JUDGMENT 1. Award passed by the Labour Court on 1.1.85 in case No. L. C. R. 25/82 has been challenged in this writ petition filed by the employer under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 2. Service of the respondent No. 1 who was employed as workman with the petitioner company was terminated w. e. f. 8.8.81. He raised a dispute against the action of the employer. Conciliation officer-cum-Joint Labour Commissioner, Jaipur took up the matter in conciliation. However, parties failed to arrive at a settlement. Consequently, the Conciliation Officer submitted his failure report to the Government on 23.2.82. In exercise of the power conferred under section-10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State Government made a reference of the dispute to the Labour Court Jaipur for adjudication. Workman filed his statement of claim (Annex.1) on 3.12.82 and challenged the legality of termination of the service on the ground of violation of the provisions of Section-25F and 25G and also on the ground that fresh hands have been employed without compliance of Section-25H. In its written statement dated, 15.2.83 the employer pleaded that the workman was engaged as a casual labour. His service was terminated when work was not left with the employer and also that when the employer made fresh appointments the workman did not opt to come for the work. Employer also pleaded that in a period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of termination of service dated, 8.8.81 the workman had not completed 240 days of service and therefore, provisions of Section 25F, 25G and 25H are not attracted. Parties led oral as well as documentary evidence and after hearing the parties the Labour Court, Jaipur passed the impugned award dated, 1.3.85. whereby it has declared termination of service of respondent No. 1 as illegal and unjustified and ordered reinstatement of the workman with consequential benefits. 3. On behalf of the employer award has been assailed on the ground that the Labour Court has failed to take into consideration material evidence which has been brought on record and it has proceeded on pure conjectures and surmises in recording a finding that the workman had completed 240 days and that the case of the workman is not covered by Section 25F read with Section 25-B (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It has also been pleaded that the Labour Court has failed to give reasons for discarding material evidence produced on behalf of the employer to prove the nature of the employment of the workman and his term of employment. On behalf of the workman it has been pleaded that the Labour Court has taken into consideration the rival cases and it has passed the impugned award after looking into oral as well as documentary evidence produced by both the sides and that even though the detailed reasons may not have been given by the Labour Court for recording findings about violation of section- 25F, there is no warrant for interference by this Court because, the workman will be deemed to have completed one year's service and he had rendered continuous service for one year as contemplated by Section- 25B (1) and mere interruption of service on account of the act of the employer cannot be a ground for declaring that the service of the workman was not continuous. 4. Before I consider rival contentions advanced by Shri Bhandari and Shri Sharma, I consider it appropriate to make a reference of the findings of the Labour Court. In its award the Labour Court has made brief reference to the pleadings and oral evidence of both sides. It has then referred to the service record of the workman. It has then observed : HINDI MATTER 364563 5. Argument of Shri Bhandari, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the Labour Court has failed to take notice of documentary evidence produced before it in the form of M-1 to M-29 as also Exhibit-M-34 which contain terms of employment of the petitioner from the date he was given first appointment. Shri Bhandari argued that if the Labour Court had taken little trouble of looking into these material documents, it was not possible for the Labour Court to have recorded a finding that the workman was in continuous service of the employer or that he had completed 240 days of service and the Labour Court could not have recorded a finding that from the record it is not clear that different orders of appointment were given to the workman at different points of time. Shri Bhandari submitted that the Labour Court has completely ignored the documentary evidence and has misread the documentary evidence produced on behalf of the employer which conclusively establish that in a period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of termination of service i. e. 8.8.81 the workman had not served for a period of 240 days. Shri Bhandari argued that the burden of proving that the workman had served continuously for a period of one year was on the workman and it was not for the employer to lead negative evidence to show that the workman had not served for 240 days. The workman has failed to adduce evidence to substantiate his claim that he had served for a period of 240 days. Since that has not been done provisions of Section-25F could not have been invoked for giving relief to the workman. He gave detailed reference to the affidavit of Shri R. Sahai, Personnel Manager of the Factory as also the statements of Shri Deepak Saphrel, Shri R. H. Kewal Ramani and Jagdish Prasad Sharma and submitted that the workman had worked only for a period of 151 days in a period of 12 months counted backward from 8.8.81. He also invited court's attention to Schedules-X and Y filed on behalf of the petitioner on March 30, 1992 and submitted that as per the record available with the employer these statements have been prepared and they clearly establish that the workman had not served for 240 days and also that there has been a gradual decline in the total number of workers employed in the industry. Shri Bhandari further argued that Section-25B (1) cannot be allowed to be pressed into service by the respondent No. 1 because no plea with reference to Section-25B (1) was ever raised before the Labour Court and such a plea must not be allowed to be raised for the first time before this Court. He then made reference to Tripartite settlements Exhibit M-37 and M-38 and argued that these settlements are binding on both the parties. Shri P. K. Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 argued that the Labour Court has recorded a finding of fact after taking note of the evidence produced by the parties. Such finding of fact cannot be interfered with by this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Shri P. K. Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 argued that the Labour Court has recorded a finding of fact after taking note of the evidence produced by the parties. Such finding of fact cannot be interfered with by this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Shri P. K. Sharma further argued that the Labour Court has specifically taken into consideration the provisions of Section-25B. He drew the attention of the Court to last portion of Para-5 of the award and argued that it was not necessary for the workman to have proved that he had worked for a period of 240 days in a period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of termination of his service. Shri Sharma referred to the statement of claim and its reply as well as the evidence led by both the parties and argued that merely by giving fresh employment with intermittent breaks the employer cannot deprive benefit of Section-25F which is available to the workman. Artificial breaks were given by the employer only with the sole object of not allowing to the workman to complete service of 240 days. He then argued that when employment is available and employee is ready to serve, break in service will have to be ignored and the provisions of Section-25-13 (1) win be attracted. Shri Sharma also argued that the Schedules which have been produced now before this Court for the first time cannot be taken into consideration for quashing the award. He also pointed out that the terms of reference made by the State Government are wide enough to cover various aspects of the termination of the service of respondent No. 1 and even if a specific reference to Section-25B (1) may not have been made to the Labour Court, award cannot be vitiated on that count. With regard to the two settlements, Shri Sharma argued that these settlements cannot be permitted to be relied upon because, these settlements related to the employees who has rendered service of short durations. The workman had in fact served for almost 4 years before being thrown out of employment. With regard to the two settlements, Shri Sharma argued that these settlements cannot be permitted to be relied upon because, these settlements related to the employees who has rendered service of short durations. The workman had in fact served for almost 4 years before being thrown out of employment. Shri C. N. Sharma, Senior Advocate and Shri Kewal Ram, Advocate, also made elaborate submissions on the nature and the power of the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunal and also need for appointment of experienced persons to preside over the Labour Courts and the Industrial Tribunals. To this aspect of the matter, I would make a reference later-on. 6. A look at the award passed by the Labour Court and particularly the portions which have been extracted hereinabove, unmistakably establish that the Labour Court has not considered voluminous documentary evidence produced on behalf of the petitioner company before the Labour Court. Exhibits M-1 to M-29 and M-34 constitute part of that documentary evidence which was produced before the Labour Court by the employer. Exhibits M- 34, M- 37 and M- 38 were also produced before the Labour Court. There is no denial on the part of the respondent No.1 that these documents were not produced in evidence before the Labour Court. Statements made by the witnesses produced on behalf of the petitioner give detailed reference to the terms of employment. The manner of termination of service of respondent No. 1 is also with reference to employment of other persons. Respondent No. I as well as four witnesses produced on behalf of the employer filed detailed affidavits and all of them were subjected to detailed cross-examination. Award of the Labour Court is however conspicuously silent about the documentary evidence as well as reference made to the statements of various witnesses is perfunctory, casual and sketchy. Total failure on the part of the Labour Court to apply its mind to the evidence produced by the petitioner coupled with its failure to record reasons in support of the award is by itself sufficient for quashing the award. If, at all, learned Judge of Labour Court had looked into the record he could not have made an observation that from the record it is not clear that the workmen was given separate letters of appointment on different dates. If, at all, learned Judge of Labour Court had looked into the record he could not have made an observation that from the record it is not clear that the workmen was given separate letters of appointment on different dates. Documentary evidence clearly show that the workman was given appointment on different dates and every time his service was terminated with the expiry of the term specified in the contract of employment. Similarly, the finding of the Labour Court that the service of the workman was uninterrupted is perverse because, it has been recorded excluding the documentary evidence which has been placed on record showing interruptions in the service of the workman. Whether on the basis of these interruptions the workman could have been deprived benefit of Section- 25F or not, is altogether a different question. In the face of the documentary evidence it was not open to the Labour Court to hold that the workman had rendered uninterrupted service. Another finding recorded by the Labour Court is that the employer was not happy with the employee and perhaps on that count he was removed from service. This finding is based on no evidence whatsoever and therefore, it is liable to be declared as perverse. Discussion made by the Labour Court on the plea of workman that he was denied opportunity of re-employment is highly sketchy and cryptic. Labour Court has simply observed that the employer had not given any notice for re-employment after 8.8.81. It has not taken into consideration the evidence produced by the employer on the question of offer of re-employment given to the workman. That apart, although reference to Section- 25B and 25F has been made in the award there is a total absence of even minimum discussion about the applicability of Section- 25B (1) or 25B (2) read with Section- 25F. Section 25H has not even been referred to what to say of the same having been considered for the purpose of giving relief to respondent No. 1. This analysis of the award passed by the Labour Court clearly shows that the whole approach of the Labour Court in passing the impugned award has been casual and perfunctory. Some of the findings recorded by it are perverse because, they are not based on any evidence. This analysis of the award passed by the Labour Court clearly shows that the whole approach of the Labour Court in passing the impugned award has been casual and perfunctory. Some of the findings recorded by it are perverse because, they are not based on any evidence. Failure of the Labour Court to take into consideration the relevant evidence produced by the petitioner and its failure to examine the important legal principles regarding the applicability of provisions of Sections- 25B, 25F and 25H afford sufficient justification for holding that the award passed by the Labour Court suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of it and is therefore, liable to be quashed. 7. Argument of Shri Bhandari that the respondent No. 1 cannot be allowed to invoke Section-25B (1) because the said provision was not pressed into service on behalf of the workman before the Labour Court, is not sustainable. A look at paragraph-v of the statement of claim shows that the workman did plead that he had completed more than one year of service and also that in previous 12 months he had completed more than 240 days and yet, notice or notice pay and compensation were not given to him before effecting termination of his service. This statement has been contested by the employer in its written statement. Statement of claim may not have been very elaborate, but looking to the nature of the proceedings before the Labour Court, it is reasonable to hold that employer had sufficient notice of the case set up by the respondent No. 1 and it was in no way prejudiced because of the absence of a specific reference to Section- 25B (1). Even though, the findings recorded by the Labour Court are not elaborate and sufficient reasons have not been put forward by the employer, a perusal of Paragraph-5 shows that the Labour Court had in its mind, provision of Section-25B (1) when it observed that it was not necessary for the workman to establish that he had served for 240 days in a period of every one year of his four years total service. Therefore, respondent No. I cannot be shut out from raising plea of applicability of Section-25B (1). 8. Therefore, respondent No. I cannot be shut out from raising plea of applicability of Section-25B (1). 8. Before concluding it is necessary to deal with the nature and scope of the power exercised by the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals and also to deal with the argument of the learned counsel for both the parties as well as Shri C. N. Sharma, Senior Advocate and Shri Kewal Ram regarding the unsatisfactory manner of working of the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunals in Rajasthan. All the learned counsel have unanimously voiced their concern about the standard of orders and awards passed by the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunals and they have emphasised the need for greater attention by the High Court in the matter of appointment and posting of the officers in the Labour Courts and the Industrial Tribunals. With the adoption of the Constitution of India the principle of laissez faire has been given a burial so far as the governance of the country is concerned and we have declared ourselves to be a democratic, socialist, secular republic. Ever increasing scope of the social welfare activities of the State and its instrumentalities has given rise to direct or indirect encroachment by the State on the rights and liberties of the individuals, may be in the interest of community. Disputes between the State and individuals have been on the increase during the last 40 years and they have acquired unusual dimensions during the last two decades. This had led to enormous increase in the quantum of litigation involving individuals and the State on the one hand and individuals inter se on the other hand. If all the disputes were to be brought to the courts of law it would have been impossible for the Court to function and to dispense justice to the people. This had led to creation of new forums for adjudication of disputes between the parties and for redressal of the grievance. With 42nd amendment of the Constitution of India Articles 323-A and 323-B have been added empowering the Parliament to create special Tribunals. During the last one decade numerous Tribunals and Railway Tribunals have been established by the Central Government and the State Governments to deal with the matters relating to taxation, rent legislations, service disputes, economic offences etc. With 42nd amendment of the Constitution of India Articles 323-A and 323-B have been added empowering the Parliament to create special Tribunals. During the last one decade numerous Tribunals and Railway Tribunals have been established by the Central Government and the State Governments to deal with the matters relating to taxation, rent legislations, service disputes, economic offences etc. Not only in India, in almost all democracies of the world concept of Tribunal has received acceptance at all levels. In Britain, report of the Frank Committee led to the enactment of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958. Frank Committee's report made a full review on the subject of Tribunals and particularly the Administrative Tribunals and it has proved to be a burning point in the system of development of Tribunals in England. This report has been treated as a water-shed over the system of Tribunals in England. In our country also the system of Tribunals has received recognition even at the hands of Apex Court and though there have been some criticism of the functioning of the Tribunals it has been realised that without establishing Tribunals it is not possible to cope up with the ever increasing litigation. Another reason for creation of more and more Tribunals is that the expertise knowledge is required in different branches of law and subject matters which arise out of special legislations like Rent Control Acts, Railway Claims, Industrial Disputes, Service Disputes and various economic offences. According to Prof. H. W. R. Wade one reason for establishment of Tribunals is to offer speedier, cheaper and more excessive justice which is essential for administration of welfare schemes involving large number of smaller claims. While making reference to social welfare Legislations like, Workman's Compensation Act etc. Prof. Wade observed "An accompanying advantage is that of expertise. Under the industrial injuries scheme, for instance, disablement questions are referred to an 'adjudicating medical practitioner', with a right of appeal to a medical appeal tribunal, while other questions go to the ordinary lay tribunals. Qualified surveyors sit on the Lands Tribunal and experts in tax law sit as Special Commissioners of Income Tax. Specialised tribunals can deal both more expertly and more rapidly with special classes of cases, whereas in the High Court Counsel may take a day or more to explain to the Judge how some statutory scheme is designed, to operate. Qualified surveyors sit on the Lands Tribunal and experts in tax law sit as Special Commissioners of Income Tax. Specialised tribunals can deal both more expertly and more rapidly with special classes of cases, whereas in the High Court Counsel may take a day or more to explain to the Judge how some statutory scheme is designed, to operate. Even without technical expertise, a specialised Tribunal quickly builds up expertise in its own field. Where there is a continuous flow of claims of a particular class, there is every advantage in a specialised jurisdiction." 9. Prof. Wade has further observed : 'The name 'tribunal' is used in a confusing way for some bodies which have the status of superior courts of law." After making reference to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Patents Appeal Tribunal over which the High Court Judges preside, he expressed the view that, they are regarded as the courts and not as Tribunals." 10. According to him, the designation "Administrative Tribunals" is also misleading in number of ways because, the Tribunals are constituted by the Act of the Legislature and decisions of most Tribunals are judicial rather than administrative, in the sense that the tribunal has to find facts and then apply legal rules to them impartially, without regard to executive policy. Such tribunals have in substance the same functions as courts of law. Prof. Wade further observed that the rules may sometimes give the tribunal a measure of discretion. But discretion is given to be used objectively, and no more alters the nature of the decision than does the "judicial discretion" which is familiar in courts of law. These tribunals therefore have the character of courts. He has discussed at length the question of independence of the Tribunals and appointment of the Presiding Officers of the Tribunals in his book 'Administrative Law' Pages 902 to 904". On the system of Tribunals a detailed research has been made by a committee formed under the auspices of the Justice, the British Section of the International Commission of Jurists and Sauls College Oxford. Its report has been published in the book titled 'Administrative Justice'. In Chapter-IX there is a detailed examination of the working of the Tribunals in England and a number of suggestions have been made to bring about improvement in the working of the Tribunals. 11. Its report has been published in the book titled 'Administrative Justice'. In Chapter-IX there is a detailed examination of the working of the Tribunals in England and a number of suggestions have been made to bring about improvement in the working of the Tribunals. 11. In India Tribunals and Labour Courts under the Industrial Disputes Act and similar social welfare legislations have played an important role in the field of adjudication of disputes concerning the workmen with reference to their conditions of service. 12. The Industrial Disputes Act was enacted with the purpose of making provisions for the investigation and settlement of disputes and for certain other purposes. Section 2(j) defines "industry" to mean any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. Section- 2(k) defines an "industrial dispute" to mean any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. Chapter II of the Act sets out the~authorities under the Act and they are (1) The Works Committee, (2) Conciliation Officers, (3) Boards of Conciliation, (4) Courts of Enquiry and (5) Industrial Tribunals. These are different authorities with different powers and the purposes for which they are set up and their functions are prescribed in the Act. The Works Committee consists of representatives of employers and workmen engaged in a particular establishment and is constituted in the prescribed manner in order to promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employers and workmen and to that end to comment upon matters of their common interest or concern and endeavour to compose any material difference of opinion in respect of such matters. The Conciliation Officers are appointed by notification by the appropriate Government charged with the duty of mediating in and promoting the settlement of industrial disputes. Boards of Conciliation are constituted by notification by the appropriate Government as occasion arises for promoting the settlement of industrial disputes. Courts of Enquiry are constituted by notification by the appropriate Government as occasion arises for enquiring into any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute. Boards of Conciliation are constituted by notification by the appropriate Government as occasion arises for promoting the settlement of industrial disputes. Courts of Enquiry are constituted by notification by the appropriate Government as occasion arises for enquiring into any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute. Industrial Tribunals are constituted by the appropriate Government for the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Chapter III provides for reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals and the relevant portion of Section 10 provides as under : "10. (1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof, or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for enquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, to a Tribunal for adjudication : Provided that where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under Section 22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall, unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this sub-section notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced." 13. Chapter IV prescribes the procedure, powers and duties of the several authorities. The conciliation officers are enjoined for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of a dispute, without delay to investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and are also empowered to do all such things as they think fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to an amicable settlement of the dispute. If a settlement of the dispute, or of any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings, they are to send a report thereof to the appropriate Government together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute. If a settlement of the dispute, or of any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings, they are to send a report thereof to the appropriate Government together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute. If no such settlement is arrived at, the Conciliation Officers have, as soon as practicable, to send to the appropriate Government a full report setting forth the proceedings and steps taken by them for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof together with a full statement of such facts and circumstances, their findings thereon, the reasons on account of which, in their opinion, a settlement could not be arrived at and their recommendations for the determination of the dispute. If, on a consideration of such report the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board or Tribunal, it may make such reference. The Boards of Conciliation to whom a dispute may be referred under the Act are enjoined to endeavour to bring about a settlement of the same and for this purpose they are, in such manner as they think fit and without delay, to investigate the dispute and all matters effecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and are also empowered to do all such things as they think fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. The Courts of Enquiry are enjoined to enquire into the matters referred to them and report thereon to the appropriate Government. The Industrial Tribunals to whom an industrial dispute may be referred for adjudication are to hold their proceedings expeditiously and, as soon as practicable on the conclusion- thereof, submit their award to the appropriate Government. Section -19, sub-ss. The Courts of Enquiry are enjoined to enquire into the matters referred to them and report thereon to the appropriate Government. The Industrial Tribunals to whom an industrial dispute may be referred for adjudication are to hold their proceedings expeditiously and, as soon as practicable on the conclusion- thereof, submit their award to the appropriate Government. Section -19, sub-ss. (3) (4) and (6) prescribe the period of operation of award : "19(3) An award shall, subject to provisions of this section, remain in operation for a period of one year : Provided that the appropriate Government may reduce the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit : Provided further that the appropriate Government may, before the expiry of the said period, extend period of operation by any period not exceeding one year at a time as it thinks fit so, however, that the total period of operation of any award does not exceed three years from the date on which it came into operation. (4) Where the appropriate Government, whether of its own motion or on the application of any party bound by the award considers that since the award was made, there has been a material change in the circumstances on which it was based, the appropriate Government may refer the award or part of it to a Tribunal for decision whether the period of operation should not, by reason of such change, be shortened and the decision of the Tribunal on such reference shall, subject to the provision for appeal, be final. (6) Notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under sub-sec (3), the award shall continue to be binding on the parties until a period of two months has elapsed from the date on which notice is given by any party or parties intimating its intention to terminate the award." Chapter-V contains provisions in regard to the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs and declares what are illegal strikes and lock-outs for the purpose of the Act. Chapter-VA was introduced by Act XLIII of 1953 and contains provisions in regard to the lay-off and retrenchment of workmen. The other provisions of the Act are not relevant for the purpose of this enquiry and need not be referred to. Chapter-VA was introduced by Act XLIII of 1953 and contains provisions in regard to the lay-off and retrenchment of workmen. The other provisions of the Act are not relevant for the purpose of this enquiry and need not be referred to. It follows from this survey of the relevant provisions of the Act that the different authorities which are constituted under the Act are set up with different ends in view and are invested with powers and duties necessary for the achievement of the purposes for which they are set up. The appropriate Govt. is invested with a discretion to choose one or the other of the authorities for the purpose of investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and whether it sets up one authority or the other for the achievement of the desired ends depends upon its appraisement of the situation as it obtains in a particular industry or establishment. The Works Committees are set up with the object of avoiding such a clash of interest or material differences of opinion as would otherwise lead to industrial disputes. If the measures adopted by the Works Committees do not achieve the end in view and industrial disputes arise or are apprehended to arise between the employers and workmen, Conciliation Officers may be appointed by the appropriate Government charged with the duty of mediating in and promoting settlement of industrial disputes. If the Conciliation Officers succeed in bringing about a settlement between the employers and workmen, such settlements are to be signed by the parties to the disputes; but if inspite of the endeavours of the Conciliation Officers properly directed in the behalf no settlement is arrived at between the parties, the Conciliation Officers are to send a full report in the manner indicated above so that the appropriate Government may have before it complete materials in order to enable it to come to a conclusion whether there is a case for reference to a Board or Tribunal as the case may be. If the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board of conciliation, it may constitute such Board for promoting the settlement of the industrial dispute consisting of a Chairman and 2 or 4 other members as it thinks fit, charged with the duty of doing all such things as it thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. If the Board succeeds in arriving at a settlement, a report thereof together with a memorandum of the settlement will be sent by it to the appropriate Government but if no such settlement is arrived at the Board will send to the appropriate Government a full report in the manner indicated above including its recommendation for the determination of the dispute. It may be noted that a reference to the Board of Conciliation is but a preliminary step for the settlement of the industrial dispute and the report made by it in the event of a failure to bring about such settlement will furnish materials to the appropriate Government to make up its mind whether it will refer the dispute for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal. Before, however, any such reference is made by the appropriate Government it may set up a Court of Enquiry for the purpose of inquiring into any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute. The Court of Enquiry will enquire into those matters and report thereon to the appropriate Government within six months from the commencement of the enquiry. That report will furnish materials to the appropriate Government for finally determining whether the industrial dispute shall be referred by it for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. It may be that the report of the Court of Enquiry discloses circumstances under which the appropriate Government considers that it is not necessary to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication to Industrial Tribunal. In that event the matter will end there and the appropriate Government may await further developments before referring the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. In that event the matter will end there and the appropriate Government may await further developments before referring the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. If, on the other hand, the materials embodied in the report of the Court of Enquiry disclose circumstances which make it necessary for the appropriate Government to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, the appropriate Government will constitute an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of the industrial dispute in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Industrial Tribunal would then adjudicate upon such dispute and submit its award to the appropriate Government. 14. In Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi, AIR 1950 S.C. 188 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the nature, of function required to be discharged by the Industrial Tribunal and majority. of Judges expressed themselves in the following words : "The Industrial Tribunal set up under Section 7, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has all the necessary attributes of a Court of justice. The fact that the Government has to make a declaration under Section 15 (2) of the Act after the final decision of the tribunal is not in any way inconsistent with the view that the tribunal acts judicially. Thus, the functions and duties of the Industrial Tribunal are very much like those of a body discharging judicial functions, although it is not a Court in the technical sense of the word." 15. In J. K. Iron and Steel Co., Ltd, Kanpur v. The Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union, Kanpur, AIR 1956 S.C. 231 , their Lordships considered the scope of jurisdiction of the adjudicating authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act and observed:- "An adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act does not mean adjudication according to the strict law of master and servant. An adjudicator's award may contain provisions for settlement of a dispute which no Court could order if it was bound by ordinary law. Industrial Tribunals are not fettered by these limitations.The scope of their adjudication is much wider than that of an arbitrator making an award. All the same, wide as their powers are, these Tribunals are not absolute though they are not Courts in the strict sense of the term. Industrial Tribunals are not fettered by these limitations.The scope of their adjudication is much wider than that of an arbitrator making an award. All the same, wide as their powers are, these Tribunals are not absolute though they are not Courts in the strict sense of the term. They have to discharge quasi judicial functions and as such are subject to the overriding jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Their powers are derived from the statute that creates them and they have to function within the limits imposed there and to act according to its provisions. Those provisions invest them with many of the "trappings" of a Court and deprive them of arbitrary or absolute discretion and power. The adjudicators and tribunals cannot act as benevolent depots. Under the Constitution the ultimate authority is given to the Courts to restrain all exercise of absolute and arbitrary power, not only by the executive and by officials and lesser tribunals but also by the legislatures and even by Parliament itself. It is evident from Sections 7 and 11, Industrial Disputes Act and the U. P. State Industrial Tribunal Standing Orders, 1951, that though these tribunals are not bound by all the technicalities of Civil Courts they must nevertheless follow the same general pattern. The only point of requiring pleadings and issues is to ascertain the real dispute between the parties, to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. It is not open to the Tribunals to fly off at a tangent and, disregarding the pleadings, to reach any conclusions that they think are just and proper." 16. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala and others, AIR 1961 S.C. 1669 , Hidayatullah J. considered the distinction between the Courts and the Tribunals and observed : "By "Courts" is meant Courts of Civil Judicature and by "tribunals" those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. Their procedures may differ, but the functions are not essentially different. What distinguishes them has never been successfully established. The real distinction, it is said, is that Courts have "an air of detachment". But this is more a matter of age and tradition and is not of the essence. A Court in the strict sense is a tribunal which is a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts of Civil judicature maintained by the State under its constitution to exercise the judicial power of the State. These Courts perform all the judicial functions of the State except those that are excluded by law from their jurisdiction. The word "judicial" has two meanings. It may refer to the discharge of duties exercisable by a judge or by justices in courts, or to administrative duties which need not be performed in court, but in respect of which it is necessary to bring to bear a judicial mind - that is, a mind to determine what is fair and just in respect of the matters under consideration. That an officer is required to decide matters before him "judicially" in the second sense does not make him a Court of even a tribunal, because that only establishes that he is following a standard of conduct and is free from bias or interest." 17. The various observations of the Supreme Court which have been quoted above, clearly show that even though a Tribunal or Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or similar other legislations may not be a court in strict sense but nevertheless, in its working it has to adopt more or less similar procedure which is adopted by the Courts. Even though, the Tribunal/ Labour Court may not be bound by the strict rules of civil procedure or technical rules of evidence, procedure which is required to be followed by the Tribunal/Labour Court was broadly confirmed to the principles of natural justice. Even though, the Tribunal/ Labour Court may not be bound by the strict rules of civil procedure or technical rules of evidence, procedure which is required to be followed by the Tribunal/Labour Court was broadly confirmed to the principles of natural justice. Provisions contained in the Industrial Disputes Act and rules framed thereunder are also indicative of the broad parameters within which the Tribunal/Labour Court must discharge their functions while adjudicating disputes referred to them or deciding the applications filed by the aggrieved parties. Even though, the Tribunals and Labour Courts are now required to deal with a huge number of cases and they have to solve extremely complex problems, these adjudicatory bodies have to adopt a procedure which is consistent with the basic principles of natural justice. They have to give reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides. For this purpose, they have to give time to the parties to file their claim and counter. They have to give opportunities to the parties to lead oral as well as documentary evidence and whenever considered necessary, records are to be summoned by the Tribunal/Labour. Court. After considering the pleadings and evidence which is brought on record, the Labour Court or the Tribunal is under a duty to pass award/order setting out reasons in support of their conclusions. Since such adjudicating bodies are subject -to the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court, it is absolutely essential for them to analyse the pleadings as well as the evidence of the parties and then give cogent reasons in support of their conclusions. Extension of the jurisdiction of these adjudicating bodies must not be misunderstood as giving them poser to pass orders in derogation of the basic rules of procedure and natural justice. Conferment of larger and wider jurisdiction on these authorities imposes more onerous duties on the Presiding Officers of these Tribunals to conduct the proceedings of these bodies in accordance with the basic principles of fairness, reasonableness and natural justice. Duty of these adjudicating bodies to record reasons is very much implicit in the powers conferred on them by the Statute. Conferment of larger and wider jurisdiction on these authorities imposes more onerous duties on the Presiding Officers of these Tribunals to conduct the proceedings of these bodies in accordance with the basic principles of fairness, reasonableness and natural justice. Duty of these adjudicating bodies to record reasons is very much implicit in the powers conferred on them by the Statute. When even administrative authorities and quasi-judicial bodies are required to record reasons and communicate the same to the aggrieved party, it cannot but be presumed as a mandatory duty of the various adjudicating bodies constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislations to record sufficient and cogent reasons in their orders. Officers of these bodies must be reminded of what their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in Siemens Engineering Manufacturing Co. v. Union of India, 1976 (2) SCC 982 . "If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law, they have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and Tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi altram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law." 18. In Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai, AIR 1970 Guj. 1 , a Full Bench of Gujarat High Court presided over by Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was) made an extremely lucid discussion the subject and declared : "The administrative authorities having a duty to act judicially cannot, therefore, decide on considerations of policy or expediency. They must decide the matter solely on the facts of the particular case, solely on the material before them and apart from any extraneous considerations by applying pre-existing legal norms of factual situations. They must decide the matter solely on the facts of the particular case, solely on the material before them and apart from any extraneous considerations by applying pre-existing legal norms of factual situations. Now, the necessity of giving reasons is an important safeguard to ensure observance of the duty to"act judicially. It introduces clarity, checks the introduction of extraneous or irrelevant considerations and excludes or at any rate minimises arbitrariness in the decision making process". "Another reason which compels making of such an order is based on the power of judicial review which is possessed by the High Court under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. These courts have the power under the said provisions to quash by certiorari a quasi-judicial order made by an Administrative Officer and this power of review can be effectively exercised only if the order is a speaking order. In the absence of any reasons in support of the order, the said courts cannot examine the correctness of the order under review." 19. Shri C.N. Sharma, Senior Advocate and Shri Kewal Ram learned counsel who appeared as interveners as well the learned counsel for the parties argued that there is a great need for the High Court to take care in the matters of appointment of officers in Labour Courts and Tribunals. Learned counsel argued that the Labour Courts and Tribunals must be presided over by persons having adequate knowledge if not expertise in the field of industrial law. Shri P.K. Sharma laid emphasis on the requirement of appointing retired High Court Judges as Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts /Industrial Tribunals. Shri P.K. Sharma also suggested that the employer and employees' representatives should be consulted in the matter of appointment. 20. Section-7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 deals with the Labour Court while Section-7A relates to Tribunals and Section-7B refers to National Tribunals. Power of constituting one or more Labour Courts vests with the appropriate Government while power to constitute one or more National Tribunals vests with the Central Government. Sections-7, 7A and 7B read thus : "Sec. 7. 20. Section-7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 deals with the Labour Court while Section-7A relates to Tribunals and Section-7B refers to National Tribunals. Power of constituting one or more Labour Courts vests with the appropriate Government while power to constitute one or more National Tribunals vests with the Central Government. Sections-7, 7A and 7B read thus : "Sec. 7. Labour Courts- (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the office Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the Second Schedule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act. (2) Labour Court shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the appropriate Government. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court, unless (a) he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; (b) he has, for a period of not less than three years , been a District Judge or an Additional District judge; or (c) omitted. (d) he has held any judicial office in India for not less than seven years; or (e) he has been the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court constituted under any Provincial Act or State Act for not less than five years. "7-A. Tribunals-(1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter, whether specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act. (2) A Tribunal shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the appropriate Government. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding Officer of a Tribunal unless (a) he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or; (aa) he has, for a period of not less than three years, been a District Judge or an Additional District judge, (b) omitted. (4) The appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, appoint two persons as assessors to advise the Tribunal in the proceeding before it. (4) The appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, appoint two persons as assessors to advise the Tribunal in the proceeding before it. "7-B. National Tribunals (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more National Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes which, in the opinion of the Central Government, involve questions of National importance or are of such a nature that industrial establishments situated in more than one State are likely to be interested in, or affected by,. such disputes. (2) A National Tribunal shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the Central Government. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding Officer of a National Tribunal (unless he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court). (4) The Central Government may, if it so thinks fit, appoint two persons as assessors to advise the National Tribunal in the proceeding before it." 21. A combined reading of these provisions shows that no person can be appointed as Presiding Officer of a National Tribunal other than a sitting or retired Judge of the High Court but in the cases of Labour Courts and Tribunals appointment of person other than sitting or retired Judges of the High Court is not barred. Sub-section (3) of Section-7 as well as Section-7A (3) does not, in terms speak of any order of priority but, it is possible to infer from the language employed in these provisions that the Legislature had intended appointment of sitting High Court Judges as Presiding Officer of a Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal or at least a retired High Court Judge in preference to a District Judge or Additional District Judge having three years experience. These provisions are conspicuously silent about the requirement of experience or expertise in the field of labour law as a condition precedent for appointment as a Judge, Labour Court or a Judge, Industrial Tribunal. That However, does not mean that while making appointment of Presiding Officer of the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal this aspect should altogether be ignored by the Government. However, in actual practice it is seen that officers of the rank of District Judge or Additional District Judge are appointed as Judge, Labour Court/Judge, Industrial Tribunal without regard to his knowledge or experience in the field of labour legislations and this . However, in actual practice it is seen that officers of the rank of District Judge or Additional District Judge are appointed as Judge, Labour Court/Judge, Industrial Tribunal without regard to his knowledge or experience in the field of labour legislations and this . single factor has given rise to dis-satisfaction both to the employer as well as the employees and has resulted in manifolded increase in the number of writ petitions. which are filed challenging awards/orders passed by the Labour Courts/ Industrial Tribunals. It is therefore, high time that the State Government and the High Court take notice of the decline in the standard of working of the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunal and appointments are made in the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal only from amongst those persons who have some knowledge of the industrial law. These appointment must not be treated as a matter of routine transfers and postings of Judicial Officers belonging to the cadre of District Judge/Additional District Judge. There is also a need for holding periodical refresher courses for these Presiding Officers so that they may be made aware of the various developments in the field of industrial legislations as well as the Judge made law. 22. Another important point which deserves serious consideration is the tenure of the persons who are appointed to preside over the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunals. Even though, the Industrial Disputes Act or any other contemporaneous legislation does not prescribe or specify the tenure of a Presiding Officer of Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals, but the very requirement of job which is to be performed, by these Presiding Officers warrant that they are appointed for a minimum fixed term. By appointing judicial officers as Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts/ Industrial Tribunals for a specified tenure, the minimum which will be assured will be continuity and independence of the concerned officer. This will also enhance working of the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals, both qualitatively and quantitively in the report of the Committee of the Justice published with the title 'Administrative justice' some necessary reforms of which reference has been made in the earlier part of this order, the Committee has directed its attention to the requirement of the length of the term of appointment and it has observed : "Another potential threat to the independence of tribunals that has caused us concern is the length of term of appointment. Once appointed, a member of a tribunal can only be discharged with the consent of the Lord Chancellor, or, as the case may be, the Lord President of the Court of Session, or the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland. But the commonest term of appointment is for three years. That is a short period and it certainly does raise the possibility that an appointee may have a subconscious, if not conscious, anxiety not to antagonise the appointing minister. On the other hand, in a system under which large number of appointments are made and the opportunities for assessment of candidates is limited, a comparatively short initial appointment may be justified. More-over, part-time members may not wish to serve for a longer period. One way of securing visible independence of members would be to appoint only for a single term. In our view, no appointment should be made for a period of less than three years, subject, of course, to the continuing existence of the Tribunals A consequence of the concern for the independence of tribunals is that the means of complaining about the performance of tribunal members (including C. Zairmen) are limited, as indeed they are in the case of Judges and Magistrates, but we have little evidence of dis-satisfaction with this state of affairs." 23. On the basis of the above, I am of the view that it will be in the fitness of things that the Government appoint a Committee consisting of at least three persons presided over by the retired Judge of the High Court to go into the entire matter relating to appointment of Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts/ Industrial Tribunals as well as their tenure and stages. Such Committee should be asked to submit its report at the earliest containing guidelines on various matters concerning the Labour Courts and the Industrial Tribunals. It is also hoped that the High Court will on its part consider this question and keep in mind the observations made above while lending officers on deputation as Presiding Officers of the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunals. 24. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Award dated, 1.8.85 passed by he Labour Court, Jaipur is set aside and case No. LCR-25/82 is remanded back to the Labour Court, Jaipur for fresh adjudication in the light of the observations made by this Court. 24. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Award dated, 1.8.85 passed by he Labour Court, Jaipur is set aside and case No. LCR-25/82 is remanded back to the Labour Court, Jaipur for fresh adjudication in the light of the observations made by this Court. Since the matter has already been delayed, the Labour Court should re-hear the parties and make fresh award within a period of six months. Copies of this judgment be also sent to the Hon'ble Chief Justice, Rajasthan High Court and the Chief Secretary, Government of Rajasthan for necessary action.Petition allowed. *******