L. RATH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner along with his mother faced trial under sections 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act on account of commission of suicide by the wife of the petitioner Mayarani married to him on 7. 6. 1986. The death occurred on 31. 10. 1987. On trial the mother of the petitioner was acquitted but the petitioner being found guilty of all the charges was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years under section 498a, I. P. C. further rigorous imprisonment for three years under section 306. I. P. C. and also rigorous imprisonment for six months under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act with all the sentences directed to run con-currently. The appeal preferred by the petitioner having been dismissed, the present revision has been filed assailing the conviction and the sentence. ( 2 ) THE skeletogenous facts are that after her marriage on 7. 6. 1985 the deceased stayed with her mother-in-law for about 1 years or 2 years whereafter she came to stay with the petitioner at Rourkela where he was employed. The suicide having occurred on 31. 10. 1987, the matter was reported by P. W. 15 on the next day at about 1 p. m. in the sector-is Police Station, Rourkela where upon U. D. Case No. 15 of 1987 was registered and investigation was taken up. During the investigation, the investigating officer seized two letters Exts. 4/1 and 6/1 purported to have been written by the deceased to her father and a suicide note left by her in a diary exhibited as Ext. 512 in the case. On the report of the investigation officer the F. I. R. was registered under sections 498- A and 306, I. P. C. and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. ( 3 ) AS is fairly conceded by the learned Additional Government Advocate, the conviction of the petitioner is exclusively based upon the evidence P. Ws. 10, 11, 12 and 13 and Exts. 4/1, 6/1 and 5/2 P. W. 10 is the mother of the deceased, P. W. 11 is the father and P. Ws. 12 and 13 are the two brothers of the deceased. It is the submission of Mr. Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner that their evidence is not believable and that there is no acceptance evidence of Exts. 4/1, 6/1 and 5/2 P. W. 10 is the mother of the deceased, P. W. 11 is the father and P. Ws. 12 and 13 are the two brothers of the deceased. It is the submission of Mr. Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner that their evidence is not believable and that there is no acceptance evidence of Exts. 4/1, 6/1 and 5/2 to have been authored by the deceased and that at any rate these documents were not put to the petitioner during his examination under section 313, Cr. P. C. . ( 4 ) ADMITTEDLY there is no direct evidence of the petitioner abetting the suicide of his wife, but the death having occurred within seven years of the marriage, both the trial as well as the appellate courts have drawn presumption under section 113-A of the Evidence Act the petitioner to have abetted the suicide. For conviction under Section 498-A of I. P. C. as also under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the evidence as earlier stated has been relied upon. So far as section 113a of the Evidence Act is concerned, it is explicit that the aid of the provision can be taken only if it is shown not only that the suicide occurred within seven years of the marriage but that either the husband or his relatives had subjected the lady to cruelty: Hence it is necessary for the prosecution to establish that in fact the victim had been subjected to cruelty by the accused. The only evidence in that regard is available from Exts. 4/1, 5/2 and 6/1. The evidence that these documents were written by deceased Mayarani however comes only from P. Ws: 11, 12 and 13. It is however pointed out by Mr. Panada that these witnesses were examined by the police only on 1. 8. 1988, i. e. about ten months after the occurrence. A reference to the evidence of the investigating officer P. W. 17 does snot show him to have breathed a word as to the reason of such delayed examination. These writings had been seized on 1. 11. 1987 and 2. 11. 1987 and hence there could be no earthly reason as to why investigation regarding these writings was delayed for a period of ten months. Such grossly delayed examination of the witness justifiably raises grave suspicion on the genuineness of the prosecution case. These writings had been seized on 1. 11. 1987 and 2. 11. 1987 and hence there could be no earthly reason as to why investigation regarding these writings was delayed for a period of ten months. Such grossly delayed examination of the witness justifiably raises grave suspicion on the genuineness of the prosecution case. In a Division bench decision of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 166 of 1986 (Prafulla Jena and another v. The State) decided on 21. 12. 1988 it was held:in that view of the matter, non-examination of the two witness for such a long period leaves the scope wide open for the witnesses to embellish their version to the advantage of the prosecution and it appear as if there was an attempt of dressing the prosecution. "reliance was placed to reach that conclusion on two decision of the Supreme Court reported in Subhash and another v. State of M. P. . In the earlier decision the evidence of the daughter of the deceased was rejected as her statement was recorded at late night on the same day though the investigating officer had reached the spot around at 2. 30 p. m. In the latter case where the witness was examined one and half months after the date of the incident and no explanation, had been offered for the delayed examination, the evidence was not found to be acceptable. Reliance was also placed on Gunduchi Patnaik and another v. State of Orissa, where no disclosure had been made by the witness to the police for about thirteen days and no explanation had been furnished of such non-disclosure. It is true that a defect in investigation is not always automatically to culminate in throwing out of the prosecution case and acquittal of the accused arid that unless the 1. 0. has been asked in the cross-examination regarding the defect, his evidence is not to be rejected only on account of the defect. Yet it has to be appreciated that where the defect in the investigation is so fundamental and strikes at a deeper root, the entire prosecution case thereby faulters and the Court may not rely upon and justifiably on the genuineness of the prosecution case unless plausible and acceptable explanation comes forth for the deficiency. ( 5 ) COUPLED with such facts, there is another grave defect in the conduct of the case. Exts. ( 5 ) COUPLED with such facts, there is another grave defect in the conduct of the case. Exts. 4/1, 512 and 6/1 being crucial documents as they were never put to the petitioner in his examination under section 313, Cr. P. C. and instead the sole question put to him was question No. 6 which was in the following words:"the above witness further state that Mayarani wrote a letter to them alleging about your misbehaviour, ill treatment and torture on her and written to them that she was disgusted with life and wanted to commit suicide. What have you got to say? The-answer of the petitioner was No Sir Ext. 6/2, suicide note, was at least net a letter. The question never mentioned as to which letter it was referring. There were two letters. It was incumbent on the part of the Court to have specifically brought to the notice of the petitioner the letters purported to have been write by Mayarani. That opportunity was not give to him. Throughout the evidence in cross-examination the petitioner had taken the stand of the letters being not genuine. Such fact appears for the. cross-examination of P. Ws. 11, 12 and 13 to whom specific suggestion was given that these letters were created documents and not written by Mayarani. No steps were taken by the prosecution to prove the genuineness of the letters otherwise. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the prosecution case was established against the petitioner. The view taken by the trial court and the appellate court is therefore not sustainable. " ( 6 ) IN the result, the revision is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the petitioner are set aside. Revision allowed. .