JUDGMENT - SIRPURKAR V.S., J.:—In this writ petition, the petitioner-tenant is challenging the orders passed by the Resident Deputy Collector, Chandrapur and Rent Controller, Chandrapur. The Rent Controller, Chandrapur had granted permission to the landlord to serve quit notice against the tenant on the ground that the tenant had fallen on arrears of rent for more than three months, that he has become habitual defaulter, that the landlord needs the premises in question for his personal bona fide occupation and that the premises in question have become dilapidated and the essential repairs cannot be effected unless the rented premises are vacated by the tenant. The Appellate Court has confirmed these findings on all counts. It is against these concurrent orders that the present petition is filed. 2. In his application, the landlord had reiterated that the respondent Mahadeo Parshive was tenant of a shop who was inducted by his father. It was claimed that the landlord was doing business in cloth and that there was a partition in the property and in the partition, the chawl consisting of three shops fell to the share of the applicant Haridas. It was further claimed that the monthly rent was Rs. 150/- and that the tenant had not paid the rent for the last 13 months and the civil suit had to be filed for recovery of arrears of rent. The landlord thus pleaded that the tenant has become habitual defaulter. It was further pleaded that the landlord was himself carrying on his business in the rented premises and that room was, very small and was not suitable for his purpose. He claimed that he has to pay monthly rent of Rs. 87.50 for his shop and that he is residing in a rented premises and paying Rs. 275/- per month as rent though he had his own building. He claimed on this count that he was suffering financial loss. He claimed that he wanted to expand his business. He contacted the bankers to finance him for his business. He further claimed that the chawl has become extremely old which was made about 50 years back. It had country tiles, old bricks and that it was likely to be demolished, as its condition has become extremely dilapidated. He further claimed that he had got the plan prepared from the architect for the construction of his proposed shop and residence. He further claimed that the chawl has become extremely old which was made about 50 years back. It had country tiles, old bricks and that it was likely to be demolished, as its condition has become extremely dilapidated. He further claimed that he had got the plan prepared from the architect for the construction of his proposed shop and residence. Amongst other documents which were filed by the landlord, were the inspection report by the expert, blue-print of the proposed construction and the promise given by the Union Bank of India for providing the finance as also a photograph of the house showing its condition on the date of application. 3. The tenant stoutly disputed the allegations and generally negatived the contentions of the landlord. He claimed that there was no partition. In short, he initially has disputed even the ownership of the house. He claimed that he was not a habitual defaulter and in fact, he had not remained in arrears of rent at any time. The other allegation that the tenanted house was required for personal occupation of the landlord, was also denied by the tenant. As regards the plea of bona fide personal occupation, the tenant has specifically contended that it is not necessary that the whole premises are liable to be vacated. Regarding the essential repairs, the plea of the tenant is that the condition of the building was good and that it did not have any danger as such. Even the fact that the plan was got prepared by the architect, has been denied. 4. The evidence was led on behalf of both the sides. After the evidence, the Rent Controller allowed the application on all counts. The appeal against the order of the Rent Controller was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority necessitating the present petition. 5. Shri Gilda, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the orders passed by the authorities below on all counts are perverse. Their findings cannot be reached on the basis of the evidence available on record and that the authorities have not properly considered the pleadings of the parties. Shri Gilda further submits that the pleadings by the landlord fall short to lead the case under the provisions of the Rent Control Order. He also submits that there is hardly any evidence to substantiate the findings given by the authorities below. Shri Gilda further submits that the pleadings by the landlord fall short to lead the case under the provisions of the Rent Control Order. He also submits that there is hardly any evidence to substantiate the findings given by the authorities below. I have considered the contentions of Shri Gilda. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has, however, supported the orders and has drawn my attention towards the fact that the two courts below have concurrently found against the tenant on all counts and, therefore, it will not be open for this Court under its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to reopen the evidence. 6. As regards the finding on Clause 13(3)(i) of the Rent Control Order, Shri Gilda points out that though both the courts have held that the tenant is in arrears of rent, no specific time to make the payment of arrears of rent has been given and that has resulted in rendering the order incorrect in that behalf. Clause 13(3)(i) of the Rent Control Order reads as under : “13(3)(i) - that on the date of filing the application the tenant was in arrears of rent for any aggregate period of six months and that he failed to deposit with the Controller the amount of arrears along with simple interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum ordered to be deposited by the Controller within such time as may be fixed by him....” It is true that no such period has been prescribed, neither has the Rent Controller directed such arrears to be paid within a particular time. The Rent Controller has found as a matter of fact that the tenant was in arrears of rent from January 1982 to March 1986 for 30 months out of 51 months. He also found that about Rs. 2200/- were paid by the tenant as per the directions of the Court. On this basis, he has clearly found that the tenant was in arrears of rent. Now, this is not the only requirement of Clause 13(3)(i). It must be shown that though ordered to pay, the tenant has failed to make the payment of arrears of rent. It is not pointed out as to when such directions were given. On this basis, he has clearly found that the tenant was in arrears of rent. Now, this is not the only requirement of Clause 13(3)(i). It must be shown that though ordered to pay, the tenant has failed to make the payment of arrears of rent. It is not pointed out as to when such directions were given. In the circumstances, the findings of both the courts below that the tenant was liable to be evicted on the ground under Clause 13(3)(i) of the Rent Control Order will have to be set aside. 7. As regards the question of habitual default, Shri Gilda pointed out that in fact the tenant had sent notice immediately to the landlord and had sent the money order to the landlord which was refused by the landlord. He claims that if the landlord showed an attitude of refusing the first money order, he was justified in not sending the further rent as probably the landlord himself was not prepared to accept the rent. The Rent Controller has found as a matter of fact that as per Exhibit A-3, the tenant had defaulted the payment of rent for 30 months during the period January 82 to March 86. It has also come in the evidence that the landlord had to file civil suits and as per the decree passed in civil suit, Rs. 2200/- were paid to the landlord on account of rent. It is also an accepted position that the tenant had not paid the rent during the pendency of proceedings. On the basis of this, the Rent Controller has recorded a finding that the tenant had become a habitual defaulter. The Resident Deputy Collector has also taken a brief resume of the evidence in this behalf and he also doubted the plea of the tenant that he had sent money order once. 8. Be that as it may, even if the tenant had sent the money order once and the landlord refused it, it did not absolve the tenant from making the payment of rent for the succeeding months. In fact, the Appellate Authority has seen the money order coupon and observed that there is no name of the landlord thereon and there is no stamp of the post office etc. Whatever may be the situation, the fact remains that the tenant was not at all regular in payment of rent. In fact, the Appellate Authority has seen the money order coupon and observed that there is no name of the landlord thereon and there is no stamp of the post office etc. Whatever may be the situation, the fact remains that the tenant was not at all regular in payment of rent. There have been exchanges of notices between the parties which go to show that specific charge has been made by the landlord in those notices that the tenant had become irregular in respect of payment of rent. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the authorities below were in any manner in error in recording a finding that the tenant has become habitual defaulter. These two findings which are supported with the adequate evidence on record, will have to be confirmed and it will not be open for this Court now to take a different view of the matter. 9. Shri Gilda relied upon the case of (Rashik Lal others v. Shah Gokuldas Waghjibhai)1, 1989(1) Bom.C.R. 610 . He also suggested that if the tenant had become a habitual defaulter and had fallen in arrears, the best course would be to ask him to make payment of all arrears and be done with it. He claims that even the Supreme Court has adopted this course in one of the cases. I am afraid, such cannot be the correct course in this case on facts. If the courts have found that the tenant has become habitual defaulter, then the necessary consequence must follow. The reported ruling does not help Shri Gilda as therein the landlord was not required to go to the Civil Court to recover the rent which is the case in the present proceedings. The facts of the reported case and those of the present case are entirely different. The reported ruling has, therefore, no application. 10. As regards the third ground of the bona fide personal occupation under Clause 13(3)(vi), I shall deal with this question after I have dealt with the ground under Clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order. The landlord has pleaded in his application that the premises had become dilapidated and as such therein the business could not be carried on. 10. As regards the third ground of the bona fide personal occupation under Clause 13(3)(vi), I shall deal with this question after I have dealt with the ground under Clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order. The landlord has pleaded in his application that the premises had become dilapidated and as such therein the business could not be carried on. The landlord had also pointed out in his pleadings that the construction has become 50 years old and in order to carry his business in those premises, he will have to make essential alterations in the shop. The landlord did not remain content with his pleadings. He also along with these pleadings further pleaded that he had got the chawl examined by the expert who had opined that the chawl had become dilapidated and for that purpose, he had also got a map prepared by an architect which went on to show that the landlord definitely intended to construct the building afresh — both for the purposes of his own residence and also for the purposes of his, shop. He also pleaded, that he was himself living in the rented premises and was paying the rent of Rs. 275/- per month and as such, suffering financial loss. 11. In his evidence, the landlord had specifically described the building and had reiterated that by minor repairs the question could not be solved as the condition of the building was deteriorated. He also described that the roof was rotten and that this was a construction made of earth. In support of his pleadings, he also examined the architect who reiterated the necessity of demolition of the building and also deposed regarding its dilapidated condition. Not only this, but the landlord had also pointed out that the Union Bank of India had offered to help him financially if he were to increase his business. The landlord has clearly pleaded that in order to increase his business, he will have to demolish the shop and will have to effect the necessary repairs to the shop as the business could not be carried on in the present state of premises. The courts below have accepted this plea. In fact, the cross-examination of the landlord is shockingly sketchy. There is absolutely no challenge raised to this version of the landlord and it is merely in 2-3 sentences that the whole subject is finished. The courts below have accepted this plea. In fact, the cross-examination of the landlord is shockingly sketchy. There is absolutely no challenge raised to this version of the landlord and it is merely in 2-3 sentences that the whole subject is finished. Beyond saying that there was no sanction by the Municipal Council and that the Municipal Council had not directed demolition of the shop, there is absolutely no challenge to the version of the landlord. Similar is the situation in respect of evidence of Shri Umathe who was examined as an expert. He has specifically reiterated the dilapidated condition and necessity of demolition of the shop. Both the courts below, have accepted this plea of the landlord and have held that the house has become dilapidated and needs to be pulled down if the new construction is to be made and for that purpose the tenants would be required to vacate the premises. 12. An effort was made by the tenant by examining an expert. However, the expert has made a shocking admission in the cross-examination that beyond the walls, flooring and roof, he did not see any other portion of the house. He had also to admit that the bamboos used for the roof had become rotten at some places and that the building as a whole had become old. Shri Gilda thus submits that thus there was no imminent danger to the building. This is not a case where we are considering whether the building should remain as it is or should be pulled down in the interest of public. When the permission is sought for on the ground that the essential repairs have to be effected, what is to be seen is, as to whether such repairs are really essential or is it only for fanciful reason that the landlord is seeking to terminate the tenancy of the tenant. The very admission made by the expert examined by the tenant to the effect that the building had become old, and its roof at some points had deteriorated, goes to show that the repairs are essential to the building. The evidence of the expert examined on behalf of the landlord shows that in fact the building had developed a crack right from its foundation, the wooden rafters have become extremely dangerous and unless the tenants vacate the premises, the premises cannot be repaired. The evidence of the expert examined on behalf of the landlord shows that in fact the building had developed a crack right from its foundation, the wooden rafters have become extremely dangerous and unless the tenants vacate the premises, the premises cannot be repaired. Now if this be so, the concurrent findings by the two courts below really do not permit me to go all over again in the evidence. Both the courts have given their careful consideration to the aspect of essential repairs and have found that the building has become really old and needs repairs and as such the tenant would be required to vacate the premises on that count. 13. Shri Gilda then invited my attention to the reported ruling of this Court in the case of (Vasant Balwant Mohite others v. Shakun B. Dhote others)2, 1980 Mh.L.J 347. His contention is that if the landlord has not shown his bona fides and if the pleadings of the landlord fell short of the plea as contemplated under Clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order, he cannot claim for eviction. He thus contends that real desire as well as essentiality are conditions precedent for moving the Rent Control machinery in this regard. It is not enough to merely state in the application that the house is required to be repaired or altered and that those repairs and alterations are essential. The bona fides, the honest desire of effecting them must also be shown to be in existence. He further says that the landlord has not pleaded the time-schedule in his application nor has he shown his readiness by way of finances etc. for effecting the said constructions. I am afraid, such is not the position. It is indeed true that the bona fides of the landlord must be brought out and must be reflected from his pleadings. It must be shown by the landlord that he honestly desires to effect the essential repairs to the building. It is also true that the landlord should, as far as possible, give the time-schedule. In this behalf, Shri Gilda relies on the following observations from the said ruling :— “Ousting of a tenant on this ground is only a temporary phase and it cannot be allowed to be made permanent. It is also true that the landlord should, as far as possible, give the time-schedule. In this behalf, Shri Gilda relies on the following observations from the said ruling :— “Ousting of a tenant on this ground is only a temporary phase and it cannot be allowed to be made permanent. Thus the commencement of the reconstruction or repairs and its completion within a reasonable time is a sine qua non to such provisions and to their combined effect. Real desire as well as essentiality are conditions precedent for moving the rent control machinery in this regard. It is not enough to merely state in the application that the house is required to be repaired or altered and that those repairs and alterations are essential. The bona fides, the honest desire of effecting them must also be shown to be in existence. An illustrative list of circumstances which can establish bona fide or real desire can be given. It may include the condition of the house, the nature of proposed work, the financial capacity to undertake and finish that and also the period within which the proposed work is intended to be commenced and completed. If these are the requirements without which the intention of the landlord cannot be held to be genuine ...” (emphasis supplied). He also invited my attention to the observations made in paragraph 19 of the judgment which are to the effect that there must be a plea as well as the proof of time-schedule and the time-schedule is one of the essential ingredients of maintainability of application under this clause. 14. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition laid down in the said decision. However, if there are circumstances available on record to show the bona fides on the part of the landlord while pleading the case under Clause 13(3)(vii), it would amount to substantial compliance and on that ground alone, the plea will not be liable to be rejected. In the present case, the landlord has already pleaded the dilapidated nature of the house and the fact that it requires essential repairs, by giving the details. He has also filed the documents to the effect that the house site has been inspected by the experts. In the present case, the landlord has already pleaded the dilapidated nature of the house and the fact that it requires essential repairs, by giving the details. He has also filed the documents to the effect that the house site has been inspected by the experts. In addition to that, he has given photograph showing the, exact nature and the state in which the house in question stood on the date of application and besides this, he has filed a detailed plan of the proposed construction. He has also shown his financial ability to construct by saying that the Union Bank of India has promised to finance him. The contention of Shri Gilda that because the time schedule is not given by the landlord that by itself is fatal to the plea, is not correct, because all these factors have to be considered in their entirety and not in isolation. If from the application and other attending circumstances brought on record by the landlord, the Court is convinced regarding bona fides of the landlord, then it would be perfectly justifiable for the Court to proceed on the basis of the plea raised. Minor defects in the application would not have the effect of dismissal of the application on that ground. Both the courts have considered the plea regarding the requisite essential repairs and have found that in fact the house has become dilapidated, its foundation has developed cracks, its roof has become rotten in parts and the walls have also developed the cracks on the basis of the evidence tendered by the landlord. The expert examined on behalf of the tenant has also not been able to help the case of the tenant and, therefore, now there is no reason for this Court to interfere with this concurrent finding of fact on the question of Clause 13(3)(vii) of the Rent Control Order. The contention of Shri Gilda that this Court should direct retrial on this issue, carries no merit. I see no point and justification for the retrial on this issue. 15. As regards the question of Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order, the courts below have accepted the plea of the landlord that he himself was living in the rented premises and on that count was spending Rs. 275/- per month. It is also a case pleaded that his shop is also in the rented premises. 15. As regards the question of Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order, the courts below have accepted the plea of the landlord that he himself was living in the rented premises and on that count was spending Rs. 275/- per month. It is also a case pleaded that his shop is also in the rented premises. His further plea is that the house purchased by his wife is not suitable for running the business as the house in question is on the main road of Chandrapur city. Both the courts have given a finding that this is indeed considered in the nature of the business of the landlord. The main ground on which this finding was opposed by Shri Gilda was that in fact, the landlord had not at all pleaded as to how the whole shop was required. Apart from this, Shri Gilda submitted that if the landlord had acquired a shop in the name of his wife, then he was bound to disclose that in his application and this non-disclosure is fatal to the case of the landlord. His further contention is that even if there are no pleadings regarding the sufficiency of the premises claimed back and even if there is no issue on the question falling under Clause 13(8) of the Rent Control Order, it is the bounden duty of the Rent Controller to first inquire into- that issue as to how much of the area was really required to be vacated by the tenant considering the overall circumstances. As regards the need of the landlord, both the courts have found that he was conducting his business in the rented premises, he was also living in the rented premises and in fact, he had a plan to construct totally a new building by making a provision for residence as also for his business. In fact, in view of the finding on question of Clause 13(3)(vii) i.e. about the essential repairs, the finding on the present question under Clause 13(3)(vi) becomes academic. The finding on Clause 13(3)(vi) arrived at by both the courts below is correct and is confirmed. The contention of Shri Gilda that even in the absence of any plea, the Court has to consider the extent of need, is not correct as a general proposition. The finding on Clause 13(3)(vi) arrived at by both the courts below is correct and is confirmed. The contention of Shri Gilda that even in the absence of any plea, the Court has to consider the extent of need, is not correct as a general proposition. In fact, the size of the concerned shop is not known, neither is it pleaded for the simple reason that this was a dilapidated house and the concerned tea shop was a small tea shop. Both the parties, therefore, rightly did not insist upon the decision of the Court on this aspect under Clause 13(8) of the Rent Control Order. 16. Shri Gilda relied upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of (Rahman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand others)3, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 413. This was a case relating to the provisions of J and K Houses and Shops Rent Control Act. While commenting on the proviso to section 11(h) of the said Act, the Supreme Court has observed that the said proviso created a mandate for the courts to consider whether the partial eviction as contemplated therein should be ordered or the entire holding should be directed to be evicted. The Court has also observed that the Court must proceed on the footing that the absence of a specific pleading under the said proviso does not stand in the way of the obligation of the Court to act in compliance with the mandate of the statute. Shri Gilda very heavily relies upon this provision of law and the observations regarding the same by the Supreme Court. Now, firstly, the language of that provision is not similar with the language of section 13(3) of the Rent Control Order. Apart from this, the observations do not create an absolute duty on the Rent Controller to enquire into each and every case under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order as to whether part of the premises should be got vacated or the whole premises should be considered to be vacated. The language of this section undoubtedly creates a duty on the part of the Rent Controller to enquire into the needs of the landlord. However, it does not create a mandate that in each and every case such a finding shall be written by the Rent Controller. The language of this section undoubtedly creates a duty on the part of the Rent Controller to enquire into the needs of the landlord. However, it does not create a mandate that in each and every case such a finding shall be written by the Rent Controller. Now, the language of Clause 13(8) of the Rent Control Order is as under :— “(8) When a landlord applies to the Controller under Item (vi) of sub-clause (3), the Controller shall enquire into the needs of the landlord and if on enquiry the Controller is satisfied that the needs of the landlord will be met by the occupation of a portion of the house, he shall give permission in respect of such portion only.” Now, the first step that the Rent Controller has to take is only to enquire into the needs of the landlord. Such enquiry undoubtedly contemplates pleading by the landlord and the tenant and more particularly, the tenant. It will also include the evidence led by the parties. The provision mandates that if after the enquiry into the needs of the landlord the Rent Controller finds that the needs of the landlord could be met by occupation of a portion of the house, then such order would be passed, by the Rent Controller. In short, the provision is an enabling provision giving discretion to the Rent Controller even to order resumption of a lesser portion than the one which is claimed by the landlord and such discretion would be exercised on the basis of the enquiry into the need. During such enquiry if there is not a whisper regarding such need by the parties, there would be nothing for the Rent Controller really to consider. When a need is enquired into, it presupposes the existence of the material therefore and the parties will have to provide such material, if not by the specific pleadings, at least in the evidence. If there is no scope for such enquiry because of the parties having not chosen to lead any evidence on the question of Clause 13(8) of the Rent Control Order, then there would be no scope for the Rent Controller to enquire into it and order the lesser portion of the house in favour of the landlord than the one which, is claimed by him. In view of this, the ruling relied upon by Shri Gilda is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 17. In view of the above, the petition must fail. The petition is accordingly dismissed. However, under the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----