N. D. V. BHAT, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision petition is referred to the division bench by the learned single judge (justice n. d. v. bhat) under Section 8 (2) of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. The civil revision petition is preferred against the order dated 4-2-1989 passed by the principal civil judge, chikodi in r. a. No. 51 of 1987. By the said Order, the learned civil judge took the view that having regard to the fact that the decree in question was passed by the learned additional munsiff, chikodi, the learned civil judge had the power to try and dispose of the appeal preferred against such a decree notwithstanding the fact that the suit in question was transferred to the file of the court of munsiff, chikodi from the file of the court of munsiff, raibag. It will have to be seen as to whether the view taken by the learned civil judge is correct. ( 2 ) WE have heard the arguments of Sri Balakrishna Shastry, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri F. S. Dabali, learned counsel for respondents 2 to 6. ( 3 ) THE point for consideration is as to whether the learned civil judge, chikodi has the jurisdiction to hear r. a. No. 51 of 1987 arising out of the judgment and decree in o. s. No. 146 of 1963 passed by the court of munsiff, chikodi. The circumstances under which the suit was tried by the learned munsiff, chikodi are already alluded to earlier. The property in question is admittedly situated within the jurisdiction of the court of munsiff, raibag. However, the said proceeding namely, the decree final proceeding was transferred to the court of munsiff, chikodi by the district judge by his order dated 14-7-1986 acting under Section 24 of CPC. In other words, the court of the additional munsiff, chikodi who tried the said suit (decree final proceeding) was a transferee court. It is in that context, this court is required to see as to whether the appeal lies to the civil judge, chikodi of whether the appeal ought to have been preferred to the civil judge to whom an appeal lies against the decree passed by the court of munsiff at raibag. In order to resolve this question it is indeed necessary to extract the Provisions of Section 96 of CPC. In order to resolve this question it is indeed necessary to extract the Provisions of Section 96 of CPC. We hasten to add here that Section 96 of the CPC is not intended to create a forum for preferring an appeal but it is only a provision conferring rights of appeal on the parties. Even so, a careful reading of the said provision would indeed provide a clue to the question as regards as to what could be the appellate forum in a situation like the one in hand. Section 96 of the CPC reads as under:"appeal from original decree. (1) save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such court. (2) an appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte. (3) no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the court with the consent of parties. (4) no appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by courts of small causes, when the amount or value of the subject matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees. "a careful perusal of the Provisions of Section 96, CPC and in particular the provision of Section 96 (1) would clearly go to show that an appeal against a decree of court exercising original jurisdiction would lie to the court authorised to hear appeals from the decision of such court. The word 'such' incorporated in Section 96, CPC, would indeed as pointed out earlier provides some clue. Sri Shastry, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the original jurisdiction in the suit in question is that of the court of munsiff, raibag, and it cannot be said that the original jurisdiction in the instant case is that of the court of munsiff, chikodi. It was therefore contended by Sri Shastry that an appeal as a matter of logical corollary should lie to the civil judge, gokak and not to the civil judge, chikodi. We are unable to agree with the submission of Sri Shastry. The expression 'original jurisdiction' will have to be understood in the correct perspective. It was therefore contended by Sri Shastry that an appeal as a matter of logical corollary should lie to the civil judge, gokak and not to the civil judge, chikodi. We are unable to agree with the submission of Sri Shastry. The expression 'original jurisdiction' will have to be understood in the correct perspective. When we speak of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction is categorised as original jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction and the revisional jurisdiction. It is needless to say that the jurisdiction exercised by the court of additional munsiff at chikodi is also the original jurisdiction. It is not as if the jurisdiction would have been the original jurisdiction had it been exercised by the munsiff, raibag, and it would not be an original jurisdiction if it is exercised by the munsiff at chikodi. Once when a suit is transferred under Section 24, CPC, the munsiff who tries that suit will get the original jurisdiction only, to try the said suit. As suck he exercises the original jurisdiction over that suit. In that context, an appeal will have to lie to that court which is authorised to hear an appeal against the decision of such court. The logical corollary that would flow from the aforesaid discussion will lead to the irresistible conclusion that it should be the same court which is authorised to hear the appeal against a judgment and decree passed by the court of munsiff, chikodi. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner however, wanted to draw some inspiration from the decision of this court in m. Umesh rao v b. Narayana acharya. That was a case where a suit pending in a small cause court was transferred to a court of the munsiff. The court of munsiff tried it as original suit and passed a decree. Being aggrieved by the same, regular appeal was preferred before the appellate court. The appellate court disposed of the appeal on merits and according to law. Being aggrieved by the same, the matter was taken before the high court. The court of munsiff tried it as original suit and passed a decree. Being aggrieved by the same, regular appeal was preferred before the appellate court. The appellate court disposed of the appeal on merits and according to law. Being aggrieved by the same, the matter was taken before the high court. Before the high court it was urged on behalf of the defendant in the said case that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal since an appeal did not lie against the judgment of the court of munsiff having regard to the Provisions of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act read with the Provisions of Section 24 (4) of CPC. Upholding the said contention this court in the aforesaid decision took the view that having regard to the Provisions of Section 24 (4), CPC, the court to which the small cause suit is transferred will be deemed to be a small causes court and in that context, forum of revision or appeal will have to be determined with reference to the Provisions of the Small Causes Courts Act. It was in that context, this court took the view which it has taken. It is obvious that the said decision has absolutely no relevance whatsoever to the facts of this case and the same cannot be of any avail to the instant petitioner. Sri Shastry, however, has relied on the decision of this court in dookiah and another v t. c. honnappa and others. In the said decision, the learned single judge of this court has held as under:"ordinarily, suits relating to immovable properties ought to be filed in a court of the lowest jurisdiction competent to try them within whose territorial limits such properties are situate. The suits, as originally instituted, were properly triable by the court at krishnarajanagar. Even after the transfer under Section 24, CPC, the court at srirangapatna will be trying it only as a delegate of the court at krishnarajanagar, in a special sense of the matter. When the suits were disposed of by the transferee court, as has been done in the present cases, the court of appeal which is competent to try the appeals preferred against such judgments and decrees is one which has territorial jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the dispute. When the suits were disposed of by the transferee court, as has been done in the present cases, the court of appeal which is competent to try the appeals preferred against such judgments and decrees is one which has territorial jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the dispute. It is clear that in the present cases, the lands in dispute are situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the court of the civil judge at mysore. That being the position I am clearly of the opinion that the appeals ought to be entertained by the court of the civil judge at Mysore and disposed of in accordance with law. " ( 5 ) THE observation reflected in the said decision of the learned single judge no doubt supports the submission made by Sri Shastry, learned counsel for the petitioner. However, with respect we are of the view that the observation made by the learned single judge as above is not correct. The learned judge has taken the view that whenever and wherever a suit is tried by a transferee court the same is tried by the said court as a delegate of the court which has territorial jurisdiction. Apart from the fact that the said observation does not appeal to us, the ultimate conclusion reached by the learned single judge also is not correct for the reasons which we have already given earlier with reference to the Provisions of Section 96, CPC. In this connection, the decision in kahan chand v faqir chand; the decision in dulhin janak nandini kunwari v kedar narain singh; and the decision in mineral development ltd. V state of bihar, can be looked into with advantage. We may also usefully refer to a decision of the division bench of the chief court of oudh in b. Sundar lal v b. Gur saran lal and others. The learned judges in the said case, among other things, have held as under:"we may here dispose of another objection raised by the learned counsel for respondents 3 to 5, which was in fact in the nature of a preliminary objection. The learned judges in the said case, among other things, have held as under:"we may here dispose of another objection raised by the learned counsel for respondents 3 to 5, which was in fact in the nature of a preliminary objection. It appears that though the plaintiffs suit was dismissed by the court below not only in respect of the share of village babrai, but also about the house of purwa chedda khawas, lucknow, the plaintiff has brought this appeal about the share of the village only, and has submitted to the lower court's decree about the house. The village of babrai is in the cownpore district, and it was on account of the suit being both in respect of a share of that village and of a house situate in lucknow that the suit was filed in the court of the civil judge, malibabad. The learned counsel for the respondents argues that owing to the abandonment of his claim about the house by the plaintiff, the present appeal relates to property which does not lie within the jurisdiction of this court, and that therefore this court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. No doubt the village in question lies beyond the jurisdiction of this court, but as the suit was rightly filed under the law in the court of the civil judge, malibabad, an appeal against his decree in the suit can only be heard by this court, and not by any other court, so that the relinquishment of his claim about the house by the plaintiff does not in our opinion affect the jurisdiction of this court to hear the appeal. " ( 6 ) A careful perusal of the observation made in the said case with which we are in complete agreement would unmistakably go to show that an appeal in such a situation would lie to the civil judge to whom an appeal lies against the judgment and decree of that particular court. Under these circumstances, we find it difficult to agree with the view taken in the decision in dookiah's case. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons stated hereinabove, the civil revision petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same is hereby dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. --- *** --- .