JUDGMENT (ORAL) Dr; E.S. Da Silva, J. - This revision is directed against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, panaji, dated 18th November, 1992 which has affirmed the judgment of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ponda dated 3rd June, 1992 convicting and sentencing the petitioner for an offence under Section 426 I.P.C. 2. The petitioner was charged for the aforesaid offence besides two more offences under Sections 4.48 and 323 I.P.C. for having criminally trespassed into the verandah of the complainant on 16th April, 1986 through the roof of his house and damaged tiles and pillars of the verandah causing him loss to the tune of Rs. 50/- and also for an offence of assault by inflicting simple injuries on her. 3. The learned Magistrate after recording evidence found the charges under Sections 448 and 323 I.P.C. baseless but convicted the petitioner for the offence under Section 426 I.P.C. and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 days. The petitioner then appealed against this sentence to the learned Sessions Judge who by the judgment under challenge upheld the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned Magistrate. 4. Shri Lotlikar, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge is bad and illegal because he has failed to consider the relevant evidence on record and has arrived at a totally unacceptable s finding that the said evidence supported the prosecution case regarding the alleged mischief caused s by the petitioner to the complainant The learned counsel has urged that admittedly there was a civil dispute between the petitioner and the complainant on account of some eavesdrops falling from the complainant's roof on the compound wall of the petitioner. The evidence shows that the complainant has admitted that the eaves of the roof of, his verandah were falling on the compound wall of the petitioner and that the said compound wall had been built by the said petitioner in the land belonging to him. It was further contended by the learned counsel that since the petitioner was only asserting his rights there was no question of any mischief caused by him by committing the acts which it is said to have been committed by the petitioner in removing the tiles of the roof of the complainant's verandah. It was further contended by the learned counsel that since the petitioner was only asserting his rights there was no question of any mischief caused by him by committing the acts which it is said to have been committed by the petitioner in removing the tiles of the roof of the complainant's verandah. It was stated by the learned counsel that a mere assertion of right cannot cause any damage to other's property. It was, therefore, not necessary for the petitioner to actually establish and allege that he had such a right when he bona-fidely claims the same. 5. Reliance was placed by Shri Lotlikar on a number of judicial pronouncements, namely, King Emperor v. Balkrishna Narhar Velhankar1, Ramchandra Govind Take v. The State of Maharashtra2, Jambulingam Pillai v. Ponnuswami Pillai3 and Manikchand Birdhichand Sharma v. The State of Maharashtra and another4. 6. I have gone through these rulings and although I am in. full agreement with the learned counsel that the proposition advanced by him to the effect that a bona-fide claim of a right rules out the intention to cause damage and mischief it is to be seen that in all those instances the findings given by the Courts were on the special facts and circumstances of the case being therefore totally inapplicable in our present case. 7. Those were all cases referring to situations in which the accused had objected to constructions sought to be put up by the complainant in apparent violation of their proprietary rights and therefore some sort of self-defence was availed of by the petitioners to vindicate their rights. 8. In the present case it is seen that admittedly the construction of the compound wall by the petitioner was subsequent to the construction of the house and the adjacent verandah by the complainant. It is the case of the petitioner that the complainant subsequently extended the verandah as a result whereof the eavesdrops of the roof were falling on the compound wall built by him. 9. It is also the case of the petitioner that on account of that he had complained to the Municipality seeking for the removal of the complainant's roof in order to prevent that its eavesdrops, should not fall on the compound wall. 9. It is also the case of the petitioner that on account of that he had complained to the Municipality seeking for the removal of the complainant's roof in order to prevent that its eavesdrops, should not fall on the compound wall. It is in this set of things that the evidence which was accepted by both the Courts below should be looked into in order to hold that the same appears to be sufficient to establish the actual commission of the offence of breaking of tiles by the petitioner. It is the petitioner's claim during the complainant's cross-examination that eavesdrops of the complainant's roof was violating his proprietory rights on the compound wall and, therefore, he had approached the Municipality to take legal action against him. This fact by itself shows that on account of the alleged failure of the Municipality to protect his rights the, petitioner seems to have chosen to take the law in his own hands and in an attempt to remove the roof and break its tiles thus causing loss to the complainant. 10. Both the learned Magistrate as well as the learned Sessions Judge in their judgments had gone through the evidence on record and were satisfied that the same was sufficient to prove the actual commission by the petitioner of the offence of breaking of the tiles of the complaint's roof and the consequent loss suffered by him. The findings arrived at by them in this regard seem to be correct and deserve acceptance. 11. It is next submitted by Shri Lotlikar that there is no evidence on record to show that while removing the tiles of the complainant's roof the petitioner had any intention to cause damage or annoyance to the complainant and there is also no, finding in that sense or even a discussion of the said evidence on the point. It was further urged by the learned counsel that there could be no inference of such intention from the mere fact of the actual damage purportedly caused by the petitioner, if any, to the complainant. 12. I am unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel. It was further urged by the learned counsel that there could be no inference of such intention from the mere fact of the actual damage purportedly caused by the petitioner, if any, to the complainant. 12. I am unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel. The facts of the case clearly disclose, as I have already stated above, that the petitioner had earlier approached the Municipality for the purpose of removing the alleged nuisance purportedly created to him by the complainant on account of the eavesdrops falling on his compound wall. Being to the intention to cause damage clearly flows from the very fact that despite of this complaint to the Municipality the petitioner chose to remove and break the tiles of the complainant's roof. No other conclusion is, likely to be drawn in the circumstances and by no stretch of imagination it can be said that while doing so the petitioner was only trying to assert his rights to his property so as to make his claim bona fide and beyond the reach of any criminal liability. Therefore there was no need either for the learned Magistrate or for the learned Sessions Judge is well to say so in so many words because the record shows that the evidence of prosecution witnesses was satisfactorily discussed by them before they arrived at the conclusion that the same evidence was enough to establish that' the petitioner had broken the tiles of the roof of the complainant in order to cause mischief and loss to him. 13. It was lastly submitted by Shri Lotlikar that the learned Magistrate having disbelieved the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in respect of the two, other offences which were alleged to have been committed by him, namely, criminal trespass and assault, he could not have accepted this evidence for the purpose of holding that the same was proving the offence of mischief. 14. It is really difficult to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel in this regard. 14. It is really difficult to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel in this regard. The offences of criminal trespass and physical assault are no doubt totally different offences and if the learned Magistrate has not accepted the evidence of the prosecution witnesses with regard to some of the alleged offences this does not mean that he should have also discarded the same evidence in respect of the offence of mischief then that offence seems to have been proved not only by the testimony of those who had actually seen the breaking of the tiles by the petitioner but also by the panch witness who has spoken to the fact of the actual damage and loss sustained by the complainant on account of such breaking. 15. Shri Bhobe, learned Public Prosecutor, has rightly submitted that the petitioner could not have taken the law in his own hands on the assumption that he was claming a right to the property when the question of his asserting such rights would have been considered only if this assumption was bonafide. The facts on record show that such bona fide claim could never be made by the petitioner and on the contrary the same facts strongly suggest that such claim appears to be wholly unjustified and a mere after thought. 16. In the result I see no substance in this revision as no case for interference on the part of this Court with the concurrent findings of both the Courts below can be said as having been made in this petition the petition is hereby dismissed and the Rule is accordingly discharged. Petition dismissed. 1. A.I.R. 1924 Born. 486. 2. A.I.R. 1968 B.L.R 399. 3. A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 400. 4. 1975 Crl. LJ. 1044.