S. NAINAR SUNDARAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS Letters Patent Appeal has been directed against the orders of rejection pronounced by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 4388 of 1983 dated January 17 1984 ( 2 ) THE appellant-petitioner had approached this Court by way of the said Special Civil Application making a grievance in respect of the fixation of his pay scales. According to him his pay scales should have been fixed in conformity with the criteria prescribed by the University Grants Commission and not according to the University. The stand taken by the respondent was that they are not governed by the University Grants Commission criteria but they have got their own criteria for the fixation of the pay scale. The learned single Judge has firstly taken into consideration the fact that there was a controversy calling upon decision on disputed questions of fact. The learned single Judge was also of the opinion that the dispute between the appellant-petitioner and the respondents regarding the fixation of his pay scale had commenced in July 1975 and that the petitioner has preferred to approach this Court by way of filing the Special Civil Application only in the year 1983. The learned single Judge therefore was of the opinion that the proceedings taken out by the petitioner suffered gross delay. The learned single Judge was not able to countenance the contention raised by the appellant-petitioner in this respect saying that his representations were pending at various stages and therefore he had preferred to wait for the decision on the representations and that therefore he had approached this Court only in the year 1983. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel Mr. Shailesh Brahmbhatt who appears on behalf of the appellant-petitioner has urged that various representations were made and the appellant-petitioner was assured that his representations would be considered. It is also the contention of the learned counsel Mr. Brahmbhatt that hearings were also given and all this procedure adopted by the respondents would go to show that the dispute which was pending between the appellant- petitioner and the respondent was never resolved up to quite a later date. Mr. Brahmbhatt has also invited our attention to Annexure-1 to the affidavit-in-reply which are orders pronounced by the Vice Chancellor dated 7. 10. Mr. Brahmbhatt has also invited our attention to Annexure-1 to the affidavit-in-reply which are orders pronounced by the Vice Chancellor dated 7. 10. 1982 in pursuance of his efforts to convince us that the dispute came to be resolved as late-as in the year 1982 by the above-said orders made by the Vice Chancellor. We are not in a position to accept this explanation coming from learned counsel Mr. Brahmbhatt because as it is evident from the above-said orders made by the Vice-Chancellor dated 7th October -1982 he had preferred to review the whole matter with a view to satisfying his conscience that no injustice was done to the appellant-petitioner but that action was only a gesture in goodwill. The said orders make it abundantly clear that they would not and need not be taken as a starting point for further action. These observations made by the Vice-Chancellor in the concluding portion of the orders dated 7th October 1982 would go to show that the appellant-petitioner has approached quite late on a chapter which according to the Vice Chancellor was a closed one and that he had preferred to examine the entire situation with a view to satisfying his own conscience. Therefore the said orders of the Vice Chancellor dated 7th October 1982 should not be taken as a ground for urging before us that the whole controversy came to a rest only somewhere in October 1982 Learned counsel Mr. JR. Nanavati who appears on behalf of the respondents has pointed out that as a matter of fact such final decisions were required to be taken by the Board of Management and not by the Vice Chancellor. In this situation it further becomes clear that what the Vice Chancellor had done was clearly with a view to satisfying his conscience that the representations being made by the appellant-petitioner are given a quietus. Merely because of these orders the appellant-petitioner would not be in a position to come out of the accusation of gross delay and laches on his part. ( 4 ) IT should also be clarified as urged by learned counsel Mr. JR. Nanavati appearing on behalf of the respondents that the Vice Chancellor was not the ultimate Authority to decide the so- called dispute which was pending between the appellant- petitioner and the respondents. ( 4 ) IT should also be clarified as urged by learned counsel Mr. JR. Nanavati appearing on behalf of the respondents that the Vice Chancellor was not the ultimate Authority to decide the so- called dispute which was pending between the appellant- petitioner and the respondents. Such a dispute if it was ever subsisting was required to be decided and disposed of by the Board of Management. In view of this situation also merely making a representation or a review application to the Vice Chancellor would not assist the appellant-petitioner to come out of the accusation of gross delay. ( 5 ) MR. Brahmbhatt learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Sualal Yadav vs. The State of Rajasthan and others AIR 1977 SC 2050 with a view to urging that when the above-said representation was heard decided and disposed of by the Vice Chancellor at quite a late juncture it would not be permissible for the High Court to resurrect the ground of delay. The facts in the above-said decision on which the learned counsel Mr. Brahmbhatt places reliance were entirely different. As noticed by the Supreme Court in that case the Governor had dismissed the review application holding it to be a case not fit for review and nothing was stated about the ground of delay of two years. In the instant case as pointed out by us earlier the orders of the Vice Chancellor dated 7th October 1982 make it abundantly clear that the above-said exercise was undertaken by him only with a view to seeing that no injustice is done to the appellant-petitioner. Anyhow the orders of the Vice Chancellor make it abundantly clear that his exercise should not be taken as a starting point of further action in a chapter which according to him was a closed one. Therefore the above-said decision on which learned counsel Mr. Brahmbhatt places reliance would not assist him in his submissions before us. ( 6 ) ONE more decision which requires to be taken notice of is the Supreme Court decision in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service Amravati and others AIR 1969 SC 329 . Therefore the above-said decision on which learned counsel Mr. Brahmbhatt places reliance would not assist him in his submissions before us. ( 6 ) ONE more decision which requires to be taken notice of is the Supreme Court decision in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service Amravati and others AIR 1969 SC 329 . While examining the question of delay and the choice of the High Court to issue writs in such cases the Supreme Court has pointed out placing reliance upon the English principles that the conduct in certain cases of the petitioner may amount to delay and laches if said action can be termed as equivalent to a waiver of his right and would put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. We feel that looking to the facts and circumstances of the case the principle laid down by the Supreme Court would be attracted and therefore also it is difficult to come out of the conclusion that the petition filed by the appellant before this Court suffered gross delay and laches. ( 7 ) MERELY because the appellant-petitioner went on making representation after representation and as in the case of the Vice Chancellor to a person who was not officially authorised to decide the pending dispute as it was required to be resolved by the Board of Management we are not in a position to countenance the contention raised by learned counsel Mr. Brahmbhatt that the petition should not have been disposed of by orders of rejection saying that it was bad for gross delay and laches. ( 8 ) THEREFORE in our view we are obliged to endorse the views expressed by the learned single Judge while rejecting the petition of the appellant-petitioner. ( 9 ) AT this juncture learned counsel Mr. Brahmbhatt pleads that despite the dismissal of the present Letters Patent Appeal his client would like to make a representation before the Board of Management for consideration. We would not like to preclude the appellant-petitioner from making such a representation to the Board of Management if he so chooses. It would be open for the Board of Management to consider such a representation if it flows from the appellant-petitioner on merits. We would not like to preclude the appellant-petitioner from making such a representation to the Board of Management if he so chooses. It would be open for the Board of Management to consider such a representation if it flows from the appellant-petitioner on merits. With this we dismiss this Letters Patent Appeal with no order as to costs. Letter Patent Appeal Dismissed. .