Judgment :- 1. The appellant is the first respondent in W.C. No. 73 of 1988 before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour-Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Tiruchirapalli. The present first respondent V. Pakkirisamy was employed in a saw mill at Mayiladuthurai. On March 18, 1988 at about 12.30 p.m. there was an accident in the mill in which Pakkirisamys left hand was cut and severed above the wrist by the saw, he was immediately taken to the Government Hospital, Mayiladuthurai and then to the Thanjavur Medical College Hospital. Inspite of the treatment given, the wrist could not be attached. Thereupon, he filed W.C. No. 473 of 1988 before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour-Commissioner for Workmens Compensation claiming Rs. 22, 400 as damages. He impleaded the appellant therein Abdul Jaleel as the first respondent and Parameswaran the present second respondent as second respondent in that application on the ground that the appellant was the original owner of the saw mill, that he joined the mill when the mill belonged to the appellant and that thereafter the appellant had leased out the mill to the second respondent. 2. The appellant pleaded that since he had leased out the saw mill to the second respondent on August 20, 1987, he had nothing to do with the day to day working of the said mill from that day onwards. He was not the employer of the first respondent at the time of the accident. Hence, the claim for compensation against him was not maintainable. 3. The second respondent contended that he was also not the employer of the worker since it was the appellant who had appointed the first respondent in his mill. He also pleaded that the first respondent is guilty of contributory negligence. 4. Learned Deputy Commissioner of Labour and Commissioner for Workmens Compensation in his order dated August 25, 1989 found that the appellant was the employer of the first respondent and that he was liable to pay Rs. 22, 671 by way of compensation. And this appeal is directed against the said order. 5. The only point urged before this Court by the appellant was that there was no relationship of master and servant between him and the first respondent on the date of the accident and that the liability was only on the second respondent to pay the compensation. And this appeal is directed against the said order. 5. The only point urged before this Court by the appellant was that there was no relationship of master and servant between him and the first respondent on the date of the accident and that the liability was only on the second respondent to pay the compensation. In support of his contention he relied on the averment in the application that in 1987 the appellant had leased out the mill to the second respondent and the evidence of the workman as A.W. 1 that the second respondent alone was paying him the wages and the mill was under the management of the second respondent at the time of the accident, he also pressed into service the statement of the second respondent as R.W. 1 that he did not appoint the first respondent as a worker in his mill. The contract of service was only between the appellant and the first respondent. He also pointed out that under Clause (e) of Sec. 2 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, when the services of a workman are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the workman has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship, the expression "employer" means such other person while the workman is working for him. So even as per the definition of the Act, the second respondent alone was his employer. 6. However, as rightly urged by learned counsel for the first respondent (workman) mere admission of lease cannot mean that the services of the worker have been transferred from the appellant to the second respondent. So long as the services of the workman are not transferred from the lessor to lessee in the manner known to law, the liability of the original employer continues. Sec. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, envisages that where the ownership or management of an undertaking is transferred, whether by agreement or by operation of law, from the employer in relation to that undertaking to a new employer, every workman who has been in continues service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such transfer shall be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 25-F, as if the workman had been retrenched. In this case, it is not the evidence of the second respondent as R.W. 1 that subsequent to his taking over the mill on lease, there was compliance of the provisions of Sec. 25-FF or there was any fresh agreement between himself and the existing workers. Even the appellant as R.W. 2 admits that there was no agreement between himself and the second respondent that all the workers employed by him to be taken as his employees. At any rate, there was no transfer of the services of the employees of the mill from the appellant to the second respondent with the consent of workers. In the absence of any tripartite agreement among lessor, lessee and workman, it cannot be said that liability to pay compensation rests with the lessee. 7. In Pyarchand v. Omkar Lakshman (1970-I-LLJ-492) it has been laid down that a contract for service is incapable of transfer unilaterally. Such a transfer of service from one employer to another can only be effected by a tripartite agreement between the employer, the employee and that third party, the effect of which would be to terminate the original contract of service by mutual consent and to make a new contract between the employee and the third party. So long as the contract of service is not terminated, a new contract is not made as aforesaid, and the employee continues to be in the employment of the employer. Therefore, when an employer orders him to do certain work for another person the employee still continues to be in his employment. The only thing that happens in such a case is that he carries out the orders of his master. The employee has the right to claim his wages from the employer and not from the third party to whom his services are lent or hired. It may be that such a third party may pay his wages during the time that he has hired his services, but that is because of his agreement with the employer. That does not preclude the employee from claiming his wages from the employer. The hirer may also exercise control and direction in the doing of the thing for which he is hired or even the manner in which it is to be done. But if the employee fails to carry out his direction he cannot dismiss him and can only complain to the employer. The hirer may also exercise control and direction in the doing of the thing for which he is hired or even the manner in which it is to be done. But if the employee fails to carry out his direction he cannot dismiss him and can only complain to the employer. The right of dismissal vests with the employer. 8. In Chotila Gram Panchayat v. Jatashankar, 1972 LIC 1178, a Division on Bench of Gujarat High Court has pointed out that except in case of statutory provision to the contrary, right to the service of an employee cannot be the subject-matter of a transfer by employer to a third party without employees consent. Therefore, on this settled legal position, it is quite evident that in the present case there is only a loan of services and not a transfer of the contract of service itself, in favour of the second respondent. So the claim of the appellant that the second respondent alone is liable to pay compensation has no substance and the trial Court has rightly fastened the liability on him. 9. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.