Judgment : BAKTHAVATSALAM, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner - Management has filed this writ petition, challenging the order of the 1st respondent passed under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act dated 2-8-1991, refusing to grant approval of the order of dismissal passed against the 2nd respondent. ( 2 ) THE 2nd respondent, who was an employees of the petitioner, was charge-sheeted by a charge memo dated 29-6-1990, charging the 2nd respondent that while he was on duly on 28-6-1990, he had assaulted one Padmanabhan, canteen worker, near the store-entrance, adjacent to the cooks room after altercation, abused the said Padmanabhan in vulgar language and threw a eversilver tumbler on his face and caused a bleeding injury on the right forehead just above the right eye. M/s Ramamurthy and Santhanam, the co-workers who were present at the scene of occurrence to the said injured Padmanabhan for first-aid and thereafter appears that he (Padmanabhan) was taken to Kilpauk Medical College Hospital in an ambulance. The 2nd respondent submitted an explanation on 2-7-1990 denying the charges and thereupon an enquiry was conducted on 10-7-1990 and in the said domestic enquiry though one of the eye witness to the occurrence Mr. Ramamurthy was examined, the other witness Santhanam could not be examined, as he was threatened by the 2nd respondent. The Enquiry Officer, on an assessment of the entire evidence, both oral and documentary, found the 2nd respondent guilty of the charges. Consequently, as per the Companys Standing Order 15 (xi), (xii) and (xiii), the 2nd respondent was dismissed from service by an order dated 20-2-1991. Since the conciliation proceedings were pending before the 1st respondent, the petitioner filed an application before the 1st respondent, for the grant of approval of the order of dismissal passed against the 2nd respondent under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act. The 1st respondent after going through the entire records and the report of the enquiry officer, refused to grant approval, holding that the evidence recorded in the course of the enquiry did not warrant for removal of the 2nd respondent and no prima facie case had been made not to pass an order of dismissal against the 2nd respondent. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner Management has fled this writ petition. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner Management has fled this writ petition. ( 3 ) THE petitioner alleges in the affidavit filed in support of this writ petition that the order of the 1st respondent is erroneous and without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions contained under Section 33 (2) (b) of the industrial Disputes Act; that if the evidence adduced by the petitioner - Management is not enough the grant approval, the petitioner should have been given an opportunity to adduce additional evidence, that the provisions contained under Section 11-A of the Act is not applicable to the proceedings under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act; that the 1st respondent cannot go into the controversy as to the adequacy or otherwise of the evidence recorded in the course of the enquiry, and therefore the order of the 1st respondent has to be quashed. ( 4 ) IN the counter filed by the 2nd respondent it is stated that he is a post-graduate having put in 17 years of service in the petitioners company, that there was no material to hold any domestic enquiry, that the alleged incident stated to have been taken place on 28-61960 is a brain-child of the management with a view to remove the 2nd respondent from service, that the documents produced by the Management will clearly show that the injury sustained by the said Padmanabhan was on account of sudden fall and therefore the oral evidence adduced by the Management that the said Padmanabhan had sustained bleeding injury on the fore head, just about the right eye on account of assault by 2nd respondent, will not prevail upon the documentary evidence and therefore, the order of the 1st respondent declining to grant approval to the order of dismissal passed against the 2nd respondent is unassailable. ( 5 ) MR. ( 5 ) MR. Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the first respondent exceeded his jurisdiction under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act and the 1st respondent is expected to see whether prima facie case has been made out for the grant of approval to the order of dismissal passed by the petitioner against the 2nd respondent that the 1st respondent has no power to sit on appeal over the factual finding arrived at by the enquiry officer, and particularly, as to the adequacy or otherwise of the evidence in the course of the enquiry and once the enquiry officer comes to the conclusion that the canteen worker Padmanabhan was attacked by the 2nd respondent and he was assaulted by the 2nd respondent with an ever-silver tumbler and caused a bleeding injury on the fore head just above the right eye and the said occurrence on 28-6-1990 was witnessed by co-workers Ramamurthy and Santhanam, it is not open to the 1st respondent to go into the veracity of the same and come to a different conclusion. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it the evidence adduced by the petitioner is not sufficient, considering the nature of the charges framed against the petitioner, the 1st respondent ought to have given an opportunity to the petitioner to place additional evidence and therefore the order of the 1st respondent refusing to grant an approval to the order of dismissal passed by the petitioner, is liable to be set aside and the matter has to be remitted back to the original authority for fresh consideration. ( 6 ) MR. R. Shankarasubbu, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends, that though the charge against the 2nd respondent is that the 2nd respondent had caused a bleeding injury on the forehead of the injured Padmanabhan on 28-6-1990 by throwing an ever silver tumbler on him, the diagnoses slip issued by the Kilpauk Medical College Hospital. Marked as Ex. 15 will clearly show that the said Padmanabhan had sustained an injury on his forehead due to "fall injury". In such circumstances, it is contended by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that the 1st respondent had come to the right conclusion that no prima facie case has been made out to grant approval to the order of the dismissal passed against the 2nd respondent. In such circumstances, it is contended by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that the 1st respondent had come to the right conclusion that no prima facie case has been made out to grant approval to the order of the dismissal passed against the 2nd respondent. It is further contended that the is no clear evidence that the 2nd respondent had assaulted Padmanabhan by throwing an ever silver tumbler on him and this incident was witnessed by M/s. Ramamurthy and Santhanam. It is also contended that there are discrepancies in the deposition of Ramamurthy and another witness Santhanam was not examined to corroborate the claim of the petitioner-management, and therefore, the 1st respondent has rightly brushed aside the evidence of Ramamurthy and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case had been made out to grant approval. In such circumstances, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contends that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 7 ) I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the 2nd respondent and perused the records and the report of the Enquiry Officer. ( 8 ) IT is settled law that the authority under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act can go into the question whether the petitioner-management has made out a prima facie case for the grant of approval to the order of dismissal passed against the 2nd respondent. It is true that the authority under the Act can not sit on appeal over the factual findings arrived at by the original authority or to reappraise the evidence recorded by the enquiry officer. It is for the 1st respondent to find out whether prima facie case has been made out and whether the findings of the Enquiry Officer are perverse and in violation of principles of natural justice and whether the action initiated against the worker. In this case the 2nd respondent, is on account of victimisation. Not like a criminal case, the prima facie case has to be made out to the hilt. If there is no ample evidence to connect the misconduct with the occurrence of incident against an employee, it is always open to the authority under Section 33 (2) of the Act of say that the findings of the enquiry officer are perverse. Not like a criminal case, the prima facie case has to be made out to the hilt. If there is no ample evidence to connect the misconduct with the occurrence of incident against an employee, it is always open to the authority under Section 33 (2) of the Act of say that the findings of the enquiry officer are perverse. ( 9 ) SO far as the procedure adopted in the conduct of the enquiry proceedings are concerned, there is no defect. The charge against the 2nd respondent is that he assualted the canteen worker Padmanabhan by throwing an ever-silver tumbler on his forehead and caused a bleeding cut injury just above the right eye on 28-6-1990 and this incident was witnessed by Ramamurthy and Santhanam. Though the said Ramamurthy deposed before the enquiry officer as to the alleged incident, the other eye witness Santhanam did not depose on account of alleged threat by the 2nd respondent. But the 1st respondent, on coming to know about the vital discrepancy between the documentary evidence and oral evidence as to the reason for the injury sustained by the said Padmanabhan, has come to the conclusion that no prima facie had been made our for granting the approval sought for by the petitioner into the dismissal of the 2nd respondent. The reason being, that the diagnosis slip marked as Ex. M 15 shows that the said Padmanabhan has sustained fall injury whereas in the course of the enquiry, the petitioner - Management has sought to establish that the said Padmanabhan has sustained a bleeding injury on his forehead, just above the right eye, on account of assault by the 2nd respondent by throwing an ever-silver tumbler. The normal presumption is that the documentary evidence has to prevail upon the oral evidence, however natural it is, In this case, Ex. M. 15 marked by the petitioner-management, followed by another slip Ex. M. 22, clearly shows that the said Padmanabhan had sustained a fall injury and it is not stated as cut injury as claimed by the petitioner and as concluded by the Enquiry Officer. In my view, any amount of oral evidence cannot prevail over the documentary evidence. It is for the petitioner-management to corroborate the documentary evidence with the oral evidence. In my view, any amount of oral evidence cannot prevail over the documentary evidence. It is for the petitioner-management to corroborate the documentary evidence with the oral evidence. It is true that the Evidence Act will not be applicable strictly to the case of this nature, but the principles formulated in the Evidence Act has to be followed. If it is so, in my view, it cannot be said that the order of the authority declining to grant approval to the order of dismissal passed against the 2nd respondent, is perverse of unreasonable, since the 1st respondent has clearly said that prima facie case has not been made out by the petitioner, as there is a discrepancy as to the nature of the injury, sustained by the victim Padmanabhan. Therefore I am of the view that the 1st respondent has acted well within the jurisdiction under section 33 (2) (b) of the industrial Disputes Act and in similar cases, this Court, as well as the apex Court of the land have held so. The next question will be whether the authority should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to let in additional evidence. ( 10 ) THE petitioner has made the following request before the authority : "the applicant submits that if on any account this Authority comes to a different conclusion namely that the domestic enquiry conducted by the applicant is defective or the findings of the Enquiry Officer is perverse, the applicant pleas that the applicant may be given an opportunity to prove the charges before the authority. It is submitted that we have additional witnesses to lead evidence against the opposite party in this regard. " The above request was made by the petitioner herein in the application submitted before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Conciliation II, Madras on 30-2-1991. The above request, in may view, has been couched in very wide terms which is now insisted upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, with a view to fill up the lacuna in the case of the petitioner. The 1st respondent has come to the conclusion, that no prima facie case has been made out by the petitioner -Management to grant approval for the dismissal of the 2nd respondent, on the basis of a material discrepancy with regard to the vital point, namely, as to the nature of the injury, sustained by one Padmanabhan. The 1st respondent has come to the conclusion, that no prima facie case has been made out by the petitioner -Management to grant approval for the dismissal of the 2nd respondent, on the basis of a material discrepancy with regard to the vital point, namely, as to the nature of the injury, sustained by one Padmanabhan. In such circumstances, I do not think that any opportunity need be given to he petitioner to lead any additional evidence and negativing the request of the petitioner to lead additional evidence, will not vitiate the impugned order. Consequently the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No costs. ( 11 ) PETITION dismissed.