N. D. V. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) IN this revision the petitioner has challenged the order dated 6-2-1992 passed by the Additional Second Munsiff, Bangalore district, Bangalore on LA. No. II. By the said order, the learned munsiff allowed LA. No. II by staying the execution proceedings in Ex. No. 69 of 1991 pending disposal of the suit at O. S. No. 222 of 1986 and O. S. No. 286 of 1990. ( 2 ) THE facts relevant for the disposal of this revision petition,briefly stated, are as under: the instant revision petitioner had obtained an order of eviction in HRC No. 1 of 1987 against the instant respondent. He had put that order in Execution Case No. 69 of 1991 on the file of the Additional Second Munsiff, Bangalore District, Bangalore. ( 3 ) DURING the pendency of the said execution proceedings, thejudgment-debtor (present respondent) filed an application at LA. II purporting to be one under Order 21, Rule 29, CPC praying for staying the execution proceedings. Among other things, it was alleged by the judgment-debtor that the decree-holder himself has filed a suit at O. S. 222 of 1986 in the very same court praying for rectification of the "number" of the schedule property in the sale deed by which he is said to have purchased the property. It was therefore alleged by him that there is a dispute with reference to the identity of the property in question. It was also alleged by him that in O. S. No. 286 of 1990 the plaintiffs therein have filed a suit for permanent injunction against the present revision petitioner praying for a decree restraining him from dispossessing them and had in fact, obtained an order of temporary injunction on 8-9-1990. The judgment-debtor (present respondent) is one of the defendants in the said suit. It was therefore contended by the instant respondent in the said LA. No. II that in view of the pendency of the aforesaid two suits, the execution of the order in HRC 1 of 1987 is liable to be stayed. ( 4 ) THE decree-holder (present revision petitioner) resisted thesaid application at LA. II contending among other things, that the ingredients reflected in Order 21, Rule 29, CPC are not attracted to the facts of the case, inasmuch as none of the said suits is a suit filed by the present judgment-debtor. ( 4 ) THE decree-holder (present revision petitioner) resisted thesaid application at LA. II contending among other things, that the ingredients reflected in Order 21, Rule 29, CPC are not attracted to the facts of the case, inasmuch as none of the said suits is a suit filed by the present judgment-debtor. It was further contended by him that the plaintiffs in O. S. 286 of 1990 are the persons who were put up by the judgment-debtor with a view to protract the execution proceedings in question and to see that the decree-holder does not get the fruits of the decree. It is also contended by the decree-holder that even the application filed at LA. I by the sons of the judgment-debtor to implead them as party opponents was also dismissed. It was therefore contended that there was absolutely no justification whatsoever for staying the execution proceedings. ( 5 ) THE lower court, on a consideration of the submissionsmade on either side and for the reasons recorded in its impugned order stayed the execution proceedings in Ex. Case No. 69 of 1991 by allowing LA. II. It is this order which is challenged in this revision petition. ( 6 ) I have heard Sri Devanand, learned counsel for the revisonpetitioner and Sri K. Suryanarayana Rao, learned counsel for the respondent. ( 7 ) THE point for consideration in this revision petition as towhether the order passed by the court below is illegal? ( 8 ) IT is not in dispute that the revision petitioner had obtainedan order of eviction against the respondent H. T. Ramakrishnappa in HRC No. 1 of 1987. It is also not in dispute that it is that order which is put in execution in Ex. Case No. 69 of 1991. Further it is not in dispute that the sons of the judgment-debtor have filed a suit at O. S. No. 286 of 1990 in the very court against the decree-holder (present revision petitioner) to which the judgment-debtor is also added as a party respondent. It is disclosed from the order of the lower court that the plaintiffs in the said suit have sought for the relief of permanent injunction against the instant revision petitioner restraining him from dispossessing them. It is further disclosed that a temporary injunction is, in fact, issued against the revision petitioner and that the said temporary injunction is still in force. It is further disclosed that a temporary injunction is, in fact, issued against the revision petitioner and that the said temporary injunction is still in force. Further, it is also disclosed from the order of the lower court that the present revision petitioner has filed O. S. No. 222 of 1986 for the rectification of the "number" given to the schedule property in the sale deed. It is in the context of these circumstances, the learned Munsiff took the view that the provisions of Order 21, Rule 29, CPC are applicable to the facts of the case, with the result, the learned Munsiff has chosen to pass the impugned order. ( 9 ) SRI Devanand, learned counsel for the petitioner contendedthat none of the circumstances referred to and relied on by the learned Munsiff would attract the provisions of Order 21, Rule 29, CPC, in that the suit at O. S. No. 286 of 1990 is not a suit filed by the judgment-debtor, but is a suit filed by his sons and that therefore, one of the important ingredients referred to in order 21, Rule 29, CPC is not attracted to the facts of the case. The learned counsel also contended that the other suit filed by the present revision petitioner has no relevance in the context of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 29, CPC. It is therefore, argued by the learned counsel that it was not competent for the learned munsiff to stay the execution in question. Reliance is placed on the decision in M/s. Patil Exhibitors (P) Ltd. v Corporation of the city of Bangalore. ( 10 ) ON the other hand, Sri K. Surayanarayana Rao, learnedcounsel appearing for the respondent contended that the provisions of Order 21, Rule 29, CPC would, in substance, apply to the facts of the case. It was argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that the persons who has filed the suit at O. S. No. 286 of 1990 are none other than the sons of judgment-debtor and having regard to the tenor of the decision in M/s. Paramound Industries and Metal Finishers v C. M. Malliga, they are more or less in the position of judgment-debtor and that therefore, the provisions of Order 21, Rule 29, CPC would apply. Dilating on this aspect, the learned counsel contended that O. S. No. 286 of 1990 is, in substance, by way of resistence to the execution of the order of eviction in HRC No. 1 of 1987 and that therefore, unless and until their rights are decided and determined, the execution Case No. 69 of 1991 cannot be proceeded with. It was further contended that if the Execution case is proceeded with even during the pendency of the suit at o. S. 286 of 1990 it would lead to an anamolous situation bringing into being unnecessary complications. Making his submissions on these lines, the learned counsel contended that the revision petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 11 ) IN order to appreciate the submissions made by thelearned counsel on either side, it is necessary to see, in the first instance, as to what are the ingredients of Order 21, Rule 29, cpc. The said provision reads as under:"where a suit is pending in any court against the holder of a decree of such court instituted by the person against whom the said decree was passed, the court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay the execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided. "a careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would clearly go to show that in order to attract Order 21, Rule 29, CPC there should be simultaneously two proceedings in one court; one is the proceeding in execution by the decree-holder and the other is a suit by the judgment-debtor against the decree-holder of such court, which means the court in which the suit is pending. Further as pointed out by this court in the decision in Pujari Sub- baiah v Lakkappanavar, the power of stay under this Rule can be exercised only if a decree that is going to be passed in the pending suit is likely to have bearing under execution. ( 12 ) IN the instant case, it is noticed that the suit at O. S. No. 286 of 1990 is not a suit filed by the judgment-debtor. The materials on record disclosed that the suit, in fact, is a suit filed by the sons of the judgment-debtor. In that context, it appears that it is not possible to say that the suit is by the judgment-debtor. The materials on record disclosed that the suit, in fact, is a suit filed by the sons of the judgment-debtor. In that context, it appears that it is not possible to say that the suit is by the judgment-debtor. Under these circumstances, it is possible to say that the provisions of Order 21, Rule 29, CPC do not strictly apply to the facts of this case. I may also point out here that another suit at O. S. No. 226 of 1986 is said to be a suit by the decree-holder for the rectification of the 'number' given to the schedule property in the sale deed. In that view of the matter it is also equally clear that the said circumstance also is not a circumstance which would attract the provisions of Order 21, rule 29, CPC. At the same time, it is not in dispute that in O. S. No. 286 of 1990, the plaintiffs have obtained a temporary injunction against the defendant (decree-holder in HRC 1 of 1987) restraining him from dispossessing them from the schedule property. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to decide as regards the course of action which the executing court can take with reference to the execution of the order in HRC 1 of 1987. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the judgment-debtor is also a party to the said suit at O. S. No. 286 of 1990. The question as to whether the executing court has simply to issue a possession warrant as against the judgment-debtor notwithstanding the temporary injunction order issued in O. S. No. 222 of 1986 against the defendant (present decree-holder) or whether the executing court should take any other course of action is a question which is required to be resolved. As pointed out earlier, Sri Suryanarayana Rao, learned counsel for the respondent with reference to the provisions of Order 21, Rule 29, cpc and the decision rendered thereon in Paramound industries case, contended that unless and until the suit at O. S. 286 of 1990 is decided the execution in question cannot be proceeded with. ( 13 ) IT is noticed that the executing court has stayed theexecution proceedings pending disposal of the suit in O. S. No. 222 of 1986 and O. S. 286 of 1990 presumably under Order 21, rule 29, CPC. ( 13 ) IT is noticed that the executing court has stayed theexecution proceedings pending disposal of the suit in O. S. No. 222 of 1986 and O. S. 286 of 1990 presumably under Order 21, rule 29, CPC. However, as pointed out earlier, the provisions of order 21, Rule 29, CPC cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case having regard to the fact that the suits referred to earlier, are not the suits by the judgment-debtor. However, it is also a hard fact that in the suit filed by the sons of the judgment-debtor to which both the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor are parties, a temporary injunction is issued against the decree-holder restraining him from dispossessing them and that the said temporary injunction is said to be in force. In otherwords, the said temporary injunction is deemed to have been issued on the ground that they are in prima facie possession of the suit property. When a court having jurisdiction has issued such an order, the executing court cannot simply ignore the same. It is for the decree-holder to get that temporary injunction vacated before he asks the court to execute the order of eviction. A court of law cannot afford to allow an anamolous situation where two apparently conflicting orders operate. It is true that the order of eviction is against a different person, that is to say, the father of the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 286 of 1990. However, when it is brought to the notice of the executing court that in the said suit, temporary injunction order against the decree-holder is issued and is in force restraining him from dispossessing the plaintiffs in the said suit, the executing court cannot close its eyes and issue a possession warrant, because the said order of temporary injunction, is deemed to have been issued on the ground that plaintiffs in O. S. No. 286 of 1990 are in prima facie possession of the property in question. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that the executing court cannot proceed with executon as long as the said temporary injunction is in force. I hasten to add here that it is not proper to say that the execution will have to be stayed till the disposal of the said suit. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that the executing court cannot proceed with executon as long as the said temporary injunction is in force. I hasten to add here that it is not proper to say that the execution will have to be stayed till the disposal of the said suit. If the temporary injunction in the said suit is vacated, there should not be any decree for the executing court to go ahead with the execution case because, this is not a case where the provisions of Order 21, Rule 29, CPC would perse apply. In my view, as long as the temporary injunction is in force, the execution petition will have to be kept pending though not under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 29. In such a situation the court can indeed exercise its inherent power under section 151, CPC. In fact, Section 151, CPC is meant to meet a situation like the one in hand among others. In this connection, the decision in P. W. Fitzholmes v Waryam Singh can be looked into with advantage. However, I am of the view that the lower court was wrong in holding that the provisions of Order 21, Rule 29, CPC would apply and that it was equally wrong in holding that the execution will have to be stayed till the disposal of the suit at O. S. No. 286 of 1990. The lower court ought to have stayed the execution only as long as the temporary injunction in o. S. No. 286 of 1990 is in force. ( 14 ) IT is also noticed that the decree-holder has filed a suit ato. S. No. 222 of 1986 for correcting the 'number' of the property in the sale deed executed in his favour by the judgment-debtor. However, on that count alone it is not possible to stay the execution of the order passed in HRC No. 1 of 1987. May be, that there is a mistake in giving the correct number and the decree- holder, in his wisdom, thought it necessary to get it corrected by filing a suit. However, there does not appear to be any dispute as regards the identity of the property. The 'number' given to the property is not the sole factor to identify a property. A property is more correctly identified by its boundaries. However, there does not appear to be any dispute as regards the identity of the property. The 'number' given to the property is not the sole factor to identify a property. A property is more correctly identified by its boundaries. Further the question as to whether there is any difficulty in handing over possession of the property on account of the wrong number, is a question which would crop up for consideration at the time of delivery of possession, if the same cannot be otherwise identified. I may also point out here that the materials on record do not disclose any difficulty either on the part of the judgment-debtor or on the part of his sons who have filed the suit at O. S. No. 286 of 1990 as regards the identity of disputed property. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that the executing court has erred in taking the view that the execution proceedings should be stayed till the disposal of the said suit i. e. , O. S. No. 222 of 1986. As pointed out earlier hereinabove, the difficulty if at all in that behalf will have to be resolved at the stage of delivery of possession of the property if the property cannot be identified otherwise than by 'number' assigned to the property. (emphasis supplied) ( 15 ) AS pointed out earlier, Sri Suryanarayana Rao, has alsocontended that the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 286 of 1990, who are the sons of the judgment-debtor are, in substance, judgment- debtors concerned. I do not agree with Sri Suryanarayana Rao, because the definition of 'judgment-debtor' in Section 2 (10), CPC does not admit of such a submission. Under the said definition 'judgment- debtor' is any person against whom a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made. Further, I am also not inclined to agree with the submission made by Sri suryanarayana Rao that the decision in Paramound Industries case would apply to the facts of the case, because in the instant case, the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 286 of 1990 are not before the court in execution case. Further it is said that even the application filed by them to come on record at LA. No. I is said to have been dismissed. Further it is said that even the application filed by them to come on record at LA. No. I is said to have been dismissed. ( 16 ) FROM what is stated hereinabove, it follows that the orderof the lower court in Ex. Case No. 69 of 1991 on LA. No. II is liable to be modified suitably in the context of what is stated hereinabove. ( 17 ) BEFORE I close I would also like to make a mention of thedecision in case of Mis. Patil Exhibitors Private Ltd. v Corporation of the City of Bangalore. That is a case where a Division bench of this court has held that the landlord is liable to be restrained from forcible acts and protection is required to be given against forcible dispossession. All that I can say is that the said decision pressed into service by Sri Devanand has no direct bearing on the facts of this case. ( 18 ) IN the result, the civil revision petition is partly allowedby way of modification of the order passed by the court below. In modification of the order under appeal, it is hereby ordered that the execution proceedings in Ex. Case No. 69 of 1991 on the file of the Additional Second Munsiff, Bangalore District, Bangalore is stayed as long as the temporary injunction order in O. S. No. 286 of 1990 on the file of the same court is in force. ( 19 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no orderas to costs. --- *** --- .