M. S. PARIKH, J. ( 1 ) CALLED in question in this petition under Art. 227 of the constitution of India by the petitioner are the orders dated 27-2-1986 and 28-12-1988 respectively rendered by the Competent Authority and the Urban land Tribunal declaring the petitioners holding of excess land to the extent of 20873. 23 sq. mtrs. of land. quashing the orders passed by the Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling and the urban Land Ceiling Tribunal. (Only a part of the Judgment approved for reporting is published. ). ( 2 ) THE short submission of Mr. Nanavati. learned Advocate for the petitioner is that the holding of the petitioners wife cannot be included in the holding of the husband. According to his submission, upon proper construction of Sees. 2 (i) and 2 (f) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and regulation) Act, 1976 (No. 33 of 1976), hereinafter referred to as the act, individual holding of land by either the husband or the wife is to be treated as distinct and separate from the holdings of the family In which wife, husband and unmarried minor children have joint right, title and interest in the land. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the submission of Mr. Nanavati, it would be necessary to set-out the provisions which Mr. Nanavati has relied upon. However, it may be stated at the out set that the whole Act except Sec. 27 is held infra vires by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Bhim singhji v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1981 SC 234 . ( 4 ) IN the first instance Sec. 3 may be reproduced since reliance has been placed by the learned A. G. P. on this provision also :"3. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub-sec. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. I. " ( 5 ) THE word "person" appearing in the aforesaid provision is defined in Sec. 2 (i), which reads as under :" (I) "person" includes an individual, a family, a firm, a company, or an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not;"it can thus be seen that it is an inclusive definition and family is included therein, with the result that the open land in excess of the ceiling limit is to be worked out on the basis of lard held by the members of the family. Who arc such members can be visualised from the definition of family. Section 2 (f) of the Act defines the word family and it reads :" (1) "family", in relation to a person, means the indivicual the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such individual and their unmarried minor children". Thus, family means husband, wife and their minor children. ( 6 ) IT is the submission of Mr. Nanavati that the legislature has not provided for any faction with regard to clubbing of individual holdings of the wife and the husband. Fey the purpose of making good this submission, he read before me the provisions contained in Sec. 4 subsees. (5), (6), (7) and (8 ). He submitted that by the said provisions the legislature made clear its intention of segrgating the interest of individuals who happen to be the partners of a firm or members of unregistered associations on the beneficiaries of a private trust. Likewise, if the legislature intended clubbing of holding of the reividual such as wife as wife and/on husband the legislature would have made a clear provision about the same. It is, therefore, the submission of Mr. Nanavati that merely by virtue of the definition of family contained in clause ()) of Sec. 2, it cannot be said that there is a provision regarding clubbing of holding of wife and the husband. The submission of Mr. Nanavati cannot be accepted if the definition of word family is read with the definition of word person in the context of Sec. 3 reproduced hereinabove. The submission of Mr. Nanavati cannot be accepted if the definition of word family is read with the definition of word person in the context of Sec. 3 reproduced hereinabove. In view of the aforesaid reading of the provisions noted above, the submission of mr. Nanavati to the effect that while working the extent of land for the purposes of Secs. 6 to 10 of the Act, land exclusively belonging to either the husband or to the wife is to be excluded, cannot be accepted. In view of what is stated above, there is no further question left in this petition. The result is that the same deserves to be dismissed. Rule is, therefore, discharged with no order as to cost. .