JUDGMENT R.C. Lahoti, J. 1. This second appeal, preferred by the defendant/appellants, raises purely a legal controversy requiring determination of shares to which the parties would be entitled on partition in accordance with principles of Hindu Law. 2. This Court has admitted the appeal for hearing parties on the following substantial question of law only :-- "Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 Lalchand is to be granted 9/32nd share in the suit property?" 3. The facts in so far as relevant for the decision of this appeal are beyond controversy at this stage. The genealogical tree is admitted. It is as under:-- Khuba | Mardansingh (Defendant No. 6) (died on 30-6-1981) | ----------------------------------------- | | Manvobai Putrobai (Paintiff No. 1) (Defdt. No. 1) (Died on 19-4-1984) | ---------------------------------------- | | | | | Lalchand Somatsingh Dannala Prabhulal Ramchandran (Paintiff No. 1) D-2 D-3 D-4 D-5 Khuba was the original owner. He had died much before the institution of the suit. He had a son Mardansingh. Mardansingh had two wives -- Manvobai and Putrobai. Mardansingh had one son -- Lalchand -- from Manvobai and four sons -- Somatsingh, Dhannalal, Prabhulal and Ramcharan -- from Putrobai. The suit was instituted on 6-4-1977 by Manvobai and Lalchand as Plaintiffs impleading Mardansingh, Putrobai and their four sons as defendants. The suit property consists of a house and an agricultural holding. Mardansingh expired on 30-6-1981 and Manvobai also expired on 19-4-1984, both during the pendency of these proceedings. It is not disputed that on the date of the institution of the suit, as also on the dates on which Mardansingh and Manvobai expired, the succession was governed by the principles of Hindu Law. 4. Both the Courts below have found the suit property to be ancestral property of Mardansingh as having been inherited from Khuba. Both the Courts below have further found that the family was joint and the suit property was in joint possession and enjoyment of the parties and hence liable to be partitioned. 5. Mardansingh having expired before the trial Court, his name was struck off the array of defendants. So also on the death of Manvobai, the plaintiff No. 1, before the trial Court, her name was struck off the array of the plaintiffs, and then Lalchand alone proceeded with the suit as sole plaintiff. 6. 5. Mardansingh having expired before the trial Court, his name was struck off the array of defendants. So also on the death of Manvobai, the plaintiff No. 1, before the trial Court, her name was struck off the array of the plaintiffs, and then Lalchand alone proceeded with the suit as sole plaintiff. 6. The trial Court held that on the death of Mardansingh, his two wives and 5 sons in all 7 members would be entitled to 1/7th share in the property. On Manvobai's death her 1/7th share would devolve on her son Lalchand. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of Lalchand declaring him entitled to 2/7th share in the suit property. 7. The lower appellate Court held that on the date of the institution of the suit, the joint Hindu family property would be deemed to have been notionally partitioned and each of the 8 members of the family on the date of the institution of the suit would be entitled to 1/8th share in the property. On the death of Mardansingh on 30-6-1981 his 1/8th share would be devided into 6 shares each of the sons taking l/6th share in the property and the 2 wives collectively taking 1/6th share. Thus on the death of Mardansingh Lalchand became further entitled to 1/6th of 1/8th i.e. 1/48th share in the property on the death of Mardansingh, Manvobai too had succeeded to 1/2 of l/6th of 1/8th share of Mardansingh, i.e., to a 1/96th share over and above 1/8th share of her own which she was already holding of her own. This 1/8th + 1/96th share of Manvobai on her death devolved upon Lalchand alone. In the opinion of the lower appellate court Lalchand was entitled to 1/8th + 1/48th 4- 1/8th + 1/96th = 27/96, i.e. 9/32nd share in the joint family property. Having thus calculated the share of the plaintiff Lalchand, the lower appellate Court superseded the decree of the trial Court declaring him entitled only to 9/32nd share in the suit property followed by a direction for partition and separate possession to that extent. 8. In the opinion of this Court, the lower appellate Court was right in determining the share of the plaintiff Lalchand. 9. It will be useful at the very outset to set out a few well settled principles of Hindu Law determining the entitlement and allotment of share of partition. 8. In the opinion of this Court, the lower appellate Court was right in determining the share of the plaintiff Lalchand. 9. It will be useful at the very outset to set out a few well settled principles of Hindu Law determining the entitlement and allotment of share of partition. The following relevant extracts are made from paragraphs 315 and 316 of Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla, 15th Edition, 1982, pages 435-437 : "315. Wife. -- (1) A wife cannot herself demand a partition, but if a partition does take place between her husband and his sons, she is entitled to receive a share equal to that of a son and to hold and enjoy that share separately even from her husband. (2) The expression "wife" in relation to "sons" includes their stepmother." "Illustration (a) A has two wives B and C, a son D by B, and four sons by C. D sues his father A for partition. Each of these eight persons is entitled to a one-eighth share including B and C." "316. Widow-mother. -- (1) A mother cannot compel a partition so long as the sons remain united. But if a partition takes place between the sons, she is entitled to a share equal to that of a son in the coparcenary property. She is also entitled to a similar share on a partition between the sons and the purchaser of the interest of one or more of them. Where unmarried son sued his two brothers for partition but died during the pendency of the suit and the mother was brought in as the legal representative she was held entitled only to his share and not to a mother's share. **** **** **** **** (3) The term 'mother' in this section includes step-mother. (4) On a partition between sons by different mothers when more than one mother is alive, the rule is first to divide the property into as many shares as there are sons, and then to allot to each surviving mother a share equal to that of each of her sons in the aggregate portion allotted to them." "Illustrations : (a) A dies leaving a widow B, three sons by B, and a son X by a predeceased wife. X sues his step-mother B and his three half-brothers for a partition. X sues his step-mother B and his three half-brothers for a partition. The property will be divided into 5 parts, each of the 5 persons above-named including B taking one-fifth. (b) A dies leaving two widows, B and C, two sons by B, and three sons by C. On a partition between the sons of B and C, the mode of division is first to divide the property into 5 shares corresponding to the number of sons. The two sons of B will share 2/5 equally with their mother B, each taking 1/3 of 2/5 i.e. 2/15. The three sons of C will share 3/5 equally with their mother C, each taking 1/4 of 3/5, i.e. 3/20. Thus B will take 2/15, and C will take 3/20." 10. In accordance with the abovesaid principles let us now proceed to determine the share available to Lalchand and the impact thereon of the two events i.e., the death of Mardansingh and the death of Manvobai occurring during the pendency of the suit. 11. The institution of a suit for partition by a member of a joint family is an unequivocal indication of his intention to separate and there consequently is severance of his joint status from the date when he instituted the suit [see - Para 325(1), Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla (supra)]. Thus on the very date of institution of the suit the plaintiffs would be deemed to have effected severance of their status from the joint Hindu family. Each of the two plaintiffs, namely Manvobai and Lalchand became entitled to 1/8th share each and that share stood determined. 12.1. Mardansingh expired on 30-6-1981 on that day he had 1/8th share in the suit property. He was survived by two widows and five sons -- all heirs of Class I in Schedule to Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 12.2. Section 10, Rules 1 and 2 provide as under :-- "Section 10. Distribution of property among heirs in Class I of the Schedule. -- The property of an intestate shall be divided among the heirs in Class I of the Schedule in accordance with the following rules: Rule 1. The intestate's widow, or if there are more widows than one, all the widows together, shall take one share. Rule 2. The surviving sons and daughters and the mother of the intestate shall each take one share. *** *** ***" 12.3. The intestate's widow, or if there are more widows than one, all the widows together, shall take one share. Rule 2. The surviving sons and daughters and the mother of the intestate shall each take one share. *** *** ***" 12.3. Mardansingh's 1/8th share shall be divided into 6 shares; each son taking 1/6th of 1/8th and the two widows also collectively taking 1/6th of 1/8th. Manvobai got 1/2 of 1/6th of 1/8th = 1/96th share in the suit property, consequent to death of her husband, over and above her own 1/8th which she was already holding. 13.1. Now Manvobai expired on 19-4-1984. 13.2. Section 15 (relevant part thereof provides) :-- "Section 15 General rules-of succession in the case of female Hindus. -- (1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in Section 16, -- (a) Firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the husband; (b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband; *** *** ***" 13.3. Lalchand being the son, would exclude Putrobai and her 4 sons, they being the 'heirs of husband'. 13.4. On 19-4-1984 Lalchand became entitled to share in the property as under :-- His own share - 1/8th Inherited by him on death of - 1/48th Mardansingh Inherited from Manvobai on - 1/8 + l/96th her death Total -1/8 + 1/48 + 1/8 + 1/96 = 9/32nd. 14.1. Para 316, Illustration (b) would have no applicability here, because the joint family had already disrupted and shares determined on the date of institution of suit and hence on the dates of deaths of Mardansingh and Manvobai, succession shall have to be determined by reference to the provisions of Hindu Succession Act alone, specially Sections 8, 10 and 15 thereof. 14.2. Illustration (a) under para 315 of Hindu Law by Mulla is more appropriate and apposite to the case at hand than illustration (b) under para 316, as partition would be deemed to have taken place on 6-4-1977, the date of institution of suit when Manvobai and Putrobai were "wives" and not "widow mothers". 15. For the foregoing reasons it is clear that the lower appellate Court did not err in determining Lalchand plaintiffs share in the suit property. The appeal is without any merit. It is dismissed. Judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are maintained. 15. For the foregoing reasons it is clear that the lower appellate Court did not err in determining Lalchand plaintiffs share in the suit property. The appeal is without any merit. It is dismissed. Judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are maintained. No order as to costs of this appeal. 16. Appreciation is placed on record of the valuable assistance rendered by Shri R.D. Jan, Advocate at the hearing of the appeal who appeared amicus curiae on a request made by the Court.