JUDGMENT This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order of removal of the petitioner from service and against all proceedings culminating in the said order of removal including the appellate proceeding in which the order of removal was confirmed. The petitioner at the relevant time was a Head Constable of the Railway Protection Force. On 31st March, 1987 the petitioner was detailed for duty from 16-00 hours to 24-00 hours from gate No. 3 to TNC office including gate No. 12 of Halisahar Depot and for escorting 735 Up Ex-Naihati to Halisahar and also 736 Up Naihati to Halisahar and also seal checking, guarding and C & W checking. According to the case of the respondents on 31st March, 1987 at about 23-35 hours in course of secret watch duty Shri M. N. P. Singh, IPF/CCS/Rly. Board along with other officers and staff detected that some miscreants were committing theft of railway materials near gate No. 12 and they captured 3 of the miscreants and seized a truck found there containing railway materials, namely, brake blocks (500 Nos ). Some brake blocks also found just near the truck and boundary wall (480 Nos.) and on further check up 600 brake blocks were found on the ground on both sides of the open doors of railway wagon standing on the railway line inside the boundary wall. Certain other materials such as Howai chappals etc. were also recovered from the place. Departmental proceeding was started against the petitioner for his failure to prevent and detect the theft while on duty. In that departmental proceeding ultimately the Disciplinary Authority issued a provisional order directing the petitioner to show-cause as to he should not be removed from service. The petitioner then moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution before this Court and ultimately obtained an order of the Court setting aside the impugned orders but the respondents were given the liberty to take de novo action from the stage of charge-sheet. Accordingly the respondents proceeded de novo against the petitioner and in that departmental proceeding the petitioner was found guilty and an order of his removal from service was passed. Thereafter the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal but in that appeal the order of removal was rather confirmed. Then the petitioner has again come up before this Court in its writ jurisdiction. Thereafter the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal but in that appeal the order of removal was rather confirmed. Then the petitioner has again come up before this Court in its writ jurisdiction. The charge on which the petitioner faced the departmental proceeding runs thus :– "Gross misconduct and neglect of duty in that during your duty hours with arms and ammunition from 16-00 hours to 24-00 hours on 31.3.87 from gate No.3 to gate No. 12 of Halisahar Store Department at about 23-35 hours CCB officers and staff detected a case of theft of C. I. brake blocks from wagon No. NR/CG 30440 Ex Patratu to DCOS/Halisahar, standing on line No.9 inside the store depot, with arrest of 3 criminals, seizure of one lorry No. WBQ 8995 with stolen property and recovered 1980 pieces of stolen brake blocks for which a case No. 1(4)87 dated 1.4.87 under Section 3 of R.P. (U.P) Act was registered at Halisahar post and you miserably failed to prevent and detect the theft." 2. As I have already mentioned in the departmental proceeding the petitioner was found guilty and order for his removal from service was passed and the same was a so confirmed in the departmental appeal. The contention of the petitioner in this writ application is that the finding that the petitioner is guilty of the charge brought against him is perverse and is based on mere suspicion and not on evidence. It is also the contention of the petitioner that the Appellate Authority did not comply with the requirements of Rule 217.3 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 prescribing the manner in which an appeal has to be considered by the Appellate Authority. It is the further contention of the petitioner that even if the finding of guilt is accepted for the sake of argument yet the penalty of removal from service is shockingly disproportionate and therefore cannot be sustained. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner that while another Rakshak who was on duty at the relevant time was penalised by reversion only, the petitioner has been removed from service which is highly discriminatory and is vitiated by mala fides. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner that while another Rakshak who was on duty at the relevant time was penalised by reversion only, the petitioner has been removed from service which is highly discriminatory and is vitiated by mala fides. It has been argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the report of Shri M. N. Singh was not placed before the Enquiring Authority in the second inquiry as a result of which the petitioner has been prejudiced. On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the respondents argued that the records would show that the report of Shri M. N. Singh was actually given to the petitioner and the petitioner could avail of that report if he so wanted. It has been further argued on behalf of the respondents that in a departmental proceeding the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence Act do not apply and the High Court will not sit in appeal over the finding and order of the departmental authorities unless the finding is based on no evidence which, it is argued, is not the case here. It is also submitted on behalf of the respondents that this court cannot consider the question of adequacy of punishment imposed at the departmental proceeding. 3. The learned Advocate for the petitioner attracted my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in (1) Union of India v. H. C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 , particularly to paragraph-27 thereof in support of his argument that mere suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. In the said decision the Supreme Court also observed that the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocents are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory rules. In the said decision the Supreme Court also observed that the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocents are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory rules. He also attracted my attention to another decision of the Supreme Court in (2) Nand Kishore v. State of Bihar, AIR 1978 SC 1277 where it has been observed in paragraph-18 that disciplinary proceeding before a domestic tribunal is of a quasi-judicial character and therefore the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice that the tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence, i. e., evidential material whid1 with some degree of definiteness points to the guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him and that suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. Reliance has been placed also on a Division Bench decision of this court in (3) Ananda Chakraborty v. Union of India, 1987(1) CLJ 467 where it has been held that the High Court in writ proceeding does not generally interfere with the findings in administrative enquiry, but if there is no material evidence on the basis of which a finding can at all be made by any reasonable person, such finding made by the Disciplinary Authority cannot but be perverse and the writ court should interfere. It has been further held therein that the Disciplinary Authority cannot be allowed to make a finding on mere suspicion and not related with the evidence adduced in a disciplinary proceeding, and even in a case of domestic enquiry the tribunal has a paramount duty to base is finding on the evidence adduced (para-12, ibid). My attention has also been drawn to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in (4) Collector of Customs v. Biswanath Mukherjee, 1974 CLJ 251 (at page-313) where it has been noted that the court will interfere with the finding of a domestic tribunal on the questions of fact on the ground of perversity in an application under Section 226 of the Constitution and has recapitulated the position of law that the finding of the tribunal will be treated as perverse if–"(a) the tribunal has come to the finding on no evidence. (b) the tribunal has based the finding on materials not admissible and has excluded relevant materials, (c) the tribunal has not applied its mind to all the relevant materials and has not considered the same in coming to the conclusion, (d) the tribunal has come to the conclusion by considering materials which is irrelevant or by considering material which is partly relevant and partly irrelevant, (e) the tribunal has disabled itself in reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case, (f) the tribunal has based its finding upon conjectures, surmises and suspicion, (g) the tribunal has based the finding upon a view of the facts which could not reasonably be entertained or the facts found were such that no persons acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have found, and (h) if the tribunal is conducting the enquiry has acted in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or has violated the principle or natural justice, where no particular procedure is prescribed." It was also observed therein that in any of the above cases and in any other case where, the court, in the particular facts of the case, considers the finding of the tribunal to the perverse and where the court is of the opinion that justice of the case so requires, the court is entitled to interfere and set aside the finding of the tribunal on any question of fact and in such cases the court holds that there is an error of law on any of the above grounds. As regards the duty of the Appellate Authority in a departmental proceeding in considering whether the punishment of removal awarded by the Disciplinary Authority was merited or that the findings of the Disciplinary Authority were warranted by the evidence on record, my attention has been drawn by the learned Advocate for the petitioner to the decision of the Supreme Court in (5) Ram Chander v. Union of India, 1986 (3) SCC 103 . There the Railway Board was the Appellate Authority and the proceeding was under Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. Rule 22 (2) of the said Railway Servants Rules made provisions as to what points were required to be considered by the Appellate Authority in an appeal against the order imposing any of the prescribed penalties or in enhancing any penalty. Rule 22 (2) of the said Railway Servants Rules made provisions as to what points were required to be considered by the Appellate Authority in an appeal against the order imposing any of the prescribed penalties or in enhancing any penalty. This Rule 22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules is in pari materia with Rule 217.3 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987. In that connection the Supreme Court in the said decision in Ram Chander (supra) observed thus in paragraph-5 ; "To say the least this is just a mechanical reproduction of the phraseology of Rule 22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules without any attempt on the part of the Railway Board either to marshall the evidence on record with a view to decide whether the findings arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority could be sustained or not. There is also no indication that the Railway Board applied its mind as to whether the act of misconduct with which the appellant was charged together with the attendant circumstances and the past record of the appellant were such that he should have been visited with the extreme penalty of removal from service for a single lapse in a span of 24 years of service. Dismissal or removal from service is a matter of grave concern to a civil servant who after such a long period of service, may not deserve such a harsh punishment. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 22(2) of the Railway Servants Rule, the impugned order passed by the Railway Board is liable to be set aside". 4. The learned Advocate for the petitioner next relied upon a decision of the Decision Bench of this Court in (6) Hindustan Paper Corporation v. Manindra K. Ghosh 1991(3) SLR 776, in which the judgment was delivered by G.N. Ray, J. (as his Lordship then was). In paragraph-6 of the said decision his Lordship observed inter alia that the contention for the appellant was justified that the quantum of punishment in a departmental proceeding is the discretion of the punishing authority and ‘except in an exceptional case where punishment cannot but shock the conscience of the Court and appears to be wholly perverse and unreasonable, interference by the writ Court on the quantum of punishment is not warranted’. It is further observed therein that the gravity of the offence should be judged in the facts of a case. It is further observed therein that the gravity of the offence should be judged in the facts of a case. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the court, in view of the said decision, is clearly entitled to interfere with the punishment awarded in a departmental proceeding where such punishment, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot but shock the conscience of the Court and appears to be wholly perverse case. In (7) Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1986 SC 995 , it was held that the report of the enquiry officer finding the delinquent officer guilty could not be sustained as the charges were vague and it was difficult to meet the charges fairly by the delinquent officer and that the evidence adduced was perfunctory and did not at all bring home the guilt of the delinquent officer would be the order of termination of service of the delinquent officer would be liable to be set aside. On behalf of the petitioner my attention has also been attracted to the decision of the Supreme Court in (8) Union of India v. J. Ahmed, AIR 1979 SC 102 where it has been held that lack of efficiency, failure to attain the highest standard of administrative ability while holding a high post would not themselves constitute misconduct and that there may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. Basing on this decision it has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that mere negligence or inefficiency, will not ordinarily amount to misconduct. 5. Basing on this decision it has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that mere negligence or inefficiency, will not ordinarily amount to misconduct. 5. The learned Advocate for the opposite party has, on the other hand, attracted my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in (9) State of Orissa v. Murlidhar, AIR 1963 SC 404 where it has been held that in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent tribunal in a departmental enquiry so that if the court has purported to re-appreciate the evidence for itself that would be outside its jurisdiction. However it has been held therein that if it is shown that the impugned findings recorded by the Administrative Tribunal are not supported by any evidence the High Court would be justified in setting aside the findings. In (10) State of Andhra Pradesh v. Shree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 it has been held by the Supreme Court that in a departmental enquiry where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. It has however been held therein that the High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant consideration or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. The decision of the Supreme Court in (11) Union of India v. Parma Nanda, 1989 SC Services Law Judgments 368 has been cited by the learned Advocate for the opposite party in support of the proposition that the Administrative Tribunal or the High Court cannot entertain the question as to what punishment will meet the ends of justice in a departmental enquiry at the matter is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority, if there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with the rules and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. It has been held in the said decision that if the penalty can lawfully by imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Administrative Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. It has been observed therein that the adequacy of penalty unless it is mala file is certainly not a matter for the Administrative Tribunal to concern with and the tribunal cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the inquiry officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter. By way of an exception to the said general proposition it has however been held therein that where the person without enquiry is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank solely on the basis of conviction by a criminal court, the Administrative Tribunal may examine the adequacy of the penalty imposed in the light of the conviction and sentence inflicted on the person and that if the penalty imposed is a apparently unreasonable or uncalled for having regard to the nature of the criminal charge, the Administrative Tribunal may step into render substantial justice and in that case the Administrative Tribunal may remit the matter to the competent authority for re-consideration or by itself substitute one of the prescribed penalties. 6. In the enquiry proceeding the petitioner took the plea that the theft in fact did not take place in the duty area or within the duty hour of the petitioner, that he had no negligence, far less any connivance in the matter, that the duty entrusted to him or for that matter to his party was far in excess of the prescribed norm, etc. The theft took place from a railway wagon stationed inside while the petitioner's duty area was outside the wall of the gate No. 12. In the enquiry proceeding the petitioner took plea inter alia as it appears from Annexure C to the revisional application that during their duty period they visited gate No. 12 twice, once at 17-30 hour and again at 22-05 hour and found nothing abnormal. It was also the plea of the petitioner that there were 38 wagons including 3-5 sealed wagons at HLR 3d line and so most of the time of their duty period they were engaged in guarding the above load as the area was a criminal infested one and there was every possibility of theft of C and W fitting from those wagons and that as there was no wagon near gate No. 12 and there was staff inside the area of the gate No. 12 and the said gate was closed and so they could not apprehend any occurrence there and for that reason they visited the area twice during their duty period and further that as there were many stable wagons at 3rd line/HLR they spent most of times there. It is also stated in the said written representations Annexure C that if anything had happened at gate No. 12 when they were at gate No. 3, i.e. just opposite of both boundary walls far from human vision it was not possible to detect and prevent the same without receiving any report from any corner. In his subsequent written representation submitted in course of the enquiry proceeding which is Annexure D, it is stated in paragraph-20 thereof that the I.O., Shri A.k. Sen conceded that according to the rules for one beat one man is detailed for duty but in the present case only six persons were detailed for duty to cover as may as 26 beats. In paragraph 21 thereof it is stated that said Shri Sen sought to explain the violation of rules and irregular detailment by stating that it was as per system in vogue and due to acute shortage of staff, and there as no willful violation of RPF regulations. In paragraph 21 thereof it is stated that said Shri Sen sought to explain the violation of rules and irregular detailment by stating that it was as per system in vogue and due to acute shortage of staff, and there as no willful violation of RPF regulations. In paragraph 22 thereof the statement of said Shri Sen has been quoted to the effect that the detailment of staff for several beats was under compulsion as there was acute shortage of staff and that a man cannot keep proper watch in several betas when he is so detailed at a time. In paragraph 24 mention has been made of the statement of said Shir Sen to the effect that the length of the petitioner’s duty beats was one and half mile in one phase and that the party was required to wait for escorting the trains at 3rd line/HLR. It may be noted here that the duty of petitioner included escorting of 735 Up and 736 Dn. Ex-NH to 3rd line HLR and 3rd line HLR to NH. The other duties also included seal checking at 3rd line, No. 3 gate to TNC office and guarding the stable wagon, coaches, seals at 3rd line from outside to gate No. 3 to TNC office and to gate No. 12. In paragraph 25 of the said Annexure D it is stated that the party had been burdened with multiple nature of duties over a number of beats and more particularly the escorting of 735 Up and 736 Dn. Required compulsory waiting at 3rd line/HLR and also the seal checking duty of the stable coaches and wagon absorbed the lion’s share of their time. In paragraph-27 thereof it is stated that according to the RPF rules the armed duty was to be booked to a party of not less than 4 persons and in the instant case the party booked was one plus three and therefore the party could not have separated themselves from one another and had to be together to cover security risk. 7. Now let us look to the report and findings of the Inquiry Officer in the departmental proceeding which is Annexure E to the revisional application. 7. Now let us look to the report and findings of the Inquiry Officer in the departmental proceeding which is Annexure E to the revisional application. In that report it is noted that in hi, cross examination P. W. 1 Shri A. K. Sen Stated that during the course of the enquiry he did not find any connivance of the delinquent (i. e. the petitioner) in the theft. The Enquiry Officer also noted that P. W. 1 Shri Sen stated that the petitioner had to check seals and C and W fittings at 3rd line and had to wait there for escorting train Nos. 735 Up and 736 Dn., between HLR and HN. The Inquiry Officer also recorded that P.W.1 Shri Sen described the beat of the petitioner as one like an arrow stretching one and quarter mile in the east from gate No.3 to TNC office and in the west about half mile from gate No. 5 to gate No. 12 and that the western side was not visible from the eastern side and vice versa due to existence of store depot in between them. The Inquiry Officer in his report also took note of the fact that P. W. 3 Shri J. G. Adhikary stated in his cross examination that during his enquiry he did not find any connivance of any RPF staff who were on duty during the material time in connection with the recovery of brake blocks. The said witness, the Inquiry Officer also noted, admitted that it was somewhat difficult for 4 staff to cover the entire area from gate No. 3 to TNC office including gate No. 12. In the said report the Inquiry Officer also noted that in his cross examination P. W. 5, Shri M. N. P. Singh agreed that in a long beat RPF staff will guard the place where sealed wagons are there instead of the place where there is no wagon and that according to the description of the duty beat of the petitioner it appeared to him (i. e. P. W. 5, M. N. P. Singh) to be quite difficult to guard both ends of the beat at a time and that he did not mention the name of the petitioner as responsible for the theft in his report. The Inquiry Officer in his report also noted the defence plea taken inter alia on the basis of the statement of witnesses, As regards the time when the seizure was made and the seizure list prepared there appeared certain prima facie discrepancies in the evidence. The Inquiry Officer although recorded that from the evidence on records it was clear that the theft took place before 12 hour during the duty hours of the delinquent H. C. (the petitioner) yet in another place of his report he recorded that 'all these facts can lead to the suspicion about the timing of the detection of the case'. In his report the Inquiry Officer also observed that although the victimized wagon was standing inside the boundary walls yet the truck and some brake blocks were recovered in the beat of the delinquent H. C. (the petitioner) and that no connivance or involvement of the RPF staff could be established. As regards the seizure list the Inquiry Officer observed that these were vital documents to establish the fact properly but the seizing officer failed to make the seizure lists properly which can damage the prosecution. 8. As regards the plea taken by the petitioner that his beat was very long and he was burdened with checking of seals and C and W fittings, escorting of trains, guarding of wagon and coaches on the 3rd line and that his main duties were at 3rd line in the eastern side of the store depot while the P.O. was at the other end of the beat on the western side of the depot where there was no wagon to guard, the Inquiry Officer observed that the same had been admitted by some P.W.s. But curiously enough and rather unfortunately the Inquiry Officer then abruptly jumped upon the conclusion ‘but after all the case has been detected in his beat area and he cannot evade his responsibilities’. This clearly smacks of a pre-disposition on the part of the Inquiry Officer that whatever may be the merit of his defence and however justified may the same be the petitioner will have to be condemned and it will have to be found that the theft could have been committed by reason of negligence on the part of ht petitioner and therefore he must be saddled with the responsibility of theft committed. The Inquiry Officer ruled out connivance on the part of the petitioner in the matter of the commission of theft. As we have seen the petitioner took the pleas that he as given multifarious duties in a very long beat not visible from one and to the other with inadequate staff and he had, of necessity, to ensure their presence at line No. 3 far away from gate No. 12 for guarding stable wagons, coaches, seals etc. and had to wait there for escorting certain trains and all these more responsible and onerous duties had to be attended to with due seriousness than sticking to gate No. 12 where there was no wagon to guard and where to flying visits had been made by the petitioner on two occasions during the duty period. These pleas, if I may say so, could not be faced by the Inquiry Officer. The merits of these pleas as we have seen, were also largely acknowledged by some of the P.Ws. who are responsible RPF officials. Far form facing nullifying the merits of these pleas by any logical approach the Inquiry Officer rather tacitly and silently acknowledged the same but tried to by-pass the same for finding the petitioner guilty of negligence by taking recourse to a despondent conclusion not backed by logic, reason or judicious approach that 'after all the case has been detected in his beat area and he cannot evade his responsibility'. Such a conclusion clearly betrays that even if the petitioner is found not responsible on circumspection, yet he will have to be made a scapegoat under invisible mandate which seems to have been operating upon the Inquiry Officer. Well, simply because the theft has been committed during his duty hours, assuming it to be so, this can no necessarily lead to the conclusion that the petitioner must be responsible for the same because of his negligence. The purpose of the disciplinary proceeding and the elaborate procedure involved therein is not only to hear and consider the version of the departmental authorities but also to hear and consider the plea of the delinquent, if any, and to consider whether this explains the prima facie responsibility of the delinquent in respect or the matter. This is what the Inquiry Officer failed to consider. This is what the Inquiry Officer failed to consider. May, I would rather say that the Inquiry Officer considered the plea and rather found it difficult to ignore or override the same and that was why he had to take recourse to the 'after all' theory that as the case had been detected in the best area of the petitioner so he could not be allowed to evade his responsibility. 9. Admittedly, in this case there is no finding that there was any connivance or collaboration of the petitioner with the criminals. The petitioner's only fault according to the Inquiry Officer, is that he could have detected and prevented it had he not been negligent. In this connection, we may refer to Rule 146 1 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 wherein it is provided that it shall be incumbent upon all members of the Force to respect the code of behaviour and maintain an attitude of complete discipline and obedience to it and that any breach of the concerned provisions on the part of any member or the Force shall constitute misconduct and shall be punishable under the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 as applied to superior officers or, as the case may be, under Section 9 or Section 17. Under this code of behaviour for members of the Force. Rule 146.2 relates to neglect of duty and clause (i) thereof provides that no member of the Force without good and sufficient cause shall neglect or omit to attend to or fail to carry out with due promptitude and diligence anything which is his duty as a member of the Force to attend to or carry out. Therefore it will be seen that mere failure to detect or prevent theft will not necessarily constitute neglect of duty on the part of a member of the Force on guard duty if there exists good and sufficient cause in favour of such member facing the departmental proceeding. In the present case as we have seen the petitioner had offered explanation as to how he was saddled with an unmanageable burden of responsibility and this has also been acknowledged by many of the P.Ws. In the present case as we have seen the petitioner had offered explanation as to how he was saddled with an unmanageable burden of responsibility and this has also been acknowledged by many of the P.Ws. He has also offered explanation as to for what reason he had to fix up priority in the matter of placing his presence and attention more continuously in certain area in preference to the other less vulnerable area and the merit of this explanation has also been virtually acknowledged by the P. Ws. Therefore when it could be appreciated that the petitioner offered good and sufficient cause as contemplated in Rule 146.2 it was highly arbitrary, capricious and against all norms of fair play to ignore the same and hold him guilty of neglect of duty on the basis of the self-condemned 'after all" theory that since the theft was committed in his beat area therefore he must be held responsible irrespective of the merit of the explanation offered in defence which was found by the Inquiry Officer also as rather unassailable. Such a finding is patently perverse and mala fide. What is more unfortunate is that on the basis of such a perverse and mala fide finding the petitioner has been awarded a 'death penalty' in service by ordering his removal from service and by confirmation of this penalty in appeal. Even if it could be assumed that since the theft was committed within the beat area of the petitioner he must be held notionally responsible for neglect of duty although he had no connivance or reckonable lapse in discharge of his duties, in that event also the punishment should have been commensurate with such notional negligence. The very fact that the punishment imposed is shockingly incompatible with and is out of proportion to the notional guilt of the petitioner, if at all, vitiates the entire proceeding upon the stage of confirmation of penalty, by perversity, mala fides and arbitrariness, and this court will be failing in discharge of its responsibility if it does not strike down the finding and punishment by which the petitioner has been victimised to an extent which is bound to cause tremor and shock not only in judicial but also in any judicious conscience as well. 10. The order of the appellate authority Annexure-H to the writ petition, is also shockingly lop-sided. 10. The order of the appellate authority Annexure-H to the writ petition, is also shockingly lop-sided. The appellate authority found fault as to why the petitioner had given attention to one area and not to the other area, but he did not care to examine the defence plea of the petitioner explaining the reasons and constraints which rather compelled him on ground of priority to bestow his presence and attention more continuously on a more vital area marked with the compulsive factors compared to that at the less vulnerable area at the other end. The appellate authority did not consider the plea of the petitioner that he visited that less vulnerable area also twice at intervals. The appellate authority did not consider the plea that near gate No. 12 there was no wagon and the theft was committed from a wagon situated on the other side of the wall outside the duty area of the petitioner. The appellate authority also, in respect of the penalty of the petitioner, did not at all take into consideration the defence plea of the petitioner although specifically taken that the person (Harisankar Roy) who was on duty at that particular area and whose responsibility therefore in respect of theft from that wagon was m re direct and far more higher in degree, was awarded a punishment of only reversing for one year while the petitioner has been awarded for the same incident the extreme penalty of removal from service which is grossly arbitrary and discriminatory. Non-consideration of all these vital factors of defence ranks the appellate order also as perverse and mala fide and the same therefore cannot be sustained. 11. As I have already held, even apart from the shocking nature of the penalty imposed, the finding of the departmental authorities regarding the guilt of the petitioner for neglect of duty is perverse, arbitrary and mala fide and therefore the same must be struck down. The finding of the Inquiry Officer dated the 5th December, 1989, Annexure-E to the writ application, the order of the appellate authority dated 3rd April, 1990 Annexure-H and the order of removal of the petitioner from service as confirmed by the said appellate order are hereby all quashed and respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service within one month from this date. The petitioner shall be paid his salary for the past period including the period of his suspension subject to his satisfying the authorities that he did not earn any other income during this period. The writ petition stands allowed accordingly, No cost is however ordered.