Judgment :- Manoharan, J. Accused/ appellant was charged under S.302 I.P.C. for having caused the death of his younger brother Antony, aged 28, by stabbing him with butcher's knife MO-1 at about 10 PM on 24-4-1988 in the court yard of PW-4. 2. Antony (deceased) and his wife were residing along with his brother PW-6, sister PW-2 and her three children including PW-1 in their house. Accused was residing in another house in the same compound. On 24-4-1988 at about 10 P.M. Antony returned home after attending a committee meeting and took supper along with PW-2. Antony heard the accused showering abusive words against him. Thereupon Antony (deceased) wanted him (accused) not to abuse him. He (accused) did not stop, instead he pelted stones at him. When PW-2 came out, she was hit by stones pelted by the accused. Accused caught hold of the neck of Antony and attempted to strangulate him; that was followed by a scuffle. PW-2 intervened and cried for help from her elder brother Kunjappan. Kunjappan disengaged them and took the accused to his house. PW-1, the son of PW-2 was in the varandah. On finding the bleeding injury on the forehead of P W-2, Antony went for fetching autorickshaw to take PW-2 to the hospital. To avoid the accused who was found in his court yard, Antony went for an autorickshaw through the back yard of the house of PW-3. When he (Antony) reached the court yard of PW-4, j the accused pelted stones at Antony, receiving which he fell. Immediately the accused reached him(Antony) and stabbed him several times with MO-1 butcher's knife. Seeing this PW-1 screamed. Then the accused threatened him (PW-1) also. Accused returned to his house and told his wife that he killed him (Antony) and that he-would take her to Laksham Veedu. Then both of them left. PW-1 rushed for fetching autorickshaw. On the way he saw PW-6, the younger brother of Antony returning home. He (PW-1) told him (PW-6) as to what happened. PW-6 then fetched an autorickshaw and Antony was taken in the Autorickshaw by PW-6 and others to the Government Hospital, Kothamangalam. PW-15 gave first aid and advised him to be taken to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam; whereupon he (Antony) was taken to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam. He (PW-1) told him (PW-6) as to what happened. PW-6 then fetched an autorickshaw and Antony was taken in the Autorickshaw by PW-6 and others to the Government Hospital, Kothamangalam. PW-15 gave first aid and advised him to be taken to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam; whereupon he (Antony) was taken to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam. In the meanwhile PW-15 sent Ext.P9 intimation, on receipt of which PW-13, Head Constable came to the Government Hospital, Kothamangalam, but by then Antony was already taken to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam. So P W 13 proceeded to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam. Finding that, Antony was unconscious and not in a position to give a statement, he (PW-13) returned to the police station and registered Ext.P 10 F.I.R. under S.324 IPC on the basis of Ext.P9 intimation. He proceeded to the scene and prepared Ext. P1 mahazar. He (PW-13) received Ext.P 11 intimation from the Government Hospital, Kothamangalam to the effect that the accused has been admitted in the said hospital. Thereupon he (PW-13) proceeded to the Government Hospital, Kothamangalam and recorded his (accused) statement. PW-15 issued Ext.P14 wound certificate concerning Antony and Ext.P15 wound certificate concerning the accused. While undergoing treatment in the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam Antony expired on 1-5-1988. On receiving the intimation that Antony expired, S.324 IPC was altered to S.302 IPC and Ext.P13 report to that effect was submitted before court by PW-14, Sub Inspector of Police. 3. The investigation was taken over by PW-16, Circle Inspector of Police who held Ext. P16 inquest on the dead body of Antony. PW-9 held autopsy on the dead body and issued Ext.P4 postmortem certificate. On 7-5-1988, the accused surrendered before PW-16, Circle Inspector of Police and he (PW-16) arrested the accused and questioned him. Pursuant to the information received from the accused, he (PW-16) proceeded as led by the accused to his (accused) wife's house and there he (accused) produced MO-1 butcher's knife from beneath the cadjan leaves seen spread in the compound. He (PW-16) questioned the witnesses, completed the investigation and laid the charge before court. 4. Prosecution examined PWs.1 to 16, produced Exts.P1 to P17 and identified MOs.1 to 4. PWs.1 to 3 are the occurrence witnesses. PW-4, a neighbour stated to her having heard Antony imploring the accused not to stab him (Antony). 5. He (PW-16) questioned the witnesses, completed the investigation and laid the charge before court. 4. Prosecution examined PWs.1 to 16, produced Exts.P1 to P17 and identified MOs.1 to 4. PWs.1 to 3 are the occurrence witnesses. PW-4, a neighbour stated to her having heard Antony imploring the accused not to stab him (Antony). 5. The prosecution relies on the evidence of PWs.1 to 4 and also the confession of the accused pursuant to which M.O.1 was recovered under Ext.P2. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that PWs.1 to 3 are not reliable witnesses as according to the learned counsel PWs.I and 2 are inimical towards the accused. It was also contended that in view of the fact that Antony died only on 1-5-1988 whereas the alleged occurrence was on 24-4-1988, it cannot be said that the death was as a result of the injuries. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the conviction under S.302 IPC at any rate was not sustainable. 7. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor would maintain that PWs.1 to 4 being natural witnesses, their testimony itself would prove the prosecution case beyond the shadow of any reasonable doubt. Apart from the -same, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, there is corroborative evidence in the recovery of MO-1 pursuant to the information received from the accused. He also maintained that the statement of the injured Ext.P9(a) recorded in Ext.P9 and also the statement by the injured as to the cause of injuries recorded in Ext.P-14 wound certificate also would support the prosecution case. Reliance was also placed on the statement of the accused to his wife spoken to by PW-1 and PW-2 to the effect that he killed the deceased, as an extra judicial confession. 8. PW-1, a student of J 4 years is the nephew of both the accused as well as the deceased. His (PW-1) mother is PW-2. Both these witnesses are related to the accused as well as the deceased. 8. PW-1, a student of J 4 years is the nephew of both the accused as well as the deceased. His (PW-1) mother is PW-2. Both these witnesses are related to the accused as well as the deceased. PW-1 said that he along with his mother, sister, PW-6, wife of PW-6 and Joseph was residing in the same house whereas the accused who also is his (PW-1) maternal uncle was residing in another house situated in the same compound, that on 24-4-1988 at about 10 A.M, accused yelled abusive words from his court yard whereupon Antony (deceased) requested the accused to stop it, but he did not stop instead he (accused) pelted stones and that was followed by a scuffle between the accused and the deceased. They fell and were rolling on the ground. Thereupon PW- 2 who came to the court yard cried for help from her elder brother Kunjappan. Kunjappan came and separated them and the accused was taken to his house. On noticing blood coming from the forehead of PW-2, Antony (deceased) left for fetching an autorickshaw. Finding the accused in his court yard, he (Antony) went through the back yard of PW-3 and when he reached the court yard of PW-4 another neighbour the accused pelted stones at Antony. Then the accused reached Antony and stabbed him with MO-1. Antony implored the accused not to stab. When PW-1 cried on seeing this, the accused threatened him. Then the accused went to his house and told his wife that he killed him (Antony) and that he would take her to Laksham Veedu. Thereafter both of them left. He (P W -1 said that he saw the occurrence in the torch light as well as the light from the kerosene lamp. He went for fetching autorickshaw. On the way he met PW-6. PW-6 brought an autorickshaw in which Antony was removed to the Government Hospital, Kothamangalam. While undergoing treatment in the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam Antony expired. He (PW-1) also said that the motive for the occurrence was enmity that the accused had, as Antony did not take his (accused) wife to the estate for work. 9. PW-2, the mother of PW-1 corroborates the evidence of PW-1. PW-3, as noticed is a neighbour. While undergoing treatment in the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam Antony expired. He (PW-1) also said that the motive for the occurrence was enmity that the accused had, as Antony did not take his (accused) wife to the estate for work. 9. PW-2, the mother of PW-1 corroborates the evidence of PW-1. PW-3, as noticed is a neighbour. He said on 24-4-1988 at about 9-30 P.M. he returned home, that he went to bed at about 10 P.M., that he heard a commotion in the compound of Antony and that he opened the door to see what was happening. Then he saw Kunjappan separating Antony and the accused. After that he (PW-3) again went to bed. About 10 minutes thereafter, he heard an alarm from the compound situated adjacent to his house. The alarm was by Antony imploring not to stab him (Antony). He (PW-3) viewed the scene through a slit in the door and saw the accused stabbing Antony. There was moon light and he heard PW-1 crying little away from the scene. Thereafter the accused went to his (accused) house and left along with his wife for Laksham Veedu. 10. PW-4 said that her house is situated on the south of the house of Antony and that on the date of occurrence her son Sivan and his wife had gone for a visit to his (Sivan) wife's house. While she was asleep she heard an alarm of Antony pleading with-the, accused not to stab him. 11. The criticism against the evidence of these witnesses is that they are interested. Mere interestedness of a witness is no ground to reject his evidence; all that is required is, the evidence of such witnesses should be subjected to careful scrutiny. PW-1 is the nephew of both the accused and deceased, and PW-2 is their sister. Therefore, the allegation that they are interested in the deceased cannot be sustained. The only point urged by the learned counsel is that whereas Antony used to attend the needs of PW-2, the accused was not doing so. Because of that alone, one cannot conclude that a sister would falsely implicate a brother in an offence which is punishable under S.302 IPC. We are not impressed with the said argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. 12. As regards the evidence of PWs.3 and 4 no interestedness could be brought out in the cross-examination. Because of that alone, one cannot conclude that a sister would falsely implicate a brother in an offence which is punishable under S.302 IPC. We are not impressed with the said argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. 12. As regards the evidence of PWs.3 and 4 no interestedness could be brought out in the cross-examination. They are the probable witnesses as they are the immediate/ neighbours of the scene of occurrence. They are persons who would be alerted by a commotion or an alarm from the court yard of PW-2 or the court yard of PW-4. They being the natural witnesses and no thing objectionable having been brought in their cross-examination to discredit them, there is no reason to reject their evidence. Their evidence is acceptable. Thus me evidence of these witnesses by themselves" would support the prosecution case. 13. Further the statement of the accused to his wife on his return after the occurrence to the effect that he killed him (Antony), spoken to by PWs.I and 2 would amount to an extra judicial confession relevant and acceptable as the same gets enough corroboration from the circumstances discussed above. 14. PW-16 said that the accused surrendered before him at 11.30 AM on 7-5-1988. He questioned him (accused) and as per the in formation received from the accused and as led by the accused he reached Ramallur Laksham Veedu colony and he (accused) produced MO-1 from beneath the cadjan leaves spread in the compound of his wife's house which he (PW-16) seized under Ext.P2. The confession is to the effect that the knife is concealed under the cadjan leaves in the compound of his (accused) wife's house in Laksham Veedu Colony. Since the authorship of concealment is not mentioned, the confession cannot be admitted in evidence under S.27 of the Evidence Act. But the said conduct of the accused in taking out MO-1 from the place of concealment is admissible in evidence under S.8 of the Evidence Act. (Prakash Cliand v. State (delliiadmn.) - AIR 1979 SC 400). Thus that also lends enough corroboration to the evidence of P Ws. 1 I to 4. 15. Though the occurrence was on 24-4-1988 at about 10 PM, Antony died only, on 1-5-1988 at 6.50 PM (Ext.P5).PW-9 in Ext.P4 as well as in his evidence said, Antony died of peritonitis and emphysema due to stab injuries to the abdomen. Thus that also lends enough corroboration to the evidence of P Ws. 1 I to 4. 15. Though the occurrence was on 24-4-1988 at about 10 PM, Antony died only, on 1-5-1988 at 6.50 PM (Ext.P5).PW-9 in Ext.P4 as well as in his evidence said, Antony died of peritonitis and emphysema due to stab injuries to the abdomen. He (PW-9) also said, emphysema is collection of pus in the chest cavity. Therefore, it was contended that the death being on account of peritonitis and emphysema, the accused cannot be attributed to have caused the death of Antony so that S.302 IPC could be attracted. PW-9 said that injury Nos.16 and 17 are fatal injuries. As noticed Ext.P4 states that the deceased died of peritonitis and emphysema due to stab injuries to abdomen. The evidence of PW-11 who also treated him in the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam supports the same. Thus the evidence definitely shows that peritonitis was caused by the injuries sustained by Antony of which injuries 16 and 17 were fatal. This court in the decision in Devasia Yohannan v. State (1958 KLT 273) held: "Where without the intervention of any considerable change of circumstances the death is connected with the act of violence by a chain of causes and effects, the death must be regarded as a proximate and not too remote a consequence of the act of violence. In law it does not m alter that the death is from a secondary cause so long as that secondary cause is a natural consequence of the injury The chain of causation is direct, and the intention to cause death being established, the accused is guilty of nothing short of murder". That was a case where the death was seven months after the sustaining of the injury-and was due to "asthenia from cystitis and tropic change". It was held that the death was due to secondary cause which was the natural consequence of the injuries and that the accused was liable for murder. To the same effect is the decision in State of Kerala v. Narayanankutty (1980 KLT 908). There also it is held: "If the complication or development is the natural or probable or necessary consequence of the injury and if Pis reasonably contemplated as its result, the injury can be said to have caused death. To the same effect is the decision in State of Kerala v. Narayanankutty (1980 KLT 908). There also it is held: "If the complication or development is the natural or probable or necessary consequence of the injury and if Pis reasonably contemplated as its result, the injury can be said to have caused death. If the original injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused by a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the injury itself, since casual connection is proximate". In the face of the evidence of PW-9 and Ext.P4, it is clear that the peritonitis and emphysema were the natural consequence of sustaining the injuries and as injuries 16 and 17 were fatal, the death has to be held to be the result of the injuries. Therefore, with due regard to the nature and seat of the injuries and also the nature of the weapon used, there can be no doubt that the accused had the intention to cause the death. 16. In Ext.P9 the alleged cause of injury is stated to be on account of the stab by 'the accused at 11.00 PM on 24-5-1988 with butcher's knife. The said statement is also obtained in Ext.P-14 wound certificate. PW-15 said that the alleged cause was staled to him by the injured himself. The evidence of PW-15 would show that Antony was conscious though he was not fully alert. The question now for consideration is whether the said statement of the injured to PW-15 is admissible as a dying declaration under S.32(1) of the Evidence' Act. As per S.32(1) of the Evidence Act, the statement must be as to the cause of the declarants death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death. As noticed, though the death was due to peritonitis and emphysema since injuries 16 and 17 were fatal, the death must be regarded as a proximate and not too remote a consequence of the injuries. Thus the injuries, under law, were the cause of death. 17. As noticed, though the death was due to peritonitis and emphysema since injuries 16 and 17 were fatal, the death must be regarded as a proximate and not too remote a consequence of the injuries. Thus the injuries, under law, were the cause of death. 17. In the decision in Moti Singh v. State of U.P. (AIR 1964 SC 90G) Supreme Court held that when the deceased is not proved to have died as a result of injuries received by him in the incident a statement given by the deceased is not relevant under S.32(1) of the Evidence Act. In that case one Gaya Charan sustained gunshot injuries, the doctor who examined him found them to be dangerous to life. Gaya Charan left the hospital. It is stated: "He was either discharged on the injuries healing up or he left the hospital before they healed up. There is nothing on the record to show in what circumstances he left the hospital. He died on March 1,1960". The occurrence therein was on February 9,1960. There was no evidence on record as to what caused Gaya Charan's death. In fact no postmortem could be conducted on his dead body before his cremation. It was found by the Sessions Judge that Gaya Charan's death must have been on account of the injuries sustained by him. The Supreme Court held: "We find that there is no evidence to support that finding and hold that Gaya Charan is not proved to have died due to the injuries received in the incident". This decision is distinguishable inasmuch as in this case, there is positive proof to the effect that Antony's death was as a result of the injuries sustained by him because though the cause of death was peritonitis and emphysema the death, in the circumstance discussed above, was proximate and not too remote a consequence of the act of violence. Therefore, the statement of the injured to PW-5 as to the 'cause of the injuries, under law, is a dying declaration relevant under S.32(1) of the Evidence Act; that also would support the prosecution case. 18. Therefore, the statement of the injured to PW-5 as to the 'cause of the injuries, under law, is a dying declaration relevant under S.32(1) of the Evidence Act; that also would support the prosecution case. 18. It is now necessary in the circumstance to deal with the contention of the accused that the prosecution since has failed to explain the injuries sustained by the accused which is proved by the evidence of PW-15 and Ext.P5, it must be held that the prosecution has not presented the whole occurrence before Court. Exhibit P15 wound certificate notes the following injuries: (1) Lacerated skin deep wound 1 cm. x 0.5 cm. on the back of top of head. (2) Lacerated skin deep wound 1 cm x 0.5 cm. on the outer aspect of left eyebrow. (3) Incised skin deep wounds on the palmer aspects of left ring and middle fingers 2 cm. distal to their bases and 1.5 cm. x 0.2 cm. in size each. PW-15 said, all the injuries are simple and injuries 1 and 2 could be caused by contact with rough and hard surface and that injury No.3 could be caused by an accidental contact with weapon like MO.1 if the assailant himself was holding the knife. In the decision in Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1976 SC 2263) the Supreme Court held: "There may be cases where the non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may not affect the prosecution case. This principle would obviously apply to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are m in or and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterest, so probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it far outweighs the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries". As noticed, the ocular evidence is cogent and uninterested and therefore the same is acceptable. Apart from that the nature of the injuries is such that the opinion of PW-15 that the opinion to the effect that the injuries are simple is acceptable. As noticed, the ocular evidence is cogent and uninterested and therefore the same is acceptable. Apart from that the nature of the injuries is such that the opinion of PW-15 that the opinion to the effect that the injuries are simple is acceptable. Adding to that in the decision in A.M. Kunhikoya @ Koya v. State of Kerala (JT 1993 (3) SC 573) the Supreme Court held that if the evidence of eye witnesses are held to be reliable and inspires confidence then the accused cannot be acquitted solely on the ground that some super Aries found on the person of the accused concerned, had not been explained by the prosecution. 19. PW-1 has stated that during the scuffle the accused and deceased were rolling on the court-yard. The evidence of PW-15, as noted, is to the effect that injuries 1 and 2 could be caused by contact with rough and hard surface, and since the accused was holding MO.1 it is reasonable to hold, in view of the evidence of PW-15 that, injury No.3 was sustained by the accidental contact with MO-1. Thus, there is also proper and acceptable explanation for the injuries sustained by the accused. 20. Thus from the above discussion, it is clear that the accused inflicted injuries on Antony which resulted in his death. Since the said injuries were caused intentionally and injuries 16 and 17 were fatal, the accused is liable to be held guilty of culpable homicide amounting to murder. Therefore, there is nothing to interfere in the finding, conviction and sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge. In the result the appeal is liable to be dismissed which accordingly is hereby dismissed.