N. D. V. BHAT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a second appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 11-2-1985 passed by the learned civil judge, sirsi, in r. a. No. 41 of 1984. By the said judgment, the learned civil judge confirmed the judgment and decree dated 23-8-1984 passed by the learned additional munsiff, sirsi, in o. s. No. 84 of 1983. The learned additional munsiff, sirsi, by his judgment had decreed the suit of the plaintiff in o. s. No. 84 of 1983 declaring that the order of compulsory retirement passed against him (plaintiff) on 1-7-1983 following the resolution dated 3-6-1983 is ultra vires illegal and opposed to principles of natural Justice with a further declaration that plaintiff has the right to continue in service till the age of superannuation, as also with certain other reliefs referred to in the operative portion of the judgment. ( 2 ) THE facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal brieflystated are as under: plaintiff-respondent-1 was a headmaster in union high school, sirsi, which admittedly is a private educational institution managed by the muslim education society, sirsi. It appears that prior to his joining this institution, plaintiff was working elsewhere and his services were transferred to this institution, wherein he was promoted and posted as a permanent headmaster of the school in question with effect from 15-6-1974. It appears that sometime in the year 1983, to be more precise on 20-6-1983, the president of the muslim education society communicated certain charges to the plaintiff reflecting certain sins of omission and commission on his part. The charges contained allegation reflecting misappropriation of funds, fabrication of documents, raising the fees of hindi class without consulting the managing committee, molesting a lady teacher, among others. Plaintiff was called upon to submit his reply within 3 days. It appears that plaintiff duly sent his reply on 21-6-1983 itself though he did not have any adequate time to reply to the charges. It is the allegation of the plaintiff that without giving any opportunity to him of being heard or without making any enquiry as required under the law, on 30-6-1983 consequent to a resolution passed by the management an order of compulsory retirement was served on him and defendant-14 was appointed as an in-charge headmaster in his place with effect from 1-7-1983. According to plaintiff, the action on the part of the management was ab-initio-void in as much as the dismissal from service is opposed to the principles of natural justice. Plaintiff also alleged other grounds reflected in detail in the plaint. ( 3 ) THE contesting defendants challenged the suit filed by theplaintiff on various grounds. They sought to support the order of compulsory retirement issued by the management against the plaintiff for the reasons reflected in the written statement. ( 4 ) ON the basis of these pleadings, the learned additionalmunsiff raised seven issues. Further, he also raised another additional issue relating the maintainability of the suit. ( 5 ) BEFORE the learned munsiff, plaintiff examined himself andgot marked the documents from ex. P. 1 to p. 13. 19 witnesses were examined for the defendant. Ex. D. 1 to d. 32 were marked for the defendants. ( 6 ) THE learned additional munsiff answered issue No. 1 byholding that he was appointed as a permanent headmaster and continued to be so. Issue No. 2 was answered by holding that plaintiff has failed to prove that defendants 6 to 13 were not the members of defendant-1 society as on 30-6-1983. Issue No. 3 was answered by holding that plaintiff was not given reasonable opportunity to establish his innocence before the impugned resolution was passed. Issue No. 4 was answered by holding that plaintiff has proved that the impugned resolution passed by defendants 6 to 13 was made in bad faith and in violation of principles of natural justice, as also in violation of principles of natural justice, as also in violation of the Provisions of grant-in-aid-code Rule and bye-laws of the society. Issue No. 5 was answered by holding that the suit of the plaintiff in the form in which it was brought was maintainable and issue No. 6 was answered with a finding that the civil court has jurisdiction to grant the reliefs claimed in the suit. Additional issue was also answered in favour of the plaintiff. In the result, the learned additional munsiff granted the reliefs referred to earlier. ( 7 ) IN appeal, the learned civil judge, confirmed the judgmentof the learned additional munsiff. ( 8 ) THE learned single judge before whom the second appealcame up for admission, admitted the appeal by raising the following substantial question of law. In the result, the learned additional munsiff granted the reliefs referred to earlier. ( 7 ) IN appeal, the learned civil judge, confirmed the judgmentof the learned additional munsiff. ( 8 ) THE learned single judge before whom the second appealcame up for admission, admitted the appeal by raising the following substantial question of law. The substantial question of law raised by the single judge reads as under :"whether in view of the Provisions in sections 14, 10, 34 and 36 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in the light of the principle laid down court in majority judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1976 Supreme Court 888, the decree in question is to be set aside on the ground that such a suit for declaration and injunction is not maintainable?" ( 9 ) AT a later date, the learned judge has referred this matterto the division bench, presumably under Section 6 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. ( 10 ) WE have heard the arguments of Sri c. b. srinivasan,learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri basava prabhu s. Patil, learned counsel appearing for the contesting plaintiff respondent-1. ( 11 ) HAVING regard to the submissions made at the bar oneither side and the admitted facts flowing from the record, the following questions arise for consideration :"1. Whether in view of the Provisions in sections 14, 10, 34 and 36 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in the light of the principle laid down in the majority judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1976 SC page 888, the decree in question is to be set aside on the ground that such a suit for declaration and injunction is not maintainable?2. Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in question in view of the Provisions of the Karnataka private educational institutions (decipline and control) Act, 1975?" ( 12 ) AT the very outset, it is necessary to make a mention ofcertain facts which are not in dispute. It is not in dispute that the muslim education society, sirsi, which has been managing union high school of which the plaintiff was the headmaster, is a minority institution. In fact, plaintiff himself has asserted in his plaint that the muslim education society, sirsi, is a minority institution. It is not in dispute that the muslim education society, sirsi, which has been managing union high school of which the plaintiff was the headmaster, is a minority institution. In fact, plaintiff himself has asserted in his plaint that the muslim education society, sirsi, is a minority institution. There is also no dispute that the said society is registered under the societies Registration Act. Further, it is also not in dispute that the school in question is a private educational institution. Further, the fact that the plaintiff was working as a headmaster of the union high school from 15-6-1974 also does not appear to be in dispute. Then again, the fact that he was served with a show-cause notice on 20-6-1983 containing allegations attributing sins of omission and commission to him is also admitted. The fact that he gave a reply to the same also does not appear to be in dispute. Further, a resolution came to be passed on 30-6-1983 followed by an order compulsorily retiring him also is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the said order of compulsory retirement is by way of punishment. It is in the context of these facts which are admitted or are not disputed that this court is required to resolve the points of law flowing from these facts. ( 13 ) WE may make a mention here that the Provisions ofkarnataka private educational institutions (discipline and control) Act, 1975 (for short 'the act') were not in so many words pressed into service in the course of the plaint. Similarly, the defendants also do not appear to have pressed into service the Provisions of the said act though in the additional written statement a contention is shown to have been taken that the plaintiffs suit is not maintainable and plaintiff if at all ought to have had recourse to an appeal. It is in that context, the additional issue appears to have been raised by the learned additional munsiff. ( 14 ) HOWEVER, it is noticed that the learned additional munsiffhas in fact referred to and relied on certain Provisions of the act as can be seen from para nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of his judgment in particular. It is in that context, the additional issue appears to have been raised by the learned additional munsiff. ( 14 ) HOWEVER, it is noticed that the learned additional munsiffhas in fact referred to and relied on certain Provisions of the act as can be seen from para nos. 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of his judgment in particular. The learned additional munsiff, as can be seen from para No. 14 of the judgment has taken the view relying on the decision of this court in mount carmel college and another v sudha rao, that the Provisions of sections 8 and 10 of the act are not enforceable against the institution which is a minority institution or against the board of management of that institution, but the other Provisions of the act can be enforced. In that view of the matter, the learned 'munsiff proceeded to examine the scope of Section 6 and other Provisions of the act and ultimately took the view among other things that in the context of the relevant Provisions of the Act, the order of compulsory retirement is rendered void. It is in the context of the said finding, as also the other finding referred to by us earlier, the suit of the plaintiff came to be decreed. We may also point out here that the learned civil judge in appeal has more or less adopted the same reasoning reflected in the judgment of the learned munsiff. ( 15 ) THE learned counsels appearing on either side before usaddressed arguments on various aspects touching upon the points raised for consideration. ( 16 ) SRI c. b. srinivasan, the learned counsel appearing for theappellants submitted that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in question, in view of the Provisions of the act. Sri srinivasan fairly submitted that though the Provisions of the act were not specifically put as a defence by way of bar to civil suit either in the court below or for that matter in the appeal memo, the position of law flowing from the admitted or undisputed facts will have to be given effect to, since the question of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter. Dilating on this aspect, the learned counsel submitted that the earlier view that certain Provisions of the act are not applicable to minority institution is no more a good law in the context of the decision of the Supreme Court in manohar harries walters v the basel mission higher education centre, dharwad and others. The learned counsel has pointed out that the Supreme Court in the said decision after reviewing the previous decisions of the Supreme Court relevant with reference to the applicability or otherwise of the Provisions of the Act, has ruled that all the Provisions including the Constitution of the tribunal by Section 10 of the act are applicable even to a minority institution and the same does not offend the provision of article 30 (1) of the constitution. The learned counsel pointed out that the latest view of the learned single judge of this court in Dr. Miss parveen rukhsana u management of khaja education society, stands affirmed by the Supreme Court and the said view holds the field on the question relating to the applicability of the Provisions of the act to minority institutions. In the alternative, Sri srinivasan submitted that the civil court has no jurisdiction to decree the suit of the plaintiff for re-instatement. In this connection, the learned counsel pointed out that the view taken in a series of judgments by the Supreme Court namely, in the decision in sirsi municipality, by its president, sirsi v cecelia kom francis tellis; the decision in executive committee of vaish degree college, shamli u lakshmi narain and others; the decision in Smt. J. Tiwari v Smt. Jawala devi vidya mandir and others; the decision in dipak kumar biswas v director of public instruction and others; the decision in the kayastha pathshala, allahabad and another v rajendra prasad and another, would unmistakably go to show that the civil court does not have the jurisdiction to grant the relief of re-instatement to a teacher of a private educational institution like the one in hand. The learned counsel pointed out that it is only in those cases, where an institution is covered by the exceptions adumberated in the decisions referred to earlier hereinabove that such a relief can be had. In sum, it was argued by the learned counsel that in a case like this a contract of employment cannot be enforced by a decree of specific performance. In sum, it was argued by the learned counsel that in a case like this a contract of employment cannot be enforced by a decree of specific performance. ( 17 ) SRI patil, the learned counsel appearing for the contestingrespondent-plaintiff on the other hand argued that at the relevant point of time, the settled position of law was that the Provisions of Section 8 and Section 10 in particular were not applicable to a minority institution and that they cannot be enforced against the said institution. In this connection, the learned counsel relied on the decision of this court in case of mount carmel college and another v sudha rao, and the decision in anjuman hami-e-muslimeen, bhatkal and others v education appellate tribunal for uttara kannada and others. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that the division bench of this court in the aforesaid decision had relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the all saints high school, etc. Etc. V the government of Andhra Pradesh and others, etc. Etc. . Sri patil submitted that though in the context of the latest decision of the Supreme Court which has in fact pointed out that there is no conflict in the different decisions of the Supreme Court and having regard to the observation made in the latest decision that is in manohar harries walters case, it may not be possible to say that Section 8 and Section 10 of the act are not applicable to minority institution, the view taken by the munsiff according to the settled position of law at the relevant point of time is not liable to be disturbed. The learned counsel further argued that if the view taken by the munsiff at the relevant point of time, which did follow the decisions of this court, which inturn relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in all saints high school's case, the same is likely to re-open many settled disputes. With reference to the alternative submission made by Sri srinivasan, particularly in the context of the substantial question of law raised by the learned single judge is concerned, the learned counsel Sri patil has placed his finger to certain specific observations made by the supreme court in executive committee of U. P. state warehousing corporation, lucknow v chandra kiran tyagi reported in. The learned counsel also tried to draw support from certain observations made by the Supreme Court at para No. 20 (page No. 875) in the decision in sirsi municipality's case. The learned counsel contended that the decision in executive committee of vaish degree college's case, does not go beyond the principles laid down in sirsi municipality's case. The learned counsel particularly placed reliance on paras 14 and 31 in U. P. s. w. corporation's case and has pointed out that this is referred to at paras 8, 16 and 18 in sirsi municipality's case. In sum, the learned counsel contended that though the private educational institution is not a statutory body as such, it has got a statutory obligation particularly in the context of the Provisions of Section 6 of the Act, in relation to its employees like the respondent in this case. The learned counsel has also argued that the separate judgment of his lordship Hon'ble Sri Justice bhagawathi in executive committee of vaish degree college's case, is not a dissenting judgment, but a judgment which supplements the view taken by the other two judges. He relied on certain views, which the Hon'ble Sri Justice bhagawathi has taken in the said case and sought support therefrom to contend that the civil court has jurisdiction to decree the relief of reinstatement in a case like the one in hand. The learned counsel in particular has placed reliance at paras 30 and 31 (at page No. 901) of that judgment. Sri patil also submitted that the decision in case of Smt. J. Tiwari v Smt. Jawala devi vidya mandir and others, has not whittled down the principles laid down in sirsi municipality's case. The learned counsel also sought support from the decision in Dr. R. k. seth v c. b. c. i. society for medical education and others reported in1, to contend that a private educational institution is a state for the purpose of article 226 of the Constitution and that therefore on the same analogy it should be possible for holding that the relief of re-instatement can be granted. ( 18 ) WE may also point out at this juncture only thatarguments also revolved round the question as to whether the order of compulsory retirement would fall within the compass of the Provisions of Section 6 (1) of the act. ( 18 ) WE may also point out at this juncture only thatarguments also revolved round the question as to whether the order of compulsory retirement would fall within the compass of the Provisions of Section 6 (1) of the act. While it is argued by Sri Srinivasan that since Section 6 (1) of the act does not make any reference to compulsory retirement but only makes reference to dismissal, removal and reduction in rank, the question of following the procedure reflected in Section 6 (1) before an order of compulsory retirement is passed does not arise at all, Sri patil, learned counsel on the other hand, submitted that as long as compulsory retirement is a punishment, the Provisions of Section 6 (1) will apply, though the word "compulsory retirement" is not one of the terms referred to in Section 6 (1) of the act. In this connection, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision in murari mohan deb v secretary to the government of India and others, reported in. It is pointed out by Sri patil that even otherwise the Provisions of Section 6 (2) of the act are clearly attracted at any rate, which inturn will bring within its sweep an opportunity of being heard to be given to the party against whom the action is proposed. ( 19 ) WE have given our anxious consideration to thesubmissions made on either side. It would be indeed in fitness of things to consider the question relating to the applicability of the Provisions of the act and the bar created under Section 11 of the act in the first instance. That is so because if this court takes the view that the Provisions of the act are in toto applicable to the minority institutions also and therefore the provision containing the bar created under Section 11 of the act is attracted, the logical conclusion follows therefrom is that the suit itself is not maintainable in a civil court. If the suit is not maintainable in a civil court, then perhaps the findings on other aspects may not be warranted having regard to the fact that the civil court will not have jurisdiction itself to entertain and try a suit. If the suit is not maintainable in a civil court, then perhaps the findings on other aspects may not be warranted having regard to the fact that the civil court will not have jurisdiction itself to entertain and try a suit. If a civil court does not have jurisdiction to entertain and try a suit on account of the bar created under Section 11 of the Act, then it would not be permissible for the court to give any finding on the other issues touching upon the controversy raised by the parties. It is therefore necessary for this court to consider in the first instance as to whether the act is applicable to the institution and whether bar under Section 11 would operate thereby barring the jurisdiction of the civil court. ( 20 ) AS pointed out earlier, it is not only not in dispute, but itis admitted by the plaintiff that the private educational institution in this case is run by the muslim education society and that the same is a minority institution. Further, it is also not in dispute and in fact arguments have been addressed on that basis that the compulsory retirement enforced against the instant appellant is by way of punishment on allegation reflected in the show-cause notice issued to him on 20-6-1983. In other words, the compulsory retirement is not one sought to be enforced in any service Rule analogous to a provision like Rule 285 (4) of kcsrs. The compulsory retirement ordered in this case is by way of punishment on the allegation that the respondent was guilty of the allegation reflected in the notice dated 20-6-1983. If that be so, it will have to be next seen as to whether the Provisions of the act are not applicable to a minority institution like the appellant in this appeal. In fact, as pointed out earlier, the learned additional munsiff has taken the view and the same view is also confirmed by the learned civil judge in appeal that some of the Provisions of the act are applicable but certain Provisions of the act are not applicable. The Provisions of the act which are held to be not applicable are the Provisions relating to appeal and the Provisions relating to the Constitution of tribunal i. e. , Section 8 and Section 10 of the act. The Provisions of the act which are held to be not applicable are the Provisions relating to appeal and the Provisions relating to the Constitution of tribunal i. e. , Section 8 and Section 10 of the act. The learned additional munsiff, however, has held that the other Provisions of the act would apply to the minority institutions. It is this aspect which has been the subject matter of an argument on the part of the learned counsel appearing on either side. We have already alluded to the different decisions referred to by other side in support of the submissions made by them. As pointed out earlier, the latest decision on the point is the decision in case of manohar harries walters v the basel mission higher education centre, dharwad and others. It is necessary to mention here that the said decision of the Supreme Court has taken a review of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court to wit, decision in frank anthony public school employees' association v union of India and others reported in; the decision in Mrs. Y. Theclamma v union of India and others reported in; the decision in osmania university teachers' association v state of Andhra Pradesh and another, reported in; the decision in case of the all saints high school, etc. Etc. V the government of Andhra Pradesh and others, etc. Etc. , apart from making a reference to the decision in case of anjuman hami-e-muslimeen, bhatkal and others v education appellate tribunal for uttara kannada and others. At this juncture, it would be indeed in fitness of things to have an idea relating to the facts of the case in manchar harries walters case, with reference to which the Supreme Court has ruled as held by it thereunder. In the said case, the appellant was the lecturer in chemistry. It appears that he committed certain sins of omission and commission. Therefore, a disciplinary enquiry was initiated against him. A retired district judge was appointed as the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer gave his report finding the appellant guilty of the charges levelled against him. The management accepted the said report and after receiving the reply of the appellant dismissed him from service. Being aggrieved by the said order of management, the appellant before the Supreme Court, preferred an appeal before the education appellate tribunal. The education appellate tribunal allowed the appeal. The management accepted the said report and after receiving the reply of the appellant dismissed him from service. Being aggrieved by the said order of management, the appellant before the Supreme Court, preferred an appeal before the education appellate tribunal. The education appellate tribunal allowed the appeal. However, it did not grant the backwages to the appellant. Both the appellant and the management preferred writ petition before this court, the appellant being aggrieved by the failure to grant backwages and the management being aggrieved by the direction to re-instatement. Before the single judge arguments were addressed by the management submitting that in view of the fact that the respondent-society is a minority institution, the Provisions of the kpei act would not be applicable. The said submission did appeal to the learned single judge, with the result, the writ petition of the appellant was dismissed and the writ petition of the management was allowed. The appeal preferred before the division bench against the said order of the learned single judge was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the same the matter was taken up before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the context of the facts marshalled hereinabove, among other things, in the course of the judgment held as under:"4. Since the decision delivered by the high court, much water has flown under the bridge. This court in the case of frank anthony public school employees' association v union of india, held that the right guaranteed to minority institutions by article 30 (1) of the Constitution is not invaded merely because a tribunal is constituted under an act to hear appeals against the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of an employee in the service of a minority institution. The same view is reiterated by another division bench of this court in case of Mrs. Y. Theclamma v union of india. There the court also pointed out that the view taken in frank anthony public school case (supra) is based on the view taken by the majority in case of all saints high school v government of Andhra Pradesh, and there was no conflict between the frank anthony public school case (supra) and lily kurian v Sr. Lewina decided by a Constitution bench of this court. Two subsequent decisions of this court, viz. Lewina decided by a Constitution bench of this court. Two subsequent decisions of this court, viz. , all Bihar christian schools association v state of Bihar and osmania university teachers' association v state of Andhra Pradesh, have also reiterated the same view. " ( 21 ) A careful perusal of the decision of the Supreme Court, therelevant portion of which is culled out hereinabove, would go to show that the minority institution cannot claim exemption from any of the provision of the act. Having regard to the fact that the portion culled out hereinabove is obviously self-explanatory, it is not necessary to dilate any further. In fact, Sri patil, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the ratio of the decision which we have chosen to cull out hereinabove, does not leave any doubt as regards the question relating to the applicability of the Provisions of the act. Having regard to the aforesaid decision, we have no hesitation whatsoever in taking a view that the Provisions of the Karnataka private educational institutions (discipline and control) Act, 1975, would apply to a minority educational institution also and that therefore the said Provisions would apply to the facts of this case. ( 22 ) IF that be so, the next question for consideration is as tothe course of action to be followed by this court in this appeal. As pointed out earlier. Sri patil, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, the view taken by the munsiff and confirmed by the civil judge is not liable to be interfered with, since the said view did proceed on the basis of a well settled position of law, which held the field for quite some time. His further submission was that if the said view is interfered with, the same is likely to re-open a plethora of cases, where matters have been already settled. We are unable to agree with the submission made by Sri patil. It is not as if the law was something different earlier. In fact, the Supreme Court in its judgment has clearly held that there is no conflict with reference to the various decisions of the Supreme Court right from 1980. We are unable to agree with the submission made by Sri patil. It is not as if the law was something different earlier. In fact, the Supreme Court in its judgment has clearly held that there is no conflict with reference to the various decisions of the Supreme Court right from 1980. In the portion of the judgment which is culled out hereinabove, the Supreme Court has pointed out as to how there is no conflict between the decision in frank anthony public school's case and the decision in lilly kurian's case. ( 23 ) UNDER these circumstances, in our view the fact that thelearned additional munsiff has relied upon the decision of this court in case of anjuman hami-e-muslimeen, bhatkal and others v education appellate tribunal for uttara kannada and others, and the decision in case of mount carmel college and another v sudha rao, would not make any difference to the conclusion required to be reached in this case in the context of the decision of the Supreme Court. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to say that settled position of law was otherwise earlier. Might be that at a point of time, a particular view is taken but as and when that view is either reversed or altered or modified, the view that is modified or altered or reversed will have to be applied to a pending matter. This appeal is a continuation of the suit filed before the learned additional munsiff and once when the law is made clear, this court has to apply the said law and act upon it. It is not as if there is any change in law by way of amending or otherwise. Under these circumstances, we are not inclined to accept the submissions made by Sri patil. ( 24 ) IF that be so, the next aspect that is required to beconsidered is, as to whether it is necessary or desirable to give our finding with reference to the substantial question of law raised by the learned civil judge. As pointed out earlier once when the jurisdiction is barred by a statutory provision like Section 11 of the Act, it is obvious that the court is precluded from deciding the various point arising from the respective contentions raised by the parties in the suit. In our view any finding given in such a situation will be one without jurisdiction. As pointed out earlier once when the jurisdiction is barred by a statutory provision like Section 11 of the Act, it is obvious that the court is precluded from deciding the various point arising from the respective contentions raised by the parties in the suit. In our view any finding given in such a situation will be one without jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary nor is it permissible for this court to give its finding on any other point of law and in our view any other question would not arise for consideration of the court in such a situation. In that view of the matter, we do not think it necessary to give our finding or answer the substantial question of law raised by the learned civil judge. Further, we are also of the view that all the findings given by the learned additional munsiff on other aspects are liable to be set at naught and similarly the findings given by the learned civil judge concurring with the finding of the additional munsiff with reference to these aspects are also liable to be set-aside and the suit is liable to be dismissed as being not maintainable. ( 25 ) IT is unfortunate that the suit will have to be dismissed atthis stage as being not maintainable in view of Section 11 of the act. However, in the context of the position of law made absolutely clear by the honourable supreme court in the aforesaid decision, there is no option left to this court but to hold that the suit is liable to be dismissed as being not maintainable in view of Section 11 of the Karnataka private educational institutions (discipline and control) Act, 1975. Sri patil, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant however submitted that if plaintiff is required to prefer an appeal at this stage before the educational appellate tribunal constituted under the Act, the appeal is likely to be barred by time. However it is obvious that the plaintiff has been prosecuting the suit bona fide and it is for him to make appropriate application for condoning the delay before the educational appellate tribunal if and when he chooses to prefer an appeal against the impugned order. However it is obvious that the plaintiff has been prosecuting the suit bona fide and it is for him to make appropriate application for condoning the delay before the educational appellate tribunal if and when he chooses to prefer an appeal against the impugned order. We have no doubt that if such an application for condoning the delay is filed along with the appeal if to be preferred before the educational appellate tribunal, the educational appellate tribunal will consider the application for condoning the delay in the context of what is stated hereinabove. ( 26 ) FOR the reasons stated hereinabove, the appeal is allowed. the judgment and decree passed by the first additional munsiff, sirsi in original suit No. 84 of 1983 and the judgment dated 11-2-1985 passed by the learned civil judge, sirsi, in regular appeal No. 41 of 1984 are hereby set-aside. The suit filed by the plaintiff is dismissed on the ground that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the said suit in view of the bar created under Section 11 of the Karnataka private educational institutions (discipline and control) Act, 1975. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct all the parties to bear their own costs all throughout. --- *** --- .