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1993 DIGILAW 324 (DEL)

D. C. M. SRI RAM INDUSTRIES LIMITED v. SHASHI MITTAL

1993-05-25

Y.K.SABHARWAL

body1993
Y. K. Sabharwal, J.- ( 1 ) HE respondent has filed a suit in the Courtof Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi, for grant of decree of permanent injunctionrestraining the defendant from transferring her outside Delhi. The Trialcourt allowed the application of the respondent for grant of interim injunction and restrained the defendant from transferring the plaintiff outsidedelhi till the disposal of the suit. The first appeal filed by the petitionerherein was dismissed by impugned order dated 18/02/1993 made bylearned Additional Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi, and hence this revision petition. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY the case of the plaintiff is that plaintiff was employed withswatantra Bharat Mills as a Telephone Operator and was transferred totextile Marketing Division with effect from 16/05/1988 and again transferred to Hindon River Mills, Delhi, with effect from 7/05/1990 whereshe was promoted to the post of Administrative Supervisor on 4/04/1991. She v/as transferred by the impugned order of transfer dated 2 4/07/1992 to HRM Dasna District Ghaziabad (U. P. ). A decree for permanent injunction is sought restraining the defendant from transferring theplaintiff to Dasna, District Ghaziabad. In the plaint certain vague allegations imputing mela fides to the defendants have been made. The plaint setsout few humanitarian grounds in support of the plea that the transfer willhave adverse effect on her family members. ( 3 ) THE Trial Court in order dated 2/12/1992 has come tothe conclusion that the plaintiff-respondent in this petition has a prima faciecase by observing that it is to be seen as to whether the order of transfer hasbeen made in order to further the administrative intetest of an Organisationor can be termed to be malafide and it would depend upon the evidence tobe led by the parties and on interpretation of terms contained in the appointment letter as to whether the defendant could transfer the plaintiff fromdelhi to Dasna. Regarding the balance of convenience the Trial Court statesthat the transfer would adversely affect the family life of the plaintiff andinvolve extraordinary economic burden on family and has thus restrained thedefendant from transferring the plaintiff outside Delhi. ( 4 ) THE Appellate Court on interpretation of the letter of appointmenthas come to the conclusion that the petitioner/management is acting inbreach of the contract. According to the order of the appellate Court inview of absence of the words "anywhere in India" in the letter of appointment, the management is not entitled to transfer the respondent outsidedelhi. ( 4 ) THE Appellate Court on interpretation of the letter of appointmenthas come to the conclusion that the petitioner/management is acting inbreach of the contract. According to the order of the appellate Court inview of absence of the words "anywhere in India" in the letter of appointment, the management is not entitled to transfer the respondent outsidedelhi. Regarding the balance of convenience the appellate Court statesthat the Company is not providing transport to employees from Delhi tou. P. and thus has come to the conclusion that the balance of conveniencewould lie in favour of the respondent. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the respective contentions Para 3 (a) of theletter of appointment, on which great reliance has been placed in the appellate order, may be reproduced as under : "the management may transfer you for any work in any unitof the Company as it may consider necessary in its discretion fromtime to time and such posting will be governed by the rules andprocedure applicable to that Unit. " ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner contends that the conclusionin the impugned order of the first appellate Court on the basis of the term ofletter of appointment are contrary to law and the Court below has exercisedjurisdiction with material irregularity in coming to the conclusion that onaccount of absence of the words "anywhere in India" in the aforesaid Para3 (a) the respondent cannot be transferred outside Delhi. There is considerable force in the contention of the learned Counsel. According to Para 3 (a),the management has the right to transfer the respondent for work in anyunit of the Company. The said paragraph does not restrict that the unit ofthe Company must be in Delhi. The absence of the words "anywhere inindia" does not mean that if the Company has a unit outside Delhi theemployee cannot be transferred to the said unit. If such a construction isaccepted it would amount to adding to paragraph 3 (a) the words "at Delhi"after the words "any unit of the company". That is not permissible. Thefirst appellate Court exercised jurisdiction with material irregularity in interpreting paragraph 3 (a ). Further, the Courts below have failed to take noticeof the fact that it has not even been pleaded by the respondent in the plaintthat in terms of the letter of appointment the management has no right totransfer her outside Delhi. That is not permissible. Thefirst appellate Court exercised jurisdiction with material irregularity in interpreting paragraph 3 (a ). Further, the Courts below have failed to take noticeof the fact that it has not even been pleaded by the respondent in the plaintthat in terms of the letter of appointment the management has no right totransfer her outside Delhi. The respondent has not been able to show thatthe unit at Dasna to which she has been ordered to be transferred is not theunit of the Company nor has it been so pleaded in the plaint. The plainteven does not refer to the letter of appointment or any term thereof. Asnoticed hereinbefore, the respondent has made only vague allegations ofmalafides and victimisation in the plaint besides setting out certain humanitarian grounds to challenge the order of transfer. The Courts below havenot come to the conclusion that the transfer order was issued with malafideintention. Before me too, Counsel for the respondent has not been able toshow any malafides. The respondent has failed to make out a prima fadecase. ( 7 ) TURNING now to the question of balance of convenience and hardship, it may be noticed that both are inter-linked. In every transfer there isa likelihood of some kind of hardship but that is inevitable and is a necessaryincidence of service. Whenever an employee is ordered to be transferred itis likely that it would cause some inconvenience and hardship to theemployee and the employee may have to incur higher expenses for transportand may have also to spend more time in reaching the place of work. It hasnot been shown that the management has any liability to provide transportto the respondent. The power to transfer of an employee on administrativeexigencies lies with the management and the interference by the Courtwould be called for only in cases where it is shown that the order is punitiveand malafide and not on the ground that it would cause some inconvenienceor hardship to the employee. In regard to hardship and the interference bythe Court with the order of transfer, the observations of the Supreme Courtin Rajendra Roy v. Union of India and Another, (1993) I, Supreme Courtcases 148, may be noticed here :- "the order of transfer often causes a lot of difficulties and dislocation in the family set-up of the concerned employees but onthat score the order of transfer is not liable to be struck down. Ina transferable post an order of transfer is a normal consequence andpersonal difficulties are matters for consideration of the department. Unless such order is passed malafide or in violation of the rules ofservice and guidelines for transfer without any proper justification,the Court and the Tribunal should not interfere with the order oftransfer. " ( 8 ) IN view of the aforesaid the impugned orders are liable to be setaside. Before parting, however, I may notice that the respondent has pleaded in the plaint that there is nobody to look after her old mother-in-law andher young female child. Counsel for the respondent submits that the transfer will have adverse effect on the old lady and the young girl. Havingregard to the family circumstances of the respondent, I have no doubt, thatif the respondent after some time when the School of her young female childreopens, makes a representation to the management for being transferredback to Delhi, the management would consider the said representation onmerit but sympathetically. With these observations the revision petition isallowed and impugned orders are set aside leaving the parties to bear theirown costs. The expression of opinion in this order is prima facie and wouldnot affect the merits of the controversy in the suit.