R. BHATTACHARYYA, J. ( 1 ) -THIS Criminal Revision is directed against on order dated 8. 4. 92, passed by the learned Additional Dist. Magistrate (J), 24-Parganas (S), Alipore in Misc. No. 147 of 1992. ( 2 ) SHORT of details, the facts of the case are that the petitioner purchased the property from one Mrs. Kana Ghosh of which O. P. No. 2 was a tenant in respect of a flat in the ground floor. There is a vacant space which never formed part of the tenancy. The O. P. No. 2 actuated by ill motive made sporadic attempts to set up a door on the north eastern side block with a view to resist the use of privies by the employees of the landlord and to annex the common area within the tenancy by means other than holy to the peril of the petitioner. ( 3 ) THE unwholesome activities were diarised in vain when the petitioner was constrained to file an application under section 144 of the Cr. P-C. , 1973. ( 4 ) THE interim order passed in connection therewith was brought to the notice of the Police. But strangely enough, the 0. 1. No, 2 without any reason or rhyme preferred an application before the learned Additional District Magistrate (J) which was registered as Misc Case No. 147 of 1992 and passed an order presumably or purportedly under section 411 (b) dated 8. 4. 92 staying all further proceedings. ( 5 ) THE petitioner-revisionist made genuine efforts to stop the construction commenced on the strength of the order passed by the Additional District Magistrate. It is needless to say, that the role of the Police was that of an onlooker who sat on the fence and lent support to the execution of the illegal work commenced by the O. P. No. 2 and concluded by him. ( 6 ) THE matter did not stop there. Suspicion of high handedness ripened into belief when the petitioner-revisionist appeared in obedience to an order of the Additional District Magistrate (J) on 12. 5. 92. But surprisingly enough the proceedings pended before the Dist. Magistrate was sought to be dropped as prayed for by the 1st party following which the learned Magistrate struck the case off the file when this revision spiraled up this Court. 5. 92. But surprisingly enough the proceedings pended before the Dist. Magistrate was sought to be dropped as prayed for by the 1st party following which the learned Magistrate struck the case off the file when this revision spiraled up this Court. ( 7 ) IT has been debated at the bar that the order passed by the learned Additional Dist. Magistrate is actuated by motive as the party aggrieved by the order complained of duly entered appearance. But to his utter surprise, the learned Additional District Magistrate struck the case off the file purely on the prayer put up by the first party for dropping the proceedings. It carries firm conviction in the mind that jurisdiction conferred by section 144 (5) of the Cr. P. C. in neither appellate nor revisional but a special jurisdiction created under the statute which can be exercised only if the actual terms of the section are carried in letter. The jurisdiction conferred by this clause upon a Magistrate to rescind or alter an order made by himself or by any subordinate Magistrate or a predecessor, is neither an appellate nor revisional jurisdiction, but it is special jurisdiction conferred by the statute. I am not unmindful that section 401 (5) is not a stumbling block for a revision to be preferred before the High Court. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, the High Court would be extremely slow not to indulge in preferring direct application for revision when there is a Magistrate who in exercise of such power under section 144 (5) of the Cr. P. C, can alter or rescind the order. ( 9 ) THE contention of Mr. Bose is that a learned Additional District Magistrate being a superior court is clothed with power to rescind or alter any order made under this section by himself or any Magistrate subordinate to him or by his predecessor-in-office. It does not signify that the Magistrate enjoys unqualified or unbridled power to rescind any order when the party aggrieved appeared before him, as directed. In default, the appearance of the party, however, in obedience to the order of the Court becomes an empty formality or a dumb show. It does not signify that the Magistrate enjoys unqualified or unbridled power to rescind any order when the party aggrieved appeared before him, as directed. In default, the appearance of the party, however, in obedience to the order of the Court becomes an empty formality or a dumb show. The legitimate procedure in the background of the appearance of the affected party would have been resorted to by the learned Additional District Magistrate by inducting himself into an enquiry for determination of the truth or otherwise of the allegations affirmed by one side and disputed by the other. It is well established that an ex parte order when called in question under this clause, the normal procedure should be for evidence to be recorded in the usual way by examination and cross-examination of witnesses in open court. There is no slim material on record that the learned Magistrate before passing the impugned order duly applied his mind, in particular, the aggrieved party when appeared in the court. The order complained of against, in my mind, is really foul of law. ( 10 ) MR. Bose has cited the case of Kisun Singh and others v. The State of Bihar, 1993 (1) Crime 494. The case of Kisun Singh as cited is not on all fours to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case. The ratio decidendi in Kisun Singh's case still holds, the held where the Supreme Court held that once it is found that the power exhibit the exercise of such power or a wrong provision will not render the order illegal or invalid (sic ? ). ( 11 ) BUT the case at hand is a complete departure from the case of Kisun Singh and Ors. that where, as here, the aggrieved party appeared in Court in obedience to the order of the learned Additional District Magistrate and the right to be heard was completely denied. It foreshadows occasion of grave miscarriage of justice for which the court of revision will never shut its door as it is well settled that the machinery of the court cannot be utilised by a party for an oblique purpose. ( 12 ) ONE may be of the view that freedom to prosecute a cause is purely personal as it is not a statutory right. ( 12 ) ONE may be of the view that freedom to prosecute a cause is purely personal as it is not a statutory right. No court of law can compel a party to prosecute such a cause, if he is unwilling. This general proposition of law is subject to limitation as the party cannot be permitted to commence and conclude an illegal act by fair means or fouls. ( 13 ) IN the case before us, the party, as it appears from the contents of the application had obtained the desired objective and it may be presumed safely thereafter, that the first party had sought for dropping of the proceedings on 12. 5. 92. But here, as it reflects from the impugned order that the aggrieved revisionist entered appearance in the said proceedings pending disposal before the learned Additional Dist Magistrate on the same day. But to my utter dismay I find that the teamed Magistrate ignoring the appearance of the petitioner-revisionist in the said proceeding passed the impugned order. It has, in my opinion, laid to conflagration of justice which cannot be' repaired without having recourse to civil proceedings or civil suits. The prayer for withdrawal of the case in the face of appearance of the petitioner-revisionist, as directed, is really striking. A Dist. Magistrate is clothed with power to cancel or alter an order in order to remove the grievance or reduce its extent. But the law does not encompass that he can make a new order constituting a fresh grievance to a party not before him. The appearance of the petitioner-revisionist has been totally ignored and there is no material on record which weighed with the learned Dist Magistrate to pass such an order to the detrimental to of the interest of the petitioner- revisionist. ( 14 ) I have already indicated above, that the Magistrate should have given an opportunity to the party to show-cause in order to ascertain as to whether the order should be modified or varied. ( 15 ) IT is amply found from the record that the learned court below did not go through the contents of the application on the basis of which an order was passed by a Magistrate subordinate to him. ( 15 ) IT is amply found from the record that the learned court below did not go through the contents of the application on the basis of which an order was passed by a Magistrate subordinate to him. ( 16 ) IT is well settled principle of law that a court cannot pass any order which will encourage multiplicity of proceedings which may be either civil or criminal. It is one of the glaring examples where the learned Additional Dist. Magistrate without going through the contents of the application and without applying his mind passed an order contrary to the provision of law. ( 17 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, the revisionist application has been preferred under section 482 of the Cr. P. C. , 1973. It is within the power and reach of the High Court to examine the correctness of the findings of fact in exercise of power vested in it by section 482 of the Cr. P. C. 1973. It is permissible within the broad sweep of section 482 of the Cr. P. C. to pass an order inter alia to secure the ends of justice. The orders passed in connection with the Misc Case No. 147 of 1992, by the Additional Dist Magistrate (f), for the foregoing reasons cannot be allowed to stand and is therefore is quashed. The learned Additional Dist Magistrate (J) is hereby directed to proceed afresh from the stage of filing the application under section 411 (b) of the Cr. P. C. by O. P. No. 2, Sambhunath Mukherjee and the proceedings must be concluded in accordance with law within a fortnight from the date of receipt of the order. Parties are to take steps accordingly. ( 18 ) IN the result, the revision succeeds. ( 19 ) A xerox copy of the order passed by the court of revision may be made available to the parties on usual undertaking. Revision succeeds.