Mr. Y. K. Sabharwal, J. ( 1 ) IN R. F. A. (OS) 20/82, on 8/04/1983, aconsent decree was passed in favour of Citi Bank, N. A. respondent hereinand against Sanjiwan Sahni and others. Sanjiwan Sahni agreed to becomesurety under Section 145, Code of Civil Procedure and the consent orderprovides that he will be jointly and severally liable alongwith the other judgment debtors for the amount of the decree. Para 3 of the application containing terms of the consent decree reads as under : "sh. Sanjiwan Sahni son of late Shri Sita Ram Sahni, residentofa-2,maharani Bagh, New Delhi, hereby stands surety to thiscourt under Section 145 Civil Procedure Code for payment of the amount of thedecree with the condition that execution against him will be filed atleast nine months after the execution has been filed against M/s. Forgings Pvt. Ltd. except with respect to this nine months time lagprovided under this clause. Shri Sanjiwan Sahni will be jointly andseverally liable alongwith other judgment debtors for the amount ofthe decree. " ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the respondent Sanjiwan the payment in terms ofthe decree was not made. The Bank gave notice under Section 6 (2) ofprovincial Insolvency Act to the petitioner in October, 1984 and thereafterthe insolvency petition was filed by the respondent against Sanjiwan Sahni. The insolvency petition seems to have been filed sometime in the year 1984. Sometimes in the year 1989 an application under Order 6 Rule 17 read withsection 151 Civil Procedure Code was filed by the petitioner seeking amendment of his replyto the insolvency petition. The said application was dismissed by theinsolvency Judge on 6/01/1990. inter alia. holding that the amendment sought for appears to be most malafide and has been filed to delay theproceedings. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Additional District Judge on 1/12/1990. Now the petitioner is beforethis Court in this revision petition. ( 3 ) THE petitioner has sought amendment so as to incorporate in thereply the plea to the following effect : "the petitioner in C. A. No. 744/87 filed before the Ld. Company Judge of the Delhi High Court at New Delhi made anunequivocal statement that the petitioner will not execute the decreeagainst the principal debtor i. e. M/s. Forgings Private Limited. Company Judge of the Delhi High Court at New Delhi made anunequivocal statement that the petitioner will not execute the decreeagainst the principal debtor i. e. M/s. Forgings Private Limited. Thepetitioner having agreed with the principal debtor not to executethe decree against the principal debtor, the respondent has beenlegally discharged of his liability under the decree and the decree,as such, has become unexecutable against the respondents. Thepetitioner in view of the statements referred to hereinabove hasbecome dis-entitled to proceed with the insolvency proceedingsinitiated against the respondent and the insolvency petition is liableto be dismissed. The petitioner is obliged in law to first attempt torecover the decretal amount from the mortgaged property/chargedproperties and it is only in the event of the recovery being not madefrom the principal debtor and mortgaged properties that the decreeholder can proceed with the execution and seek to recover thedecretal amount from the respondents, who was stated to be asurety within the contemplation of Section 145 of C. P. C. " ( 4 ) THE plea that the decretal amount shall be first recovered fromthe principal debtor and then alone the surety should have been proceededis against the terms of the consent decree which provides that the petitionerwill be jointly and severally responsible alongwith the other judgmentdebtors. In State Bank of India v. M/s. Indexport Registered and Others1992 Vol. 3. S. C. C. Page 159 the Supreme Court has held that decree-holdercan execute the decree against the guarantor without proceeding against themortgaged property and that the liability of the guarantor is co-extensivewith that of the principal debtor. The amandment is, thereforeunnecessary. ( 5 ) REVERTING now to the first part of the amendment sought for itwould be useful to reproduce the order made on C. A. 744/87 on 24/07/1989 as also orders made on 12/09/1989 an C. A. 4153/89. Theseorders read as under : "24. 7. 89c. A. 744/87citi Bank of India has filed the present application u/sec. 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 read with Section 151 ofc. P. C. thereby seeking leave of this Court to proceed with the executioncase No. 1 /84 now pending on the Original Side of this Court. Ihave been informed that the case of the respondent-company isbeing considered by the Board for Financial and Industrial Reconstruction constituted under the Sick Industrial Companies (Specialprovisions) Act. 1985. P. C. thereby seeking leave of this Court to proceed with the executioncase No. 1 /84 now pending on the Original Side of this Court. Ihave been informed that the case of the respondent-company isbeing considered by the Board for Financial and Industrial Reconstruction constituted under the Sick Industrial Companies (Specialprovisions) Act. 1985. Learned Counsel for the applicant submitsthat as the matter is pending before the Board for the time beingthe applicant wants to execute the decree against the other judgment debtors other than the respondent-company. C. A. standsdisposed of. 24/07/1989. Sd/- S. N. Sapra, J. " "12-9-1989c. A. 5153/89the present application has been filed by Smt. Satish Sondhi,respondent No. 2 under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956and Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, thereby seekingreview of the order passed by this Court on 24/07/1989 inc. A. No. 744 of 1987. The Citi Bank N. A. filed an application being C. A. No. 744/87 thereby seeking leave of this Court to proceed with theexecution Case No. 1 of 1984 which was then pending on theoriginal side of this Court. Vide my order dated 24/07/1989, I granted permission tothe Citi Bank N. A. to execute the decree against the Judgmentdebtors other than the Company. Learned Counsel for applicant submits that the order passedby this Court, is being interpreted in a way, which will deprive theguarantor of their right to file objections to the execution of thedecree. Moreover, the permission to execute a decree is requiredonly against the company not the other persons. As far as my order is concerned, that is very clear. What Imeant was that the Bank could not execute the decree against thecompany. The Bank was at liberty to execute or not to executethe decree against the other judgment debtors. With this clarification C. A. 4153 of 1989 stands disposed of. 12-9-89 Sd/- S. N. Sapra, J. " ( 6 ) THE aforequoted order on C. A. 744/87 shows that the bank didnot make a statement that it will not execute the decree against the principaldebtor as sought to be pleaded by the petitioner by amendment. What wasstated by Counsel for the Bank and recorded in the order dated 24/07/1989 is that as the matter is pending before the Board for Industrial andfinancial Reconstruction constituted under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act. What wasstated by Counsel for the Bank and recorded in the order dated 24/07/1989 is that as the matter is pending before the Board for Industrial andfinancial Reconstruction constituted under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act. 1985 the bank for the time being wants to executethe decree against the other judgment debtors and that it will not execute thedecree against the bank. Under these circumstances permission was grantedto the bank to execute the decree against the judgment debtors other thanthe company. The order dated 12/09/1989 is only clarificatory innature as it borne from a bare reading of the order. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner places strong reliance on adecision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Rattan Singh,a. I. R. 1964 SC. 1223 holding that the Insolvency Court is not precluded bysection II from enquiring into the question whether the alleged debtor wasreally a debtor and liable to pay sums said to be payable by him. Relianceis placed on this decision to support the argument that the Insolvency Court,has wide power and it can both at the time of hearing the petition foradjudication of a person as insolvent and subsequently at the stage of proofof debt reopen the transaction on the basis of which the creditor had securedthe judgment of a Court against the debtor. There can be no quarrel withthe aforesaid proposition in regard to the powers of the Insolvency Court. but it has no applicability to the present case. The amendment sought for isbased on the order passed on 24/07/1989 on the basis of statement madeby Counsel for the bank and the misreading of the said statement by thepetitioner, to put it mildly. I may also notice another aspect of the citeddecision. The Supreme Court has also held that a decree is binding only onthe parties in the suit in which the judgment was decreed but the saidbinding effect is only to be respected by the Insolvency Court in circumstances where nothing is reasonably alleged against the correctness of thejudgment debt. The Supreme Court further proceeds to opine that Insolvency Court has jurisdiction to re-open such debts and will do so when suchdebts have been obtained by fraud, collusion or any circumstances indicatingthat there might have been miscarriage of justice. The present case does notfall in any of the categories. The Supreme Court further proceeds to opine that Insolvency Court has jurisdiction to re-open such debts and will do so when suchdebts have been obtained by fraud, collusion or any circumstances indicatingthat there might have been miscarriage of justice. The present case does notfall in any of the categories. It is not the case of the petitioner that thedecree dated 8/04/1983 was obtained by fraud or collusion. Referenceto Sections 134 and 135 of the Contract Act, in the context of the presentcase, is also misconceived. This amendment sought for is also unnecessary. ( 8 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I concur with the view expressed bythe Courts below that the amendment application is malafide and has beenfiled to delay the proceedings. The amendment sought for is wholly unnecessary for deciding the subject matter of controversy in the insolvencypetition. There is no ground to interfere in this petition. The petition is,accordingly, dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.