Judgment :- MISHRA, J A writ petition and a suit have been tried together, in which a learned Single Judge has delivered a judgment holding that the plaintiff/respondent is entitled to a decree that the show cause notice dated 13-2-1978, marked as Ex. P-1 is illegal, void and barred by limitation and accordingly, he is entitled to a permanent injunction to restrain the 1st defen- dant (1st appellant before us) from proceeding with the enquiry or taking any steps or passing any orders in pursuance of the said Ex. P-1. 2.Since we were to presently state why we have decided to interfere with the judgment, but at the same time we are not inclined to reject the case made out in the plaint and in the writ petition, we do not propose to detail every fact except as follows :- On 22-9-1975 the 1st defendant directed that the plaintiff should clear tariff duty under Tariff Item No. 17(4) of the Central Excises and Salt Act. The same was challenged before this court by filing a writ petition in W.P. No. 6287 of 1975. The plaintiff also preferred an appeal against the said demand before the Collector of Central Excise. Before, however, the writ petition was disposed of, the Collector allowed the appeal stating, inter alia, that any demand of duty should be preceded by an enquiry after giving a notice to the plaintiff. It appears, however, that while the writ petition was pending but after the order of remand by the Collector on 5-8-1977, some order was passed to give a notice to the plaintiff calling upon to show cause. But before the said notice was issued and served upon the plaintiff, the Tariff Rules were amended, in the sense that Rule 10 and Rule 10A, as they existed earlier, were modified. Rule 10A was emitted and Rule 10 was reworded and made effective from 6-8-1977. It appears, however, that the notice dated 5-8-1977 was revised and the 1st defendant/lst appellant decided to issue a revised show cause notice on 30-1-1978/13-2-1978. A memo accordingly was, filed on behalf of the Union of India in W.P. No. 6287 of 1975 stating that a revised show cause notice dated 13-2-1978 had been issued to the party and the party was free to urge such points as it might deem fit in the case. A memo accordingly was, filed on behalf of the Union of India in W.P. No. 6287 of 1975 stating that a revised show cause notice dated 13-2-1978 had been issued to the party and the party was free to urge such points as it might deem fit in the case. The writ petition, which related to memo, orders and earlier show cause notice had become in fructuous and therefore had to be dismissed. Entertaining the same, the court dismissed WP. No. 6287 of 1975 as in fructuous on 20-2-1978. 3.It appears for a cause that on 13-2-1978 when the defendants issued notice, the new Rule 10 had become operative, under which notice could be issued only for the purposes specified therein and within a period of six months only and Rule 10A which could enable the defendants to proceed against the plaintiff with the demand aforementioned was no longer available. The plaintiff moved this court, first by filing-a suit in C.S. No. 119 of 1978 and then by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4.In the proceedings aforementioned, defendants have besides other facts stated that the plaintiff has been litigating as and when demands were made for payment of taxes, the first being one in W.P. No. 1873 of 1970, another being one in W.P. No. 6287 of 1975. But the fact of the matter has been that the first defendant issued a notice to show cause to the plaintiff on 7-9-1972, to which the plaintiff submitted its explanation on 2-4-1974 and also asked for a personal hearing and after complying with the demands of the plaintiff, the 1st defendant on 18-8-1975 called upon it to pay duty on excisable product that he produced even before the final commodity called 'Light Roofing'. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the said order and contended that the intermediary product called fibrous mat or board was not at all goods and so no market at all. The appellate authority, however, remanded the matter. The plaintiff preferred W.P. No. 6858 of 1975 against the appellate order and W.P. No. 6287 of 1975 against the order of the 1st defendant after the remand dated 22-9-1975. The appellate authority, however, remanded the matter. The plaintiff preferred W.P. No. 6858 of 1975 against the appellate order and W.P. No. 6287 of 1975 against the order of the 1st defendant after the remand dated 22-9-1975. 5.As further case of the defendant has been stated in the judgment of the trial court, we may extract, - 'It was then discovered that light roofing itself is a paper board falling within tariff item and should be subjected to excise duty. These writ petitions were finally dismissed as infructuous since the original order was set aside by the Appellate Collector. The writ petition relating to the order dated 22-9-1975 was also dismissed as in fructuous for the reason that in the proceedings that had been taken before the original authority the plaintiff would have sufficient opportunity to represent their point of view. The show cause notice was issued on 13-2-1978. The plaintiff has now filed the suit for declaratory reliefs. The point at which duty is payable and the commodity on which duty is to be paid are the subject of all these inquiry proceedings before the first defendant. The proceedings were initiated in 1970 itself and was remanded either by this court or the appellate authority for examination and on re-examination it was found that what was called roofing sheet was a paper board and that duty was payable by weight. The proceedings had left the matter at large for investigation.'Sworn of details the issues that were gone into by the trial court related to maintainability of the suit and the writ petition, whether the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration that his product was not covered by Tariff Item 17(4), whether the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration that the show cause notice dated 13-2-1978 was illegal and whether the defendants have demanded duty from the plaintiff within time and answered by the trial court against the defendants. It appears, however, that on the main question whether the plain tiff is entitled to the declaration that the show cause notice 13-2-1978 is illegal the trial court was told that Rule 10A of the Central Excise Rules wasultra viresas held by a Division Bench of this court in the case ofThe Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., Madrasv. It appears, however, that on the main question whether the plain tiff is entitled to the declaration that the show cause notice 13-2-1978 is illegal the trial court was told that Rule 10A of the Central Excise Rules wasultra viresas held by a Division Bench of this court in the case ofThe Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., Madrasv. The District Revenue Officer, Chingleput and Others[1973 I MLJ 99] and the amended Rule 10 was not available and if the notice was purportedly issued under the amended Rule 10, it was barred by limitation. The trial court accepted this contention for the reason of a Bench decision of this court and for the reason of the fact that the notice dated 6-8-1977 could not be a valid notice because Rule 10A wasultra viresand notice dated 13-2-1978 was barred by limitation because the period under which such notice was required to be issued was six months only. 6.The judgment of this court on Rule 10A beingultra viresis no longer in force for the reason of a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case ofAssistant Collector of Central Excisev. Ramakrishnan Kulwant Rai 1990 (41) ELT 3 SC] and once it is found that Rule 10A existed and was in force action under the said Rule could be taken against the plaintiff. The issue of limitation in such a situation will assume a different complexion and will depend upon whether in fact any notice was issued on 5-8-1977, and if it was not served before Rule 10A was omitted, could that still be valid, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, for the reason that no action could be taken against the plaintiff/respondent as this court had stayed action against the plaintiff in one or the other writ petitions. 7.Since findings in respect of these two matters recorded by the learned single Judge cannot be sustained, as we have said above, we have to interfere with the impugned judgment. We have our apprehensions that for the reason of the changed circumstances, particularly that Rule 10A has been held to beintra viresby the Supreme Court, the plaintiff may be required to raise additional issues of law and fact and the defendants may, accordingly, be required to modify their stand. We have our apprehensions that for the reason of the changed circumstances, particularly that Rule 10A has been held to beintra viresby the Supreme Court, the plaintiff may be required to raise additional issues of law and fact and the defendants may, accordingly, be required to modify their stand. All this is possible if the case is remitted back to the trial court and the parties are asked to raise their disputes in accordance with law before the trial court if necessary by amending their respective pleadings. We have, however, our reservations on this for a remand will continue the proceedings in this court, whereas under the Central Excises and Salt Act there are specific provisions under which the plaintiff can seek remedy. It is well settled that availability of an alternative remedy is not a bar to the maintainability of a suit or a writ petition. There cannot be any doubt that unless it is found that civil courts' jurisdiction is either expressly or impliedly barred, there can be no objection taken as to the maintainability of a suit. The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is well known, is wider than the powers that a civil court may exercise in a suit. But it is also known that the courts exercise this extraordinary jurisdiction with circumspection and restraint. No bar to a suit or the extent of the jurisdiction that this court may have under Article 226 of the Constitution, however, should not be understood to give to any and every person option to elect a proceeding in a court of law either by way of a suit or a writ petition in preference to an internal remedy which may be equally efficacious. The rule of prudence accordingly has been developed by the courts in India that they ordinarily ask a party to exhaust all internal remedies before invoking courts' extraordinary jurisdiction. 8.Courts, however, do not entertain any objection on the ground of alternative remedy and proceed to decide such controversies as are brought before it in the cases where the impugned action is alleged to have been taken under an invalid or void law and/or the principles of natural justice are violated. 8.Courts, however, do not entertain any objection on the ground of alternative remedy and proceed to decide such controversies as are brought before it in the cases where the impugned action is alleged to have been taken under an invalid or void law and/or the principles of natural justice are violated. It seems that this court by holding that the two previous writ petitions had become infructuous and intended that the plaintiff/ respondent would now avail the opportunity to show cause and file all objections in reply to the said notice and raise all objections which it may have as to the imposition of duty, validity thereof, etc. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, we are inclined to hold that it is in the interest of justice that plaintiff is put to the same position as it was when this court accepted the memo filed on behalf of Union of India in W.P. No. 6287 of 1975. We accordingly dispose of the suit and the writ petition with the following direction :- (1) The plaintiff/respondent shall show cause, if any, in response to the notice dated 30-1-1978/13-2-1978 within six weeks from the date of the receipt of a copy of this order, for which it must apply in course of the day. (2) The appellants shall keep ready all the records and permit inspection of all such documents on which they propose to rely as well as all such other documents which the plaintiff/respondent demands for inspection and permit inspection of the same on working days between 10.00 A.M. to 4.00 P.M. to the plaintiff or any authorised agent of the plaintiff. They shall permit inspection on any day but not after the expiry of a period of four weeks from the date of the service of a copy of this order. (3) The Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Vellore Division, Vellore - 1st appellant herein - shall give full opportunity to the plain tiff/respondent to represent its case and shall fully comply with the order of the Appellate Collector dated 10-10-1975 and dispose of the proceedings as quickly as possible, preferably within a period of six months. It shall be open to the plaintiff/respondent to move the court in an appropriate proceeding after exhausting the internal remedy.On the facts of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.