trial available to an accused, since provided within the realm of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It really passes all comprehension to believe that 15 years have already expired and the prosecution case is still in the cold chamber, although a considerable period has elapsed between the date of submission of the charge-sheet and the framing of charge. This is really harrowing and disturbing feature of this case. The continuation of a trial for more than 16 years is really shocking and the provision for speedy trial which is the premable of the Article 21 is therefore, nipped in the bud. If one looks for guidance, the case of State of Bihar vs. Ramdaras Ahir, 1985 Cri. LJ 584, it may throw a considerable light. The continuation of a trial for more than 16 years is really shocking and the provision for speedy trial which is the premable of the Article 21 is therefore, nipped in the bud. If one looks for guidance, the case of State of Bihar vs. Ramdaras Ahir, 1985 Cri. LJ 584, it may throw a considerable light. In my view, the case of this nature where the law laid down in Ramdaras Ahiz' may not only afford to us considerable materials but also throw adequate light for dispensation of justice. One may profit himself, if the salient points are taken note of as their Lordships held therein: "It seems manifest that now by precedential mandate the basic human right to speedy trial has been expressly written, as if with pen and ink, into the constitutional right of life and liberty, guaranteed by Article 21. The word 'trial' in the context of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial includes within its sweep a substantive appeal provided by the Code to the High Court whether against conviction or against acquittal. Thus, it would follow that the constitutional right of speedy trial envisages an equally expeditious conclusion of a substantive appeal and not merely a technical completion of the proceedings in the original court alone. Once the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial and the right to a fair, just and responsible procedure has been violated them the accused is entitled to an unconditional release and the charges levelled against him would fall to the ground. Where the delay in defeating a speedy trial has been occasioned by the absconding of the accused or by other obstructive and delaying tactics adopted by him by resorting to a series of untenable proceedings these factors would necessarily have to be noticed for determining the issue of the denial of the constitutional right". 8. I am tempted to quote a case of our High Court where his Lordship in Rameswar Agarwala vs. State, 1993 (1) Cal LT. 1993 (1) HC 319 held; "As regards an accused's right to speedy trial and court's duty when such right is curtailed by an unconscionably long delay for holding such a trial the same has been elaborately discussed in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1992 SC 1701 (A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak). 1993 (1) HC 319 held; "As regards an accused's right to speedy trial and court's duty when such right is curtailed by an unconscionably long delay for holding such a trial the same has been elaborately discussed in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1992 SC 1701 (A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak). In this judgment the Supreme Court has examined the various aspects of this question vis-a-vis the court's duty. It has been held in this case that right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. In the instant case, therefore, indefinite and inexplicable delay has certainly affected the accused's right to speedy trial." 9. The prosecution in the background of the above, cannot enjoy any unfettered liberty to bide time which imperils the fundamental right of an accused to speedy trial. 10. Considering the conspectus of the facts and circumstances of the case, in the backdrop of the legal position discussed hereinabove, I am of the view that this is a fit and proper case where the High Court should exercise its inherent power to prevent the abuse of justice. The proceedings in Case No.1 of 1980 at Balurghat which arose out of Hili, P.S. Case No. 3 dated 2.3.77, pending against the accused is accordingly quashed and the accused is discharged, after being released from his bail bonds. 11. A Xerox copy of the order may be given to the petitioner-revisionist on usual undertaking. Proceedings quashed.