JUDGMENT - M.L. PENDSE, J.:--By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners are seeking a declaration that the amendment made to section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by section 17(b) of the Finance Act, 1983 by inserting sub-sections (3-A) to (3-D) is bad in law, illegal, invalid and violative of the petitioners fundamental rights. The facts which gave rise to the filing of the petition are as follows : 2. Petitioner No. 1 was incorporated as a public limited Company on April 29, 1978. Prior to its incorporation, the business was carried on by a partnership firm known as Belsara Hygiene Products. The partnership firm was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of air purifiers, water filters, lavatory cleansers and mosquito repellant cream. In year 1978, the partnership firm entered the field of dental hygiene with the introduction of a new tooth paste called Promise. It is the claim of the petitioners that the tooth paste earned high acclaim and won many awards on account of quality and price. From year 1980, the business of the partnership firm was taken over by the Company. The petitioners claim that from year 1981, the sales of the tooth paste have gone up dramatically and the Company exports large quantities abroad and the earnings of the Company run into crores of Rupees. The Company spends large amounts on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion to compete with the tooth pastes marketed by multi-national manufacturers. The sale of tooth paste climbed up from Rs. 557 lacs in the year 1981 to Rs. 1077 lacs in the year 1983. The expenses on advertisements, promotion, etc. in respect of sale of tooth paste also jumped up from Rs. 116 lacs in the year 1981 to Rs. 138 lacs in the year 1983. For the year ending June 30, 1983, the Company incurred expenditure on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion totalling to Rs. 197 lacs and out of this amount Rs. 138 lacs were spent on advertisement in newspapers, films, television and radio. 3. The petitioners claim that expenditure incurred on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion was allowed as a deduction in the computation of its income subject to certain small disallowances under Rule 6-D of Income Tax Rules, 1962 made pursuant to section 37(3) of the Act. In the year 1978. 3. The petitioners claim that expenditure incurred on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion was allowed as a deduction in the computation of its income subject to certain small disallowances under Rule 6-D of Income Tax Rules, 1962 made pursuant to section 37(3) of the Act. In the year 1978. Section 37 of the Act was amended by Finance Act, 1978 by inserting sub-sections (3-A) to (3-D). The effect of the amendment was to disallow a portion of the expenses incurred by an assessee on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion in excess of Rs. 40,000/-. Representations were made by various Associations and Small Scale Industries to the Central Board of Direct Taxes against these amended provisions and consequently, the amended provisions were withdrawn by the Finance Act, 1980 with effect from April 1, 1981. The Parliament by Finance Act, 1983 again amended section 37 by inserting sub-sections (3-A) to (3-D) and, inter-alia, provided that 20% of the expenditure incurred on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion, running and maintenance of air-craft and motor cars and payments made to hotels would be disallowed if the expenditure exceeded Rs. 1,00,000/-. It is necessary to set out the amended provisions which are under challenge : (3-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where the expenditure or, as the case may be, the aggregate expenditure incurred by an assessee on any one or more of the items specified in sub-section (3-B) exceeds one hundred thousand rupees, twenty per cent of such excess shall not be allowed as deduction in computing the income chargeable under the head "Profits and gains of business or profession." (3-B) The expenditure referred to in sub-section (3-A) is that incurred on- (i) advertisement, publicity and sales promotion; or (ii) running and maintenance of aircraft and motor cars; or (iii) payments made to hotels. Explanation :For the purposes of sub-sections (3-A) and (3-B),- (a) the expenditure specified in Clause (i) to Clause (iii) of sub-section (3-B) shall be the aggregate amount of expenditure incurred by the assessee as reduced by so much of such expenditure as is not allowed under any other provision of this Act; (b) expenditure on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion shall not include remuneration paid to employees of the assessee engaged in one or mere of the said activities ; (c) expenditure on running and maintenance of aircraft and motor cars shall include,- (i) expenditure incurred on chartering any aircraft and expenditure on hire charges for engaging cars plied for hire; (ii) conveyance allowance paid to employees and, where the assessee is a Company, conveyance allowance paid to its directors also." (3-C) Nothing contained in sub-section (3-A) shall apply in respect of expenditure incurred by an assessee, being a domestic company a defined in Clause (2) of section 80-B, or a person (other than a Company) who is resident in India in respect of expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively on - (i) advertisement, publicity and sales promotion outside India in respect of the goods, services or facilities which the assessee deals in or provides in the course of his business ; (ii) running and maintenance of motor cars in any branch, office or agency maintained outside India, for the promotion of the sale outside India of such goods, services or facilities." (3-D) No disallowance under sub-section (3-A) shall be made- (i) in the case of an assessee engaged in the business of running operation of aircraft in respect of expenditure incurred on running and maintenance of such aircraft; (ii) in the case of an assessee engaged in the business of running motor cars on hire, in respect of expenditure incurred in running and maintenance of such motor cars." 4. The petitioners claimed that for year ended June 30, 1983, the gross receipts of the Company amounted to Rs. 16,94,77,023/- whereas the total expenditure for the same period amounted to Rs. 16,96,92,618/-. The petitioners claimed that the loss as per the books of account for the year ended June 30, 1983 was Rs. 2,15,595/-, but the loss to be computed under the provisions of the Income Tax Act would work out to Rs. 5,74,457/-. 16,94,77,023/- whereas the total expenditure for the same period amounted to Rs. 16,96,92,618/-. The petitioners claimed that the loss as per the books of account for the year ended June 30, 1983 was Rs. 2,15,595/-, but the loss to be computed under the provisions of the Income Tax Act would work out to Rs. 5,74,457/-. The petitioners claim that there was no liability for payment of Income Tax or sur-tax under the Companies (Profits) sur-tax Act, 1964 in the absence of impugned amendments. However, on account of the impugned amendments, the total amounts to be disallowed will be Rs. 40,23,123/- and the break-up of the disallowed amounts is Rs. 39,49,089/- on advertisement and business promotion, Rs. 44,036/- on motor car expenses and Rs. 30,000/- on hotel payment. The petitioners apprehended that on assessment, the Company will be liable to pay Income Tax of about Rs. 19,45,000/- and Sur-tax of about Rs. 20,000/-. The petitioners, therefore, challenged the amendment made to section 37 by section 17(b) of the Finance Act, 1983 claiming that the amended sections are violative of fundamental rights guaranted under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. The challenge in the petition is on the ground of violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The Counsel for the petitioners did not press the challenge based on Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution in view of the decision of Division Bench of Karnataka High Court reported in 160 Income Tax Reports 50 (Mysore Kirloskar Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others)1. The decision of the Karnataka High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court but Special Leave Petition was dismissed by a Bench consisting of Chief Justice Pathak and Justice Venkatachaliah as he then was, by order dated November 10, 1987. 5. Shri Chinoy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the amended provisions are violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and are liable to be struck down as the fundamental rights of the shareholders of the Company are assailed by State action. The learned Counsel urged that the freedom of speech and expression includes the right of a businessman to advertise, publicise and promote sales of his products and which is popularly referred to as commercial speech. The learned Counsel urged that the freedom of speech and expression includes the right of a businessman to advertise, publicise and promote sales of his products and which is popularly referred to as commercial speech. It was urged that the impugned amendments constitute an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners right of freedom of commercial speech and the direct and inevitable effect of the amendments is to curtail or restrict the petitioners fundamental rights. Shri Chinoy submitted that commercial speech results in the education of the citizens of this country endowing them with sufficient choice in their consumption pattern, and the amendment seeks to limit the circulation of information to which citizens are entitled by virtue of the constitutional guarantee. It was further contended that the main source of income for newspapers is from advertisement and direct and inevitable effect of the impugned amendments would be to reduce the advertisements and, thereby, to curtail the circulation of the newspapers, and which would directly affect the freedom of press. Shri Jetly, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Department, on the other hand, contended that the challenge to the amended provisions as violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India is not correct. It was submitted that the assumption of the petitioners that there is a restraint on commercial speech and the direct and inherent effect of the amendments would affect the freedom of the press is not accurate. The leaned Counsel urged that the amendments provide for denial of exemption to large business houses who incur expenditure over sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- on advertisements, and running and maintenance of aircrafts, motor-cars and payment made to hotels. It was submitted that denial of 20% of excess tax over one hundred thousand rupees while computing the deduction on the income chargeable can by no stretch of imagination be violative of Article 19(1)(a) as there is no absolute immunity to the advertisements from taxation. It was urged that the fiscal statute cannot be struck down when the direct and inevitable effect of the impugned amendment is not to curtail or to restrict the right to advertisements but merely to regulate. In view of the rival submissions, the question which requires answer is whether the amended provisions are violative of protection guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 6. In view of the rival submissions, the question which requires answer is whether the amended provisions are violative of protection guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 6. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India provides that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. Article 19(2) provides that nothing in sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by sub-clause provided it is in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, etc.. Shri Chinoy submitted that while introducing the Finance Bill, the reasons given by the Finance Minister in support of the impugned amendments were as follows: "Honble members must be aware of levish and wasteful expenditure by trade and industry, particularly on travelling, advertisement and the like. With a view to inculcating a climate of austerity and providing a disincentive to non-productive, avoidable and ostentatious spending by trade and industry, I propose to provide that 20% of such expenditure will be disallowed in computing the taxable profits." The learned Counsel urged that the intention for carrying out the amendment is not to levy tax but to prevent non-productive, avoidable and ostentatious spending by the trade, it was suggested that from the speech of the Finance Minister, an inference is inevitable that the amendments were introduced with a view to curtail or restrain the commercial speech. The learned Counsel placed strong reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court 515 (Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and others. v. Union of India and others)2, A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 305, (Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India)3, and A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 544, (Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi v. Union of India)4, in support of the submission. Before adverting to the decisions relied upon and to determine whether the amended provisions directly put restrain upon commercial speech or the freedom of speech and expression on businessman to advertise, it is necessary to refer to the exact ambit of the amended provisions under challenge. Before adverting to the decisions relied upon and to determine whether the amended provisions directly put restrain upon commercial speech or the freedom of speech and expression on businessman to advertise, it is necessary to refer to the exact ambit of the amended provisions under challenge. Section 37 of the Income Tax Act provides that any expenditure not being expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession shall be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head "profits and gains of business or profession". To the general rule, exception is carved out by amended provisions of sub-section (3-A) of section 37. The sub-section provides that where the expenditure incurred by the assessee on any one or more of the items specified in sub-section (3-B) exceeds one hundred thousand rupees, twenty per cent of such excess shall not be allowed as deduction in computing the income chargeable under the head "Profits and gains of business or professions". The items specified in sub-section (3-B) are: (a) advertisement, publicity and sales promotion; or (b) running and maintenance of aircraft and motor cars ; or (c) payments made to hotels. Sub-sections (3-C) and (3-D) are not relevant for the challenge raised by the petitioners. The perusal of the amended provisions makes it clear that normally sub-sections (3-A) and (3-B) would come into play in case of large business houses who incur expenditure of more than Rs. 1,00,000 on advertisement, running and maintenance of aircrafts and motor cars and payment made to hotels. It is unlikely that the expenditure would cross the limits of Rs. 1,00,000/- unless the turn over of the assessee is far in excess of a lac of rupees. 7. The gravemen of the complaint urged on behalf of the petitioners is that commercial advertisements constitute speech and expression as contemplated under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The petitioners claim that speech and expression cannot be curtailed or restricted because the Government considers such speech and expression to be socially unproductive. 7. The gravemen of the complaint urged on behalf of the petitioners is that commercial advertisements constitute speech and expression as contemplated under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The petitioners claim that speech and expression cannot be curtailed or restricted because the Government considers such speech and expression to be socially unproductive. It is further claimed that the tax or other fiscal measures cannot be imposed for the purpose of curtailing or restricting the volume of expression or for controlling its content and any fiscal measure taken for such purposes must necessarily be unconstitutional unless protected by Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Shri Chinoy submitted that perusal of the Finance Ministers speech establishes the object of levy and situation it was sought to remedy and, therefore, the impugned fiscal levy directly seeks to curtail the volume of advertising on the ground that Government considers such expenditure/activity as wasteful and unproductive. Shri Chinoy submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 544, Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi v.Union of India, indicated that commercial advertising would not fall within the expression "speech and expression" under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India but the subsequent decision in A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 305, Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, and A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court 515, Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, clearly establish that commercial speech can also come within the ambit of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. 8. At this stage, it would be convenient to make reference to the decision cited by Shri Chinoy in support of the submission. In the case reported in 1951 Supreme Court Reports 682, (The State of Bombay and another v. F.N. ...Balsara)5, the Supreme Court examined the expression "commending" in section 23(a) and section 24(1)(a) of Bombay Prohibition Act to determine whether the expression "commending" intoxicant are said to conflict with the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court observed that there can be no doubt that the prohibition against "commending" intoxicant is a curtailment of the right guaranteed and it can be supported only if it is saved by Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court observed that there can be no doubt that the prohibition against "commending" intoxicant is a curtailment of the right guaranteed and it can be supported only if it is saved by Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. The next decision referred to is reported in A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 544, where the question of constitutionality of the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954 arose for consideration. The Supreme Court in paragraph 17 of the judgment observed that an advertisement is no doubt a form of speech but its true character is reflected by the object for the promotion of which it is employed. It assumes the attributes and elements of the activity under Article 19(1)(a) which seeks to aid by bringing it to the notice of the public. When it takes the form of a commercial advertisement which has an element of trade or commerce, it no longer falls within the concept of freedom of speech, for the object is not propagation of ideas, social, political or economic, or furtherance of literature or human thought, but the commendation of the efficiency, value and importance of certain goods. Shri Chinoy suggested that the decision in Hamdards case indicates that commercial advertisement will not attract Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The submission is not accurate because the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 18 of the judgment : "It cannot be said, therefore, that every advertisement is a matter dealing with freedom of speech nor can it be said that it is an expression of ideas. In every case one has to see what is the nature of the advertisement and what activity falling under Article 19(1) it seeks to further." From the above observations, it is obvious that the Supreme Court never intended to lay down a principle that commercial advertising does not constitute speech and expression within Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The next decision relied upon is reported in A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 305. The constitutional validity of Newspaper (Price and Page) Order, 1960 came for consideration. The effect of the Act and the impugned Order was to regulate the number of pages according to the price charged, prescribe the number of supplements to be published and prohibit the publication and sale of newspapers in contravention of any order made under section 3 of the Act. The effect of the Act and the impugned Order was to regulate the number of pages according to the price charged, prescribe the number of supplements to be published and prohibit the publication and sale of newspapers in contravention of any order made under section 3 of the Act. The Act also provided for regulating the sizes and area of advertising matter in relation to other matters contained in a newspaper. Mr. Justice Mudholkar speaking for the Bench observed: "It may well be within the power of the State to place, in the interest of the general public, restrictions upon the right of a citizen to carry on business but it is not open to the State to achieve this object by directly and immediately curtailing any other freedom of that citizen guaranteed by the Constitution and which is not suspectible of abridgment on the same grounds as are set out in Clause 6 of Article 19. Therefore, the right of freedom of speech cannot be taken away with the object of placing restrictions on the business activities of a citizen. Freedom of speech can be restricted only in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence. It cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be curtailed in the interest of the general public. If a law directly affecting it is challenged, it is no answer that the restrictions enacted by it are justifiable under Clauses (3) to (6). For the scheme of Article 19 is to enumerate different freedom separately and then to specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected and the objects for securing which this could be done. A citizen is entitled to enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together and Clause (1) does not prefer one freedom to another. That is the plain meaning of this clause. It follows from this that the State cannot make a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. All the greater reason, therefore, for holding that the State cannot directly restrict one freedom by placing an otherwise permissible restriction on another freedom." The next decision is reported in A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court 106, (Bennet Coleman and Co. All the greater reason, therefore, for holding that the State cannot directly restrict one freedom by placing an otherwise permissible restriction on another freedom." The next decision is reported in A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court 106, (Bennet Coleman and Co. Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others)6, where import policy for newsprint for the year April, 1972 to March, 1973 was challenged on the ground of infringement of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). The Supreme Court observed that the tests of pith and substance of the subject matter and of direct and of incidental effect of the legislation are relevant to questions of legislative competence but they are irrelevant to the question of infringement of fundamental rights. It was then observed in paragraph 39 of the judgment that the true test is whether the effect of the impugned action is to take away or abridge fundamental rights. It was further observed: "If it be assumed that the direct object of the law or action has to be direct abridgement of the right of free speech by the impugned law or action, it is to be related to the directness of effect and not to the directness of the subject matter of the impeached law or action. The action may have a direct effect on a fundamental right although its direct subject matter may be different." 9. The last decision of the Supreme Court to which reference was made is A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court 515, Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others. The challenge was to the validity of the imposition of import duty on newsprint imported from abroad under section 12 of the Customs Act and the levy of auxiliary duty under the Finance Act. The Supreme Court after exhaustively setting out the importance of the freedom of speech and expression which includes the freedom of speech proceeded to consider whether it is open to the Government to levy any tax on any of the aspects of the press and the question posed was "Do newspapers have immunity from taxation?" After exhaustive consideration of the subject, the Supreme Court held that newspapers cannot claim immunity from taxation. As to whether the tax levied on newspaper industry transgresses into the field of freedom of expression and stifles that freedom, the Supreme Court observed: "As long as it is within reasonable limits and does not impede freedom of expression it will not be contravening the limitations of Article 19(2). The delicate task of determining when it crosses from the area of profession, occupation, trade, business or industry into the area of freedom of expression and interferes with that freedom is entrusted to the courts." The Supreme Court then examined the earlier decisions is Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. and Bennet Coleman Company and observed that the impugned provisions have direct consequence of curtailment of advertisement. The freedom is violated by placing restraint upon integral part of the freedom or by placing restraint upon something which is initial part of the freedom. Shri Chinoy referred to decision of United States Supreme Court reported in 48 United States Supreme Court Reports 346, (Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.)7. The question examined was whether protection of First Amendment is available for "commercial speech". The issue arose as the Pharamacists published the advertisement of prescription drug prices and the nature of advertisement was summarised in following words: "The "idea" he wishes to communicate is simply this: "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price." The Supreme Court examined whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment. After taking into consideration various decisions, it was held that the communication is not outside the protection of the First Amendment. The decisions referred to on behalf of the petitioners does establish that the commercial advertising constitutes speech and expression within Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. 10-A The real question which requires determination is whether the impugned amendments in section 37 of the Income Tax Act restrains or curtails commercial speech. The decisions referred to on behalf of the petitioners does establish that the commercial advertising constitutes speech and expression within Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. 10-A The real question which requires determination is whether the impugned amendments in section 37 of the Income Tax Act restrains or curtails commercial speech. In the decision reported in A.I.R. 1958 Supreme Court 578, (Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India)8, the question arose as to whether the Wage Board specifying the wages and conditions of service of the Working Journalists and imposing certain financial burden was an infrigement of right of freedom of press and Shri Justice Bhagwati speaking for the Bench observed: "Unless these were the direct or inevitable consequences of the measures enacted in the impugned Act, it would not be possible to strike down the legislation as having that effect and operation. A possible eventuality of this type would not necessarily be the consequence which could be in the contemplation of the legislature while enacting a measure of this type for the benefit of the workmen concerned." The Supreme Court referred with approval to the decision referred in (1935)297 U.S. 233, (Crosjean v. American Press Co.)9, for the proposition that a statute imposing a tax on the business of publishing advertisements would be void if it was found to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public was entitled by virtue of the constitutional guarantees. 10-B Bearing this principle in mind, it is necessary to examine whether the provisions of section 37(3-A) of the Income Tax Act put a restraint or curtails the right of the advertiser to publish commercial advertisements so as to attract the prohibition contained in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. In our judgment, it is impossible to accede to the submission that the Parliament had found deliberate and calculated device in the guise of the tax to limit the right of advertiser of commercial speech. It is also difficult to accede to the submission that the enactment of sub-sections (3-A) and (3-B) of section 37 of Income Tax Act has direct inevitable consequences of infringing upon the protection guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. It is also difficult to accede to the submission that the enactment of sub-sections (3-A) and (3-B) of section 37 of Income Tax Act has direct inevitable consequences of infringing upon the protection guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. As mentioned hereinabove, sub-section (3-A) prescribes that when the aggregate expenditure incurred by the assessee exceeds one hundred thousand rupees, then 20% of such excess shall not be allowed as deduction in computing the income chargeable under the head "Profits and gains of business or profession". It is necessary to bear in mind that there is no restriction whatsover on the expenses which an assessee can incur on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion or running and maintenance of aircraft and motor cars or payments made to hotels. The legislature has provided for levy of tax by prescribing that 20% of the excess shall not be allowed as deduction in cases where the aggregate expenditure exceeds one hundred thousand rupees. The Supreme Court in the case of Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Limited, held that even the newspapers are not immune from taxation. In the present case, we are concerned not with the taxation in regard to newspapers but taxation on assessee who incur expenditure in excess of one hundred thousand rupees in respect of items specified in sub-section (3-B) of section 37 of Income Tax Act and which, inter alia, refers to the expenses in regard to advertisement, publicity and sales promotion. The principle that even though the commercial speech falls within the ambit of Article 19(1)(a) is accepted, that would not give immunity to an assessee from payment of taxes in respect of advertisements. In this connection, it is interesting to note that earlier by Finance Act, 1978, sub-sections (3-A) to (3-D) were inserted in section 37 of the Act and these sub-sections were omitted by Finance Act, 1980. In those sub-sections, the aggregate expenditure which was in excess of Rs. 40,000/- was not allowed deduction at a certain percentage depending upon the turnover. The Legislature in its wisdom raised the limit of aggregate expenditure of one hundred thousand rupees before depriving 20% of such expenses from deduction in computing the income tax chargeable. In those sub-sections, the aggregate expenditure which was in excess of Rs. 40,000/- was not allowed deduction at a certain percentage depending upon the turnover. The Legislature in its wisdom raised the limit of aggregate expenditure of one hundred thousand rupees before depriving 20% of such expenses from deduction in computing the income tax chargeable. In our judgment, the contention of the petitioners that the tax or the fiscal measure under sub-section (3-A) and sub-section(3-D) was imposed for the purpose of curtailing or restricting or controlling commercial speech is not correct. The sub-sections do not curtail or restrict the expenditure which an assessee desires to incur, nor restricts the contents of such advertisements but merely provides that in case the assessee exceeds a particular limit, then 20% of such excess shall not be allowed as deduction. In our judgment, the provisions of sub-sections (3-A) and (3-B) of section 37 of the Income Tax Act have no consequence to transgress the freedom of publishing advertisement either directly or even remotely. It is well settled that unless the impugned provisions have direct or inevitable consequence to transgress upon the freedom of speech, it is not possible to strike down the legislation as having that effect and operation. The reliance by Shri Chinoy on the speech of Finance Minister at the time of introduction of Finance Act cannot lead to the conclusion that fiscal levy seeks to curtail the volume of advertising on the ground that such expenditure is wasteful and unproductive. The speech of the Finance Minister must be read in its proper context and it cannot be overlooked that the provisions of sub-section (3-B) of section 37 do not refer merely to expenditure incurred on advertisements but also running and maintenance of aircrafts and motor cars and payments made to hotels. The speech of the Finance Minister cannot be limited only to the expenditure incurred on advertisements and reading it in its proper perspective, it is obvious that fiscal levy is not a restraint on the speech and expression of advertiser in publishing the advertisements. 10-C. While examining the complaint of restraint on advertisements, it is not possible to equate the right to publish advertisements with freedom of speech guaranteed to newspapers. 10-C. While examining the complaint of restraint on advertisements, it is not possible to equate the right to publish advertisements with freedom of speech guaranteed to newspapers. The complaint of Shri Chinoy that the restriction on the advertiser in view of provisions of sub-section (3-A) of section 37 of the Act would indirectly effect the revenue of the newspaper leading to the decrease in circulation and, therefore, impeaches on the freedom of speech guaranteed to the newspapers cannot be accepted. The claim is far-fetched and of remote consequence as there is no restriction on the assessee to incur expenditure beyond Rs. 1,00,000/- on advertisements and consequently, the complaint that the freedom of press will be violated is imaginary. In our judgment, the challenge to the provisions of sub-sections (3-A) to (3-D) of section 37 of the Income Tax Act as introduced by section 17(b) of the Finance Act, 1983 in without any merit and the petition must fail. 11. Accordingly, rule is discharged with costs. Petition fail.