Judgment S.K.Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. In this writ application, the petitioner has moved this Court for quashing the first information report in Kotwali P. S. Case No. 207 of 1993, dated 29-4-1993 instituted for an offence alleged to have been committed under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 , (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground of violation of the provisions of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Unification Order) and the condition of licence granted thereunder. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing investigation pursuant to the said first information report and alss for quashing the seizure of 1170 tins of edible oils, 83 bags of Aata and 61 bags of Maida. The petitioner further prayed for release of the said articles as contained in the seizure list dated 29-4-1993. 2. While admitting the writ petition by order dated 20-5-1993, a Division Bench of this Court directed the authority concerned to release the said articles to the petitioner on furnishing security. 3. The relevant facts are not in serious dispute and may be noted with relative brevity. 4. The petitioner is carrying on business in foodgrains including edible oils and sugar by virtue of a licence granted to him under the Unification Order. On 29-4-1993, a raid was conducted at the business premises of the petitioner by the officials concerned and in course of the said raid, the raiding party found 1170 tins of edible oils of different brands, 83 bags of Aata and 61 bags of Maida and seized those articles under the seizure list prepared on the same day. The basis of the aforesaid seizure, as stated in the first information report, is that the raiding party conducted physical verification of the stock of the aforesaid shop in presence of the independent witnesses and the petitioner who was also present produced the licence at that time. 5. On verification, the informant found 1170 tins of edible oils of different brands containing 15 kgs. each and also found 83 bags of Aata and 61 bags of Maida weighing approximately 144 quintals. After making seizure in presence of the independent witnesses, those articles were handed over to one Tapeshwar Singh for custody. 5. On verification, the informant found 1170 tins of edible oils of different brands containing 15 kgs. each and also found 83 bags of Aata and 61 bags of Maida weighing approximately 144 quintals. After making seizure in presence of the independent witnesses, those articles were handed over to one Tapeshwar Singh for custody. On the basis of the aforesaid seizure, the allegation in the first information report is that since the petitioner was holding the above food articles in excess of the stock limit, he has violated clause 18 of the Unification Order and also the condition of licence. 6. Mr. P. S. Dayal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised several contentions in support of the writ petition. His firt submission is that as because neither in the Unification Order nor in the Notification No. G. S. R. No. 49, dated 17-10-1985 as amended from time to time, the meaning of B and C class cities have been defined, there is virtually no storage limit fixed in respect of foodgrains and edible oils in relation to Ranchi town. Further it has been submitted that fixation of storage limit is a sine qua non for application of licensing order and as no storage limit has been fixed under the Unification Order, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed an offence. In support of this contention, strong reliance has been placed upon a decision of this Court in Shambhu Nath Agrawal v. State of Bihar and others, (1991)1 PLJR 462. 7. Secondly, it has been submitted by the learned counsel that the provision of Unification Order shall have no application to the edibls oils in view of the fact that licence fee which was prescribed by Notification No. G. S. R. 17, dated 10-7-1985 has been quashed by this Court and in view of the said decision and by virtue of the Letter No. 920, dated 22-2-1990 issued by the Food Commissioner, Bihar, stating |therein that question of obtaining licence/renewal of it in respect of edible oils and oils seeds does not arise and as such the institution of criminal case against the petitioner is mala fide. 8. 8. Further it has been submitted that there being no reason assigned in the seizure list, the seizure list dated 29-4-1993 is not valid and as the valid seizure is a sine qua non for prosecution, the present prosecution initiated against the petitioner is vitiated in law and as such liable to be quashed. In this regard, Mr. Dayal, learned counsel has relied on in the case of K. L. Subhayyas. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 711 and Rant Chandra Pansari v. State of Bihar, 1989 East CrC 378 : 1988 PUR 623. He has also strongly relied upon an unreported decision of this Court in the case of Saheb Singh v. State of Bihar, Cr WJC No. 18 of 1993 (R), disposed of on 4-3-1993. Lastly, it has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the allegations contained in the first information report do not make out any offence under the Act read with Unification Order, and as such, the same as well as investigation pursuant thereto cannot be allowed to continue. 9. Mr. Shivnath, learned Government Pleader No. 1 on the other hand has referred to Annexure A to the counter-affidavit, the Notification No. S. O. 93 (E), dated 8-2-1993 and submitted that maximum storage limit in respect of edible oilsedible oil seeds and pulses has been fixed separately by the Government of India in exercise of its power under Section 3 of the Act and has issued an Order, namely. Pulses, Edible Oilseeds and Edible Oils (Storage Control) Amendment Order, 1993, (hereinafter referred to as "The Central Order" and, as such, the argument that no storage limit has been fixed, is baseless. Advancing his argument, he has submitted that according to the Central Order, maximum limit of retailers has been fixed as 24 quintals in respect of all edible oils including hydrogenated vegetable oils. Similarly 800 quintals have been fixed as the maximum storage limit in respect of wholef saler. Advancing his argument, he has submitted that according to the Central Order, maximum limit of retailers has been fixed as 24 quintals in respect of all edible oils including hydrogenated vegetable oils. Similarly 800 quintals have been fixed as the maximum storage limit in respect of wholef saler. It has been submitted that in view of Notification No. G. S. R. 13, dated 23-8-1990, a retailer in B class cities is entitled to hold maximum stock of 100 (one hundred) quintals of foodgrain of one or all type at a time but as 144 bags of Aata and maida seized from the shop premises of the petitioner were approximately 144 quintals, the petitioner has violated the order and, as such is liable to be prosecuted. It is further submitted that in view of the Government Notification No. G. S. R. 49, dated 17-10-1985 as amended by Government Notification No. G. S. R. 8, dated 24-2-1988, Renchi City comes under category of B City. Moreover, as per 1981 census, Ranchi Urban area comes under B class city which, it is submitted, will be borne out by Bihar Government (Finance Department) Letter No. 3/R-1-3-4 dated 10-10-1983. 10. In view of the aforesaid submission, made on behalf of the parties, the following questions arise for consideration in this application : (A) Whether the petitioner has violated the storage limit as specified by G. S. R. 49 dated 17th October, 1985, as amended by Government Notification No. G. S. R. 8, dated 24-2-1988 ? (B) Whether the petitioner has violated the condition of Licence No. 5 (iv) and Clause 18 of the Unification Order for storing the aforesaid articles in excess of its limit ? (C) Whether the seizure effected by respondent No. 2 is invalid on the ground of non-recording of reasons thereon ? (D) Whether in view of Letter No. 920, dated 22-2-1990 issued by the Food Commissioner, Bihar, as contained in Annexure 4, no licence is required to be obtained in respect of edible oils, oilseeds ? (E) Whether the allegations made in the first information report made out any offence under the Act read with Unification Order ? Re : Question No. (A): 11 In order to appreciate the contentions raised, it will be helpful to mention some of the clauses under the Unification Order. Clause 18 of the Unification Order reads as follows : "18. (E) Whether the allegations made in the first information report made out any offence under the Act read with Unification Order ? Re : Question No. (A): 11 In order to appreciate the contentions raised, it will be helpful to mention some of the clauses under the Unification Order. Clause 18 of the Unification Order reads as follows : "18. Restriction on possession of trade articles.No person shall, either by himself or by any person on his behalf, store or have in his possession at any time any trade aricle mentioned in Schedule I and Schedule II in quantity exceeding the limits fixed (i) under an order issued by the Central Government, or (ii) by the State Government with prior concurrence of the Central Government by issuing a notification in official Gazette from time to time." Clause 5 (iv) of the terms and conditions of the licence reads as follows : "5. The licensee shall not (i) *** *** *** (ii) *** *** *** (iii) *** *** *** (iv) keep in his possession stocks of trade articles exceeding the limits fixed under clause 18." 12. It is not in dispute that Notification being G. S. R. 49, dated 17-10-1985 has been issued fixing the storage limit of different articles. 13. Clause 5(a) of the said notification reads as under : "5(a) The wholesale dealer of edible oils in B class cities means a person who at any time holds stock of any or all edible oils taken together including hydrogenated vegetable oils for purchase, sale or storage for purpose other than personal consumption in a quantity exceeding fifteen quintals, but not exceeding 500 (five hundred) quintals." Similarly Clause 5(b) reads as follows : "The wholesaler dealer of edible oils in C class cities, towns and rural areas means a person who at any time holds stock of any one or all edible oils taken together including hydrogenated vegetable oil for purchase, sale or storage for purposes other than personal consumption in a quantity exceeding 10 (ten) quintals but not exceeding 300 (three hundred) quintals." To crown with this, bare perusal of Annexure A, the Notification No. S. O. 93 (E), dated 8-2-1993 by which Pulses, Edible Oilseeds and Edible Oils (Storage Control) Order, 1977, was amended, it is clear that the stock-limit was fixed by the Central Government. It is relevant to mention some of the clauses of this notification, namely, Clauses 1 and 2 respectively : "1. (1) This Order may be called the Pulses, Edible Oilseeds and Edible Oils (Storage Control) Amendment Order, 1993, (2) It shall come into force on the date of its publication in the official Gazette. 2. In Puleses, Edible Oilsseds and Edible Oils (Storage. Control) Order, 1977, in clause 4, in sub-clause (1), (a) for the existing item numbers (ii) and (iii) and the entries relating thereto, the following item numbers (ii) and (iii) and the entries shall respectively be substituted, namely : Category of Cities Stock limits in quintals in case of wholesaler Retailer (ii) Edible Oil Seeds. Categories A Cities 3000 200 1. All edible oilseeds taken together. Categories B Cities. 2000 150 2. For groundnut kernel or seeds 75% limits specified shall apply. . (iii) Edibile Oils including hydrogenated vegetable oils Category A Cities 1200 40 All edbile oils including hydrogenoted vegetable oils." Category B Cities 800 24 Other Areas 500 16 14. In Shambhu Nath Agarwal (supra). It was admitted by the Advocate-General that there was no provision in the Unification Order to indicate that the definition given of A, B and C classes of cities in other Act has been adopted in this order. It appears that the Advocate-General also conceded that no notification had been issued by the State Government fixing storage limit of A, B and C classes of cities or in fact what is meant by A, B, and C classes of city has also not been defined till date. In that situation, this Court held that in view of the admision made by the State that there was no provision fixing the storage limit in respect of A, B and C classes of city for wholesale dealer of foodgrains, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any offence by storing foodgrains more than prescribed quantity. Relying on the said decision another learned Single Judge in Vijoy Kumars case (supra), reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 605 : 1992 East CrC 446, quashed the prosecution. 15. However, such is not the position here. Relying on the said decision another learned Single Judge in Vijoy Kumars case (supra), reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 605 : 1992 East CrC 446, quashed the prosecution. 15. However, such is not the position here. As noticed above, in terms of clause 18 of the Unification Order, every person has been prohibited from possessing at any time trade Article exceeding the limit fixed under the order issued by the Central Government or by ths State Government. 16. Further there is no denial of the fact that Central Government in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 3 of the Act has made an order known as Pulses, Edible Oilseeds and Edible Oils (Storage Control) Order, 1977, (hereinafter called as "the Central Order"). The said Order defines Category A and Category B cities and other areas in the following manner: "2. Definition. In the order, unless the context otherwise requires : (a) * * * * * * (b) "category A city" means a city, included as category A city in the schedule to this order, having a population of 10 lacs and more ; (c) "category B city" means a city included in category B city in the schedule to this order having a population of three lacs and more but less than 10 lacs, or the capital of State or a Union Territory not included in category A city ; (d) "other areas" means any other place which is not a category A city or category B city ; ** * * * * (h) "population" means population determined in the 1981 Census. By reason of clause 3 of the Central Order, prohibition has been imposed in carrying on any business except under a licence granted by the State Government under a State Order, which means an Order issued by the State Government or Union Territory Administration under the provision of the Act and for the time being in force as would be evident from clause 2(m). By reason of clause 4(iii) of the Central Order, the stock limits for the wholesale dealers of edible oils including hydrogenated vegetable oils has been fixed as 500 quintals, 400 quintals and 250 quintals in categories A, B and other areas respectively. The second proviso and fourth proviso to clause 4 of the Central Order reads as follows : 4. By reason of clause 4(iii) of the Central Order, the stock limits for the wholesale dealers of edible oils including hydrogenated vegetable oils has been fixed as 500 quintals, 400 quintals and 250 quintals in categories A, B and other areas respectively. The second proviso and fourth proviso to clause 4 of the Central Order reads as follows : 4. Restriction on possession of pulses, edible oilseeds and edible oits. (1) No dealer shall, after a period of fifteen days from the coming into force of this clause, either by himself or by any person on his behalf, store or have in his possession at any time pulses, edible oilseeds or edible oil in excess of quantities specified below : (iii) Edible oils including hydrogenated vegetable oils. Cat. A cities Cat. B cities Cat. C cities 500 400 250 25 15 10 All edible oils including hydrogenated vegetable oils * * * * * * * Provided further that where a dealer is also carrying on business as a producer or commission agent, he shall be entitled to retain the stock limits specified in this sub-clause for each such business if such business and accounts thereof are kept separate and distinct from one another : * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Provided also that where any quantity of pulses, edible oil or edible oilseeds is in transit, then, for the purposes of this sub-clause, such quantity shall during the period when such quantity is in transit, be deemed to have been included in the stocks of the dealer in whom the property in such quantity is retained during such transit in accordance with terms of any contract or agreement in pursuance of which the quantity is put in such transit." I have already noticed earlier that clause 4(ii)(iii) of the Central Order has been amended by Notification No. S. O. 93(E) dated 8-2-1993, by reason of which stock limit prescribed under Central Order has been substantially amended clause 6 of the Central Order reads as follows : "6. State Orders to apply.The provisions of the State Order relating to storage of pulses, edible oilseeds or edible oils shall apply in respect of any matter for which no provision has been specifically made in this order." 17. State Orders to apply.The provisions of the State Order relating to storage of pulses, edible oilseeds or edible oils shall apply in respect of any matter for which no provision has been specifically made in this order." 17. It will appear that the provision of the State Order relating to storage of pulses, edible oilseeds or edible oils shall apply in respect of any matter for which no provision has been made in the said order. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that in terms of the Central Order not only storage limit has been fixed but also Class A and B cities have been defined. 18. In this connection, the schedule appended to the Central Order is to be noted. From a mere glance to the schedule, it will appear that Ranchi has been categorised in Class B cities having serial No. 29 in the State Order. In such view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the decision in Sambhu Nath Agarwala and Vijay Kumar are clearly distinguishable and the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner has no merit and is to be rejected. 19. Mr. Dayal, however, has drawn my attention to the case of Saheb Singh (supra) and has submitted that as on the similar facts and circumstances, a Division Bench of this Court has quashed the first information report, the present writ petition should be allowed. In my considered opinion, the agrument of Mr. Dayal is only to be seen and rejected. 20. In Saheb Singh (supra), the first information report was dated 25-11-1992, whereas, in the present case, it was dated 29-4-1993 and in such view of the matter. Notification No. S. O. 93 (E) dated 8-2-1993 will apply in this case. Secondly from the reading of the aforesaid decision, it appears that clause 18 of the Unification Order was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. Moreover, if attention of their Lordships would have been drawn to the aforesaid notification, dated 8-2-1993, their Lordships could have considered the import of the Central Order as well as the notification dated 8-2-1993. 21. Moreover, if attention of their Lordships would have been drawn to the aforesaid notification, dated 8-2-1993, their Lordships could have considered the import of the Central Order as well as the notification dated 8-2-1993. 21. I have already discussed above that from the facts and circumstances of the present case, the decisions rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Shambha Nath Agrawala, Vijay Kumar, have no application inasmuch as Shambhu Nath Agrawala, was decided on the concession made by the learned Advocate-General whereas in the present case, I have already dealt with in extenso relevant clauses of the Unification Order as well as the Central Order and the notifications issued from time to time. 22. It is a settled principle of law that a decision will not be an authority for the proposition, if a point was not canvassed before it and if the decision of the higher court or of a co-ordinate bench was not brought to the notice of the Court, the same decision shall not be binding upon another Bench. In this connection, the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurunam Kaur, (1989)1 SCC 101 may be taken note of. In the said case the Supreme Court also considered the effect of the decisions which had been rendered sub silentio. In this connection, reference may also be made to the case of Saiyeda Mossorat v. Hindustan Steel Limited, 1989 Vol. I SCC 272 and Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, 1989 Vol. II SCC 754. la such view of the matter, I am of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the decisions rendered by a Division Bench in Saheb Singhs case has no application. Regarding Question No. (B): 23. Answering this question, I may observe that clause 5 (iv) of the terms and conditions of licence has already been quoted above. It is apparent from clause 5 (iv) that if a licensee is found in his possession, stock of trade articles exceeding the limits fixed under clause 18, he can be prosecuted under Section 7 of the Act. Clause 4 of the terms and conditions of the licence reads as follows : "The licensee shall not contravene the provisions of the Order or any other law relating to essential commodities for the time being in force." 24. Clause 4 of the terms and conditions of the licence reads as follows : "The licensee shall not contravene the provisions of the Order or any other law relating to essential commodities for the time being in force." 24. Thus from the aforesid discussion, it is clear that the petitioner was under a legal obligation to possess stocks of articles within the permissible limits and not having done so, he has violated clause 18 of the Unification Order and the terms and conditions of licence. Regarding Question No. (C): 25. Mr. Dayal next argued that the search and seizure must be declared invalid as before conducting the search and making seizure, the officer concerned has not recorded his reason to believe in the search warrant. Continuing it is submitted that by reason of this failure on part of the officer concerned, search and seizure was invalid, as a result of which, the whole prosecution must be quashed inasmuch as it is a settled principle of law that a valid search and seizure is a sine qua non for prosecution. In support of his contention. Mr. Dayal relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ramchandra Pansari v. The State of Bihar, 1988 PLJR 623, and of the Supreme Court in the case of K. L. Subhayya v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 711 . 26. In order to appreciate the argument of Mr. Dayal, it is necessary to quote Clause 30 (1) (a) of the Unification Order which reads as under : "30. Power of entry, search and seizure, etc.(1) ...... (a) require, the owner, occupier or any other person-in-charge of any place, premises, vehicle or vessel in which he has reason to believe that any contravention of provisions of this Order has been or is being or is about to be made to produce any books of accounts or documents showing transaction relating to such contravention". Reading the aforesaid clause, in my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force. There is no mandate of the legislature under this clause that whenever the licensing authority conducts, any search and make seizure, he must record his reason to believe before hand. Reading the aforesaid clause, in my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force. There is no mandate of the legislature under this clause that whenever the licensing authority conducts, any search and make seizure, he must record his reason to believe before hand. If the duty to record reasons which furnished ground for entertaining a reasonable believe were to be recorded in advance, the same could have been incorporated in Clause 30 (1) of the Unification Order. I may in this context refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Pratap Singh and another v. Director of Enforcement, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and others, AIR 1985 SC 989 . Their Lordships in the aforesaid case after considering the scope of Section 37 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (46 of 1973) vis a vis Section 165 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and relying in the case of S. Narayanappa v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, AIR 1967 SC 523 , has obseved that : "The expression reason to believe is not synonymous with subjective satisfaction of the officer. The belief must be held in good faith ; it cannot be merely a pretence. In the same case, it was held that it is open to the court to examine the question whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section." In the same case, the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "If the duty to record reasons which furnish grounds for entertaining a reasonable belief were to be recorded in advance, the same could have been incorporated in Section 37(1), otherwise a simple one line section would have been sufficient that all searches as required for the purpose of this Act shall be carried out in the manner prescribed in Section 195 of the Code by the officer to be set out in that section. In order to give full meaning to the expression so far as may be sub-section (2) of Section 37 should be incorporated to mean that broadly the procedure relating to search as enacted in Section 165 shall be followed. In order to give full meaning to the expression so far as may be sub-section (2) of Section 37 should be incorporated to mean that broadly the procedure relating to search as enacted in Section 165 shall be followed. But if a deviation becomes necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act in which Section 37(1) is incorporated, it would be permissible except that when challenged before a court of law, justification will have to be offered for the deviation. This view will give full play to the expression so far as may be." In paragraph 13 the Supreme Court has further observed as follows ; "The view which we are taking is in accord with the view taken in Gopikrishna Agarwals case AIR 1976 SC 1298. The grounds which induced reasonable belief therefore need not be stated in the search warrant." I am tempted further to quote the observation of their Lordships which runs as follows : "However, one can profitably refer to Radha Krishan v. State of U. P. (1963) Suppl. 1 SCR 408 at page 411; AIR 1963 SC 822 at p. 828. wherein the court held that assuming that the search was illegal the seizure of the article is not vitiated. It may be that because of illegality of the search the court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding seizure, but no other consequence ensues." In the case of S. Narayanappa (supra), Section 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 was interpreted by their Lordships which reads as follows : "But the legal position is that if there are in fact some reasonable grounds for the Income Tax Officer to believe that there had been any non-disclosure as regards any fact, which could have a material bearing on the question of under assessment that would be sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Income Tax Officer to issue the notice under Section 34. Whether these grounds are adequate or not is not a matter for the Court to investigate. In other words, the sufficiency of the grounds which induced the Income Tax Officer to act is not a justiciable issue. It is of course open for the assessee to contend that the Income Tax Officer did not hold the belief that there had been such non-disclosure. In other words, the sufficiency of the grounds which induced the Income Tax Officer to act is not a justiciable issue. It is of course open for the assessee to contend that the Income Tax Officer did not hold the belief that there had been such non-disclosure. In other words, the existence of the belief can be challenged by the assessee but not the sufficiency of the reasons for the belief. Again the expression "reason to believe." in Section 34 of the Income-tax Act does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the Income Tax Officer. The belief must be held in good faith, it cannot be merely a pretence. To put it differently it is open to the Court to examine the question whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section. To this limited extent, the action of the Income Tax Officer in starting proceedings under Section 34 of the Act is open to challenge in a Court of law." Taking into accounts this authoritative pronouncement of their Lordships, I am of the view that the first information report against the petitioner cannot be quashed on the ground that the search ans seizure was invalid on account of non-recording of reason to believe by the authority concerned. 27. Now coming to the decision of K. L. Subhayaya (supra) I am of the view that this case does not improve the case of the petitoner. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court interpreted the import of Section 54 of the Mysore Excise Act which inter alia says that : "... he may after recording the grounds of his belief......" In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal on the ground that the Inspector of Excise who searched the Car along with panches had no jurisdiction to do so because he did not comply with the provisions of Section 54 of the Excise Act. The Court held that as there was a direct noncompliance of the provision of Section 54 which rendered the search completely without jurisdiction, as a logical corollary, the conviction of the appellant was vitiated. 28. From the reading of the aforesaid decision, in my opinion, the contention raised by Mr. The Court held that as there was a direct noncompliance of the provision of Section 54 which rendered the search completely without jurisdiction, as a logical corollary, the conviction of the appellant was vitiated. 28. From the reading of the aforesaid decision, in my opinion, the contention raised by Mr. Dayal is not tenable in law, inasmuch as Section 54 of the Mysore Excise Act will show that there was a legistative mandate for recording the reasons to believe before conducting search and making seizure. This mandate, however, is absent in clause 30(1)(a) of the Unification Order as observed earlier. Similarly the decision rendered in Ramchandra Pansari (supra) does not help the petitioner. In the aforesaid case, their Lordships while considering Rule 12 of the Bihar Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel Oil Licensing Order, 1966, came to a finding that as the search and seizure was not made by competent officer, the same was invalid. Relying in the case of K. L. Subhayya, the Division Bench of this Court observed as follows : "I am, therefore, of the view that since the search and seizure made by the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, Khutauna, was absolutely illegal and without jurisdiction, the same has to be ignored. Once the search and seizure is ignored the very foundation for initiating a proceeding under Section 7 of the Act vanishes. In the circumstances, the trial has to be quashed." In my considered opinion, in the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench, the interpretation of the term "reason to believe" did not arise inasmuch as that point was not canvassed by the petitioner before their Lordships. 29. It is an established principle of law that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what logically can be deduced therefrom It is also a settled law that a point not argued does not create any binding precedent with regard thereto. 29. It is an established principle of law that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what logically can be deduced therefrom It is also a settled law that a point not argued does not create any binding precedent with regard thereto. In support of this conclusion, I may helpfully refer to a recent decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Central Coalfields Limited v. The State of Bihar and others, 1993 (1) PLJR 617, where the Division Bench after discussing several authorities of the Supreme Court as well as other High Courts, have come to a finding that the judgment of the Supreme Court has to be read in a reasonable manner and that judgment of a court is not to be read as statute. It is further held that there cannot be any doubt that a judgment like any other document will have to be read in its entirety. 30. faking into consideration the facts of the present case, I am of the view that Clause 30 (1) (a) of the Unification Order does not contemplate recording of any reason to believe before conducting search and making seizure. In this context, I may refer to a decision of another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Narendra Kumar v. The State of Bihar and others, 1977 BBCJ 570 . While considering Section 3 of the Act, their Lordships have held as follows : "Section 3 of the Act, inter alia, lays down that orders under that section may provide for search and seizure of any article in respect of which the person conducting the search or making the seizure has reason to believe that contravention of the order has been or is being or is about to be committed. Clause 9 of the Order provides for search and seizure. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that there is nothing on the record to indicate that the officer conducting the search and seizure had reason to believe that there was any contravention of the provisions of this Order or of the conditions of any licence issued thereunder. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that there is nothing on the record to indicate that the officer conducting the search and seizure had reason to believe that there was any contravention of the provisions of this Order or of the conditions of any licence issued thereunder. True it is that the officer conducting the search and making the seizure has not recorded that he has reasons for such a belief ; but on the facts of the instant case, when we find that the allegation that correct accounts were not maintained by the petitioner cannot be said to be entirely baseless, the search and seizure cannot be held to be illegal on the ground that the authority concerned has not put in writing that he had reasons for such a belief." 31. I am in respectful agreement with this Division Bench and I hold from the fact and circumstances of the present case that the allegation made in the first information report prima facie shows that the petitioner has violated clause 18 of the Unification Order as well as condition 5 (iv) of the terms and conditions of licence and as such the search and seizure cannot be held to be illegal solely on the ground that authority concerned did not record his reasons for such belief. 32. Before concluding my answer to this question, I may profitably refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jyoti Prasad v. State of Haryana, 1993 East CrC 57 : 1993 (1) UJ (SC) 236. Their Lordships in the aforesaid case while considering the meaning of the words "reason to believe have observed as follows : "Under the Indian Penal Law, guilt in respect of almost all the offences is fastened either on the ground of "intention" or "knowledge" or "reason to believe". We are now concermed with the expressions "knowledge" and "reason to believe". "Knowledge" is an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. "Reason to believe" is not the same thing as "suspicion" or "doubt" and mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing. "Reason to believe" is a higher level of state of mind. Likewise, knowledge" will be slightly on fjigher plane than "reason to believe". "Knowledge" is an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. "Reason to believe" is not the same thing as "suspicion" or "doubt" and mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing. "Reason to believe" is a higher level of state of mind. Likewise, knowledge" will be slightly on fjigher plane than "reason to believe". A person can be supposed to know where there is a direct appeal to his senses and a person is presumed to have a reason to believe if he has sufficient cause to believe the same. Section 26, I.P.C. explains the meaning of the words "reason to believe" thus : "26. "Reason to belive".A person is said to have "reason to believe" a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise." "In substance what it means is that a person must have reason to believe if the circumstances are such that a reasonable man would, by probable reasoning, conclude, infer regarding the nature of the thing concerned. Such circumstances need not necessarily be capable of absolute conviction or inference, but it is sufficient if the circumstances are such creating a cause to believe by chain of probable reasoning leading to the conclusion or inference about the nature of the thing. These two requirements i.e., "knowledge" and "reason to believe" have to be deduced from various circumstances in the case." In the context of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, namely, that the petitioner admittedly was a licensed dealer and on search and seizure, stocks were found from his business premises which were in excess of the limit prescribed under the Unification Order, in my opinion, the officers who conducted the raid and made seizure had reason to believe that the petitioner has violated the provision of Unification Order as well as the terms and conditions of the licence. From the discussions made above, I am satisfied that the officer had "reason to believe" that stocks were in excess of the prescribed limit. Regarding Question No. (D): 33. Mr. From the discussions made above, I am satisfied that the officer had "reason to believe" that stocks were in excess of the prescribed limit. Regarding Question No. (D): 33. Mr. Dayal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has drawn my attention to Annexure 4, a letter No. 92, dated 22-2-1990 and has submitted that the provisions of the Unification Order are not otherwise applicable in respect of oils in view of the fact that the licence fee prescribed by notification No. G.S.R. 17, dated 10-7-1975 having been quashed by this Court, the Food Commissioner, Bihar, has issued Annexure 4 in which it has been stated that since the notification by the licence fee with respect to edible oil was fixed and the same being quashed by this Court, the question of licence/renewal for edible oil and oilseeds does not arise. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard has also relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Ranchi Thok Khadya Vyapari Sangh and others v. The State of Bihar and others, 1987 PLJR 46. I am constrained to hold that the argument advanced by Mr. Dayal is devoid of any merit and is fit to be rejected. In the aforesaid case, a single Judge of this Court while dealing with Schedules 4 and 5 of the Unification Order held that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court the enhancement of fees payable by the licensee cannot be sustained. I fail to understand as to how this judgment has been interpreted by the Food Commissioner, Bihar, as contained in Annexure 4. From ihe reading of the aforesaid case, it is implicit that fees as earlier prescribed were changed and a higher fee was prescribed and, as such, this Court held that the enhancement was illegal. Nowhere, the judgment has declared that no licence fee with respect to edible oils was necessary. In my opinion, misinterpretation of the judgment by the authority concerned while issuing Annexure 4 does not give a cause of action to the petitioner for contending that no licence for edible oils and oilseeds were required to be obtained. Regarding Question No. (E): 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner has lastly submitted that the first information report does not disclose any offence and, as such, it should be quashed. I am constrained to hold that even this argument of Mr. Regarding Question No. (E): 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner has lastly submitted that the first information report does not disclose any offence and, as such, it should be quashed. I am constrained to hold that even this argument of Mr. Dayal has no force. It is not the case of the petitioner that lodging of the first information report was a result of any malice on part of the informant and Mr. Dayal very correctly has not argued that point before us. In the case of State of Bihar v. Shri P. P. Sharma and another, 1991 East CrC 425 ; 1991 (2) PLJR (SC) 11, the Supreme Court has observed that the High Court under the circumstances could not have assumed jurisdiction and put an end to the process of investigation and trial provided under the law. It is well settled that whether there is any violation of the statuory provisions indicated under the Unification Order is a matter to be adjudicated. The High Court will not go into the question of facts by deciding as to whether Unification Order or Clause 5 (iv) of the terms and conditions of the licence were violated or not. Suffice it to say that from the aforesaid discussion of the relevant laws and fact. I am prima facie satisfied that there is violation of Clause 18 of the Unification Order as well as clause 5 (iv) of the terms and conditions of licence by the petitioner and, as such, exercising our discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. I refuse to in terfee. in this application by quashing the first information report as well as the investigation. 35. I may conclude by quoting the oi servation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the State of Gujrat v. Mohanlal, AIR 1987 SC 1321 which renders as follows : "To deny the opportunity to remove the formal defect was to abort a case against an alleged economic offender. Ends of justice are not satisfied only when the accused in a criminal case is acquitted. The community acting through the State and the Public Prosecutor is also entitled to justice. The cause of the community deserves equal treatment at the hands of the Court in the discharge of its judicial functions. The community or the State is not a persona non gratia whose cause may be treated with disdain. The community acting through the State and the Public Prosecutor is also entitled to justice. The cause of the community deserves equal treatment at the hands of the Court in the discharge of its judicial functions. The community or the State is not a persona non gratia whose cause may be treated with disdain. The entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book." 36. Having considered the pros and cons of the case, I am of the view that no case whatsoever has been made out by the petitioner for interfering with the prosecution. In such view of the matter, I find merit in the case. 37. In the result, this application is dismissed but, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I shall make no order as to costs. 38. I agree.