JUDGMENT 1. - This is an application for cancellation of bail under Section 439 (2) Cr. P.C. The learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur (Shri Sunil Kumar Garg) under his order dated July 10, 1992, had allowed pre-arrest bail to the accused-non-petitioner No. 2. Tikam Chand, the petitioner herein, has made an application for cancellation on the ground that the accused-non-petitioner No. 2 Harbans Lal Khurana committed forgery in respect of some judicial record in which a case was registered against him and Harbans Lal Khurana was allowed pre-arrest bail as aforesaid 2. First the facts to understand the controversy which are these. Petitioner Tikam Chand had filed a suit for eviction against Surya Narain son of Bheru Ram. The said suit has been filed on the ground of default, reasonable and bona fide necessity as well as nuisance. Surya Narain, the defendant, contested the suit. As aforesaid the suit was also on the ground to default under Section 13(1) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short, the Act) and as required under Section 13(3) of the Act the learned Trial Court determined the rent to be paid by the tenant Surya Narain under its order dated November 13, 1980 and directed the defendant to deposit the same on or before November 28, 1980. An application under Section 13 (5) of the Act was filed by the petitioner Landlord and the plaintiff in the suit for striking off the defence against eviction as the tenant failed to deposit the rent as per direction of the order dated November 13, 1980. The learned Trial Court ordered on January 5, 1984 that the defence against avion of the defendant Surya Narain be struck off. 3. The plaintiff, the petitioner herein, closed his evidence and the case was then adjourned and the defendant Surya Narain wanted to lead evidence sometime in October, 1986 also on the point of default. The petitioner filed an application immediately and raised an objection that the defence of the defendant had been struck off as aforesaid and he could not lead any evidence in so far as the point of default is concerned. The defendant denied in the reply to the application that his defence against eviction has been struck off. The petitioner filed an application immediately and raised an objection that the defence of the defendant had been struck off as aforesaid and he could not lead any evidence in so far as the point of default is concerned. The defendant denied in the reply to the application that his defence against eviction has been struck off. The petitioner then came to know that the page of the Court file containing the order-sheet dated January 5, 1984, under which the defence of defendant against eviction had been struck- off has been substituted by another order-sheet. The petitioner was quite cautious and he had secured a certified copy of the earlier order- sheet dated January 5, 1984. He produced the same in order to substantiate his plea that the order-sheet which was in the file in fact has been substituted by another order-sheet. This fact prima facie cannot be disputed. The petitioner filed a complaint to the Chief Justice in respect of this gross misconduct of the non-petitioner who was the Reader attached to the Court of Addl. Munsif and Judicial Magistrate No. 4 Jaipur City and also complained that the order-sheet from the Court file has been substituted by the non- petitioner No. 2 in collusion with the defendant. A Preliminary Enquiry was initiated and the Addl. District Judge No. 4 Jaipur City was appointed as the Inquiry officer. The Inquiry officer on enquiry found that the non-petitioner the then Reader of the aforesaid Court was guilty of substitution of the aforesaid order- sheet. The non-petitioner No. 2 was then put. under suspension and Disciplinary Enquiry was initiated under the provisions of Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, the CCA Rules). Learned Add l. District & Sessions Judge No. 6 Jaipur City, Jaipur was appointed as Inquiry officer. The inquiry was completed on November 23,1990 and the non-petitioner No. 2, the then Reader to the aforesaid Court was found guilty of the charges and a penalty of removal from service was suggested. But the learned District Judge only inflicted a penalty of with-holding of tree grade increments with cumulative effect. A writ petition was filed by the petitioner in this Court for enhancement of the aforesaid penalty and I re member that it had come before me and I dismissed the same on the ground of locus standi of the petitioner. But the learned District Judge only inflicted a penalty of with-holding of tree grade increments with cumulative effect. A writ petition was filed by the petitioner in this Court for enhancement of the aforesaid penalty and I re member that it had come before me and I dismissed the same on the ground of locus standi of the petitioner. Though, I was of the opinion that the punishment awarded to the accused-non- petitioner No. 2 in a case of present nature was inadequate, but if the department would have come, the result of the writ petition might have been otherwise. In my opinion, how in a case where the judicial record has been substituted any punishment other than removal or dismissal from service could be adequate. The District Judge took a lenient view in the matter. The then District Judge, (Shri J.P. Banal) should not have taken such a lenient view in the matter. Be that as it may, I am not sitting in appeal from the order of punishment inflicted on the non-petitioner No. 2 and I am not examining the question whether the order of punishment inflicted on the non-petitioner is adequate or not in a case of present nature. The question to be examined is as to whether the learned Sessions Judge should have allowed pre-arrest bail and if he had allowed bail whether it is a case calling for the exercise of my powers under Section 439 (2) Cr. P.C. to cancel the bail granted by the learned Sessions Judge. 4. It will be seen from the order of the learned Sessions Judge (Shri Sunil Kumar Garg) that the only ground on which he had allowed pre-arrest bail to the accused-non-petitioner was that he had been dealt with departmentally and a penalty has been inflicted on him in the disciplinary proceedings. I fail to understand if it could be reason to allow pre-arrest bail in a serious matter. Learned Judge could have said the prima facie no case for pre-arrest bail is made out. He has not said that the accused-non- petitioner will be harassed in case pre-arrest bail is not allowed to him. In my opinion, no question of.harassment would have arisen to a Reader who was found guilty of substitution of the order-sheet. Learned Judge could have said the prima facie no case for pre-arrest bail is made out. He has not said that the accused-non- petitioner will be harassed in case pre-arrest bail is not allowed to him. In my opinion, no question of.harassment would have arisen to a Reader who was found guilty of substitution of the order-sheet. It was a serious matter in my opinion the learned Sessions Judge could not have and should not have exercised his power under Section 438 Cr. P.C. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the accused-non-petitioner that once pre-arrest bail was allowed and after investigation charge-sheet has been filed and the accused has not misused the bail, at any rate, no case for cancellation of bail is made out. In support of his contention the learned Counsel has placed reliance on the case of Bhagirath Singh v. State of Gujarat (1984)1 SCC 284 . It was a case where bail was not granted under Section 438 Cr. P.C. but was granted under Section 439 Cr.P.C.. The case was not in relation to forgery of the judicial record under Section 307 IPC. The bail granted was cancelled by the Gujarat High Court on being moved by the State. The ground on which bail was cancelled was that once a prima facie case was established, the Sessions Court ought to have taken into consideration the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence was committed. The Apex Court said that even where a prima facie case is established, the approach of the Court in the matter of bail is not that the accused should be detained by way of punishment but whether the presence of the accused would be readily available for trial or that he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence. The Apex Court observed "We would have certainly overlooked this aspect of the matter if the approach of the learned Judge was otherwise one which would commend to us." Observing that the learned Judge of the High Court was impressed by some of the most irrelevant considerations, the Apex Court said that the bail should not have been cancelled. It was a case decided on its own facts and in my opinion does not apply so far as the present case is concerned. The judicial record is sacrosanct. It was a case decided on its own facts and in my opinion does not apply so far as the present case is concerned. The judicial record is sacrosanct. The Presiding officer relies on his Reader and has full faith on him and at times, may be because of rush of work, having implicit faith on the Reader, puts his signatures on the files and if the Reader misuses faith of the Presiding officer in him and obtains signature of the Presiding officer wrongly, should not have been dealt with leniently. In a case of present nature I fail to understand how any Session-, judge or this Court can grant pre-arrest bail to a person against whom prima facie case was made out and who had been found guilty in disciplinary proceedings, surprisingly, a lenient view in the matter of punishment was taken. In my opinion, the learned Sessions judge has acted illegally and against all established principles of law in granting pre-arrest has bail to the accused-non-petitioner. Merely because the charge-sheet has been filed and the accused has not misused the bail, how this fact in a case of present nature, can weigh with the Court to come to a conclusion that bait once granted should not be cancelled. As said earlier, I am of the opinion, that this is a case where the learned Sessions Judge has granted pre-arrest bail for irrelevant consideration and the exercise of his discretion under Section 438 Cr. P.C. was not in accordance with law. 5. Consequently, I allow this application for cancellation of bail and set aside the order dated July 10, 1992, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, under which he allowed pre-arrest bail to the accused-non-petitioner. The pre-arrest bail granted to the accused-non-petitioner under Section 438 Cr. P.C. is cancelled.Application allowed and bail cancelled. *******