JUDGMENT : R.R.K. Trivedi, J. In this petition notice has been accepted by the learned standing Counsel for both the Respondents and in view of the short question involved on which, basis the petition may be decided finally, it is not necessary to call for a counter-affidavit. Both the learned Counsel have agreed that petition may be decided finally at this stage. 2. Facts giving rise to this petition are that Petitioner is an elected Pradhan of Gaon Sabha Phulawaria, Block Bhatpura, Tahsil Nawabganj, district-Bareilly. On certain complaints proceedings u/s 95(1) (g) of the U P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were initiated against Petitioner. He was served with a chargesheet on 21-12-1991 which is Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition. Petitioner filed reply and contested the proceedings. However, Respondent No. 2 by his order dated 23-1-1993 removed Petitioner from office of Pradhan. True copy of the order is Annexure 3 to the Writ Petition. From the aforesaid order Petitioner preferred an appeal before Collector, Bareilly which too has been dismissed by order dated 31-3-1993 passed by Respondent No. 1, Aggrieved from the aforesaid orders, Petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, 3. Learned Counsel for Petitioner has challenged the order of removal dated 23-1-1993 on the ground that the order is violative of principles of natural justice and has been passed without affording ah opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner as required under the First proviso to Section 95(1) of the Act which provides that no action shall be taken under Clauses (f), (g) or (h) except after giving to the body or person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed. Learned Counsel for Petitioner has submitted that the aforesaid proviso has been considered by a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court and it has been held that the aforesaid phrase used in the Proviso (i) means that the person concerned should be given two opportunities; the first opportunity is by which chargesheet is served and Petitioner is called upon to submit his replies and thereafter the enquiry is held and the second, opportunity should be given when the Authority applies its mind to the material on record and the charges and records finding for taking the proposed action. Learned Counsel for Petitioner has placed reliance for the aforesaid submission in a case of Jangali Singh v. Sub-Divisional Officer 1977 AWC 497 . Learned Counsel has submitted that from the impugned order passed by Respondent No. 1 it is clear that he did not give any such opportunity to Petitioner after the enquiry report dated 29-5-1992 was submitted by the Enquiry Officer/Tahsildar, Nawabganj and Respondent No. 1 straightway passed the order of removal against Petitioner. Learned Counsel has submitted that the impugned order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and the statutory provision and thus the order is void and cannot be sustained. The question was raised and argued in appeal before the Respondent No. 2 but as he has failed to consider this aspect of the case and has committed a manifest illegality, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 4. Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, has submitted that the orders do not suffer from any error of law. The two opportunities of hearing may be required to be given in those cases where several punishments are prescribed and may be given by the disciplinary Authority and the Authority concerned has to apply his mind as to which of the penalty may be adequate or suitable for the misconduct alleged against the employee. However, in the case of Pradhan, if the charges are proved, the only course open is to. pass an order of removal from the office for which notice is given at the initiation of the proceedings along with the chargesheet. The learned Standing Counsel has further submitted that the Full Bench of this Court in case of Abdul Wahab v. District Magistrate, Basti 1973 RC 136, has considered rules of natural justice and the compliance thereof in the proceedings u/s 95(1) (g) of the Act and the Full Bench has not said that Pradhan should be given two opportunities. Learned Standing Counsel has further submitted that the aforesaid Full Bench case has not been considered by the Division Bench which decided the case of Jangali Singh relied on by learned Counsel- for Petitioner and as such it cannot be said that the view expressed by the learned Judge's of the Division Bench is good law on the point. 5. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for parties and perused the material on record. 5. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for parties and perused the material on record. Before coming to the legal question involved, it is necessary to consider certain facts which are clear from the record. It appears that the chargesheet dated 21-12-1991, Annexure 1 to the Writ Petition, was served on the Petitioner and Tahsildar, Nawabganj, was appointed as enquiry officer. The reply was submitted by Petitioner and thereafter enquiry was completed and report dated 29-5-1992 was submitted. The first paragraph of the impugned order is very relevant for appreciating the controversy in the present case which is being reproduced below: Shree Jwala Prasad Pradhan Gaon Sabha Phulwaiya ke virudh aarop patra dinank 21-12-91 ko diya gaya tha jiske uttar unhone janch adhikari Tahsildar Nawabganj ke sammukh prastut kiya. Janch adhikari ne apni janch akhya dinank 29-5-92 ko prastut kee parantu tatkaleen Pargan adhikari dwara ispar koi adesh nehi ko sake. Pradhan ke virudh lagaye gaye aarop uske spastikaran tatha janch adhikari ke akhya ka maine ablokan kiya tatha' stithi nimn parkar paya gaye hai. 6. From a perusal of the aforesaid extract from the impugned order, it is clear that Respondent no, 1 after receiving the report of the enquiry officer did not give any Show Cause Notice and reasonable opportunity of bearing to Petitioner for taking the action as proposed under Proviso (1) of Section 95(1) of the Act. Respondent No. 1 based his findings on the report of the enquiry officer. The witnesses and the documents were examined by the Tahsildar and not by Respondent No. 1. The entire proceedings of the enquiry and the conclusion mentioned in the enquiry report was an exercise done by the Tahsildar. The hearing of the case upto that stage was before the enquiry officer. In my opinion, after receipt of the enquiry report a reasonable opportunity of showing- cause against the action proposed should have been given to the Petitioner. In case of Jangali Singh, the Sub-Divisional Officer himself had held the enquiry and had examined witnesses and thereafter he straightaway passed the order of removal against the Pradhan. In my opinion, after receipt of the enquiry report a reasonable opportunity of showing- cause against the action proposed should have been given to the Petitioner. In case of Jangali Singh, the Sub-Divisional Officer himself had held the enquiry and had examined witnesses and thereafter he straightaway passed the order of removal against the Pradhan. The Division Bench disapproved the procedure adopted and after relying on the view expressed by Privy Council in case of AIR 1948 121 (Privy Council) and Khen Chand v. Union of India AIR 1953 SC 300, concludes as under: In the light of the principle laid down in the aforesaid authorities, we are of the opinion that the concept of reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed as required by Section 95(1) (g) clearly envisages that a Pradhan must be given two opportunities, one at the stage When the charges are” enquired into at the stage of enquiry and the other at the stage when the authorities concerned come to the conclusion as to whether the charges or proved or not and provisionally propose the action against the Pradhan. If any of the two opportunities are not given to the Pradhan the statutory requirement of reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed will not be fulfilled. The expression reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed” was interpreted by the Privy Counsel and the Supreme Court. Even then the legislature enacted the proviso to Section (95)(1)(g) by the Amending Act No. III of 1973, it knew the extent and scope of the opportunity contemplated under the said expression. Since the proviso to Section 95(1) (g) was enacted by the legislature at a time when opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed was well established by the Privy Council and Supreme Court, it must be presumed that the legislature deliberately used the said expression which indicates the legislative intent that a Pradhan should be given two opportunities before his removal. 7. The Division Bench has taken the view that after the charges are found to be established, the Pradhan is entitled to contend that the charges are not proved and that the findings are not correct and that the charges even if proved do not require the punishment proposed to be meted out to him and this is the concept of reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed. In my opinion, the view expressed by the Division Bench squarely covers the present case and the impugned orders cannot be sustained. 8. Learned Standing Counsel, however, placed reliance on a Full Bench case of Re: Abdul Wahab, The reference to the Full Bench was made in view of the conflict in the two Division Bench decisions of this Court, namely Ved Singh Pradhan Vs. Assistant Sub-Divisional Officer and Others, AIR 1965 All 370 and in case Hari Chand v. State of U.P. 1970 AWR 48. It may be noticed that the Full Bench was considering the provisions of Section 95(1) (g) as they stood before the Amendment introduced by the U.P. Rural local Self Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973, i.e., U.P. Act No. III of 1973, which was published on 22-1-1973 and came into force with effect from November 24, 1972. The Full Bench judgment was delivered on 4-9-1972, i.e., before the amending Act came into force. The provisions of Section 95 were extensively amended. The proviso (i) and (ii) to Section 95 were inserted for the first time by Section 13 of the aforesaid Act. Thus the proviso in question which has been relied on by the learned Counsel for Petitioner and interpreted by the Division Bench was not on the Statute Book when the Full Bench judgment was delivered. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the view expressed by the Division Bench in any way is inconsistent with the view expressed by the Full Bench and is not good law. The Full Bench clearly observed that where no particular procedure is prescribed as is the case u/s 95(1) (g) of the Act it would be enough compliance with the principles of natural justice” if the charges are duly communicated to the person concerned, the result of the enquiry, if any, is made known to him and the material which is sought to be used against him is disclosed to him and he is afforded adequate opportunity to meet the charges and to lead evidence in rebuttal. In my opinion, from the aforesaid observation, the view expressed by the Division Bench is fortified that after conclusion of the enquiry, its result should be made known to the person concerned, its result should be made known to the person concerned. It is this opportunity which has been said by the Division Bench as second opportunity. In my opinion, from the aforesaid observation, the view expressed by the Division Bench is fortified that after conclusion of the enquiry, its result should be made known to the person concerned, its result should be made known to the person concerned. It is this opportunity which has been said by the Division Bench as second opportunity. It can be safely assumed that, the legislature while enacting the U.P. Act No. III of 1973 was fully aware of the view expressed by the Full Bench of this Court and the legislature purposely and intentionally used the phraseology in Proviso (i) which requires that opportunity should be given to the Pradhan even after conclusion of the enquiry and when the Authority makes up its mind to take action proposed. It may be mentioned that the office of Pradhan is of vital importance to carryout the provisions of the Act and the provisions of several other Acts like U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. Importance has been further added as the Pradhan has a pivotal role to play in implementing the schemes under Jawahar Rozgar Yojna. The village administration and the development which the various schemes aim to promote are to be effected through Pradhan. He heads the functioning of the democracy at the grass-root level. The legislature realising the importance has intended to provide protection to Pradhan in the same way as it is provided to the Government servants. In my opinion, in the present case, Respondent No. 1 passed the order in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and failed to give reasonable opportunity of showing cause to the Petitioner at the vital stage and the order passed by him removing Petitioner from the office of. Pradhan. cannot be sustained. The Respondent No. 2 also failed to consider this vital aspect of the case and simply expressed his agreement with the order and failed to have a critical examination of the order passed by the Respondent No. 1 which is normally expected from a Court or Authority sitting in appeal, which is rehearing of the entire case on all questions of law and fact. 9. For the reasons recorded above, this Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated 23-1-1993, Annexure 3 to the Writ Petition, and order dated 31-3-1993 passed by Respondent No. 4 Annexure 4 to the Writ Petition, are quashed. 9. For the reasons recorded above, this Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated 23-1-1993, Annexure 3 to the Writ Petition, and order dated 31-3-1993 passed by Respondent No. 4 Annexure 4 to the Writ Petition, are quashed. It is made clear that it will be open to the Authority to take action against the Petitioner in accordance with law after giving him reasonable opportunity of hearing if it so desires. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.