Judgment :- The short question that arises in this second appeal is whether an order passed by the Appellate Court under R.27 of 0.41 rejecting the reception of additional evidence can be challenged in second appeal under S.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Appellants are the plaintiffs in O.S.32/81 before Sub Court, Parur. The suit is for specific performance of an agreement alleged to have been entered into between the defendant-respondent and the husband of first appellant and father of appellants 2 to 4 by name Sathyan. By that agreement defendant had agreed to sell the properties described in the plaint. But the document could not be executed since defendant was in an advanced stage of pregnancy at that time. Demands were made subsequently. But defendant refused to execute the assignment and that necessitated the suit. Defendant denied the execution of the agreement and disputed the signature contained in the agreement as hers. Witnesses were examined on both sides and documents were also produced. The trial court after a consideration of the documents and evidence dismissed the suit holding that the evidence is not sufficient to establish the genuineness of the agreement. An appeal was preferred against that decision. During the pendency of the appeal appellants moved an application as I.A.374/86 for getting the opinion of an expert after comparing the disputed signature of the defendant with her admitted signatures. The lower Appellate Court dismissed that petition. After hearing both sides the appeal was dismissed. Hence the second appeal. 3. The following three substantial questions of law are seen formulated in the appeal memorandum. The appeal was admitted on those questions of law. L Whether the lower appellate court is right in disallowing the additional evidence sought to be adduced as per the provisions of O.XLI R.27 of the C.P.C. 1908? ii. The lower appellate court has observed that there is no conclusive evidence regarding the comparison of the signature in Ext. Al agreement with other admitted signatures. This lacuna which remaining obscure can be filled up only by adducing expert evidence so as to pronounce the judgment in a just and more satisfactory manner. Whether these aspects are "substantial causes" under 0.41 R.27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? iii. Whether the lower appellate court required additional evidence to be recorded as per 0.41 R.27(b) of the C.P.C., 1908 to enable it to pronounce judgment? 4. Whether these aspects are "substantial causes" under 0.41 R.27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? iii. Whether the lower appellate court required additional evidence to be recorded as per 0.41 R.27(b) of the C.P.C., 1908 to enable it to pronounce judgment? 4. Heard counsel on both sides. 5. The order of the lower appellate court rejecting the request for obtaining additional evidence is not an appealable order. But that order can be questioned in an appeal from the appellate decree. The question arises whether this Court in second appeal should interfere with the discretion exercised by the lower appellate court in rejecting the application. 6. Before adverting to that question the scope and ambit of R.27 of 0.41 has to be understood. That rule reads: "Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court. (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or) (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission." 7. In order to enable the appellate court to allow additional evidence one of the following conditions has to be satisfied: (i) There was improper refusal to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted by the trial court, (ii) non-production of evidence notwithstanding exercise of due diligence, (iii) the requirement of the appellate court for pronouncing judgment and (iv) any other substantial cause. It is settled law that the court is not bound to allow additional evidence and the parties are not entitled, as of right, to get additional evidence admitted and the matter is entirely in the discretion of the court. It is settled law that the court is not bound to allow additional evidence and the parties are not entitled, as of right, to get additional evidence admitted and the matter is entirely in the discretion of the court. But that discretion to receive and admit additional evidence is not an arbitrary discretion but a judicial one though circumscribed by the limitations specified in R.27 of 0.41. As far as conditions 1 and 2 are concerned there may not be much difficulty. The party has only to prove that the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted or that the additional evidence sought to be produced was not within the knowledge of the party and could not have been produced even after the exercise of due diligence. But the third condition is the requirement of the court to pronounce judgment. In that case the test is whether the appellate court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials available before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be produced. This provision is not attracted in a case where satisfactory judgment can be pronounced by the appellate court on the basis of the evidence available on record. 8. Additional evidence may be allowed not only to enable the court to pronounce judgment but also for any other substantial cause. The Supreme Court in K. Venkataramiah v. Seetharama Reddy (AIR 1963 SC 1526) observed that there may well be cases where even though the court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of record as it is, and so it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it still considers that in the interest of j us rice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. The Supreme Court held that such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence for any other substantial cause under R.27(1)(b) of the Code. Even here the Supreme Court observed that the requirement must be the requirement of the court upon its appreciation of the evidence as it stands. The defect may be one pointed out by the party or a party may move the court to supply the defect. Even here the Supreme Court observed that the requirement must be the requirement of the court upon its appreciation of the evidence as it stands. The defect may be one pointed out by the party or a party may move the court to supply the defect. The Supreme Court observed that such requirement of the court is not likely to arise ordinarily unless some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent on an examination of the evidence. In short the appellate court can admit additional evidence only if it is not able to pronounce a judgment satisfactorily on the basis of the materials available on record. 9. It is well settled that it is not the function of the court to fill up the laches or the lacuna in the evidence adduced by a party. The Privy Council in the decision in Mohammed Akbar Klian v. Mt. Kotai & ors (AIR 1948 PC 36) observed that the power of an appellate court to admit further evidence under Order 41 Rule 27(1)(b) is confined to cases in which the court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable to it pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. It was held that the power only arises where the court requires the further evidence for one of the two causes specified and that an order under this sub-rule cannot be made to enable a party to fish out evidence in order to prove his case and make up the lacuna which then existed. 10. In Dasarathi Chamar v. Balmukunda Das (AIR 1959 Orissa 38) it was held that the court cannot place himself in the position of an adviser to a party and that laches or lacuna should not be permitted to be filled up unless the court is fully satisfied that there was sufficient reason which prevented the plaintiff from taking proper steps to prove his case. 11. In Kalipada Dinda v. Kartick Chandra (AIR 1977 Calcutta 3) it was held that mere insufficiency of evidence is no ground for allowing any party to adduce further evidence when the dispute is lying in appeal. If there is insufficient evidence for any party to prove his case, he will suffer. It is observed that a party must come under a provision of law for getting an order to adduce further evidence. If there is insufficient evidence for any party to prove his case, he will suffer. It is observed that a party must come under a provision of law for getting an order to adduce further evidence. The Madras High Court also is of the same view. See Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramasami Chettiar (1980) 1 M.L. J. 178. 12. Can an order admitting or refusing to admit additional evidence in appeal be challenged in second appeal? It cannot be disputed that the power given to the appellate court to receive and admit additional evidence under rule 27 of Order 41 is discretionary. The question whether an order rejecting the application to allow additional evidence can be interfered in second appeal came up for consideration before a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Vaithinatha Filial v. Kuppa Thevar and others (AIR 1919 Madras 1166). The Full Bench was considering the unamended rule. The Full Bench by a majority held that the High Court cannot in second appeal interfere with an order of a lower appellate court rejecting an application made to it by a party to the appeal to admit certain material evidence discovered since the date of the decree appealed against which was not available to the said party with the exercise of diligence during the trial of the suit. 13. This decision was followed in Chinna Reddy v. Govinda Reddl (AIR 1927 Madras 1099). The only ground of appeal in that case was whether the lower appellate court improperly refused to admit fresh evidence in appeal. Following the decision in AIR 1919 Madras 1166 it was held that this is not a ground upon which a second appeal is sustainable. The decision in Vaithinatha Filial's case was relied on by the Patna High Court in Kali Charan Sahi v. Jaldhari Raut (AIR 1929 Patna 98) where it was held that the High Court should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the lower court in refusing fresh evidence particularly when such discretion is not exercised contrary to legal principles. 14. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this aspect in Kamala Ranjan v. Baijnath (AIR 1951 SC 1) That was a case where the appellate court allowed additional evidence to be given in order to clear up certain matter. 14. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this aspect in Kamala Ranjan v. Baijnath (AIR 1951 SC 1) That was a case where the appellate court allowed additional evidence to be given in order to clear up certain matter. The Supreme Court held (hat the matter is fully covered by Order 41 Rule 27 and no objection can be taken to the course adopted by the appellate court in second appeal as there is no reason to interfere in the exercise of the court's discretion. 15. The position therefore is that Rule 27 of 0.41 does not enable the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage when it can pronounce judgment even without such evidence. The power under that rule cannot be exercised for adding to the evidence already on record except upon one of the ground sped filed in that provision. The appellate court has no power to order fresh trial and such course is also not permissible under R.27 of 0.41. The Code gives a discretion to the appellate court either to receive and admit additional evidence or refuse to admit the same. But this discretion is not an arbitrary one but a judicial one circumscribed by the limitations specified in the rule. The test is whether the appellate court is able to pronounce judgment on the basis of the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. When party has deliberately withheld evidence from the trial court and a decision is rendered against him additional evidence cannot be allowed to be admitted at the appellate stage to fill up the lacuna in his evidence. The requirement under R.27(b) is that of the court and the admission of additional evidence can only be for the purpose of enabling the court to pronounce a satisfactory judgment and not for filling up the lacuna or gaps in the evidence adduced by the parties. 16. When a discretion has been given to the appellate court either to reject or to admit the additional evidence sought to be introduced a decision rendered by the appellate court one way or other cannot be challenged in second appeal unless it is arbitrary. It is for the appellate court to consider whether the matter can be satisfactorily decided on the basis of the materials available. It is for the appellate court to consider whether the matter can be satisfactorily decided on the basis of the materials available. If after such consideration the court feels that the additional evidence sought to be produced is necessary for a satisfactory adjudication the court has every right to do so. On the other hand, if the court is of the opinion that the matter can be satisfactorily decided on the basis of the materials available on record the request has to be rejected. In either case the court exercises the discretion after satisfying itself as to whether the documents sought to be produced are necessary or not. This discretion exercised by the appellate court cannot be the subject matter of an appeal under S.100 CPC. A second appeal under this section can be sustained only if the appellant is able to show that the lower appellate court has proceeded in an arbitrary manner and without conforming to the restrictions imposed under R.27 of 0.41 and the requirement of the court to pronounce a satisfactory judgment. 17. Viewed in the light of the principles enunciated above this second appeal is not maintainable. Respondent had disputed the signature contained in the agreement and had denied having executed any agreement to all the properties. In the face of this plea raised in the written statement the burden was heavy on the appellants to produce sufficient materials before the court to prove the agreement and to show that it was executed by respondent. No steps were taken by appellant during the pendency of the suit to get the document examined by an expert and the signature in the disputed document compared with the admitted signatures. They proceeded to trial on the basis of the evidence on record which included some documents containing the admitted signal^ -e of respondent. The trial court was therefore denied the benefit of the opinion of handwriting expert with the result that the court had to compare the disputed signature with the admitted signatures and to decide the case on the basis of the evidence available. On comparison of the disputed signature with the admitted signatures the learned Subordinate judge noticed disparities and that was also taken as a circumstance against the defendant. The trial court has analysed the oral evidence adduced by the parties and had also adverted to the documents produced. On comparison of the disputed signature with the admitted signatures the learned Subordinate judge noticed disparities and that was also taken as a circumstance against the defendant. The trial court has analysed the oral evidence adduced by the parties and had also adverted to the documents produced. It was after a proper consideration that a finding was entered against the plaintiffs. No request is seen to have been made to the trial court for getting the opinion of an expert after comparison of the disputed signature with the admitted signatures. That decision was challenged in appeal filed in 1984. It is to fill up the lacuna or gap in the evidence that an attempt was made at the appellate stage to get the document examined by a handwriting expert. It is settled law that a party cannot be permitted to adduce evidence at the appellate stage in order to fill up lacuna in the evidence adduced before the trial court. Moreover, the request for getting the opinion of the expert was made about two years after the filing of the appeal. The lower appellate court dismissed that petition for proper reasons. The request for a remand of the case for the purpose of sending the document to an expert was also turned down for these reasons. No error has been committed by the lower appellate court in rejecting the request of the appellants for sending the document to an expert for his opinion. There is therefore no merit in this second appeal and the substantial questions of law formulated in the appeal memorandum do not arise for consideration. In the result the second appeal is dismissed but without costs.