Judgment :- Accused 1 and 2 (A1 and A2) are the appellants. They were charged under sections 302, 307, 326 and 324 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. The learned II Additional Sessions Judge found A1 guilty under section 302 of the I.P.C. and convicted and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. He was also convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- under section 307 of the I.P.C. In default of payment of fine, he has to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. He was also convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months under section 324 of the I.P.C. A2 was found guilty under section 326 and he was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 1/2 years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. In default of payment of fine, he has to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months more. He was also convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months under section 324. All the sentences to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case is that on 16-8-1988 at 6.30 a.m. Manikkuttan (deceased), P.W. 1 Geetha (sister of the deceased), P.W. 2 Unni (elder brother of the deceased) and P.W. 3 Pankajakshy Amma (mother of the deceased) were returning after taking tea from the shop of P.W. 6 Ramachandran Pillai, that when they reached in front of P.W. 5's house P.W. 2 went to meet P.W. 5, that deceased, P.W. 1 and P.W. 3 walked towards their house, that A1 assaulted P.W. 2, that when deceased, P.W. 1 and P.W. 3 came to the scene A1 and A2 assaulted them and that A1 caused fatal injury on the deceased when he tried to save his mother (P.W. 3) being attacked by A1. Nearby people gathered there. The injured persons were taken to Taluk Headquarters Hospital, Kottarakkara. Manikkuttan died on the way to the hospital. P.Ws. 1 to 3 who sustained injuries were referred to the District Hospital, Quilon. On receiving intimation from the District Hospital, Quilon P.W. 21 Sub-Inspector of Pooyappally reached the hospital and recorded the first information statement (Exh. P-1) from P.W. 1 and crime was registered as 146 of 1988. Ext. P-1(a) is the first information report. 3. P.Ws. 1 to 3 who sustained injuries were referred to the District Hospital, Quilon. On receiving intimation from the District Hospital, Quilon P.W. 21 Sub-Inspector of Pooyappally reached the hospital and recorded the first information statement (Exh. P-1) from P.W. 1 and crime was registered as 146 of 1988. Ext. P-1(a) is the first information report. 3. Knowing that A1 was admitted in the same hospital P.W. 21 recorded the statement of A1 and registered Crime No. 147 of 1988 under section 326. That was referred later. P.W. 22 Circle Inspector undertook the investigation. He prepared inquest report Ext. P-21 and scene mahazar Ext. P-22. P.W. 11 doctor conducted autopsy and issued Ext. P-3 post-mortem certificate. P.W. 15 Dr. Devarajan examined P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 and issued Exts. P6, P-8 and P-7 wound certificates respectively. 4. A1 was arrested on 20-8-1988 after he was discharged from the hospital. As per his statement M.O. 2 knife was recovered as per Ext. P-5 mahazar attested by P.W. 13. A2 was arrested on 21-8-1988 and as per his statement M.O. 1 (iron pipe) was recovered as per Ext. P-4 mahazar which was attested by P.W. 12. The recoveries were effected by P.W. 22 Circle Inspector. 5. Prosecution mainly relies on the testimony of the eye-witnesses P.Ws. 1 to 6. P.Ws. 1 to 3 sustained injuries. P.W. 4 is a neighbour. P.W. 5 is a neighbour and a close relative to P.Ws. 1 to 3 and A1 and A2. P.W. 6 is the owner of the tea shop close to the place of occurrence. 6. The first information statement given by P.W. 1 was recorded by P.W. 21 from the District Hospital, Kottarakkara. P.W. 1 deposed that while she, P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and Manikuttan (deceased) were returning from the tea shop of P.W. 6 Ramachandra Pillai P.W. 2 went to P.W. 5 Krishna Pillai's house and she, P.W. 3 and Manikkuttan proceeded to their house. P.W. 1 heard a hubbub and looked towards that direction. It is her evidence that A1 stabbed P.W. 2 Unni stating that his father Vasu Pillai was responsible for a raid in which arrack was seized, that P.W. 2 sustained injury on his left hand and that she alerted her mother P.W. 3 about the incident and implored A1 not to beat P.W. 2. A2 with M.O. 1 iron pipe assaulted her. A2 with M.O. 1 iron pipe assaulted her. There was a contusion on her left hand. A2 again beat her causing bleeding injury. A1 stabbed her aiming at her left breast. She moved swiftly and that stab hit below the left knee of her infant Sasiraj who was on her shoulder causing bleeding injury. P.W. 3 was stabbed by A1 on her back, left side of the head and shoulder. A2 assaulted P.W. 3 with M.O. 1 on her left wrist. Manikkuttan embraced P.W. 3 stating that his mother should not be killed. A1 inflicted a stab injury on Manikkuttan. He fell down. A2 beat P.W. 3 with M.O. 1 iron pipe. P.W. 3 moved quickly and it hit on the head of A1. P.W. 1 further stated that she, her mother and brothers were taken to the Government Hospital, Kottarakkara. Manikkuttan died due to the injury sustained by him. She, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 were sent to the District Hospital, Quilon and they underwent treatment there. 7. P.W. 1's evidence that herself, P.W. 2, deceased and P.W. 3 went to the shop of P.W. 6 is corroborated by the testimony of P.W. 6. The other injured witnesses P.Ws. 2 and 3 have given similar version as that of P.W. 1 before the Court. The learned II Additional Sessions Judge on scanning the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 held that the minor discrepancies brought out in cross-examination are not in any way sufficient to cast doubt on the prosecution case. We have been taken through the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 by the counsel for the accused. On going through their evidence we do not find any discrepancies or other infirmities to view their evidence with suspicion. 8. P.W. 4 is an independent witness. She deposed that she saw the incident whereby P.Ws. 1 to 3 and Manikkuttan sustained injuries. The overt acts of A1 and A2 spoken to by P.Ws. 1 to 3 got ample support from P.W. 4. The main attack on the testimony of P.W. 4 is that her testimony cannot be relied as she is highly interested in the prosecution as she herself admitted in cross-examination that in a criminal case against her P.W. 3 stood as surety. That by itself is not a circumstance to hold that she has given a perjured version before the Court. That by itself is not a circumstance to hold that she has given a perjured version before the Court. On going through the entire evidence of P.W. 4, a neighbour to the place of occurrence it would appear that she has sufficiently corroborated the testimony of P.Ws. 1 to 3 in all material particulars. Counsel for the accused pointed out that P.W. 4 did not say that she saw P.Ws. 1 to 3 and deceased going to the shop of P.W. 6 Ramachandra Pillai for taking tea and returning from there and this would be a glaring circumstance to disbelieve the prosecution case. Merely because P.W. 4 did not see them going to the tea shop of P.W. 6 and returning from there her testimony cannot be doubted. Another attack on P.W. 4's evidence is that she had admitted in cross-examination that there was injury on the chest of P.W. 1 whereas P.Ws. 1 to 3 do not have such a case. Counsel for the accused submitted that this would show that she has given an exaggerated version before the Court and this itself is a circumstance to discard her testimony. Such minor discrepancies do occur in every case and so long as there is nothing to show that the evidence suffers from any inherent defect the testimony of such witnesses cannot be discarded. 9. P.W. 3 Krishna Pillai is the paternal uncle of P.Ws. 1 and 2. He is related to the accused as well. He has corroborated the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4 in all material particulars. The omission brought out in his evidence is too trivial to have any deleterious impact on the prosecution case. P.W. 5 has denied the suggestion that P.W. 1's father Vasu Pillai (P.W. 7) and his children were waiting in P.W. 5's courtyard. P.W. 5's evidence shows that he was very much present at the place of occurrence. Cross-examination has not brought out any factor to disbelieve him. He has emphatically denied the suggestion that the accused were assaulted by P.W. 7 Vasu Pillai and others and suppressing the same he has given false evidence before the Court. P.W. 5 admitted that there was some dispute with regard to the cutting of a branch of a cashew tree between him and A2's father-in-law and that he objected to the cutting. But he asserted that he has no enmity towards the accused. P.W. 5 admitted that there was some dispute with regard to the cutting of a branch of a cashew tree between him and A2's father-in-law and that he objected to the cutting. But he asserted that he has no enmity towards the accused. In view of the close relationship of P.W. 5 to the accused, it is not at all possible or reasonable to hold that P.W. 5 has given evidence to falsely implicate with a serious crime. On going through the entire evidence of P.W. 5, it is not possible to hold that he has falsely implicated the accused. 10. P.W. 6 is an independent witness. It is his evidence that he saw the incident whereby P.Ws. 1 to 3, P.W. 1's infant and deceased sustained injuries. It is to his shop that P.Ws. 1 to 3 and deceased had gone to take tea in the morning. P.W. 6 has corroborated the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 5 in all material particulars. Counsel for the accused pointed out that P.W. 6 did not tell the Circle Inspector that the incident took place when P.Ws 1 to 3 and deceased were returning after taking tea from his shop. This omission is not of that magnitude to shatter his evidence. The significant aspect in his evidence is that there is no material contradiction or glaring omission to hold that it tainted or otherwise unworthy of acceptance. 11. On going through the evidence of the eye-witnesses, it is not possible to hold that they have given inconsistent versions regarding the incident. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in Boya Ganganna v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 1541 : (1976 Cri LJ 1158), It must always be remembered that the evidence given by a witness would very much depend upon his power of observation and it is possible that some aspects of an incident may be observed by one witness while it may not be witnessed by another though both are present at the scene of offence. Merely on account of minor contradictions which would not affect the core of the prosecution case testimony of the eye-witnesses cannot be rejected. Merely on account of minor contradictions which would not affect the core of the prosecution case testimony of the eye-witnesses cannot be rejected. Wholesale condemnation of the testimony of the eye-witnesses on the ground of discrepancies in matters of detail pertaining to the precise number of blows given by the assailant, the standing or lying posture of the victims at the time of the assault has no justification as the evidence tendered by the eye-witnesses might show some variations here and there as there are always natural differences in the faculties of different individuals in the matter of observation, perception and memorisation of details. In S. T. Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 791 : (1974 Cri LJ 674), the Supreme Court held that merely on account of discrepancies in matters of detail concerning the occurrence deposed by the eye-witnesses the evidence cannot be rejected when there is consensus as to the substratum of the prosecution case. As the evidence of the eye-witnesses considered as a whole sufficiently proves the overt acts attributed by the prosecution against A1 and A2, we are unable to agree with the defence contention that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 12. It is next contended by the counsel for the accused that as the prosecution itself had admitted that Manikkuttan died as a result of the stab injury when he embraced his mother (P.W. 5) it has to be held that A1 did not have the intention to cause his death and so the offence would only come under Section 304, Part II of the I.P.C. Merely because A1 wanted to stab P.W. 3 and solely because the deceased suddenly came and embraced his mother he happened to sustain the stab injury the aforesaid contention is not available to him. Though A1's intended overt act was against P.W. 3, it had disastrous effect on her son. In view of Section 301, A1 cannot raise such a plea. 13. Underlying principle of Section 301 is that where a blow aimed at one person alights upon another and kills him, the offence committed by the assailant is the same as it would have been if the blow had struck the intended victim. The section embodies the well established principle of criminal jurisprudence known as the doctrine of "transferred malice" or transmigration of motive. The section embodies the well established principle of criminal jurisprudence known as the doctrine of "transferred malice" or transmigration of motive. It is intended to meet a situation like the one in the case in hand. It applies to a case where a person intending to cause the death of A by stabbling him and if B rushes to save A and receives the injury intended for A. 14. Defence contention is that A1 did not really intend to cause the death of Manikkuttan and at best his intention was only to inflict stab injury on his mother and so it cannot be held that he offence would come under section 302. The definition of culpable homicide in Section 299 nowhere requires that the accused's intention to cause death or his knowledge that the death is likely to be caused by his act should exist with reference to the particular person whose death has actually been caused by such act. Section 299 reads : "Whoever caused death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide." From a reading of the section it is apparent that what it requires is that there should be an intention to cause death or a knowledge that the death is likely to be the result. It cannot be discerned that homicidal intention or knowledge must be with reference to the life of the person whose death is actually caused. As the law is intended to protect every person from assaults, the assailants cannot escape on the ground that he did not intend to cause the injury on that particular person whereas his intention was only to cause injury on another person. If the contention of the defence counsel is accepted, it would lead to absurdity and gross injustice. 15. Illustration (a) to Section 299 makes the position clear that the Legislature deliberately employed general and unqualified language in order to cover cases where the person whose death is caused by the act of the accused was not the person intended to be killed by him but some other person. 15. Illustration (a) to Section 299 makes the position clear that the Legislature deliberately employed general and unqualified language in order to cover cases where the person whose death is caused by the act of the accused was not the person intended to be killed by him but some other person. Section 301 gives no room for doubt as it assumes that the accused in such cases would be guilty of culpable homicide. It is useful to refer to Ballan v. The State, AIR 1955 All 626 : (1955 Cri LJ 1448), where the Allahabad High Court observed : "Section 301 declares a rule deducible from Sections 299 and 300. It states that the quality of the homicide, that is, whether it amounts to murder or not, will depends on the intention or knowledge which the offender had in regard to the person intended or known to be likely to be killed or injured and not with reference to his intention or knowledge with reference to the person actually killed. Thus Section 301 clearly makes the culpable homicide murder notwithstanding the fact that there was no intention actually to commit the murder of the deceased particularly. In such a case the accused can be rightly convicted under section 302." A1's intention that the offence would not come under section 302 of the I.P.C. is devoid of merit. In this context it is useful to refer to Suba v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Lahore 344 : (1928 (29) Cri LJ 280), where the Lahore High Court held : "Where a blow aimed at one person alights upon another and kills him the offence committed by the assailant is the same as it would have been if blow had struck the intended victim." 16. P.W. 11 doctor who conducted autopsy and issued Ext. P-3 post-mortem certificate opined that the death was due to haemorrhage and shock as a result of injury to the inter-costal vessels and lung. Her evidence is also to the effect that the injury could be caused with a weapon like M.O. 2. The wound entered the left chest cavity through 10th inter-costal space cutting the inter-costal muscles and vessels, the depth being 12 cms. In view of the medical evidence, A1's contention that he had no intention to cause death while inflicting the injury warrants outright rejection. The wound entered the left chest cavity through 10th inter-costal space cutting the inter-costal muscles and vessels, the depth being 12 cms. In view of the medical evidence, A1's contention that he had no intention to cause death while inflicting the injury warrants outright rejection. In Lakhtawar v. State of Haryana, 1979 Mad LJ (Cri) 602 : (1979 Cri LJ 833), the Supreme Court held (at p. 885 of Cri LJ) : "For the commission of the offence of murder it is not necessary that the accused should have the intention to cause death. It is now well settled that if it is proved that the accused had the intention to inflict the injuries actually suffered by the victim and such injuries are found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the ingredients of clause Thirdly of Section 300 of the Penal Code are fulfilled and the accused must be held guilty of murder punishable under section 302 of the Code." The evidence in the case strongly establishes the prosecution case against A1 under S. 302. 17. On going through the entire evidence, we hold that the learned II Additional Sessions Judge was justified in accepting the prosecution case against A1 and A2. Conviction and sentence entered against them are confirmed. The Criminal Appeal stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.