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1993 DIGILAW 307 (KAR)

Hyderabad Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax

1993-12-01

K.SHIVASHANKAR BHAT

body1993
JUDGMENT K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.—The petitioner is an assessee assessed by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle-II, Hyderabad, under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ("the Act" for short). In respect of the various years, excess tax paid by the petitioner was refunded. The petitioner claimed interest under section 214 and 244(1A) of the Act. Regarding the claim under section 244(1A), the assessing authority allowed interest to some extent; as to the interest under section 214, the assessing authority followed the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The excess tax claimed to have been paid by the petitioner includes the advance tax paid. This fact is necessary to appreciate the contention raised under section 244(1A). The petitioner filed revision petitions before the Commissioner under section 264 of the Act without any success. Hence these writ petitions. 2. Learned counsel for the Revenue raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of these writ petitions. Learned counsel pointed out that the assessee is at Hyderabad and the assessment orders were made at Hyderabad and therefore the cause of action arises only at Hyderabad, and this court has not jurisdiction to entertain these writ petitions. Learned counsel also pointed out that revision petitions were lodged at Hyderabad and the revision petitions were heard by the commissioner at Hyderabad. There is some dispute as to whether the revision petitions were filed at Hyderabad or at Bangalore because the petitioner assets that the revision petitions were filed at Bangalore since the office of the Commissioner is located at Bangalore. This dispute is irrelevant for the purposes of these writ petitions. 3. There is no dispute that the order of the Commissioner was made at Bangalore and they were dispatched to the assessee from Bangalore. Since the order is made at Bangalore, normally there is no difficulty to hold that a part of the cause of action arose in Bangalore within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. However, Mr. Dattu, learned counsel for the respondent, pointed out that the questions on the merits raised by the petitioner are covered by the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court against the petitioner, while the decision of this court as to the scope of section 214 is in favour of the assessee. However, Mr. Dattu, learned counsel for the respondent, pointed out that the questions on the merits raised by the petitioner are covered by the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court against the petitioner, while the decision of this court as to the scope of section 214 is in favour of the assessee. It was contended that the purpose of filing the writ petitions in this court is to take advantage of the decision rendered by this court though the authorities in Andhra Pradesh are bound by the law declared by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. In case these writ petitions are entertained and this court applies the law declared by this court, implementation of the order that may be made by this court will be impracticable because the authorities located in Andhra Pradesh are not expected to disobey the law declared by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. 4. This problem of jurisdiction, with reference to the cause of action, frequently arises under article 226 of the Constitution. Article 226(2) makes it clear that any High Court which exercises the jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action wholly or in part arises may exercise the writ jurisdiction. The basic test is whether the cause of action wholly or in part arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this court to attract its writ petition in any particular case. 5. Under the provisions of the Act an order of the assessing authority is not final. It is subject to revision or appeal and this court has held that the order of the original authorities, whether it is affirmed or modified or reversed, gets merged in the order made by the appellate or revisional authority, vide Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnataka-I Vs. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., (1986) 157 ITR 315 KAR In the instant case, the petitioner is aggrieved by the order refusing its claim for interest. The interest to some extent was denied by the assessing authority. That order was affirmed by the Commissioner at Bangalore. If so, there can be no doubt that the effective order is the order of the Commissioner and the cause of action to challenge the said order, at least partly arose at Bangalore. In fact the Commissioner is located at Bangalore and even on that ground alone this court may have jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition against his orders. If so, there can be no doubt that the effective order is the order of the Commissioner and the cause of action to challenge the said order, at least partly arose at Bangalore. In fact the Commissioner is located at Bangalore and even on that ground alone this court may have jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition against his orders. In an identical situation another assessee had filed Writ Petition No. 8234 of 1988 (Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. v. ITO, dated November 16, 1990). The petitioner therein was aggrieved by the denial of the interest claimed under section 214 of the Act. The Commissioner had affirmed the order of the assessing authority. A preliminary objection was raised in that writ petition also. The preliminary objection was overruled stating that the Commissioner was within the territorial jurisdiction of this court and part of the cause of action arose at Bangalore. Thereafter, a writ was issued to grant the interest in the light of the decision rendered by this court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Deepchand Kishanlal, (1990) 183 ITR 299 KAR. The Revenue challenged the said order in W. A. Nos. 2546 of 1990 and 713 of 1991. The writ appeals were dismissed. The Bench pointed out that the Commissioner of Income Tax exercises his revisional jurisdiction in Bangalore and, therefore, part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this court. The Bench further affirmed the decision on the merits regarding the payment of interest by applying the earlier ruling in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Deepchand Kishanlal, (1990) 183 ITR 299 KAR. I do not find any substantial difference between the aforesaid case and the present case before me. 6. Mr. H. L. Dattu, however, pointed out that in the earlier case the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court taking a contrary view as to the scope of section 214 was not placed before this court and the court had no occasion to consider the anomaly that would result by issuing a writ by applying the decision of this court regarding the scope of section 214. Learned counsel pointed out that the same assessing authority may have to apply different standards, one by applying the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and another by applying the decision of this court in obedience to the writ that may be issued by this court. Learned counsel pointed out that the same assessing authority may have to apply different standards, one by applying the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and another by applying the decision of this court in obedience to the writ that may be issued by this court. The relief to be granted to an assessee within the State of Andhra Pradesh, thus, would depend upon the assessee accepting the order of the assessing authority or challenging it by filing a revision petition before the Commissioner. Being an authority exercising the statutory power within Andhra Pradesh, the said authority has normally to apply the law by the Andhra Pradesh, the said authority has normally to apply the law by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Trustees of H. E. H. Nizam's Religious endowment obedience thereto could be nullified by an assessee by approaching the Commissioner at Bangalore (who is the sole revisional authority for both the State of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh), and then by filing a writ petition in this court. 7. I am of the view that this kind of anomaly is inevitable. In fact, it is also anomalous that an assessee governed by the Act gets a particular benefit in Karnataka while the same benefit is denied to a similar assessee in Andhra Pradesh, because of the conflicting views of the High Courts. Probably in another State, if the High court of that State has taken a third view, the authorities in that State shall have to follow the said third view. In such a situation, within this country, three similar assessees are likely to be treated in three modes. Either the law on the particular subject shall have to be settled by the Supreme Court or by Parliament by amendment to the Act. 8. While exercising its jurisdiction this court shall have to apply the law as accepted by this court. Only because there will be certain anomalies this court cannot refuse its jurisdiction. The solution to the problem should be found elsewhere. Probably the Commissioner may get over the problem hereafter by writing his orders at Hyderabad and disclosing the same at Hyderabad so that the entire cause of action will be confined to Andhra Pradesh. This apart, I am bound by the decision of this court rendered in Sirpur Paper Mills' case. Consequently, I am constrained to overrule the preliminary objection raised by Mr. This apart, I am bound by the decision of this court rendered in Sirpur Paper Mills' case. Consequently, I am constrained to overrule the preliminary objection raised by Mr. H. L. Dattu. 9. Regarding the claim under section 214, there cannot be much dispute as far as this court is concerned. The question is squarely covered by the decision of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Deepchand Kishanlal, (1990) 183 ITR 299 KAR . To that extent the order of the Commissioner shall have to be set aside with a direction to make a fresh order. 10. As to the scope of section 244(1A), learned counsel for the petitioner referred to section 219 of the Act. It was pointed out that by virtue of the said provision any sum paid by an assessee as advance tax shall be treated as a payment of tax and therefore credit shall be given for it to the assessee in the regular assessment. In other words, as and when a regular assessment is made an automatic credit is given to the advance tax paid in relation to the assessment year in question and the advance tax paid earlier is treated as a payment of tax in respect of the income of the said period. By virtue of section 219, the earlier payment of advance tax is treated as payment of tax on regular assessment. Under section 244(1A), if an amount is due to an assessee, interest shall have to be paid on it from the date the amount becomes due, Payments made by an assessee after March 31, 1975, if found to be in excess and require to be refunded, interest from the due date of refund shall have to be paid. Since advance tax paid earlier is treated as payment of tax on the date of assessment, the logical consequence is to deem the earlier payment as the payment made by the assessee on the date of assessment and if that date of assessment is after March 31, 1975, interest shall have to be paid on it under section 244(1A). 11. Since advance tax paid earlier is treated as payment of tax on the date of assessment, the logical consequence is to deem the earlier payment as the payment made by the assessee on the date of assessment and if that date of assessment is after March 31, 1975, interest shall have to be paid on it under section 244(1A). 11. Learned counsel for the Revenue, on the other hand, contends that the language of section 244(1A) shall have to be read as conveying the idea of an actual payment in pursuance of an order of assessment and that there is not scope to deemed payment made earlier as a payment made on the date of assessment. Learned counsel contends that the language of a provision in the fiscal legislation should be literally understood without extending the meaning beyond the words used in the said provision. 12. In National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. Vs. Union of India and others, (1981) 130 ITR 928 Delhi , a Bench of the Delhi High Court applied the provisions of section 219 to a claim under section 244(1A). It was held that the fiction created under section 219 should be extended to its logical end. 13. Equitable considerations are not foreign to a fiscal law, especially while construing its machinery provisions. Similarly, if the statute creates a fiction and the purpose of the fiction is not limited for a particular purpose, full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical end. It was said by Lord Asquith and quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in The State of Bombay Vs. Pandurang Vinayak Chaphalkar and Others, AIR 1953 SC 244 : "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it...... The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit you imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs." 14. Section 219 has bidden to treat the advance tax as the actual payment of tax on the date of assessment. Section 219 has bidden to treat the advance tax as the actual payment of tax on the date of assessment. This mandate is not confined to any particular purpose; if at all the purpose is to adjust the advance payment towards the quantified liability on the date of assessment. Advance payment automatically becomes the current payment. If so, as a consequence of this status conferred on the payment, giving credit to it, the excess shall have to be refunded in the same manner as any other excess payment referred to in section 244(1A) is refunded. I am in respectful agreement with the observations made by the Delhi High Court in this regard. Consequently, it is not possible for me to sustain the order of the Commissioner even under section 244(1A). 15. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed. The order of the respondent is set aside. The respondent is directed to make a fresh order in the light of the observations made in this order. Rule made absolute.