K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) WHETHER the High Court in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would be entitled to judicially review and disturb the finding of the fact arrived at, in the first instance by the Disciplinary Authority, and thereafter confirmed in appeal by the Appellate Authority, on the sole ground that the just, reasonable and probable defence of the delinquent indicating that the whole departmental proceedings were maliciously set into motion by a person who was stung and embittered because of the serious allegation of misconduct, consequentially bringing to an end his service career ?"this in short is the question that has been urged before this court for consideration in the background of the following facts. ( 2 ) FEW relevant facts:- Petitioner - Bahelim S. Sorabkhan was recruited in the Police department as an Unarmed Police Constable and accordingly was serving on the said post since last many years. Further according to the petitioner, to his utter shock and surprise, on 30-3-1991 he was served with a Chargesheet (Annexure "a") issued by the District superintendent of Police, Mehsana; Respondent No. 4 herein, inter alia, alleging that on 27-1-1989 at 17-00 hours when he was serving at Bavlu Police Station, he had given filthy abuses to one Un-armed Head Constable -Mr. Kanjibhai Ramjibhai and by this act of insubordination, had committed a misconduct On the basts of the said Chargesheet, the enquiry Officer - Sub Divisional Police Officer, Kalol, held inquiry and submitted his report dated 28-5-1990. Thereafter, the petitioner was issued a show-cause notice calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be given punishment of reduction in pay-scale. Thereafter, the respondent No. 4 finally punished the petitioner with reduction in pay-scale ie. , from Rs. 870/- to that of Rs. 825/- for two years. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Respondent No. 3 herein, who in his turn of his own issued a show-cause notice calling upon the petitioner to show-cause as to why instead of the punishment of reduction in the pay-scale inflicted by the District Superintendent of Police, Mehsana, he should not be dismissed from service ? This was replied to. However, ultimately by an Order dated 3-10-1991 the special I. G. P. dismissed the petitioner from service. This was replied to. However, ultimately by an Order dated 3-10-1991 the special I. G. P. dismissed the petitioner from service. It is this order of dismissal passed by the Special I. G. P. as well as the order of reduction in pay-scale passed by the District superintendent of Police, Mehsana, which are challenged before this Court by the present writ-petition. ( 3 ) MR. Jagdish Yadav, the learned advocate for the petitioner, while challenging these two impugned orders vehemently contended that the same were on face of them quite arbitrary, illegal and unjust, which has resulted into serious failure of justice, and accordingly, the same deserves to be quashed and set-aside. Making good these general submissions, Mr. Yadav has raised the following two contentions :- (i) That the finding of the concerned authority holding that the alleged misconduct against the petitioner was proved, was on face of it patently perverse, unfair, unjust, arbitrary and illegal in as much as the same has proceeded on a single track of reasoning namely that what has been alleged by 8 witnesses examined against him have been mechanically accepted without considering the just, reasonable and probable defence version put-forward by the petitioner-delinquent (ii) That in the alternative, in case this Court was not inclined to accept the aforesaid first contention, then in that case, taking into consideration the alleged quite sudden trifle misconduct of the petitioner-delinquent, the punishment of dismissal being quite harsh and unjust being grossly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 3. 1. Making good the first contention, Mr. Yadav submitted that he indeed cannot run away from the fact that out of 8 witnesses examined at the proceedings, 3 have clearly supported the allegation made by the Head Constable -Kanjibhai Ramjibhai. Mr. Yadav further submitted that had indeed the present case been confined only to the statements of those witnesses without anything further on the record, he would not have been in position to pursuade this court to quash and set-aside the impugned order as the scope of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extremely narrow. But unfortunately, that is not the case here. According to Mr. Yadav, the most important glaring fact which exists as a matter of official record viz. But unfortunately, that is not the case here. According to Mr. Yadav, the most important glaring fact which exists as a matter of official record viz. , Annexure-G dated 25- 1-1989, the complaint filed by the petitioner against the Head Constable Kanjibhai Ramjibhai before the Deputy superintendent of Police, Kalol has been lightly brushed aside saying that it is not believable. The said Annexure-G, as translated into English language reads as under:to, the Honble Divisional Police Officer Sahab, kalol Division. SUB : Regarding abducting the person obstructing the working of Police. I, Unarmed Police Constable Sherikhan Sorabkhan, B. No. 2564, serving in Bavlu police Station, at present Chandasan Outpost, humbly request that:the Head Constable Nandlal of Outpost had give message that Abubhai Jamabhai resident of Agol the accused of offence of theft is to be arrested. So on 23-1-1989 at 13-00 hrs. I had gone to Agol village. I had sent other persons of Agol village to arrest the said accused. This accused was not found up to 22-00 Hrs. of the night. At that time, the sarpanch of Agol village and Rasulbhai Motibhai and Mirkhan Malukbhai Sepoi had come and given information that Thakarda Kalubhai Masabhai of Bavlu village had come to the village and met the said accused and told him that he may not produce himself before any Police Officer but he will produce him (accused) before Head Constable kanjibhai and get him released. At that time, information was received that accused was available in the village. So he was got seated in the Panchayat office and I had taken him to Bavlu Police Station in the morning. On 24-1-1989 at 12-00 Hrs. Thakarda Kalubhai masabhai of Bavlu had come to the Police Station and told me that why this accused has been arrested by you. So I had taken this Thakarada in the Chamber of PSI and told the psi that this Thakarda had abducted the accused of this offence of theft and so I desired to file case against him u/s. 186 and he was in drunken condition in the night. At that time, Kanjibhai and two persons of public had come and abducted this Kala masa by catching hold of me. This incident has taken place in the office of Police Sub inspector. At that time, Kanjibhai and two persons of public had come and abducted this Kala masa by catching hold of me. This incident has taken place in the office of Police Sub inspector. At that time, the Head Constable of Chandasan Outpost, Police Constable -Sartan, the Head Constable of Meda Adraj Outpost, other policemen, the said accused, mirkhan Maluk and Rasulbhai Khemabhai, resident of Agol were present in the police station. So justice may be given to me after making inquiry into the incident. DATE: 25-1-1989. YOURS faithfully,sd/- un-ARMED Police Constable, bavlu Police Station. According to Mr. Yadav, the aforesaid complaint at Annexure-g is a documentary evidence coming from the police custody itself, which the petitioner had neither an opportunity to have it by an after-thought nor to fabricate the same in any other manner, is just ignored which a man of ordinary prudence conducting the departmental inquiry would not have. Mr. Yadav further submitted that infact because of specific allegations made against the Head Constable Kanjibhai in Annexure "g" which in turn would have seriously prejudiced his service prospects including termination of his service if the same were accepted, he in order to counter- blast the same on 27-1-1989, concocted a patently false case against the petitioner only with a spirit of vendata to settle the score. Thus, according to Mr. Yadav, the entire inquiry against the petitioner came to be sparked off because of the personal animosity of the said Kanjibhai against the petitioner. Further according to Mr. Yadav, despite such a glaring situation, day light clear to which none could ever shut his eyes, and yet if the concerned authority turning totally blind eyes to it thinks it proper to dismiss the petitioner from service, then such an order on face of it being quite perverse, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside at once. 3. 2 In support of his second alternative submission on the point of punishment, Mr. Yadav has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in case of Rama Kant Misra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. 3. 2 In support of his second alternative submission on the point of punishment, Mr. Yadav has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in case of Rama Kant Misra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. , reported in 1982 (3), SCC, p. 346 and submitted that the punishment of dismissal being quite disproportionate to the alleged misconduct, the same may be suitably modified and as held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, instead of dismissing the petitioner from service, the original punishment of reduction in pay-scale inflicted by the Respondent No. 2 may be restored. ( 4 ) COUNTERING the above submissions, Mr. T. H. Sompura, the learned AGP submitted that the contentions raised by Mr. Yadav having no substance, the same deserves to be rejected. The learned AGP further submitted that this court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not supposed to appreciate the evidence of the witnesses as it is ordinarily done by the Court of Appeal. To put it other way, this court is not expected to appreciate the evidence as done by the Criminal Courts in finding out whether the case is proved beyond doubt much less the reasonable doubt or not The learned AGP further submitted that in this case, three witnesses have clearly deposed that the petitioner gave filthy abuses and misconducted himself by the said act of insubordination. The learned AGP further submitted that so far as the defence version of the petitioner is concerned, it cannot be alleged that the same was not taken into consideration at all by the Respondent No. 3, who as impugned order shows was quite conscious of the same while Holding that the same was not believable. The learned AGP further submitted that so far as the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority who passed the order of dismissal, etc are concerned, they indeed had no personal bias against the petitioner to pass the impugned order. Thus, under the circumstances whether to accept the version of the Complainant Kanjibhai or to accept the defence version of the petitioner was entitely within the discretion and competence of the concerned authority, and in that view of the matter, how mo evidence could and should have been belter appreciated cannot be a matter to take exception to it in this matter under writ jurisdiction. The learned AGP has further submitted that the defence of the delinquent has no relevance whatsoever in the departmental inquiry once it failed to satisfy and convince the Disciplinary Authority ! As a matter of fact, once the concerned authority believes that the charges of misconduct against the delinquent are duly proved, then it can certainly pass an order accordingly against the delinquent. The learned AGP further submitted that this is not a case where the petitioner has been dismissed from service on no evidence. According to the learned AGP, when such is the position, this Court under its limited powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of india would not be justified in interfering with the impugned order. In support of this contention, the learned AGP has relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in the cases of (i) Union of India vs. H. C. God, reported in, AIR 1964, SC. 364 : and (2) state of Andhra Pradesh vs. V. S. Sree Rama Rao, reported in AIR 1963, S. C. 1723, out of which, the learned AGP has invited attention of this court to para-7 of the above referred decision in the case of -State of Andhra Pradesh vs. V. S. Sree Rama Rao, which reads as under: p. 7. There is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the court, must be applied and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant, it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behelf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so. wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for as writ under Article 226 of the Constitution ". The learned AGP on the basis of the above Supreme Court decision submitted that the principle laid down therein are fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case and in that view of the matter, the contentions raised by Mr. Yadav deserves to be discarded. The learned AGP further submitted that to accept the contentions of Mr. Yadav would be to introduce a new principle in a departmental inquiry against the public servant wherein for his alleged misconduct, the High Court under Article 226 of the constitution can re-appreciate the evidence on the basis of the rule of criminal jurisprudence practised in the ordinary criminal trials, that is to say, a person can not be convicted till the time the prosecution proves its case beyond doubt much less the reasonable doubt. This way of appreciation of evidence in view of the aforesaid decision of the supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. VS. This way of appreciation of evidence in view of the aforesaid decision of the supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. VS. Sree Rama Rao (Supra) is completely out of question. The learned AGP at the cost of repetition once again further submitted that once there is some evidence on record to prove the alleged misconduct of the delinquent, then the only thing which the High Court would be entitled to find out as to whether the provisions contained in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution are complied with or not and if that is found to be duly complied with, then there is nothing further by which the High Court can interfere. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the learned AGP finally submitted that there being no substance in any of the contentions raised on behelf of the petitioner, this petition deserves to be dismissed. ( 5 ) HAVING gone through the relevant record to which the attention of this Court was drawn, and further having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties, it may be stated that it is not possible at all to accept the submissions made by the learned AGP. It is indeed quite true that while dealing with the case of the departmental proceedings, this court has got absolutely limited powers while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is also equally true that appreciation of facts and conclusions to be drawn therefrom is always a matter of discretion of the Disciplinary authority, however, the question that still shall have to be examined and decided is whether in a given case where there is a definite material by way of unquestionable documentary evidence having logical probative value which a man of ordinary prudence will not fail to take notice thereof and give due weightage to it while deciding the controversy between the parties, the same could be conveniently ignored on the spacious argument that this Court should not step in and interfere with the impugned order on the ground that the same amounts at appreciation of evidence ? 5. 5. 1 Now turning to the facts of the present case, had indeed the decision of dismissal of the petitioner merely rested on the allegation made by the Complainant Kanjibhai ramjibhai and three of his associate Police Constables, and further still, there was no concrete contemporenous documentary evidence in support of the defence by way of annexure "g", then in that case, this Court was clearly debarred from entering into the ultimate finding recorded by the concerned authority quite conscious of its limitation that it was not sitting in appeal over the finding of fact. But that is not the case here. Rather, in the instant case, the evidence of Kanjibhai Ramjibhai by no stretch of imagination could have been considered in isolation without bearing in mind and attaching due importance to the unquestionable documentary evidence at Annexure "g" produced in defence by the petitioner raising a definite fingure of accusation against him as a malicious persecutor of the departmental proceedings! in fact, while deciding such matters in a departmental proceedings, the concerned authorities acting as a quasi-judicial authorities are supposed to know that if there is some tangible defence which is not only probable but the same is duly supported by unquestionable contemporaneous documentary evidence nailing the truth of the evidence of the complainant, making the same quite vulnerable, then in that case, fairness and justness demands of him not only to give due weightage to such version, but in case of accepting version of the complainant, it must arrive at the definite conclusion that the defence version is false and febricated. This is precisely not done here in this case. The defence version put forwarded by the petitioner by no stretch of imagination can be said to be a mere ipsi-dixi. In fact, when such a" serious incident took place as alleged by the petitioner in Annexure "g" on 25-1-1989, which the petitioner never knew that after two days thereafter, some incident would take place involving him, and therefore, by way of some pre-planning device the complaint at Annexure "g" was given to the D. S. P! at this stage, one cannot be oblivious to the fact that the allegations levelled by the petitioner against Kanjibhai were quite serious enough. It is not denied that no such complaint as at Annexure "g" was ever filed against Head Constable Kanjibhai. at this stage, one cannot be oblivious to the fact that the allegations levelled by the petitioner against Kanjibhai were quite serious enough. It is not denied that no such complaint as at Annexure "g" was ever filed against Head Constable Kanjibhai. Neither it is shown that the same was false and fabricated. Under such circumstances, it is indeed not difficult at all to appreciate how stung and embittered Kanji Ramjibhai would have been to bear grudge to revenge the petitioner for the alleged complaint at Annexure "g" and thereby to settle his score. What this Court says is that bearing in mind the ordinary human behaviour in day- to-day dealings by way of action and reaction centering around ego it is quite conceivable, and therefore, understandable that if on 27-1-1989 Kanjibhai comes out with an allegation against the petitioner as giving him filthy abuses and misconducted himself by the said act of insubordination no reasonable man with ordinary prudence while accepting the said evidence of such deeply motivated witness would ever fail to put himself on guard before accepting the same as a gospel truth and relying and acting upon the same. If that much care is not taken, the Disciplinary Authority has certainly failed in its duty of exercising quasi-judicial power in proper perspective. In a departmental inquiry, the authority concerned has not to mechanically act and pass some orders on mere asking, on the basis of some wild and irresponsible allegations made by some interested witnesses against the delinquent without testing its veracity. In other words, there indeed would be no meaning left in such mechanical disciplinary proceedings as it would be reduced to mere eye-wash. In fact the concerned authority is also expected to see that it acts justly, fairly and reasonably, and is not instrumentalized as a lever by any interested or motivated party to wreck the personal vengence against the delinquent on the anvil of the departmental proceedings. Any authority which is called upon to inquire into the misconduct of any delinquent, therefore, must keep its mind quite open and proceed ahead bearing in mind the above principles. Any authority which is called upon to inquire into the misconduct of any delinquent, therefore, must keep its mind quite open and proceed ahead bearing in mind the above principles. The Disciplinary Authority, as a matter of fact, is required to be on extreme guard while conducting such proceedings because if the allegations constituting the misconduct are mechanically accepted, ignoring altogether the probable defence version which stands duly supported by unquestionable documentary evidence on record, it was likely to commit serious blunder of imposing the unwarranted varying nature of penalties resulting into patent injustice. Maybe, in a given case, by mechanically accepting such allegations, the disciplinary authority may not impose extreme penalty of dismissal and may rest satisfied with some minor penalties and in a given case with few words censuring the delinquent but this also if is imposed, in defiance if just and probable defence, then in that case it may unnecessarily to that extent stigmatize otherwise clean record of the delinquent-employee. If the deeply motivated evidence of Kanji Ramjibhai was to be straightway accepted without the same being tested on the touch-stone of reasonableness and probability of his two days previous conduct (as reflected in Annexure "g" dated 25-1- 1989), then in that case, the same not only amounted to an arbitrary of power but also further demonstrates that the authority has quite inadvertently or unwittingly allowed itself to be placed and played in the hands of the scheming complainant! In substance, while conducting the departmental proceedings, the authority should be watchful enough to see that its forum is not abused, instrumentalized or exploited for wrecking the personal vengence of the complainant against the delinquent Before this court also, an attempt is made to the effect that since the evidence of the complainant Kanji Ramji and other police constables have been accepted by the disciplinary authority for passing the impugned order against the petitioner, this Court should keep off from judicially reviewing the same on the stock ground that it cannot appreciate and re-appreciate the same. Now such a contention can never be accepted save and except at the cost of the object underlying Article 226 of the Constitution wherein every High Court is under obligation to intervene and set right the injustice resulting into the perversity of approach. Now such a contention can never be accepted save and except at the cost of the object underlying Article 226 of the Constitution wherein every High Court is under obligation to intervene and set right the injustice resulting into the perversity of approach. Once again, at the cost of repetition, it may be stated that the departmental inquiry is a quasi-judicial proceedings and the disciplinary authority is expected to act judiciously i. e. , justly, fairly and reasonably, and accordingly, it just cannot ignore the import of the probative value of the defence version. It is indeed true that while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court cannot usurp the discretion of the disciplinary Authority, but at the same time, if the conclusion arrived at appears to be quite unreasonable, not to intervene and set-aside the same would be just perpetrating the injustice already done to the petitioner. When it is argued before this Court that this Court under Article 226 of the constitution is not permitted to intervene with discretion of Disciplinary Authority, we will have to first of all understand properly what is the meaning of the word discretion? according to Justice Coke, "discretion" is a science or understanding to discren between falsity and truth, between right and wrong, between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to be do accordingly to their wills and private affections. " Further in a decision in the case of Sharp vs. Wake fleld, reported in 1891 AC 173, Lord Halsbury has observed that "discretion"means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to be done according to the rules of reasons and justice, and not according to private opinion according to law and no humour. It is to be, not arbitrry, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to discharge of his office ought to confine himself. It is to be, not arbitrry, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to discharge of his office ought to confine himself. In this view of the matter, it is quite true that the High Court exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can not appreciate and evaluate the evidence regarding its adequacy or insufficiency, but that does not mean that there is something like an unfettered discretion immune from judicial reviewability vested in the Disciplinary Authority when it finds that the conclusion arrived at is not consistent with reason, justice and fair play. In the facts of this case, it appears to this Court that the defence taken up by the petitioner is not only natural, reasonable and probable, but the document (Annexure "g") on which he relies is a document which cannot be subsequently prepared or fabricated as the same comes from custody of the police department itself. Hence, it clearly sets at naught the allegation made by the complainant Kanji Ramji who is the root-cause of the departmental proceedings against the petitioner. If despite this, the disciplinary authority just accepts the one sided version of the Complainant who was obviously stung and embittered because of complaint (Annexure "g") made by the petitioner against him on 25-1-1989, and therefore, was out to ruin him, then it has got to be stated that the said approach is patently unreasonably and perverse. Under such circumstances, if such probable defence is to be discarded by merely saying that not believable and then to argue that this Court while exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot (ouch the evidentiary part, it would mean to put a seal of approval on patently unjust order. Under such circumstances, if such probable defence is to be discarded by merely saying that not believable and then to argue that this Court while exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot (ouch the evidentiary part, it would mean to put a seal of approval on patently unjust order. To say on the one hand that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution cannot appreciate the evidence to interfere with the finding of the facts arrived at by the Competent Authority is indeed quite right, however, as against on the other hand to say that this Court examining the evidence with an eye to find out whether the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer are vitiated either because of violation of the principles of the Natural Justice or in law or are perverse in any other manner is altogether a different thing. These two different kind of exercises of appreciation of evidence and looking at the evidence to find out legality and perversity therein cannot be equated and branded as one and the something. It is required to be made clear that deciding the quesution of legality and perversity of findings does not amount to appreciation of evidence. In the opinion of this Court, this is one of the fitest case where this Court feels that in the interest of justice it must intervene and set-right the patently unreasonable order of dismissal passed against the petitioner. 52 Now turning to the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of State of andhra Pradesh vs. Shree Rama Rao (Supra) relied upon by the learned AGP, it may be stated that there indeed can never be any dispute about the principles laid down therein. It is true that in the instant case, it cannot be said that there is no evidence on the record, but then the evidence of the complainant projects only one sided picture, and accordingly, before the same could be accepted, it is required to be tested on the touch-stone of reasonableness and probablity in the light of defence version. It is true that in the instant case, it cannot be said that there is no evidence on the record, but then the evidence of the complainant projects only one sided picture, and accordingly, before the same could be accepted, it is required to be tested on the touch-stone of reasonableness and probablity in the light of defence version. It is quite true that in departmental proceedings when the disciplinary authority has to appreciate the evidence and decide the matter, the standard ordinarily applied by the criminal courts of proving the case beyond doubt much less the reasonable doubt is not to be resorted to, and that everything depends upon the ultimate subjective satisfaction of the concerned authority. But at the same time, in such proceedings also, the evidence of the complainant is certainly required to be tested on the touch-stone of reasonableness and probability of the case and if the defence version makes out a case of false charge, them in that case applying the test of ordinary prudent man, it should refuse to accept the complainants version. The departmental proceedings being quasi-judicial proceedings, the disciplinary authority is expected to act justly, fairly and reasonably meaning thereby that if the delinquent employee is entitled to any fair and reasonable benefit on the basis of his probable defence version then the same should be given. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, when the evidence of complnant Kanji ramjibhai is ft ,md to be so much so deeply motivated and that ultimately on the basis of such evidence if the fate of delinquent petitioner was to be sealed, then in that case, taking into consideration his defence version supported by contemporaneous record coming from the police department itself, it is required to be held that no case was reasonably made out by the complainant on the basis of which the petitioner-delinquent could ever be removed from service In fact, if We carefully peruse the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the same clearly advances youch-safe and supports the contentions raised on behalf of the petitiouner also In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, the submissions made by the learned AGR simply fails to carry home the point canvassed before this Court. ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, the finding of the respondent authority that the petitioner has misconducted himself by abusing Kanji Ramji, and thereby had insubordinated himself being quite unjust and uhreasopable, the same shall have to be quashed and set aside. The defence version supported by the contemporaneous record [annexure "g"] appears to be quite probable and reasonable, which no man of ordinary prudence in the facts and circumstances of this case can ignore except at the cost of the greatest prejudice of the petitioner. In this view of the matter, this petition deserves to be allowed, and is allowed accordingly. ( 7 ) SINCE this petition is allowed on the first point, it is indeed not necessary for this court to enter into the second question as regards the harshness or otherwise of the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner. ( 8 ) IN the result, this petition is allowed. The impugned order of termination dated 3-10-1991 passed by the Special IGP, Gandhinagar- Respondent No. 3 herein, and the impugned order of reduction in pay-scale dated 29-1-1991 passed by the DSP Mehsana are hereby quashed and set-aside. The petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service within one month from the date of receipt of this Order. The petitioner is entitled to full back- wages. The respondents are directed to pay the same to the petitioner on or before 31-1-1994. Rule made absolute. .