Judgment : The petitioner challenges an order passed on 212. 1988 by the District Educational Officer ordering direct payment of salary to the teachers of the petitioner Institution. Admittedly, the petitioner Institution is a minority institution. After the above mentioned order dated 212. 1988 has been passed, the petitioner made a representation to the Chief Educational Officer on 1. 1989 and the Chief Educational Officer by order dated 20.1.1989 stayed the order of the District Educational Officer, Lalgudi, dated 212. 1988 stating that the District Educational Officer can order direct payment only after getting an order from the Chief Educational Officer. Consequent to this order, the District Educational Officer informed the petitioner correspondent by proceedings dated 31. 1989 stating that the salary for January, 1989 has already been disbursed the amount and the salary for future months also will be paid through the correspondent. However, on 12. 1989, the District Educational Officer directed the petitioner correspondent to produce records with regard to the payment relating to the period from 1986 to 1988. The petitioner then replied to the District Educational Officer stating that the records have already been sent to the Chief Educational Officer on 12. 1989 itself. On 20.2.1989, the Chief Educational Officer has passed an order unilaterally stating that the order passed by him on 20.1.1989 is kept under suspension. It is stated in that order, that such an order has been passed after perusing the records submitted by the petitioner Institution. This is followed by another letter of the District Educational Officer, Lalgudi dated 22. 1989 directing payment of the salary to the Headmistress of the School. The petitioner challenges the original order passed by the District Educational Officer on 212. 1988 by which he was aggrieved i.e. ordering payment directly to the teachers. 2. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. The counter-affidavit narrates some irrelevant fact which is an infight between the Headmistress and the Correspondent of the petitioner Institution is not necessary for the purpose of deciding the issue raised by the petitioner. In paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that even in the case of minority school direct payment to teachers may be ordered by the departmental authorities where there is falsification of accounts and misuse of government grant. In paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that even in the case of minority school direct payment to teachers may be ordered by the departmental authorities where there is falsification of accounts and misuse of government grant. It is also stated in the counter-affidavit that as there was falsification of accounts and misuse of Government grant on the part of the then correspondent of the school direct payment was ordered under Rule 6(4)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Minority Schools (Recognition and Payment of Grant) Rules, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules”). It is also claimed in the counter-affidavit that records have been called for from the petitioner Institution and that no records were produced for verification. It is also stated in the counter-affidavit that there is no interference in the internal administration of the petitioner institution. Two instances were stated in the counter-affidavit wherein in the first instance, the Headmistress of the school has stated that her pay for June, 1987 was paid only on 37. 1987 and in the second instance one S.Susairaj, Assistant of the petitioner school has stated that his pay for April 1988 was disbursed to him only on 25. 1988. On these allegations, the Counter-affidavit proceeds to state that it is proved that the petitioner has misused the Government grant and that the statement that there is no complaint from the staff members is false. It is also stated in the counter-affidavit that before arriving at conclusion to issue direct payment order, sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner. It is also stated that in no way the fundamental rights of the petitioner are affected by issue of direct payment orders, and that by resorting to direct payment the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of India are not at all affected. It is also claimed in the counter-affidavit that direct payment orders were issued only after perusing the relevant records and only after giving sufficient opportunities to the petitioner. 3. Mr.Balapazhanoor, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the impugned order has been passed without notice to the petitioner. It is also claimed in the counter-affidavit that direct payment orders were issued only after perusing the relevant records and only after giving sufficient opportunities to the petitioner. 3. Mr.Balapazhanoor, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the impugned order has been passed without notice to the petitioner. Learned Senior Counsel also contends that even according to Rule 6 of the Rules, 1977 the power is conferred on the authorities to stop further grant if any falsification of account or misuse of the amount of grant paid to any minority school is found or reported and if, after due enquiry, a conclusion is arrived at. According to the learned senior counsel it has not been doe so. Learned Senior Counsel also contends that though the power is conferred on the authority under Sub-rule (4)(c) of Rule 6 of the Rules which states that the District Educational Officer will resort to direct payment to the teachers till such time the falsification of account or misuse of the amount of grant paid is set right and the District Educational Officer found the account correct, on the facts and circumstances of the cases, though the impugned order has been passed in the year 1988, for the past 4 1/2 years nothing has been done so far. That apart, the learned senior counsel states that the Rule itself is liable to be challenged as it offends Art.30 of the Constitution of India. 4. Mr.V.Raghupathy, the learned Additional Government Pleader confined his arguments on the basis of the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents. 5. Having considered the arguments of Mr.Balapazhanoor, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, lam of the view that the impugned order has to be set aside on the simple ground that it is violative of the principle of natural justice. I may immediately say that I do not want to go into the question with regard to the validity of the Rule, as it is not necessary to decide the issue on hand. On facts as stated by the peti-tioner and as found from the counter-affidavit it is very clear that the first respondent District Educational Officer has invoked the power under Sub-rule (4)(c) of Rule 6 which talks of payment of grant to the minority institutions. On facts as stated by the peti-tioner and as found from the counter-affidavit it is very clear that the first respondent District Educational Officer has invoked the power under Sub-rule (4)(c) of Rule 6 which talks of payment of grant to the minority institutions. Rule 6(iv)(a)(b)(c) reads as follows: “....If any falsification of account or misuse of the amount of grant paid to any minority schools is found or reported and if, after due enquiry by the Chief Educational Officer in respect of pre-primary/primary /middle schools or the Joint Director of School Education/Secondary Education in respect of high/training/special/ Anglo-Indian Schools, it is found that falsification of account or misuse of the amount of grant is proved, then such minority school shall not be eligible for further grant. .(b) Before refusing further grant under Clause (a) the management of such minority school shall be given an opportunity of making its representation. .(c) The District Educational Officer will resort to direct payment to the teachers till such time the falsification of account or misuse of the amount of grant paid is set right and the District Educational Officer found the account correct....” So it is seen that a power is conferred if a falsification of account or misuse of the amount is proved to stop the grant after due enquiry, but before passing any such order, under these Rules, mentioned above, an opportunity has to be given. Under Sub-rule (4)(c) of Rule 6, the District Educational Officer can resort to direct payment to the teachers till such time the falsification of account or misuse of amount of grant paid is set right. In my view, the power under Rule 6(4)(c) can be exercised only after an action has been taken against the petitioner under Rule 6(4)(a) as extracted above. Nowhere in the matter, it is stated that any action has been taken against the petitioner under Rule 6(4) (a) of the Rules. No record has been produced to show that any notice has been issued to the petitioner, exercising the power under Rule 6(4)(a). An actin has to be taken by the Chief Educational Officer in respect of minority schools, like that of the petitioner school. This Court has not been shown any notice issued by the Chief Educational Officer under Rule 6(4)(a). It has not also been averred in the counter-affidavit that such an action has been taken. An actin has to be taken by the Chief Educational Officer in respect of minority schools, like that of the petitioner school. This Court has not been shown any notice issued by the Chief Educational Officer under Rule 6(4)(a). It has not also been averred in the counter-affidavit that such an action has been taken. Only pending an action under Rule 6(4)(a), the power under Rule 6(4)(c) can be exercised. In so far as no action has been taken by the respondents against the petitioner Institution under Rule 6,1 do not think that the impugned order can be sustained on any ground. It is true that after passing the order on 29.121988, the petitioner has approached the Chief Educational Officer and the Chief Educational Officer has stayed the order. Unfortunately, the Chief Educational Officer has himself, changed his stand and has stayed his order unilaterally without notice to the petitioner. So looking at any angle, this is a case where the principle of natural justice has been violated and no opportunity has been given to the petitioner before passing the impugned order. On this ground alone, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. In Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1402, the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that the shift now is to a broader notion of “fairness” or “fair procedure” in the administrative action, and that an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rule expressed in the Latin Maxim audi alteram partem which means that the decision maker should afford to any party to a dispute an opportunity to present his case. Admittedly that has not been done here. If the principle laid down in Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1402, mentioned above, is applied to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the impugned order has got to be set aside and accordingly the impugned order is set aside and the writ petition shall stand allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.