Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. The petitioner which is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 in this application, has inter alia prayed for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the Bihar State electricity Board and its officers to supply electrical energy to the factory premises purchased by it in an auction held under Sec.29 of the State financial Corporation Act. 2. The petitioner purchased the said property for a consideration of rs.8 laks and the same was registered with the Registrar of Companies, bihar. The said sale was completed on 29-11-1991. 3. The said auction sale was subject matter of a writ application which was dismissed. A special leave petition was filed against the said order, but ultimately the Supreme Court also dismissed the same. According to the petitioner he had to spend a huge amount in the said litigations. The possession of the said factory was handed over to the petitoner on 23-2-1992. 4. The petitioner has contended that after purchasing the aforementioned unit it had invested more than Rs.3 laks in renovating the delapidated factory-building and reparing of the machines. 5. The electrical connection of the said unit had however, been disconnected by the Bihar State Electricity Board, allegedly on the ground that there was a huge dues against the original owner. 6. The petitioner brought the said matter to the notice of the Bihar state Financial Corporation who in turn wrote a letter to the Member (Finance) Bihar Electricity Board to the effect that he was not liable for any dues of the erstwhile owner and his application for fresh connection may favourably be considered. 7. The petitioner filed an application for grant of fresh electrical connection on 9-6-1992 which is contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application. 8. According to the petitioner be personally mett the authorities of the respondent-Board and tried to impress upon them that it bad purchased a sick industry and invested a huge amount under the rehabilitation programme and thus it was not liable to pay the arrears in relation to the old connection. 9. It has further been contended by the petitioner that it was in no way connected with the old owner and they were completely strangers to each other. 10. 9. It has further been contended by the petitioner that it was in no way connected with the old owner and they were completely strangers to each other. 10. The petitioner has contended that in fact, the Bihar State Electricity board itself has issued a circular letter No.43 (GH) dated 19-1-1972 where in it has been laid down as follows :- "instance have come to our notice in which reconnection was given to premises, disconnected earlier for non-payment of electric dues, without realising the arrear dues In many cases, the consumers, who had committed default in payment of the electric dues were found to have obtained the reconnection in the name of some other member of their families. By giving reconnection without realising the arrear, dues, the chances of recovery of the dues against the premises become remote. In this manner, considerable loss of revenue is being caused to the Board. This has to be prevented at all cost.2. In the matter of giving reconnection to disconnect premises, the following instructions are accordingly laid down : - (i) Re-connection to a disconnect premises shall not be given without realisation of full dues outstanding there against. (ii) There may be a genutne case in which the old consumer (who had committed default in payment of the dues) has left the premises for good and another person, not connected with him in any manner has come in occupation thereof and wants re-connection. In such a case, it may neither, be legal nor proper to insist on realisation of the arrear dues from him for giving re-connection. In such a case, the Assistant engineer concerned should personally enquire into the matter and, on being satisfied regarding its genuiness, submit a detailed report in regard thereto his Suprintending Engineer, through his Executive Engineer for approval to give reconnection to the premises, without realisation of the arrear dues. The re-connection may be given in such a case, only after the approval of the Superintending Engineer has been received.3. The foregoing instructions may please be brought to the notice of all the Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers under you for strict compliance by them. It may clearly be brought how to them that any breach of these instructions will be taken serious notice of.4. These instructions come into force with effect.5. The foregoing instructions may please be brought to the notice of all the Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers under you for strict compliance by them. It may clearly be brought how to them that any breach of these instructions will be taken serious notice of.4. These instructions come into force with effect.5. Spare copies of, this letter are being enclosed for being forwarded by you to the Assistant Engineers and Executive engineer under you. " 11. The said circular is contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application. The petitioner thereafter filed several representations ; one of them is dated 11-6-1992 is contained in Annexure-3 to the writ application. 12. The petitioner has further stated that in a similar case the respondent had granted electrical connection to a purhaser as would be evident from the letter dated 20th April, 1990 which is contained in Annexure-4 to the writ application. 13. The Bihar State Electricity Board and its Officers have not filed any counter affidavit controverting the allegations made in the writ applicatioa although Mr Ramanand Yadav learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the Board had sought for adjournments on that ground. On 18-9-1992. The case on his prayer, was again adjourned to 25-9-1992 and thereafter to 3-5-1993. 14. The matter was heard in part On 23-6-1993 and Shri Yadav sought for a short adjournment to answer the questions involved in this application. The case, was therefore adjourned to 25-6-1993. On 25-6-1993 Mr. Yadav only relied upon unreported order of this court in CWJC No.1536 of 1991 (R) and CWJC No.6437 of 1992. He, however, did not answer any of our querries. 15. Mr. Shivkirit Singh, another counsel appearing on behalf of the bihar State Electricity Board however, assisted us He drew our attention to a dircular letter No.1033 dated 20th June, 1970 which relates to reconaection of a supply to a new tenant. The said circular has no application to the facts and circumstances of the case. 16. It was further submitted that the Bihar State Electricity Board had unfettered discretion to dis-connect the supply of electrical energy in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Sec.24 of the Indian Electricity act, 1910 and continue to do so till the entire arrears are paid. 17. 16. It was further submitted that the Bihar State Electricity Board had unfettered discretion to dis-connect the supply of electrical energy in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Sec.24 of the Indian Electricity act, 1910 and continue to do so till the entire arrears are paid. 17. The learned counsel, however, when questioned, conceded that the agreement between the petitioner and the consumer is a personal covenant and the dues of the Board do not create any charge on the property. 18. The learned counsel, however submitted that even in terms of an agreement entered into by and between the consumer and the Bihar State electricity Board, the word consumer has been defined to mean not only the person with whom the agreement in question has been entered into but also a person who is his heir or successor-in-interest. 19. Section 22 of the Indian Electricity Act enjoines a duty upon a licensee to supply electrical energy to a consumer. The obligation imposed under Sec.22 of said Act is a statutory one. Sec.26 of the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act although inter alia excludes the, applicability of Sec.21 of the Indian Electricity Act, but clause VI of the schedule I appended to the Indian Electricity Act imposes such an obligation upon the Bihar State Electricity Board, the said Clause reads as follows :- "requisition for supply to owners or occupiers in vicinity.- (1)Wnere (after distribution mains have been laid down under the provisions of Clause IV on Clause V and the supply of energy through those mains or any of ihern has commenced) a requisition is made by the owner or occupier of any premises situate within (the area of supply) requiring the licensee to supply energy for such premises, the licensee shall, within one month from the making of the requisition, (or within such) longer period as the Electrical Inspector may allow) supply, and, save insofar as he is prevented from doing so by cyclones, floods, storms or other occurences beyond his control, continue to supply, energy in accordance with the requisition : provided, first that the licensee shall not be bound to comply with any such requisition unless and until the person making it. (a) within fourteen days after the service on him by the licensee of a notice in writing in this behalf tenders to the licensee a written contract, in a form approved by the State Government), duty executed and with sufficient security, binding himself to take a supply of energy for not less than two years to such amount as will (assure to the licensee at the current rates charged by him. an annual revenue not exceeding fifteen pet centum of the cost of the service line required to comply with the requisition), and (b) If required by the licensee so to do, pays to the licensee the cost of so much of any service line as may be laid down or placed for the purposes of the supply upon the property in respect of which the requisition is made, and of so much of any service line as it may be necessary for the said purposes to lay down or place bevond one hundred feet from the licensees distributing main, although not on that property : provided, secondly, that the licensee shall be entitled to discontinue such supply. (a) if the owner or occupier of the property to which the supply is made has not already given security, or if any security given by him has become invalid or insufficient, and such owner or occupier fails to furnish security or to make up the original security to a sufficient amount, as the case may be, within seven days, after service upon him of notice from the licensee requiring him to do, or. (b) If the owner or occupier of the property to which the supply is made adopts any appliance, or uses the energy supplied to him by the licensee for any purposes, or deals with it in any manner, so as unduly or improperly to interfere with the efficient supply of energy to any other person by the licensee, or (c) if the electric wires, fittings, works and apparatus in such property are not in good order and condition, and are consequently likely to affect injuriously the use of energy by the licensee or by other persons, or (d) if the owner or occupier makes may alterations of, or additions to, any electric wire (sic) fittings Works or apparatus within such property as aforesaid, and does not notify the same to the licensee before the some are connected to the source of supply, with a view to their being examined and tested, (but the licensee shall reconnect the supply with all reasonable speed on the cessation of the act or default or both, as the case may be, which entitled him to discontinue it. Provided, thirdly the maximum rate per unit of time at which the owner or occunier shall be entitled to be supplied with energy shall not exceed what is necessary for the maximum consumption on the premises, and, where the owner or occupier has required a licensee to supply him at a specified maximum rate, he shall not be entitled to alter that maximum, except after one months notice in writing to the licensee, and the licensee may recover, from the owner or occupier any expenses incurred by him by reason of such alteration in respect of the service lines by which energy is supplied to the property beyond the hundred feet from the licenses distributing main, or in respect of any fittings or apparatus of the licensee upon that property : and provided, fourthly, that (if any requisition is made for a supply of energy and) the licensee can prove, to the satisfaction of an electrical Tnspetor. (a) that the nearest distributing main) is already loaded up to its full current carrying capacity, or (b) that, in case of a larger amount of current being transmitted by it, the loss of pressure will seriously affect the efficiency of the supply to other consumers in the vicinity the licensee may refuse to acceded to the requisition for such reasonable period not exceeding six months; as such Inspector may think sufficient for the purpose of amending the distributing main or laying down or placing a further (2) Any service line laid for the purpose of supply in pursuance of a requisition under sub-clause (1) shall, notwithstanding that a portion of it may have been paid for by the persons making requisition, be maintained by the licensee who shall also have the right to use it for the supply of energy to any othef pereon ). (3) Where any difference or dispute arises as the amount of energy to be taken or guaranteed as aforesaid or as to the cost of any service line or as to the sufficiency of the security offered by any owner or occupier, (or as to the position of the meter board), or as to the improper use of energy, or as to any alleged defect in any wires, fittings, works or apparatus, or as to the amount of the expenses incurred under the third proviso to sub-clause (1 ). the matter shall be referred to an Electrical Inspector and decided by him. (4) Every requisition under this clause shall be sigasd by the makers thereof and shall be served on the licensee. (5) Every requisition under this clause shall be in a form to be prescribed by rules under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and copies of the form shall be kept at the office of the licensee and supplied free of charge to any applicant. 20. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether a bonafide purchgser of an Industry can be deprived from supply of electrical energy so as to frustrate the very purpose and object of sale of mortgaged assets by the Bihar State Financial Corporation in exercise of its statutory power under Sec.29 of the State Financial Act. 21. As noticed hereinbefore, it is not in dispute that an agreement entered into by between the licensee and the consumer is purely contractual. 21. As noticed hereinbefore, it is not in dispute that an agreement entered into by between the licensee and the consumer is purely contractual. The rights and obligation of the pattees to the said contract are, thus personal in nature. 22. Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act provides for a statutory power to a licensee to disconnect electrical energy after complying with the formalities laid down therein only in a case where any persons neglects to pay charges for energy or any sum. other than a charge for energy, due from him to a licensee in respect of the supply of energy to him. (Emphasis supplied) 23. It is, therefore, clear that Sec.24 postulates discontinuance of supply of electrical energy to the consumer in respect of a sum due from him. 24. Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, therefore, does not create any charge on the unit. It is true that a supply of electrical energy is made to a consumer occupying a premises. There is however, no provision either under Indian Electricity Act or under any other statute whereby a statutory charge is created in relation to any dues arising out of non payment of bills of the Bihar State Electricity Board. The dues of a consumer are not statutory dues but are contractual dues. 25. In Bihar State Electricity Board and another V/s. M/s Dhanwat Rice and Oil Mills, reported in AIR 1989 S C.1030, Bihar State Electricity Board v. M/s Green Rubber Industries reported in A. I. R 1990 S. C, 699, it has been held that the supply of electrical energy is made under a contract. The supreme Court again in General Manager-Cum-Chief Engineer, Bihar State electricity Board V/s. Rajeshwat Singh reported in AIR 1990 S. C.706 held that despite discontinuance of suply of electrical energy, the contract between the copsumer and the Bihar State Electricity Board remains operative. 26. Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act further en ables the licensee to disconnect supply of electrical energy only if the conditions precedent therefore are satisfied but without prejudice to its right to recover such charge or other sum by suit. 27. 26. Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act further en ables the licensee to disconnect supply of electrical energy only if the conditions precedent therefore are satisfied but without prejudice to its right to recover such charge or other sum by suit. 27. It is, therefore, evident that the primary remedy of a licensee to recover the dues from a consumer is to file a suit but Sec.24 of the Indian electricty Act merely provides for an enabling provision to discontinue supply of electrical energy which it was otherwise bound to do under the agreement. 28. Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, therefore, cannot apply in a case where a transferee who had no connection with the original consumer purchases the property bonafide and in good faith. 29. As indicated hereinbefore, the Bihar State Electricity Board has a statutory obligation to supply electrical energy to any person whenever any requisition therefore is made subject to the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in Clause VI of schedule 1 of the Indian Electricity Act. 30. In State of U. P. V/s. Hindusthan Aluminium Corpn. reported in 1979 sc 1459, it has clearly been held as follows :- "the provision of the schedule to the Act are deemed to be incorporated, in and to form part of every licensee granted under Part ii. Clause VI of that schedule states that where after distributing mains have been laid down and the supply of energy thought them has coromenced a requisition is made by the owner or occupier of any premises situate within the area of supply requiring the licensee to supply energy of such premises, the licensee shall make the supply and shall continue to do so in accordance with the requisition. But as has been pointed out, the second, proviso to Sec.26 of the Act of 1948 places a restriction on that obligation it says that the provisions of Clause VI shall apply to the Board in respect of that area only "where distributing mains have been laid by the Board and the supply of energy through any of them has commenced. " clause (i) of Sec.2 of the Act defines a main to mean any electric supply line through which energy is. or is intended to be supplied to the public. " clause (i) of Sec.2 of the Act defines a main to mean any electric supply line through which energy is. or is intended to be supplied to the public. A "distributing main" has been defined by clause (e) of the same section to mean the portion of any main which a service line, is, or is, intended to be immediately connected. We have also gone through the definitions of "electric supply-line" and "service line". They leave no doubt that a "distributing main" is different from an electric supply line for to it a serviceline is immediately connected. " 31. In this case, the petitioner is ready and willing to enter into a new contract with Bihar State Electricity Board Act for supply of electrical energy. It does not intend to obtain the continuance of supply of electrical energy on the basis of the old agreement. 32. It is, in this background, the circular letter dated 19-1-1972 issued by the Bihar State Electricity Board itself had to be considered, in terms whereof it has been laid if an old consumer has left the premises for good and another person not connected with him in any manner has come in occupation, in such a case it would neither be legal nor proper to insist upon the realisation of arrear-dues before giving him re-connection. 33. The Bihar State Electricity Board being a statutory authority is a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Its action, must, therefore pass the test of fairness and reasonableness and enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 34. The statutory authority who has a statutory obligation to supply electrical energy to a consumer particularly in view of the fact that it has a monoploy, in the matter of supply of electrical energy, cannot refuse to do so, except for reasons supported by statutory provisions. 35. As noticed hereinbefore the contract of supply of electrical energy is a personal contract. A party to the contract has a remedy fo recover demages from the party thereto for non-fulfilment of the contractual obligations. 36. 35. As noticed hereinbefore the contract of supply of electrical energy is a personal contract. A party to the contract has a remedy fo recover demages from the party thereto for non-fulfilment of the contractual obligations. 36. The Bihar State Electricity Board, therefore, in law, is not entitled to get rid of its statutory obligation of supply of electrical energy by refusing to give new connection to the owner of an industry who has purchased the same in an auction held under Sec.29 of the state Financial corporation Act, 37. In terms of Sec.29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, the corporation is entitled to sell the mortgaged assets of a defaulter loanee A person taking part in the auction does so keeping in view the value of the mortgaged assets. Even in a case of a transaction entered into by the parties thereto upon negotiation a purchaser is not expected to make an enquiry from the Bihar State Electricity Board so as to know as to whether the vender has any dues with it or not. By purchasing immovable properties, the purchaser cannot be fastened with the personal liabilities of his vender, more so when the sale is an in voluntary one. 38. In terms of the doctrine of caveat Emptory which provides for a rule of caution also that a prospective purchaser is to make enquiries with regard to the title of the owner of the property and not with regard to his personal liabilities. 39. Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, as indicated hereinbefore, provides for a statutory transfer. In terms of Sec.2 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act, even the provisions of Transfer of Property act, have no application is in relation to such transfer. 40. In a transfer effected by reason of a statutory sale, the higest bidder even may not know the owner nor he is presumed to know the extent of his personal liability. While participating in an auction a bidder is not made aware that he is not only to deposit the entire consideration of auction but he also to the personal liabilities or the borrower whose mortgaged assets are being sold, so as to enable him to take a decision as to whether it would be worth to take any part in the auction or not. 41. 41. Thus, in my opinion, a purchaser of an Industry connot be refused to be supplied with the electrical energy, although requisition had been made for by him from the Bihar State Electricity Board, only on the ground that the previous owner did not pay off his dues. A purchaser in a statutory transaction is not bound by any personal agreement and thus is not statutorily liable to clear off the personal dues of his predecessor. 42. Further it appears from the Annexure-4 to the writ application that the Bihar State Electricity Board itself had been granting new electrical connection to such purchasers. There is thus, absolutely no reason as to why the petitioner should be discriminated against. Such an action on the part of the respondent-Board is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 43. In -Isha Marbles V/s. Bihar State Electricity Board and Ors. in CWJC no.1536 of 1991 (R) as also in M/s Dani Mardhwal Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. V/s. Bihar State Electricity Board and Ors. in CWJC No 5437 of 1992, the division Bench had not considered the aforementioned aspects of the matter at all. It proceeded on the basis that if a purchaser is entitled to obtain fresh connection the same would encourage dishonest consumers. In M/s Ma Marbles case (Supra) it has been observed as follows :- "the contention sought to be raised is that there is a transfer of an unit, the transferee is not liable for the energy consumed before such transfers. In this case, the petitioner is such transferee. If this contention is accepted than that would permit dishonest consumers transferring their units from one hand to another from time to time ad inteimitum without payment of the dues to the extent of lacs and lacs of rupees and each one of them would be entitled to claim that he is not liable for the liability of the predecessor in interest. " 44. The Division Bench also has held that an auction sale under Sec.29 of the Bihar State Financial Corporation Act is a voluntary sale: a sale by action under Sec.29 of the State Financial Corporation Act cannot be voluntary and in our opinion, the same is an involuntrily sale. 45. As indicated hereinbefore, it is in fact, a statutory sale within the meaning of Sec.2 (D) of the Transfer of Property Act. 45. As indicated hereinbefore, it is in fact, a statutory sale within the meaning of Sec.2 (D) of the Transfer of Property Act. Sub-Section 1 of section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act says that if an industry concerned make any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalments thereof, the Corporation would have the right to take over the management or both the Industry concerned as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale. The right of the State Financial Corporation under section 29, thus is a statutory right This has been so held in Mahesh chandra, V/s. Regional Manager, U. P. Financial Corporation reported in 1993 (2) S. C. C.279. (See para 13 ). It has further been held in the aforesaid case that Sec.29 confers very wide power to ensure effective measures to realise the arrears. (See para 15 ). In paragraph 21 of the said decision itseif it has been held that the sale by public auction is universally recognised to be the best and most fair method. It is expected to fetch best competitive price and is beyond reproach. 46. The Supreme Court again in UP. Financial Corporation V/s. Gem. Cap. (India) Pvt reported in 1993 (2) S. C C.299 held that where the debtor concerned ceased to operate within few months of getting the loan and failed to make any repayment as stipulated in the agreement and hypothecation deed, action of the Corporation in issuing notice under Sec.29 for taking over managment of the concern for recovery of the amount due, was neither unfair or unreasonable nor in violation of any statute. 47. In Dant Mordhwal Cold Storage Pvt Ltd. V/s. Bihar State Electricity board and Ors. in CWJC No.6437 of 1992 (Supra) the Bench while following its earlier decision in Isho Marbles case (Supra) observed as follows:- We do not find any reason for differing with the said division bench Judgment. We are of the opinion that this contention has no basis at all. If this contention is accepted, then, in our opinion, this will amount to an absurd interpreation of law. We give only one instance A particular unit is owned by one x, who is a consumer, as he has a separate meter in his name. He defaults in payment of electricity bills to the tune of one lac. If this contention is accepted, then, in our opinion, this will amount to an absurd interpreation of law. We give only one instance A particular unit is owned by one x, who is a consumer, as he has a separate meter in his name. He defaults in payment of electricity bills to the tune of one lac. Thereafter he transfers the said unit in the name of his wife y. If the contention of the petitioner is accpeted, then y his wife, can claim supply of electricity in her name, in spite of such arrears, claiming that she is not liable for the arrears during the period of her husband x. She also does not choose to pay bills in respect of electricity consumed by her in respect of the meter in her name in respect of the said suit. The arrears again run upto another Rs. one lac. Thereafter y. the wife, transfers this unit in favour of her son z may also take up a similar contention claiming supply of electricity of his predecessors. This can go on ad infinaitum if interpretation is accepted, it would not be possible for any licensee under the Act to function properly and it would give rise to a peculiar situation. Honest consumer will suffer. Dishonest consumers would prosper. " 48 In our opinion, with utmost respect to the Hon ble Judges, the approach to the question is not correct. A transaction is presumed to be bonafide unless it is held otherwise. Whenever a transaction is held to be fraudulent the same vitiated. A statute cannot be interpreted on a supposition that the action of a party may be fraudulent. Further commission of a fradulent act is an action on the part of a party. The same, thus, when provide vitiates the transaction, but the same has nothing to do for the purpose of consideration as to the power of a statutory authority. 49. A statute has to be interpreted keeping in view the words used therein and not on hypothesis. 50. A transaction is sham or collusive or fraudulent, no title in respect of the property in question passes to the transferors. There may be transactions which are entered into in order to defeat the legitimate claim of the third parties. Such, sham, mala fide or bogus transactions are not transactions in the eye of law. 50. A transaction is sham or collusive or fraudulent, no title in respect of the property in question passes to the transferors. There may be transactions which are entered into in order to defeat the legitimate claim of the third parties. Such, sham, mala fide or bogus transactions are not transactions in the eye of law. However, unless a transaction, is held or shown to be a sham, mala fide, or bogus transaction, the same must be presumed to be a bona fide one. A bona fide purchaser of a property in a statutory sale, therefore, does not come within the purview of the illustrations given by the learned Judges. 51. It is true as has been observed by the Division Bench that the auction sale did not affect the rights of a third party, but a right of the third party can only be enforced in a manner provided for under the law or the terms of the contract. The Bihar State Electricity Board which is a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India has to act within the four corners of the law and not put the financial burden of its consumer upon the shoulders of the purchaser who had no concern with the former A contract has to be enforced as against the contracting party and not as against the third party who is not bound by the terms thereof. If such a consideration is allowed to be encouraged, no bona fide purchaser would come forward to take part in auction sale held under Sec.29 of the State financial Coropration Act, which would substantially affect the right of State financial Corporation itself. 52. The difference between the agreements entered by the Bihar State electricity Board and Bihar State Financial Corporation Act is that while agreement entered into by the between and consumer, contains personal covenants, the agreement entered into by the between the latter and its borrower creates a charge in the property as the assets of and borrower are mortgaged with the corporation and thus the said convenants run with the land and/or the mortgaged assets. 53. Further, the Bihar State Electricity Board also cannot be permitted to the take advantage of its own wrong. It is bound to serve bills upon consumer every month and realise the same within the stipulated period. 53. Further, the Bihar State Electricity Board also cannot be permitted to the take advantage of its own wrong. It is bound to serve bills upon consumer every month and realise the same within the stipulated period. In case of any default, it can and should immediately take recourse to Section 24 (1) of the Indian Electricity Act and take steps for realisation of its dues, if the Bihar State Electricity Board sleep over its right and allow a defaulting party to enjoy uninterrupted supply of electrical energy resulting in mounting of arrears, it has to thank itself for it. Thus it cannot take advantage of its own wrong by suddenly waking up its slumber and refuse to give new electrical connection to a consumer when the owner of the premises defaulted not only in payment of electrical dues but also in payment of dues of other statutory corporation. The dues as against such a person can only be recovered from him by filing a suit unless and until a statute provides a power to realise the dues of a consumer from a third party. In absence of such a statutory provisions or contract the Bihar State Electricity Board cannot do so. 54. There is another aspect of the matter. Under clause VI of the schedule of the Indian Electricity Act, a consumer is required to furnish adequate security. The Bihar State Electricity Board can also ask for additional security as and when required. 55. Such securities either carry no or little interest In Ferro Alloys corporation Ltd. V/s. A. P. State Electricity Board,reported in 1993 (2) J. T. (S. C.) page 85, it has been held interest free security is really an adjustable advance payment of consumption charges. The Supreme Court noticed that normally a period of 21/2 month is needed for recovery of the amount before auction for disconnection can be taken. 56. Unforunately, the attention of the Division Bench was also not drawn to the earlier decision of this court in CWJC No.204, of 1984 (R) and other decisions. The Supreme Court noticed that normally a period of 21/2 month is needed for recovery of the amount before auction for disconnection can be taken. 56. Unforunately, the attention of the Division Bench was also not drawn to the earlier decision of this court in CWJC No.204, of 1984 (R) and other decisions. Recently a learned single Judge of this Court in M/s Wexpo industries Ltd. V/s. Bihar State Electricity Board reported in 1993 (1) PLJR page 293 held as follows :- "so far as the question involved in the present case is concerned, in my opinion, the same is squarely covered by a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ram Krishna Choudhaay V/s. Bihar state Electricity Board and others (CWJC No.204 of 1984 (R)and analogous case) disposed of on the 15th October, 1990, where under the facts and circumstances similar to the present case, the court has held as under : "in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that when the ownership is transferred by auction as in the cases under consideration, unless there is a caluse that the auction purchaser shall not only have the assets but also the liabilities including the liability of the Board, the latter cannot take the stand that unless the dues of the erstwhile owners is cleared, no electric connection will be given to the auction purchasers". Respectfully following the law laid down in the aforesaid Bench decision, the electric connection granted to the petitioners pursuant to the interim order, referred to above will not be disconnected on the ground to the petitioners have not paid the dues of the mortgagar company. Learned counsel for the respondents has sought to place reliance on a Bench decision of this court in the case of M/s Isha-Marbles V/s. Bihar State Electricity Board and Ors. (CWJC No.1536 of 1991 (R)disposed of On 5-9-91. But in my opinion that case cannot be of any assistance to the respondent for the reasons that the case of Ram Krishan Choudhary (Supra) is an earlier Bench decision which was not brought, to the notice in the subsequent case of m/s Isha Marbles it was not brought on the record that the assets have been sold to the purchaser company free from all liabilities of the erstwhile owner. " 57. " 57. In Ram Krishna Choudharys case it was further held by the division bench that an auction sale under Sec.29 of the State Financial corporation Act is an involuntary sale, 58. It is thus, not correct to contend that the electrical energy is supplied to an industry and /not to the company. The Industry as such is not a juristic person. The Industry has its owner and although there is no electrical energy is supplied to an unit but the unit is not a contracting party inasmuch as such a unit is not a juristic person and thus capable of entering into a contract. 59. Further it is now also well settled that Sec.24 of the Indian electricity Act has to be construed strictly. Such an action can only be taken as a last resort. It has also been held by various courts including this court that even if a person has two connections in the same premises, one connection cannot be disconnected for realisation of dues relating to the other connection. Reference in this connection may be made to John Earnest V/s. Jogendra chandra (AIR 1935 Calcutta 298 ). Following the. aforementioned decisions in relation to a telephone matter, I have held in Chotangapur Engg. Works V/s. Union of India reported in 1987 Bihar Law Times 299 that the telephone connection of a Director cannot be dis-connected for non-payment of dues by a company. 60. In T. Chenchian V/s. A. P. E. Board reported in AIR 1980 Andhra pradesh 12 it has clearly been held that for default to pay electrical dues of a firm, the electrical connection of the partners thereof cannot also be disconnected. 61. Reference in this connection may be made to Andhra Cement Co. Ltd V/s. A. P. State Electricty Board reportedin AIR 1983 A. P.263. These decisions therefore indicate that power under Sec.24 can be exercised only in relation to a consumer and that too in respect of electrical connection in question. 62. Section 24 of the Indian Electricty Act, so construed, cannot be held to confer any power upon the Board not to give fresh electrical connection. 63. In any event, the Board is bound by its own circular letter dated 19-1-1972. It was therefore, duty bound to take recourse to clause 2 thereof without any delay. 62. Section 24 of the Indian Electricty Act, so construed, cannot be held to confer any power upon the Board not to give fresh electrical connection. 63. In any event, the Board is bound by its own circular letter dated 19-1-1972. It was therefore, duty bound to take recourse to clause 2 thereof without any delay. Its action is not implementing its own policy decision, therefore, leads to a conclusion that its action was malafide and arbitrary. 64. In view of the fact that the aforementioned aspects of the matter ; the circular of the Board the provisions of law and the earlier binding decision of this court as noticed hereinbefore, have not been brought to the notice of the Beach decision in CWJC No.1536 of 1991 (R), and CWJC No.6437 of 1992, the same must be held to have been rendered per tncuriam. 65. In Md. Jalnul Ansari V/s. Md. Khalil reported in 1990 (2) BLJR 278 it has been held as follows :- "in A. Antulay V/s. R. S. Nayak and another (reported in 1988 Vol. I. SCC 602) a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that if a judgment which has been rendered by the Supreme Court, ignoring a provision of law, the same must be held to have been rendered per incuriam and is not binding upon another Bench. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Gurnam Kaur, (reported in 1983 vol. I SCC 101) the Supreme Court held as follows ;-"quotability as law applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decldendi. The only thing in a judges decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent judge is the principle upon which the case was decided Statements which are not part of the ratio decldendl are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The tasks of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of a social justice. That being so the direction made by this court in Jamna Das case could not be treated to be a precedent. That being so the direction made by this court in Jamna Das case could not be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the direction in Jamna Das case was made not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various factors and the court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. The court no doubt made incidental observation to the directive Principle of State Policy enshrined in Article 38 (2) of the Constitution and said : article 38 (2) of the Constitution mandates the State to strive to minimise amongst others, the inequalities in facilites and opportunities amongst individuals. One who tries to survive by ones own labour has to be encouraged because for want of opportunity destitution may disturb the conscience of the society. Here are persons carrying on some paltry trading on open space in the scorching heat of Delhi sun freezing cold or torrential rain, are being denied continuance at the place under the specious plea that they constitute an obstruction to easy access to hospitals. A little more space in the access to the hospital may be welcomed but not at the cost of some neon being deprived of his very source of livelihood so as to sic shall the ranks of the fact growing unemployed. As far as possible this should be avoided which we propose to do by this short order. This indeed was a very noble sentiment but incapable of being implemented in a fast growing city like the Metropolitan City of Delhi where Public streets are overcrowded and the payement squatters create a hazard to the vehicular traffic and cause obstruction to the pedestrains on the pavement. Pronoune of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument. Without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encoracbment from any public place like pavements or public streets and without any citation of authority. It was delivered without argument. Without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encoracbment from any public place like pavements or public streets and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not prooose to uphold the decision of the high Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when in given in ignorance of the terms of a statute. So far as the order shows, no argument was addressed to the court on the question whether or not any direction could properly be made compelling the Municipal Corporation to construct a stall at the pitching site of a pavement squatter. Professor P. J. Fitzgerald, editor of the Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th ed. explains the concept of sub-silentio at p.153 on these words : "a decision is passed sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind. The court may consciously decide in favour of one party because of point A, which is considers and pronounces upon. It may be shown, however, that logically the court should not have decided in favour of the particular party unless it also decided point B in his favour ; but point B was not argued or considered by the Court. In g such circumstances, although point B was logically involved in the facts and although the case had a specific outcome the decision is not an authority On Point b is said to pass sub-silentio" in Gerad V/s. Worth of Paris Ltd (K) the only point argued was on the question of priority of the claiments debt and on this argument being heard, the court granted the order. No consideration was given to the question whether a granishee order properly be made on an account standing in the name of liquidator. When, therefore the very point was argued in a subsequent case before the court of Appeal in Lancaster Motor Co. (Londan) Ltd V/s. Bremith Ltd, the court held itself not bound by its previous decision. No consideration was given to the question whether a granishee order properly be made on an account standing in the name of liquidator. When, therefore the very point was argued in a subsequent case before the court of Appeal in Lancaster Motor Co. (Londan) Ltd V/s. Bremith Ltd, the court held itself not bound by its previous decision. Sir Wilfrid Green, M. R. said that he could not help thinking that the point DOW raised had been deliberately passed sub-silentio by counsel in order that the point of substance might be decided. He went on to say that the point had to be decided by the earlier court before it could make the order which it did, nevertheless, since it was decided" without argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of authority. ", it was not binding and would not be followed. Precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule has ever since been followed. One of the Chief reasons for the doctrine of precedent is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression of a Judge, however, eminent, can be treated as an ex-cathedra statement, having the weight of authority. " recently again in Union of India V/s. Raghbir Singh (reported in 1989 vol. II SCC 754) after exhautive study with regard to law of precedent and treating the history thereto the Supreme Court laid down the law relating to value of precedent but stated in no uncertain terms that in appropriate case, particularly when the earlier decisions of the court or the relevant provisions of the law were not brought to the notice of the court, the judgment rendered therein shall not be binding upon a subsequent bench. Salmond on his Jurisprudence (12th Edition) at page 15, states as to when a judgment passess in sub-silentio. In M/s Goodyear India Ltd. and another V/s. State of Haryana and another analogous cases, reported in 1990 (2) Supreme court Cases 72 at page 96 it was held : A decision on a question which has not been argued cannot be treated as a precedent. " Reference in this connection may be made to Md. In M/s Goodyear India Ltd. and another V/s. State of Haryana and another analogous cases, reported in 1990 (2) Supreme court Cases 72 at page 96 it was held : A decision on a question which has not been argued cannot be treated as a precedent. " Reference in this connection may be made to Md. Naztmuddin V/s. State of bihar reported in 1990 (2) PLJR 505. 66 A similar view has been taken by this court in Durga Podo Banerjee v. Smt. Sushmita Banerjee reported in 1993 (1) Bihar Law Judgment page 313. In Central Coalfield Ltd V/s. The State of Bihar reported in 1993 (1)PLJR 617 it has been held :- "it is DOW well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what logically can be deduced thereform. It is also well settled that a point not argued does not cereate a binding precedent with regard thereto. " 67. For the reasons aforementioned, this writ petition is allowed and the Respondents are hereby directed to give a new electrical connection to the petitioner on the terms and conditions laid down under Clause VI of the scheduled appended to the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 with utmost expedition and preferably within a period of three weeks from the date of the receipt of a copy of this order. 68. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioners are also entitled to costs which is quantified at Rs.2500/-. Writ Petition Allowed