SHAH, J. ( 1 ) ). This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is filed by a duly elected Corporator of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, who was also Ex-Mayor of the Corporation to challenge the constitutional validity of Gujarat Local Authorities (Temporary Postponement of Elections and Extension of Term) Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the Postponement of Election Act"), in so far as it seeks to postpone the General Elections of Councillors of the Corporations in four major metropolis, viz. , Ahmedabad, baroda, Surat and Rajkot. Though in the main petition, a prayer for issuance of writ was made to declare the entire Postponement of Elections Act, 1993 as ultra vires the Constitution of India and for quashing and setting aside the said enactment, it must be stated that at the hearing of this petition, challenge was confined to Sec. 3 (a) of the said Act. It must also be stated that though no specific relief was prayed for holding election of the Councillors of the said Corporations, as a relief consequential to the main relief, in the course of submission, it was also prayed that directions must be issued to the respondents and more particularly to the Commissioners of respective corporations being respondents Nos. 2 to 5 to hold elections of the Councillors at the earliest. ( 2 ) ). In order to appreciate the challenge to the constitutionality of the postponement of Elections Act, 1993, it will be necessary to refer chronologically to the facts and circumstances, which have given rise to the enactment of the Postponement of Elections Act and consequently to the present petition. The relevant Facts are as under : (I) Four Municipal Corporations, viz. , Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, surat Municipal Corporation, Baroda Municipal Corporation and Rajkot municipal Corporation were reconstituted after General Elections of the councillors in the month of February, 1987 under the provisions of the bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act ). Under Sec. 6 (1) of the Principal Act, terms of office of the elected Councillors would expire at the end of the fifth year if not extended for a further period upto one year by the state of Gujarat. It is an admitted fact that terms of the Councillors of reconstituted Corporations were to expire between 6th and 1 2/02/1992. Under Sec. 6 (1) of the Principal Act, terms of office of the elected Councillors would expire at the end of the fifth year if not extended for a further period upto one year by the state of Gujarat. It is an admitted fact that terms of the Councillors of reconstituted Corporations were to expire between 6th and 1 2/02/1992. as the period of five years from the date of the first meeting of the Councillors would expire between those dates. The terms of the Councillors were not extended by the State Government under sec. 6 (1) for the further period of one year. Under Sec. 7 (A) of the principal Act, on expiry of the terms of the Councillors, the State of gujarat had power to appoint Administrators to take over charge of the corporations. Since the State Government had admittedly not taken any action for extending the term of the aforesaid Corporations and since it was apprehended that the Administrators might be appointed under sec. 7 (A) of the Principal Act, a group of petitions being Special Civil applications No. 583 to 588 of 1992 came to be filed in this Court inter alia challenging the constitutionality of Sec. 7 (A) of the Principal act and also for a writ of mandamus against the concerned authorities, calling upon them to initiate process of election for reconstituting the aforesaid four Corporations and to extend the terms of the Councillors in the meantime. (II) Such group of petitions came to be decided by the Division Bench of this Court comprising of S. B. Majmudar, Acting Chief Justice and N. J. Pandya, J. on 20/02/1992. The said decision of the Division bench in the case of Abdulgani Abdulbhai Kureshi v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1992 (1) GLR 503 , the Division Bench directed the State of Gujarat to proceed to hold General Board Elections in all the four corporations forthwith on the basis of 1981 Census figures. The State of Gujarat was also directed to issue necessary Notifications under Sec. 5 (2) and (3) of the Principal Act in the light of the Census figures. The State of Gujarat was also directed to issue necessary Notifications under Sec. 5 (2) and (3) of the Principal Act in the light of the Census figures. The State Government was also directed to complete the aforesaid exercise on or before 31/03/1992 and thereafter it was directed to issue suitable directions to the Commissioners of the four Corporations to take steps to prepare electoral rolls for all the Corporations and thereafter to commence the process of election so as to complete the same latest before the end of December, 1992. The Division Bench also directed that in the meantime the outgoing Councillors will act as full-fledged councillors discharging all their legitimate functions and the Division bench also restrained the State Government from resorting to exercise of power under Sec. 7 (A) of the Principal Act and from appointing administrators to the said Corporations. (Ill) Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the Division bench in the group of petitions, the State Government has filed Special leave Petition (Civil) No. 12062 of 1992 with 11750, 12375 and 77 and 12460 of 1992, seeking special leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court. The State government has also filed an application for ex parte stay and Special leave Petitions as well as applications for interim relief were placed for admissional hearing on 30/11/1992 before the Division bench of the Supreme Court, comprising of Honble Mr. Justice M. N. Venkatachaliah (as His Lordship then was) and Honble Mr. Justice a. S. Anand. The Supreme Court passed following order : "issue Notice on the SLPs returnable on 29/01/1993. Stay Application is dismissed " (IV) It must be stated that the State of Gujarat partially complied with the directions issued by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of a. A. Kureshi, (supra) so as to issue necessary notifications under Sec. 5 (2) and (3) of the Principal Act. The said exercise was completed on or before 31/03/1992 arid necessary instructions were issued to all the Commissioners to prepare electoral rolls of all the Corporations and to proceed to hold fresh election of the Councillors. In view of the fact that Supreme Court of India refused to grant stay and dismissed the applications for stay on 30/11/1992, the final step in the process of election, viz. In view of the fact that Supreme Court of India refused to grant stay and dismissed the applications for stay on 30/11/1992, the final step in the process of election, viz. , fixing the date of polling was also notified and polling was scheduled to take place on 2 7/12/1992. It is not disputed before us that all necessary steps for holding of General Elections of the Councillors of the aforesaid four municipal Corporations were duly taken. (V) On 6th of December, 1992, the unfortunate incident of demolition of babri Masjid at Ayodhya took place, giving rise to large scale violence in various parts of the country including the State of Gujarat. It is the case of the respondents that incidents of riots, arson and looting on a large scale took place in various parts of the State and more particularly in the city of Ahmedabad, Baroda, Surat, Bharuch, Palanpur and at Mahudha town in Kheda District. It is further case of the State that the law and order situation deteriorated and was beyond control in some of the towns including Surat and Bharuch for quite long time thereafter. In such an atmosphere surcharged with communal frenzy and hatred, a total atmosphere of revenge and panic prevailed and the atmosphere in the entire State including the four metropolis was not congenial to hold free and fair elections of Municipal Councillors. (VI) On 10th of December, 1992, the Municipal Commissioners of the aforesaid four Corporations issued public notices informing the inhabitants of the respective city that looking to the deteriorating situation of law and order in the city, it was not possible to hold or to get hold the General elections of the Municipal Corporations on 27/12/1992 and, therefore, the General Elections to be held on 27/12/1992 were postponed approximately for a period of two months. Such notice also stipulated that postponed date of election will be notified at appropriate time. Identical notices were issued by all the four Commissioners of respective Corporations. Such notice also stipulated that postponed date of election will be notified at appropriate time. Identical notices were issued by all the four Commissioners of respective Corporations. (VII)On 12th of December, 1992, the Advocate of the present petitioner addressed communication to the Municipal Commissioner of Ahmedabad intimating him that postponement of election scheduled to take place on 27/12/1992 will amount to contempt of the Supreme Court of India inasmuch as the Supreme Court of India and the High Court of Gujarat have directed to hold election before specified time and it was not permissible to postpone election indefinitely beyond specified date and he also called upon the municipal Commissioner to withdraw such notice. (VIII) Immediately thereafter the Municipal Commissioners of the aforesaid four cities, viz. , respondents No. 2 to 5 herein moved interlocutory applications for stay in the Supreme Court for extending the outer date for conducting the elections. Such applications were permitted to be circulated on 17/12/1992 and after hearing the learned Counsels for all the parties, the Honble Supreme Court of India passed order the relevant portion of which is as under :"the result is that the State is under an obligation to obey the mandamus issued by the High Court which, in turn, calls upon the State to have the elections conducted before the 31/12/1992. The Commissioners of the Municipal corporations of the cities of Ahmedabad, Rajkot, Surat and Baroda have come up with these applications that having regard to the existing state of unrest in the various parts of the State the conduct of elections, which has been scheduled for the 27th December, 199. in obedience to the orders of the High Court and which requires deployment of massive Police supervision, has become difficult. They accordingly, seek an extension of time in these extraordinary circumstances we think that the submission is reasonable and requires to be granted. However, the requirement upto and inclusive of what was earlier scheduled till l 7/12/1992, shall be fulfilled by 20/12/1992 However, the polling itself may be fixed on the 24th of January, 1993 instead of 27/12/1992. The counting shall be taken up on the 27th and 28/01/1993. However, the requirement upto and inclusive of what was earlier scheduled till l 7/12/1992, shall be fulfilled by 20/12/1992 However, the polling itself may be fixed on the 24th of January, 1993 instead of 27/12/1992. The counting shall be taken up on the 27th and 28/01/1993. The order of the High Court, to this extent, stands modified " (IX) From the aforesaid order of the Supreme Court of India, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court of India was fully appraised of the situation prevailing in the State of Gujarat and more particularly in the cities of Ahmedabad, Baroda, Surat and Rajkot immediately after spreading of large scale violence due to incident of 6/12/1992 at Ayodhya and the Supreme Court rescheduled the programme of election by directing the Corporations to fix the polling on 24th January, 1993. (X) Realising that the Supreme Court of India has not acceded to the Municipal commissioners of the aforesaid four Municipal Corporations to postpone the General Election of Councillors, the State of Gujarat introduced an official Bill in the Legislative Assembly to provide for temporary postponement of elections and extension of term of office of Councillors and members of local authorities on 30/12/1992. The said bill being Bill No. 27 of 1992 was captioned as "the Gujarat Local authorities (Temporary Postponement of Elections and Extension of Term) bill, 1992 (XI) Immediately thereafter before the said Bill could be passed by the legislative Assembly of the Slate, one member of the Legislative Assembly addressed communication to His Excellency the Governor of Gujarat, to the Chief Minister and to Honble Speaker of Gujarat Legislative Assembly, informing them that introduction of Bill in the Legislative Assembly, was directly aimed at setting at naught the decision of the Supreme court and the mandamus of the Division Bench of the High Court and it was a serious inroad in the judicial order passed by the Apex Court of the country and, therefore, such Bill was required to be withdrawn. (Xll)Despite serious objections from various political circles and opposition parties, the aforesaid Bill was passed by the Legislative Assembly on 6/01/1993 and thus Gujarat Act No. 1 of 1993 being the postponement of Election Act came to be passed, which is under challenge in this petition. (Xll)Despite serious objections from various political circles and opposition parties, the aforesaid Bill was passed by the Legislative Assembly on 6/01/1993 and thus Gujarat Act No. 1 of 1993 being the postponement of Election Act came to be passed, which is under challenge in this petition. On that very date Writ Petition No. 22 of 1993 was filed before the Supreme Court of India challenging the legality and constitutionality of this very Act which ultimately came to be disposed of by the Supreme Court of India on 6th of April, 1993 on the ground that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked as no violation of fundamental right was alleged in the petition. (XIII) Immediately thereafter present petition is filed in this Court for the reliefs already set out hereinabove and the Division Bench of this Court issued rule nisi returnable on 14/06/1993. ( 3 ) ). In response to the rule nisi issued by this Court, respondents have appeared and one Mr. R. H Gori, Secretary, Parliamentary Affairs in Legal department of the State of Gujarat has filed the affidavit-in-reply setting out facts and circumstances necessitating introduction of the Bill and enacting of the legislative enactment by State Legislative Assembly and also defending the impugned Act as a permissible and constitutional piece of legislation. The affidavit-in-reply makes a detailed reference to the position of law and order situation in various towns and cities of the State of Gujarat immediately after 6th of December,. 992 as a result of the incident of demolition of Babri Masjid at Ayodhya. It has made a detailed reference to widespread violence and eruption of communal frenzy leading to large number of deaths of innocent citizens and causing of serious grievous injuries to large number of citizens. The affidavit also sets out in detail the law and order situation in various towns, cities and villages of the State, which deteriorated calling for deployment of large Police Force, Home Guards and other Para Military Forces. The entire police Force, Home Guards, Military and Para Military Forces, according to the deponent of the affidavit, were called for aid of civil authorities for maintenance of public order in order to meet the situation. The entire police Force, Home Guards, Military and Para Military Forces, according to the deponent of the affidavit, were called for aid of civil authorities for maintenance of public order in order to meet the situation. The entire State machinery of Revenue Department, Industries Department and other departments were engaged in huge task of rehabilitation work and it is the case of the state that all the available resources of the Stale were mobilized for this task. It is in such Circumstances that the Bill was drafted and introduced in the legislative Assembly of She State and, therefore, the impugned Act was not unconstitutional. It is further stated in the affidavit-in-reply that all preparations for holding election as per Order of the Honble High Court were made and even Polling Date was fixed. But for the widespread communal riots in the state because of the incident of 6/12/1992, election as scheduled would have taken place. It is further case of the State that for circumstances which were created subsequent to the aforesaid incident it was not congenial and expedient for holding free and fair election of local authorities, as administrative machinery of the Stale, under the circumstances, was required to be geared up to meet with the law and order situation and for undertaking relief and rehabilitation measures. It was also felt that for holding such election, proper arrangements for sparing and deployment of the necessary staff and for taking other steps for holding free and fair elections and to ensure that no inconvenience is caused to the candidates as well as the voters in genera], large scale arrangements were required to be made calling for deployment of huge staff, Police Force, and the same was not then possible as the Commissioner of respective Corporations, collector of the Districts, Election Authorities and other Government and local officials were extremely busy with meeting the situation that has arisen after 6th of December, 1992. . It is further case of the State that consistent with the constitutional objective of secularism, it was necessary to see that complete religious neutrality is achieved and communalism and orthodoxy of certain power factions in the country is eschewed. . It is further case of the State that consistent with the constitutional objective of secularism, it was necessary to see that complete religious neutrality is achieved and communalism and orthodoxy of certain power factions in the country is eschewed. With a view to seeing that the voters exercise their franchise freely and fairly without being suppressed or influenced by the communal frenzy which was let loose by certain fundamentalist forces, it was necessary to postpone the election to a future date. The affidavit further recites that with that end in view the impugned legislation was passed which the State Legislature was competent to enact and which seeks to provide only postponement of election beyond the term of six years (extended term) thereby extending the terms of the Councillors for a period upto 31/10/1993 or any date prior thereto when the state decides to hold election. The impugned Act, therefore, is in substance a Validating Act and is a remedial measure enacted with a view to deal with an impossible situation not contemplated by the Principal Act and, therefore, such a statute was neither impermissible nor unconstitutional nor was it enacted with a view to make any inroad on the exercise of judicial power. ( 4 ) ). Preamble and the Provisions of the Impugned Act : Before we proceed to sec out the submissions and various challenges made to the constitutionality of the impugned Act, it is necessary to have a closure look to some of the provisions of the Act. The long title of the Act makes it clear that it is a Temporary Statute. The Act, contains unusually long preamble which seeks to introduce the very statement of objects and reasons of the act as part and parcel of the Preamble of the Act. Since the Act Seeks to provide for a situation, that has arisen immediately after 6th of December, 1992 and since it seeks to deal with a situation, which was not congenial and expedient for holding free and fair election of local authorities and since unusually long preamble in a temporary statute acts as a minor to effectively reflect the legislative will, in our opinion, reproduction of the entire Preamble would go a long way in ascertaining the need or otherwise of such a statute. We, therefore, reproduce the Preamble to the Act hereunder : whereas on account of recent widespread disturbances in the State, circumstances are created which are not congenial and expedient for holding fair and free elections of local authorities; anil Whereas the administrative machinery of the State under the circumstances is required to be geared up to meet with law and order situations and for undertaking relief and rehabilitation measures; and Whereas the programme for all these elections will have to be adjusted in such manner as to enable the Commissioners, Collectors, Election Authorities and other Government and local authorities, officers without dislocating their other work, to make proper arrangement for sparing and deployment of the necessary staff and for taking other steps for holding free and fair elections and to ensure that no inconvenience is caused to the candidates as well as the voters in general; and Whereas representations have been received requesting not to hold elections for some period as in the prevailing circumstances campaigning for election and holding of meetings therefor would further vitiate the atmosphere and create hindrances in establishing peace and harmony amongst the people in the State; and Whereas for the reasons stated above, it is considered necessary to provide for temporary postponement of these elections and for extension of term of office of councillors and members of local authorities and to provide for other connected matters. ( 5 ) ). If reference is made to a long statement of objects and reasons for enacting the impugned Act, it becomes clear that preamble to this Act is nothing but substantial reproduction of the statement of objects and reasons. The legislature has in its wisdom provided a very long preamble so that the object and reasons for enacting such a Temporary statute are explicitly made known to all concerned. Firstly such a long preamble would provide a permissible internal aid to the interpretation of the statute or any of the provisions thereof. Secondly such a long preamble would obviate the need of resorting to external aid to interpretation such as resort to statement of objects and reasons. It is not and it cannot be seriously disputed before us that reference to preamble of a statute in case of ambiguity or uncertainty is a permissible aid to interpretation. ( 6 ) ). Mr. Altaf Ahmed, learned Add1. It is not and it cannot be seriously disputed before us that reference to preamble of a statute in case of ambiguity or uncertainty is a permissible aid to interpretation. ( 6 ) ). Mr. Altaf Ahmed, learned Add1. Solicitor General of India has very elaborately submitted that the preamble has in reality vividly provided pictorial of then existing situation in the State of Gujarat. The existence of widespread disturbance in the State of Gujarat pursuant to the incident of 6/12/1992 at Ayodhya was then not a matter of remote past. The existence of circumstances replete with communal frenzy and violence so as to need deployment of practically entire State machinery to bring about normalcy and law and order situation in major parts of the State of Gujarat also cannot be disputed. On the one hand, there was a mandamus from the Division bench of the Gujarat High Court and Interim direction from the Supreme court to hold election of local authorities more particularly of Councillors of four Corporations. When such a writ is issued undoubtedly the Courts of law intended to see that voters of the respective area exercise their franchise to elect their representative in local self-Government. However, the atmosphere created by the incident of 6/12/1992 was not congenial and expedient for holding such election as almost all voters in areas seriously affected by communal violence were suppressed and oppressed by the feeling of insecurity and were perhaps not interested to exercise their franchise at the cost of their security. In such a situation, holding of election would have been only literal compliance with the writ of mandamus issued by this court as holding of such election was not holding of free and fair election, submits the learned Counsel. He, therefore, submitted that postponement of election was in fact in aid to exercise of right of free and fair election and consistent with that objective, the legislature has acted as preamble clearly recites. Secondly, the administration felt, submits the learned counsel that very purpose of issuance of mandamus was likely to be defeated as the Honble Court wanted holding of free and fair election where electorate had the opportunity to exercise its franchise freely and fairly. The action of the administration, therefore, in simply postponing thy election to a future date was consistent with the directives of the Court. The action of the administration, therefore, in simply postponing thy election to a future date was consistent with the directives of the Court. It was further submitted by the learned Counsel that the preamble also accepts the administrative inability in holding election. In fact the entire Slate machinery was geared up for undertaking relief and rehabilitation measures and deployment of State Reserved police Force, Para-military Forces and Army was required to meet with law and order situation. The need of bringing about normalcy of law and order situation and to see that candidates contesting the election can freely carry on their election campaign and propaganda and creation of the atmosphere where almost all voters participate in the process of election and exercise their franchise free from panic and fear of violence is also accepted and cannot be disputed. ( 7 ) ). The preamble of a statute is an admissible aid to construction. Although not an enacting part of a statute, it is expected to express the scope, object and purpose of the Act more comprehensively than the long title. It may, as in the present case, recite the ground and cause of making the statute, the evils sought to be remedied or the doubts which may be intended to be settled. In Brett v. Bhatt. (1826) 162 ER 456 Sir John Nicholl brought out the use of preamble in following words -"it is to the preamble more specifically that we are to look fur the reason or spirit of every statute, rehearsing this, as it of dinarily does, the evils nought to be remedied, or the doubts purported to be removed by the statute, and so evidencing, in the best and most satisfactory manner, the object or intention of the legislature in making or passing the statute itself. "a preambles has always been held a safe means of collecting the intention to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute and to have recourse to preamble is a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischief which they intended to redress. The preamble is itself not an enacting provision but it is a part of a statute and it can be read along with other portions of the Act to find out the meaning of words in the enacting provisions as also to decide whether they are clear or ambiguous. The preamble is itself not an enacting provision but it is a part of a statute and it can be read along with other portions of the Act to find out the meaning of words in the enacting provisions as also to decide whether they are clear or ambiguous. If the words and enacting provisions in the statute are clear and unambiguous reference to preamble is not permissible. The utility of preamble diminishes on a conclusion as to clarity of enacting provisions. ( 8 ) ). It is true that unusually long preamble of the impugned statute has brought to the surface the state of affairs then existing in the State. But in our opinion, too much importance cannot be attached to the statements of platitudes nor would the Court of law be justified in being solely influenced by the statements contained in the preamble for the purpose of deciding and upholding the constitutional validity of a statute. Undoubtedly, preamble has an important role to play in case of difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of words or provisions of a statute or in ascertaining the intention of the legislature in enacting the statute. A preamble cannot be used as a defence to the challenge of constitutionality of a statute and Court of law would not be justified in upholding the statute as it is enacted for objectives which are laudable. If a legislature cannot enact the law being incompetent to enact it or if cannot enact the law infringing any of the fundamental rights, no amount of promises or platitudes contained in the preamble would save the piece of legislation. Therefore, while examining the challenge to the impugned Act we may not be juststified in solely relying upon the preamble to the impugned Act though reference to it for the purpose of ascertaining the object and the need of the statute is permissible. ( 9 ) ). The title of the Act also brings about clearly the fact that the statute is a Temporary Statute. Its duration is upto and inclusive of 3 1/10/1993 or such earlier date as may it notified by the State government in the official gazette. It has come into force on 7/01/1993. It is to be noted that on that date, the mandamus issued by the division Bench of this Court and subsequent direction issued by the Honble the Supreme Court of India was operative. It has come into force on 7/01/1993. It is to be noted that on that date, the mandamus issued by the division Bench of this Court and subsequent direction issued by the Honble the Supreme Court of India was operative. Despite such mandamus, a temporary Statute was enacted and it was to hold the field or to operate from 7/01/1993 till 31/10/1993. The postponement of election of the Councillors and extending of the term of the office of the councillors, which is sought to be achieved by the Temporary Statute was thus purely temporary. No permanency is attached, therefore, to the provisions of the Act. ( 10 ) ). From the definition clause which is contained in Sec. 2 of the said Act it becomes clear that: all local self-Government bodies are brought within (the sweep of the Temporary Statute. The Panchayats constituted under the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961, Municipalities constituted under the gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 and Corporations constituted under the bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 are brought within the sweep of the Act by giving a wide definition of the terms "relevant Act" so as to include all the aforesaid three statutes dealing with Panchayats, municipalities and Corporations. ( 11 ) ). Section 3 of the impugned statute is the main provision which brings about postponing of the election of local authorities and extending of terms of office of Councillors and members. In fact, validity of Sec. 3 (a) is challenged before this Court and, therefore, in our opinion, it will be just and proper to set out provisions of Sec. 3 extensively in its entirety along with rest of the provisions as they have some bearing on challenge raised in this petition. "3. Notwithstanding anything contained in the relevant Act or the Rules or bylaws or orders made thereunder or in any judgment, decree or order of any Court Of authority; (a) during the period from the date of commencement of this Act and upto and inclusive of the 31/10/1993 or such earlier date as may be notified by the State government under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 1 (hereinafter in this Act referred to as "the said period"), no general election of the Councillors of any Corporation or of any Municipality or of members of any Panchayat, and no election to fill any casual vacancy of any such Councillor or member, shall be held, and the election process started and at whatever stage reached prior to the commencement of the act shall stand postponed during the said period; (b) the term of office (including extended term of office) of all the Councillors of corporations or Municipalities and of all members of Panchayats (whether elected, nominated, appointed, co-opted, or ex-officio), who were in office on the day immediately preceding the date of commencement of this Act (hereinafter referred to as the said date") shall be deemed to have been extended or to be extended, as the case may be, and every such Councillor or member shall continue to hold office during the said period; (c) the term of office (including the extended term of office) of the administrators or any Corporation, Municipality or Panchayat who were in office on the said date (whether their term had expired before or will expire on or after the said date at any time during the said period) shall be deemed to have been extended and every such administrator (including any person appointed as administrator in his place from time to time) shall hold or continue to hold office during the said period. 4. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, after a date or different dates (being a date before the expiry of the said period) as notified by the State Government in the Official Gazette, arrangements shall be made by the Commissioners, Collectors, election Authorities and other Government and Municipal officers concerned to constitute or reconstitute new Corporations or Municipalities or Panchayats, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant Act and the rules made thereunder before the expiry of the said period. 5. Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the relevant act shall in all other respects apply in case of a Corporation, Municipality or Panchayat. 6. 5. Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the relevant act shall in all other respects apply in case of a Corporation, Municipality or Panchayat. 6. If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, or by reasons of anything contained therein, or in giving effect to the relevant Act in respect of any matter contained in this Act, the State Government may, as occasion arises, by order, do anything which appears to it to be necessary for the purpose of removing the difficulty. " ( 12 ) ). From the aforesaid provisions of Sec. 3, it becomes clear that legislature has employed non-obstante clause in Sec. 3, so as to give overriding effect to the provisions of Sec. 3 over anything contained in the relevant Act or the roles or by-laws or orders made thereunder. To the extent a legislature overrides provisions of other statutes or subordinate legislation by employing the nonobstante clause, exercise of power can be said to be permissible if otherwise it is within legislative competence of the legislature. However, in the present case by the non-obstante clause, the overriding effect is given to the provisions of the impugned Act over anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or authority. It is this part of the non-obstante clause which is seriously under challenge before this Court and if an inroad is made on the exercise of judicial power by the legislature, the same shall have to stand zealous scrutiny of the Court of law. ( 13 ) ). Non-Obstante Clause of Sec. 3 : In order to appreciate the aforesaid rival submissions, it shall have to be seen as to whether the Postponement of election Act can be said to be an Amending Act to the Principal Act. The definition clause enacted by Sec. 2 of the impugned Act no doubt makes a reference to the Principal Act in the definition of "relevant Act" as defined by Sec. 2 (e ). Section 3, however, does not directly or openly bring about amendment in the previsions of any of the provisions of the Relevant Act including the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. Section 3, however, does not directly or openly bring about amendment in the previsions of any of the provisions of the Relevant Act including the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. Section 3 nowhere provides that any of its provisions is to be substituted or to be read as part and parcel of any of the provisions of B. P. M. C. Act. To that extent Sec. 3 does not expressly amend the provision of the B. P. M. C. Act. However, it shall have to be kept in mind that Sec. 3 begins with non-obstante clause and nonobstante clause ordinarily is enacted with a view to giving overriding effect to the provision made. It is, therefore, submitted that in substance by employing non-obstante clause, the Legislature has amended the Principal Act. ( 14 ) ). Mr. P. M. Raval, learned Add. . Advocate General has in this connection invited the attention of the Court to the following extract from "principles of Statutory Interpretation" by G. P. Singh (5th Edition) page 220:"non-OBSTANIE ciause-A. clause beginning with notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in some particular provision in the Act or in some particular Act or in any law for the time being in force, is sometimes appended to a section in the beginning, with a view to give the enacting part of the section in case of conflict an overriding effect over the provision or Act mentioned in the non-ubstame clause. It is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provision or Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause, the enactment following it will have its full operation or that the provisions embraced in the non-obstante clause will not be an impediment for the operation of the enactment. The phrase notwithstanding anything in is used in contradistinction to the phrase subject to, the latter conveying the idea of a provision yielding place to another provision or other provisions to which it is made subject. A non-obstante clause must also be distinguished from the phrase without prejudice A provision enacted without prejudice to another provision has not the effect of affecting the operation of the other provision and any action taken under it must not be inconsistent with such other provision. A non-obstante clause must also be distinguished from the phrase without prejudice A provision enacted without prejudice to another provision has not the effect of affecting the operation of the other provision and any action taken under it must not be inconsistent with such other provision. Ordinarily, there is close approximation between the non-obstante clause and the enacting parr of the section and the non-obstante clause may throw some light as to the scope and ambit of the enacting part in case of its ambiguity, but when the enacting part is clear its scope cannot be cut down by resort to non-obstante clause. " ( 15 ) ). Based on the aforesaid quotation from the book of the learned Author, it was submitted before us that the Legislature in the present case has deliberately employed non-obstante clause in Sec. 3 as it wanted to give overriding effect to the provisions of Sec. 3 over inconsistent provision contained in the Principal act. It was submitted that since life of the Corporations could have come to an end at the expiry of the sixth year and since in the situation then existing, it was not possible to hold election, the Legislature has by postponing election and by extending the term of the Councillors upto 31/10/1993, in substance amended the Principal Act temporarily for extending the term of the Councillors beyond six years and by directing not to hold election of Councillors, therefore, the Principal Act is in substance amended. ( 16 ) ). In this connection, reference is required to be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. G. M. Kokil, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1022 wherein about the effect of a non-obstante clause, the supreme Court observed as under :"it is well known that a non-obstante clause is a legislative device which is usually employed to give overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be found either in the same enactment or some other enactment, that is to say, to avoid the operation and effect of all contrary provisions. Thus the non-obstante clause in Sec. 70 of Bombay Act, namely, "notwithstanding anything in that Act" must mean notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that act and as such it must refer to the exempting provisions which would be contrary to the general applicability of the Act. Thus the non-obstante clause in Sec. 70 of Bombay Act, namely, "notwithstanding anything in that Act" must mean notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that act and as such it must refer to the exempting provisions which would be contrary to the general applicability of the Act. In other words, as all the relevant provisions of the Act are made applicable to a factory notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in it, it must have the effect of excluding the operation of the exemption provisions. Just as because of the non-obstame clause the Act is applicable even to employees in the factory who might not be "worker" under Sec. 2 (1), the same nonobstante clause will keep away the applicability of exemption provisions qua all those working in the factory. " ( 17 ) ). From the aforesaid observations it becomes clear that it is not necessary for the Legislature to directly amend the law in question by enacting an amendment Act thereby either adding, amending or substituting any of the existing provision. Amendment in a statute can also be effected by making a separate statute and by enacting a non-obstante clause therein, so as to make a provision contrary to the provision which is enacted in the Principal act. This is another legislative device available to the legislature by which provision of Principal Act can be amended. ( 18 ) ). In the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, reported in AIR 1987 SC 117 , once again while examining the effect of employment of non-obstante clause, the Supreme Court made following pertinent observations :"a clause beginning with the expression notwithstanding anything contained in the act or in some particular provision in the Act or in some particular Act or in any law for the lime being in force, or in any contract" is more often than not appended to a section in the beginning with a view to give the enacting part of the section in case of conflict an overriding effect over the provision of the Act or the contract mentioned in the non-obstante clause. It is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provisions of the Act or any other Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause or any contract or document mentioned the enactment following it will have its fall operation or that the provisions embraced in the non obstante clause would not be an impediment for an operation of the enactment. " ( 19 ) ). To the same effect, are the observations of the Supreme Court in connection with Sec. 37 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Honble mr. Justice K. Jayachandra Reddy in the case of Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kishan la. and Ors , reported in AIR 1991 SC 558 , held that employing non-obsianie clause in Sec, 37 of N. D. P. S. Act, the Legislature has limited the scope of the applicability of the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code regarding bail. The non-obstante clause which was employed in Sec. 37 was given its true meaning and it was held that power of the Court to grant bail was substantially restricted. ( 20 ) ). Similarly ill the case of M/s. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. v. State of Orissa, reported in AIR. 1991 SC 672, the Supreme Court examined effect of employment of non-obstante clause in Sac. 5 which was introduced in the Principal Act, namely, Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981. By the Amendment Act of 1989, Sec. 5 was substituted which contained non-obstante clause. Having noticed the language of the non-obstante clause, the Supreme Court observed in para 12 as under:"this sub-section overrides "any provision to the contrary in any other law". These words are an expression of the widest amplitude engulfing all Rules having the force of law, whichever be the source from which they emanate - statutory, judicial or customary - the only exception, in the context, being the Constitution of India. This means, once brought into force the sub-section will, subject to the Constitution, operate with full vigour, notwithstanding any statute or judicial decision or any other Rule recognising any right or interest or grant. inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of the sub-section. " . ( 21 ) ). From the aforesaid resume. This means, once brought into force the sub-section will, subject to the Constitution, operate with full vigour, notwithstanding any statute or judicial decision or any other Rule recognising any right or interest or grant. inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of the sub-section. " . ( 21 ) ). From the aforesaid resume. of the decision of the Supreme Court, it becames clear that employment of a non-obstante clause is a permissible device for a Legislature by which it can make ineffective the provision to the contrary contained in the Principal Act or in any other Act or Rules. If otherwise competent, by employing the device of non-obstante clause, the legislature can amend the Principal Act and can make ineffective or can override the provisions of the Principal Act or Rules. By this device, it may not expressly by addition or substitution amend the Principal Act or statute. Still, however, by enacting an inconsistent or contrary provision and by giving overriding effect to such inconsistent or contrary provision, a Legislature. can make ineffective the other provisions of the Principal Act. It can, therefore, be said that though the impugned Act does not expressly amend the Principal act, it has in substance amended the Principal Act by making contrary provision in the impugned Act by enacting Sec. 3. To that extent, the impugned Act shall have to be treated as an Amendment Act which has amended the provisions of the Principal Act. However, we are conscious of the fact that the impugned act is merely a Temporary Act and by such Act there will be temporary amendment in the provisions of the Principal Act. On the expiry of the period of 31st of October, 1993, the impugned Act will expire and, therefore the Principal Act shall operate as if the amendment which has sought to be made by Sec. 3 of the impugned Act has not at all existed. In our opinion, therefore, Mr. P. M. Raval, learned Add1. Advocate General is right in submitting that the impugned Act though doss not expressly amend the principal Act by attaching the device of non-obstante clause, it has in employing amended the Principal Act. However, we are required to see to what extent such an amendment is permissible in Law. ( 22 ) ). P. M. Raval, learned Add1. Advocate General is right in submitting that the impugned Act though doss not expressly amend the principal Act by attaching the device of non-obstante clause, it has in employing amended the Principal Act. However, we are required to see to what extent such an amendment is permissible in Law. ( 22 ) ). A non-obstante clause can thus have an overriding effect over the provisions to the contrary in the same statute or provisions to the contrary in some other statute. By the device of non-obstante clause the legislature achieves an overriding effect for inconsistent or contrary provision which it seeks to enact and such contrary provision is made effective or operative. The provision to which an inconsistent provision is made by non-obstante clause is to be treated as inoperative or ineffective so long as and to the extent non-obstante clause operates. In the case before us, a nonobstante clause enacted by Sec. 3 seeks to override any provisions to the contrary contained in the relevant Act or Rules or the Bye-laws It thus, overrides any provision to the contrary contained in the Gujarat Panchayats act, 1961, Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 and the Bombay Provincial municipal Corporations Act, 1949 or the Rules made under any of the aforesaid acts. This non-obslante clause also seeks to override any judgment, decree or order of any Court or authority. Any direction, therefore, which is contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court which is contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions enacted by Sec. 3 which begains with nonobstante clause is rendered nugatory, ineffective and inoperative. It is pertinent to note that this non-obstante clause doss not Reek to amend any of the provisions of the relevant Act However, indirectly it achieves the same effect by enacting inconsistent or contrary provision to the Principal Act and by providing that such contrary provision shall operate irrespective of what is contained in the relevant Act, To this extent, this non-obstante clause achieves the result of temporarily repealing the provisions to the contrary contained in the relevant Act, or of atleast temporarily suspending the provisions of the relevant Act. ( 23 ) ). ( 23 ) ). Constitutional Validity : The petitioner has challenged the constitutional validity of Sec. 3 (a) of the Postponement of Election Act by contending that clause (a) enacts a direction not to hold any general election of the Councillors of any Corporation during the period from the date; of commencement of Postponement of Election Act upto 1/10/1993, or such earlier date us may be notified by the State Government, which is contrary to or inconsistent with the mandamus issued by the Division Bench of this Court. in the case of A. A. Qureshi (supra) so as to direct the respondents to hold election on or before 31/10/1992, and it also runs counter to the direction issued by the Supreme Court of India so as to hold the election before 24/01/1993. To the extent Sec. 3 (a) seeks to render inoperative and ineffective a binding direction of the Division Bench of this Court and the direction of the Supreme Court of India, it is an in-road on the exercise of judicial power, and is, therefore unconstitutional. ( 24 ) ). It may be stated that the: vires of Sec. 3 (b) of the impugned act is not challenged before us, and it is submitted that the said provision would help the; Court in issuing appropriate direction to hold the election by permitting the Councillors of the Corporations to continue in office till the election is held. It is submitted by the petitioner that Sec. 3 (a) contains the impugned provision and Sec. 3 (b) is simply the consequence of direction contained in Sec. 3 (a ). It is further submitted that the provision of Sec. 3 (a) is not an instance of enacting legislative provision in the nature of positive command by the legislature, but it is in substance, an executive fiat not to hold the election dispite the directions to the contrary given by the Division Bench of this Court and by the Supreme court of India. It is submitted that the provision of this nature is not only a naked usurpation of power by the legislature, but it is an instance of legislature deliberately disregarding the mandate of the Court of law thereby to assert its supremacy and thereby consequently subordinating or belittling the judiciary. ( 25 ) ). It is submitted that the provision of this nature is not only a naked usurpation of power by the legislature, but it is an instance of legislature deliberately disregarding the mandate of the Court of law thereby to assert its supremacy and thereby consequently subordinating or belittling the judiciary. ( 25 ) ). On the other hand, it is the case of the respondents that the provisions in the Principal Act were inadequate and insufficient to provide for a situation which has arisen after 6/12/1992. ft was submitted that in the Principal act or the Rules made thereunder there was no provision for extension of the term of the Councillors beyond a period of six years, and there was omission in the said statute inasmuch as it did not provide for any unforeseen situations when the term of the Councillors can be extended beyond sixth year. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court was based on interpretation of Secs. 6 (1) and (2) of the Principal Act, and since the said provisions did not provide for a situation which had arisen after December 6, 1992 the legislature by enacting Sec. 3 (a) provided the basis to deal with the situation arising from the situations set out in the preamble. Though there was provision directing holding of elections by a particular date in the relevant act, if read with Rules, it can be said that there was provision for holding of elections before the expiry of the term of the Corporation or before the extended term of the Corporation. By Sec. 3 (a) therefore, a basis was provided for not holding elections upto 31/10/1993, and the term of the office of the Councillors is extended till then, it was, therefore, submitted that a basis for not. holding elections even before the extended term is provided by Sec. 3 (a), and thereby the very foundation of the decision of the Division bench of this Court was knocked out, and the said decision was rendered ineffective. It was a permissible exercise of legislative power, and therefore, the Act was not required to be invalidated. ( 26 ) ). holding elections even before the extended term is provided by Sec. 3 (a), and thereby the very foundation of the decision of the Division bench of this Court was knocked out, and the said decision was rendered ineffective. It was a permissible exercise of legislative power, and therefore, the Act was not required to be invalidated. ( 26 ) ). It must be stated at this stage that Sec. 3 (a), in substance, is a legislative mandate not to hold general elections of the Councillors of any corporation during the period from the date of commencement of impugned act, and upto 31/10/1993 or such an earlier date as may be notified by the State Government under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 1, and it further directs that the election process started and at whatever stage reached prior to the commencement of the impugned Act shall stand postponed during the said period. Thus, legislature has deliberately and knowingly issued a direction contrary to and inconsistent with the mandamus issued by the Division Bench of this Court. The legislature has expressly not laid any foundation for issuance of said legislative direction. The legislature has not amended expressly any of the provisions of the relevant Act or the Rules. Yet, however, it has achieved the result of amending the Principal Act by enacting the non-obstante clause the effect of which is to give overriding effect to Sec. 3 (a) over inconsistent provision contained in the Principal Act or the Rules made therein. ( 27 ) ). Is this legislative exercise of power permissible, or constitutional? answer to this question is not very easy to offer. The well-known pattern of all validation Acts by which the basis of judgments and orders of competent courts or Tribunals is changed and the judgments and orders are made ineffective is to be found in M. P. Sundararamier and Co. v. State of Andhra pradesh, 1958 0 SCR 1422 : ( AIR 1958 SC 468 ). The rendering of a judgment ineffective by changing the basis by legislative enactment is not encroachment on judicial power because the legislation is within the competence of the legislature (vide Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299 ). ( 28 ) ). There does exist distinction between "legislative" act and/or "judicial" act. The rendering of a judgment ineffective by changing the basis by legislative enactment is not encroachment on judicial power because the legislation is within the competence of the legislature (vide Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299 ). ( 28 ) ). There does exist distinction between "legislative" act and/or "judicial" act. However, in some cases the line which separates one category from the other may not be easily discernible. However, when the distinction between the two provisions is well accepted under our Constitution, the legislature cannot by a bare declaration, without more, directly overrule, reverse or override the judicial decision. To issue a direction not to hold general elections of the Councillors of the Corporation, in the teeth of the direction issued by the Division Bench of the High Court and of the Supreme Court of India may or may not amount to overruling or countermanding the direction of the Court. We, however, at this stage, do not express any opinion. A legislature may, at any time, in exercise of plenary powers conferred on it by Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law on a topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing with retrospective, curative or neutralising effect the conditions on which such decision is based. The rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent Courts and Tribunals by changing their basis by legislative enactment is a well-known pattern of all validating Acts. Such validating legislation which removes the causes for ineffectiveness or invalidity of actions or proceedings is not an encroachment on judicial power (vide J. N. Saxena v. State of M. P. , AIR 1976 SC 2250 ). ( 29 ) ). In the case of The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. The New Shorrock Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. , reported in AIR 1970 SC 1292 the constitutional validity of Sec. 152a (3) which was introduced by Gujarat Amending and Validating Ordinance, 1969, was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Court found that the said provision, in substance, commanded the Corporation to refuse to refund the amount illegally collected despite the orders of the Supreme Court and the High Court. The Supreme court found that the State of Gujarat was not well advised in introducing such a provision. The Court found that the said provision, in substance, commanded the Corporation to refuse to refund the amount illegally collected despite the orders of the Supreme Court and the High Court. The Supreme court found that the State of Gujarat was not well advised in introducing such a provision. That provision attempts to make a direct in-road into the judicial powers of the State. The legislatures under our Constitution have within the prescribed limits, powers to make laws prospe ctively as well as retrospectively. By exercise of those powers, the legislature can remove the basis of a decision rendered by a competent Court thereby rendering that decision ineffective. But, no legislature in this country has power to ask. the instrumentalities of the State to disobey or disregard the decisions given by the Courts. The Court made reference to its earlier decision in the case of Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough municipality, reported in AIR 1970 SC 192 and it observed that granted legislative competence, it is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the legislature does not possess or exercise. A Courts decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. It is not open to the legislature to declare any decision of a Court of law to be void or of no effect. It is also not open to the legislature to say that the judgment of a Court properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its powers in a matter brought before it shall be deemed to be ineffective and the interpretation to the law shall be otherwise than as declared by the Court. ( 30 ) ). In the case of Janapada Sabha v. The Central Provinces Syndicate ltd. , reported in AIR 1971 SC 57 the legislature by enacting the Validation act purported to exercise the power in the very manner in which the legislature has acted in the case before us. The impugned Act before the Supreme Court did not set out the amendments intended to be made in the principal enactment. , reported in AIR 1971 SC 57 the legislature by enacting the Validation act purported to exercise the power in the very manner in which the legislature has acted in the case before us. The impugned Act before the Supreme Court did not set out the amendments intended to be made in the principal enactment. By a fiction it deemed that the Principal Act and the Rules framed therein have been amended without disclosing the text or even the nature of the amendments. It was in this context, that the Supreme Court observed in para 10 as under :"the nature of the amendment made in Act 4 of 1920 has not been indicated. Nor is there anything which enacts that the notifications issued without the sanction of the State Government must be deemed to have been issued validly under Sec. 51 (2) without the sanction of the Local Government On the words used in the Act, it is plain that the legislature attempted to "overrule 01" set aside the decision of this court. That, in our judgment, is not open to the legislature to do under our constitutional scheme. It is open to the. legislature within certain limits to amend the provisions of an Act retrospectively and to declare what the law shall be deemed to have been, but it is not open to the legislature to say that a judgment of a Court properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its powers in a matter brought before it shall be deemed to be ineffective and the interpretation of law shall be otherwise than as declared by the Court. " ( 31 ) ). " ( 31 ) ). Once again, in the case of Madvn Mulian Pathuk v. Union of india, reported in AIR 1978 EC 803, the Constitutional Bench of the supreme Court speaking through P. N. Bhagwati,, J. (ah His Lordship then was) faced with the situation when the mandamus issued by a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court directing the L. I. C. to pay annual cash bonus to Class III and IV employees for the year 1-4-1975 to 31-3-1976 along with their salary as provided by the settlement which became final us L. P. A. preferred against it was unconditionally withdrawn, arid therefore, the l. I. C. was bound to obey the writ of mandamus, However, the Government instead passed an impugned Act Known as "l. I. C. (Modification of settlement) Act, 1976," and it was the validity of said law which was under challenge. The Supreme Court rot iced that the judgment of the calcutta High Court has become final and the employees became entitled to enforcement of the right recognised by said judgment. The said right under the judgment was not sought to be taken away by the impugned Act. It was not, therefore, permissible for the Government to render ineffective such judgment of the Court. Conceding that by validity set out in a given case the legislature may remove the basis on which the judgment proceeded and may render the judgment ineffective, but such an exercise is not permissible by a bare declaration or direction nullifying the direction issued by the Court of law. In fact, the basis of the judgment of the Court can be legitimately removed, but to issue direction contrary to the direction issued by the Court would not, in substance, amount, to removing the basis of the judgment. To the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the second l. I. C. case in the case. of A. V. Nachane v. Union of India, reported in air 1982 SC 1126 . Once again in the case of P. Sambamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 1987 SC 663 , the Honble Chief Justice, mr. P. N. Bhagwati by very strong words depricated the exercise of legislative power so as to render the decision of a Court of law ineffective. Once again in the case of P. Sambamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 1987 SC 663 , the Honble Chief Justice, mr. P. N. Bhagwati by very strong words depricated the exercise of legislative power so as to render the decision of a Court of law ineffective. In para 4 of the reported judgment the Court made the following pertinent observations:"it is obvious from what we have stated above that this power of modifying or annulling an order of Administrative Tribunal conferred on the State Government under the Proviso to clause (5) is violative of the rule of law which is clearly a basic and essential feature of the Constitution it is a basic principle of the rule of law that the exercise of power by executive or any authority must not only be conditioned by the Constitution but must also be in accordance with law and the power of judicial review is conferred by the Constitution with a view to ensuring that the law is observed and there is compliance with the requirement of law on the part of the executive and other authorities. It is through the power of judicial review conferred on an independent institutional authority such as the High Court that the rule of law is maintained and every organ of the State is kept within the limits of the law. Now if the exercise of power of judicial review can be set at naught by the State Government by overriding the decision given against it, it would sound the death knell of the rule of law. The rule of law would cease to have any meaning, because then it would be open to the State Government to defy the law and yet to get away with it. ("he proviso to clause (5) of Art. 371-D is therefore clearly violative of the basic structure doctrine. " ( 32 ) ). Very recently in the matter of reference of Cauvery Water Disputes tribunal a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in AIR 1992 SC 522 once, again reiterated the very law. While upholding the supremacy of legislative power the Supreme Court in no unclear terms asserted that any executive order or legislative enactment of a State which interferes with the adjudicatory process and adjudication by a tribunal is an interference with the judicial power of the State. While upholding the supremacy of legislative power the Supreme Court in no unclear terms asserted that any executive order or legislative enactment of a State which interferes with the adjudicatory process and adjudication by a tribunal is an interference with the judicial power of the State. The action of Karnataka Government in issuing the ordinance so as to nullify the effect of the order of the tribunal was regarded as against the basic tenets of the rule of law inasmuch as the State of Karnataka by issuing the ordinance has sought to take law in its own hands and put it above the law. Such an act is invitation to lawlessness and anarchy, inasmuch as the ordinance is a manifestation of a desire on the part of the State to be a Judge in its own cause and to defy the decisions of the judicial authorities. The action forebodes evil consequences to the federal structure under the Constitution and opens doors of each State to act in the way it desires disregarding not only the rights of the other States, the orders passed by the instrumentalities constituted under an Act of Parliament but also the provisions of the Constitution. From the aforesaid resume of decisions it becomes clear that though the legislature has power to remove the basis of judgment of a Court of law so as to render such judgment ineffective but its power is not equivalent to conceding that it can by direct command to the contrary reverse or overrule the decision of a Court of law so as to direct quite to the contrary from what is directed by a competent Court of law. Such a power would, undoubtedly, lead to an invitation to lawlessness and anarchy and cannot be and is not rightly conceded to a legislature. ( 33 ) ). Such a power would, undoubtedly, lead to an invitation to lawlessness and anarchy and cannot be and is not rightly conceded to a legislature. ( 33 ) ). Based on the aforesaid principle we are called upon to decide the question as to whether directions contained in Sec. 3 (a) of the impugned act not to hold genera) elections of Councillors of four Corporations upto 31/10/1993 which is contrary to the directions issued by the Division bench of this Court to hold elections on or before 31/12/1992 can be said to be permissible exercise of legislative power or is it an attempt to undo what the judiciary has done, or is it an instance of Black Law enacted by the legislature at the instance of arrogant executive which has decided to take the decision of the Court of law for a ride and has shown scant regard or perhaps, no regard for the directions issued by the Court? ( 34 ) ). Is it necessary to decide constitutionality of impugned Act ? as and when constitutionality or validity of a law made by the Legislature is challenged before a Court of law either on the ground of lack of legislative competence or infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed by part-111 of the Constitution, a Court of law may on finding the statute to be beyond a legislative competence or infringing any of the fundamental rights, declare such law to be unconstitutional. However, it is well accepted principle that a Court of law shall not undertake an exercise in futility when challenge has become purely academic. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality of a statute. Therefore, when the challenge to the constitutionality of a statute has become merely academic, a Court of law shall not undertake such exercise. There is a further statement of law to the effect that the Court will not decide constitutional questions if a case is capable of being decided on other grounds. In the case of Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi and Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1959 SC 149 , this principle was accepted by the Supreme court of India, when a question arose before the Supreme Court as to whether doctrine of waiver of fundamental right can be invoked in the fact situation then prevailing before the Court. In the case of Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi and Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1959 SC 149 , this principle was accepted by the Supreme court of India, when a question arose before the Supreme Court as to whether doctrine of waiver of fundamental right can be invoked in the fact situation then prevailing before the Court. In the facts of the case before the Supreme Court violation of Art. 14, i. e. , right to equlity was alleged and the only question was as to whether such a fundamental right can be waived by a person who is complaining breach thereof. It was in this context that the question arose as to whether the Court should also decide as to whether other fundamental rights could be waived by a person. The Chief Justice S. R. Das clearly stated the law on the subject by making the following observations :"for disposing of this appeal it is not necessary for us to consider whether any of the other fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution can or cannot be waived. We take the view that this Court should not make any pronouncement on any question which is not strictly necessary for the disposal of the particular case be ore it. We, therefore, confine our attention to Art. 14 and proceed to discuss the question on that footing. " ( 35 ) ). Ordinarily, therefore, a Court shall not decide a question, which is not required to be decided if the case could be decided on other grounds. To the similar effect are the observations at page 192 in the "constitutional law" by learned Author Cooley. It is thus a wise and well settled rule, that a Court will not pronounce constitutional question unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. ( 36 ) ). We may now turn to the facts situation obtaining before us to answer the question as to whether we should decide the challenge to the constitutionality of Sec. 3 (a) of the impugned Act. We are of the opinion that challenge to Sec. 3 (a) of the impugned Act cannot be said to be academic or as one which has become infructuous. We are of the opinion that challenge to Sec. 3 (a) of the impugned Act cannot be said to be academic or as one which has become infructuous. In our opinion, it is still not necessary for us to decide the question as the substantive relief prayed for in the petition can even otherwise be granted to the petitioner consistent with the provisions of impugned Act. We, therefore, do not decide the question of constitutionality of Sec. 3 (a) of the impugned Act for following reasons : (I) The purpose of filing the present petition is not only to obtain a declaration about unconstitutionality of the provision of the impugned act, but the purpose is to seek directions to the respondents to hold general election of the Councillors of the four Corporations forthwith or at the earliest. The petitioner has, in fact, prayed for a direction to the respondents to hold election of the four Corporations at the earliest. Therefore, if such a relief can be granted to the petitioner, the question of constitutionality of Sec. 3 (a) of the impugned Act may not be decided. (II) In our opinion, from the provisions of the impugned Act as well as from the oral submissions made before the Court by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, it is clear that the respondents were not opposed to holding of general elections of the Councillors of the four corporations and they were ready and willing to hold such elections as early as possible and even earlier to the final date, i. e. , 31st of October, 1993. Section 1 (2) of the impugned Act which deals with duration of the impugned Act provides that it shall remain in force upto and inclusive of 31/10/1993 or such earlier date as may be notified by the state Government in the Official Gazette and shall then expire. It is thus clear that it is open to the respondent State to restrict the operation of the impugned Act even to a period earlier to 31/10/1993 either by issuing a notification or by actually holding the election. It is thus clear that it is open to the respondent State to restrict the operation of the impugned Act even to a period earlier to 31/10/1993 either by issuing a notification or by actually holding the election. Section 3 (a) which is the impugned provision before this Court also provides that no General Election of the Councillors of Corporation shall be held during the period from the date of commencement of this Act and upto and inclusive of 31/10/1993 or such earlier date as may be notified by the State Government under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 1. Thus, an earlier date can be notified prior to 31st of October, 1993. If the elections are held on any date earlier to 31st of October, 1993, under the direction of the Court, the very purpose of the petition will he served and direction of the Court will be consistent with Sec. 3 (a) of the impugned Act. (Ill) It is required to be noted that the situation then existing in the month of January, 1993 has drastically undergone a change and a situation of total normalcy prevail in the State of Gujarat and more particularly in the four metropolitan cities, namely, Ahmedabad, Baroda, Surat and rajkot. As on today, it is not the case of the respondents that because of law and order situation or situation arising from the communal violence or frenzy, it is not desirable or expedient to hold General Election of Councillors of the Corporations. It is, therefore, possible for the respondents to hold free and fair election of the Councillors of the four Corporations at any time prior to 31/10/1993. (IV) It is required to be noted that the impugned Act is purely temporary statute. Admittedly, its life is upto 31/10/1993, at the expiry of which, it shall expire. The statute makes itself defunct and dead on the expiry of 31/10/1993. The statute does not make any provision for extension of such statute or for extension of the period of its operation. The statute has virtually and substantially lived its life by being in operation till date without any of its provisions being stayed, suspended or declared ultra vires. The statute makes itself defunct and dead on the expiry of 31/10/1993. The statute does not make any provision for extension of such statute or for extension of the period of its operation. The statute has virtually and substantially lived its life by being in operation till date without any of its provisions being stayed, suspended or declared ultra vires. Till date, therefore, the statute has achieved the effect of not holding General Election of the Councillors of any of the four Municipal Corporations and declaration of unconstitutionality or invalidity of such a statute which is purely temporary and which is to expire on 31/10/1993 is not going to serve any useful purpose if the ultimate relief which is prayed for, can still be granted by this Court by issuing direction to the respondents to continue the process of election from the stage reached prior to the commencement of this Act. (V) It is also required to be noted that situation in the State of Gujarat and more particularly in the four metropolis is treated to be normal and well Within control even by the Constitutional Body like Election commission of India, which has in fact held by-elections to the vacancies in the Gujarat State Legislative Assembly. In fact, by-elections in the six constituencies including one in Ahmedabad were held as back as may 1993 and even thereafter period of more than two months has expired and, therefore, we do not see any justifiable reason on the part of the State to refuse to hold election of the Councillors of the four Corporations at any time prior to 31/10/1993. (VI) Further, at this stage it is submitted by learned Additional Advocate general that monsoon has already set in and ordinarily during monsoon, no General Elections are held. The duration of the monsoon in the state of Gujarat is between 16th June, and 31st August. Though, it is the case of the respondents that monsoon can be said to be over only by middle of September, 1993. In our opinion, elections are not to be held in the remote villages or in rural areas, but they are to he held in the four metropolis, where reasonably sufficient arrangements exist for the discharge of rain water. Though, it is the case of the respondents that monsoon can be said to be over only by middle of September, 1993. In our opinion, elections are not to be held in the remote villages or in rural areas, but they are to he held in the four metropolis, where reasonably sufficient arrangements exist for the discharge of rain water. (VII) It is also required to be noted that ordinary rainfall in the aforesaid four cities on an average does not exceed 25" to 30" and the same is practically received in the month of July or middle of August. Even otherwise, scanty rain or occasional showers do not adversely affect holding of elections. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it would be in every respect reasonable and consistent with the provisions of the impugned Act as well as the objectives of the impugned Act to direct the respondent-State to hold election on any date earlier to 31st of October, 1993. In our opinion, it would be just and proper to direct the respondents to hold election of the Councillors of the four Municipal corporations on or before 12-9-1993 and if such direction is given it would not be necessary for this Court to decide the question of constitutionality or otherwise of Sec. 3 (a) of the impugned Act. ( 37 ) ). Consistent with the provisions of the impugned Act and reasons and objects for which the Act is enacted, we are of the view that directions to the respondents to hold General Election of the Councillors of the aforesaid four Municipal Corporations by 12-9-1993 shall suffice for the purpose of this petition. ( 38 ) ). Power to issue directions to hold election : The power of the Court to issue writ directing the State to perform a public duty including, inter alia the duty to hold an election, cannot possibly be questioned. In de Smiths judicial Review of Administrative Action (Fourth Edition) it has been observed at page 549 :". . . . . . . . . THE High Court has statutory power to order an election to a local government office to be held on. a day appointeed by it. In de Smiths judicial Review of Administrative Action (Fourth Edition) it has been observed at page 549 :". . . . . . . . . THE High Court has statutory power to order an election to a local government office to be held on. a day appointeed by it. This power which was formerly exercisable on an application for rnandarnus, may be used either when the authority has failed to hold an election at all or when an election that has been held is a nullity. "at page 592 it is observed that a writ of mandamus would go on the application of any aggrieved party to compel the performance of a wide range of public or quasi-public duties, performance of which had been wrongly refused. The writ could issue inter alia, to compel the holding of an election to the office or to prevent the unlawful packing of a Corporation. In Administrative Law by H. W. R. Wade (Fifth Edition) it has been observed at p. 623 :"as well as illegil action, by excess or abuse of power, there may be illegal inaction, by neglect of duty. Public authorities have a great many legal duties, under which they have an obligation to act. as opposed to their legal powers, which give them discretion whether to act or not. "at pp. 632, 633 and 634, it is observed as follows :". . . . . . MODERN Government is based almost exclusively on statutory powers and duties vested in public bodies, and mandamus is the regular method of enforcing the duties. "today the majority of applications for mandamus are made at the instance of private litigants complaining of some breach of duty by some public authority. Within the field of public law the scope of mandamus is still wide and the Court may use it freely to prevent breach of duty and injustice. "these observations of high authority show that even where enabling the discretionary power is conferred on a public authority, the words which are permissive in character may be construed as involving a duty to exercise the power, if some legal right or entitlement is conferred or enjoyed and, for the purpose of effectuating such right or entitlement, the exercise of such power is essential. If there is failure on the part of the done to exercise such power accordingly, the Court will require it to be exercised. ( 39 ) ). The present case stands on a much higher footing. The provision of Principal Act imposed a statutory duty upon the State Government to hold an election for the purpose of constituting a Corporation consisting, inter alia, of elected Councillors as soon as may be after the appointed day. Having regard to the object and purpose of the statute and the language in which the duty is imposed, there is no manner of doubt that its enforcement can be secured by the issue of an appropriate writ. ( 40 ) ). In India the Courts have intervened and directed the competent authority to hold election. An illustrative case is provided by Budha Mal v. Stale of Punjab, 69 Punjab Law Reporter 974. Before the Punjab High Court, the constituency had remained underrepresented for a period of over ten months and the constituencys representative, who could have an important voice in the administration of the municipal affairs, could not do so as the election was not held. The Punjab High Court then proceeded to make the following pertinent observations at pages 983 and 984 :"the essential character of a democratic form of Government is bound to be lost if the executive becomes so unmindful of Us mandatory duty. . . Freedom of franchise is a valuable right which must not be destroyed or delayed, and the working of the democratic machinery ought not to be suspended, or, unlawfully interfered with. The basic feature of a democracy is. that the Soverign power resides in the people as a whole, and is exercised through the elected representatives. A democratic ideal will be delusive if Government servants can stall its functioning by delaying elections, or by not calling upon the constituency to fill the vancancy by electing its representatives. In such a contingency as has occurred in the instant case, the democratic functioning remains suspended, and all this, because of the remissness of the executive. It is of consequence, that the wishes and opinions, not excluding even prejudices of the voters shall count, as also their interests, represented. But when a constituency, through an executive act of omission, remains unrepresented, the wishes, the opinions and the interests of the electorate become mute and voiceless. It is of consequence, that the wishes and opinions, not excluding even prejudices of the voters shall count, as also their interests, represented. But when a constituency, through an executive act of omission, remains unrepresented, the wishes, the opinions and the interests of the electorate become mute and voiceless. The effective prevention of the democratic process by allowing the vacancy to remain unfilled is not a trite or a negligible omissiot; it cannot be dismissed from thought as a trifling peccadillo, or a mere trivia, or minutiae too trumpery to call for serious notice. The municipal committee as well as those for whose benefit, the institution of the local Government is intended, are entitled to the judgment, intelligence, experience, guidance and counsel for the elected represententatives of the people in the constituency. The executive in this case, has deprived a section of the community from the services of its elected representatives. The inordinate delay in not inviting the electors to choose their nominee cannot but be deprecated, especially when it has remained unexplained and was avoidable. The statutory right to elect candidates for Municipal constituency could not, either directly or indirectly, be denied or abridged, but the non-compliance with the statutory provisions has in this case, violated the exercise of their right; and till the constituency is called to elect its representative, the franchise stands abridged The voter in his constituency has been shut off from the ballot box, which is obnoxious to the statutory guarantee of the right to vote. The principle underlying the policy of the rule of law while conferring right also imposes an obligation not only on the citizen, but also on the State. The State which has rights, has also undeniable duties, enforceable under the law. Where the law permits, legal obligation owned by the State can be enforced in a Court of law. Any contravention of law or in the name of the State can be resisted in the judicial forum- So also, violations of any rights, whether of the citizen, or by the citizen, or the State, or by the State, may be judicially resisted and the rights may be enforced, Tex non a rege est violanda, the law is not to be violated by the king is an old maxim, and equally applicable to the State. The dischargeof a legal duly on the part of the State is not only a statutory obligation hut also a moral one, to which the principle noblesse oblige is attracted. In this case, there is a statutory obligation to hold flection Even if law were to afford no remedy for enforcing it, there is imposed a duty upon this Court to remedy the wrong and interfere, by mandamus (see Veley v. Burder, (1841) 12 A and E 265, at p. 266 ). In a case like the present, the duty to hold an election was ministerial in its character and there is no controversy as to the existence of the conditions upon which the call of the election was founded. The officer responsible, or, the State Government, can be compelled by mandamus to make the call and hold election. Mandamus, in the circumstances, is an appropriate remedy to compel performance by officers and by the State of their duty with respect to the holding of an election. The statute does not invest the State government, or any of its officers with the arbitrary power of refusing to take any action. On the contrary, it is their statutory duty to conform to the letter and spirit of Rule 69. The State whose duty for holding election is purely ministerial can, in an appropriate case, be compelled to act by a writ of mandamus. This Court is not without power to issue mandamus in a case like the present, where in consequence of laches, the holding of an election has been unduly delayed. A writ of mandamus to compel the holding of an election is competent at the instance of an elector or a candidate. . . . . . " . ( 41 ) ). Development before pronouncement judgment : It is required to be noted that looking to the temporary nature of the statute and unfortunate but drastic and enormous effect the State action of postponement of election can have, the Division Bench of this Court while admitting this petition in the month of April, 1993, peremptorily fixed it for final hearing on 14/06/1993, i. e. , immediately in reopening of the Court after Summer Vacation. In view of the situation, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner insisted that hearing of the petition should be proceeded and attempt of the respondents more particularly the State Government to thwart the hearing should be discouraged. As usual, the Additional Advocate general of the State came with a request that the matter should be adjourned as Sr. Counsel from Delhi was most likely to appear on behalf of the State. Despite our displeasure to the adjournment being sought in a matter like this, we acceded to the request to accommodate the Counsel of the State and hearing was fixed on 21/06/1993. Once again the same request was repeated and hearing was adjourned to 24/06/1993. For the third time successively the request was reiterated on the ground that Sr. Counsel from Delhi was to appear on behalf of the State Government as ill has appeared on behalf of the State Government in cognate proceeding before the Supreme Court of India, and that he cannot come before 5/07/1993. The unreasonableuess of the request was writ large in the motion of adjournment itself and, therefore, by a Speaking Order on 23/06/1993, this Court peremptorily fixed the hearing on 29/06/1993 at 11. 00 a. m. Hearing of the petition commenced on that date and the submissions of the counsel of the petitioner were over in the first sitting before recess. The learned Additional Advocate General then commenced his submissions. On 30/06/1993 he stated to the Court that he would continue with the hearing. But since 1st of July, 1993 was public holiday and since on 2/07/1993 (Friday) because of some personal work, he cannot attend Court, he should be permitted to resume his submission on 5/07/1993. Since adjournment was sought on the ground of personal inconvenience of the counsel, no serious objection was raised though it was openly suggested to the Court that attempt is, any how, to prolong hearing upto 5/07/1993, so that any Senior Counsel from Delhi can came and can continue the hearing. On 30/06/1993, the Addl. Advocate General actually dragged the hearing upto the end of the day and not at all surprise of anyone, on 5/07/1993, Mr. Altaf Ahmed, Addl. Solicitor General appeared before the Court. The Add ). Advocate General hurriedly wound up his submission and when Mr. Altaf Ahmed, Addl. Solicitor General of India was permitted to address the Court. ( 42 ) ). Altaf Ahmed, Addl. Solicitor General appeared before the Court. The Add ). Advocate General hurriedly wound up his submission and when Mr. Altaf Ahmed, Addl. Solicitor General of India was permitted to address the Court. ( 42 ) ). We may mention at this stage that in the commencement of his submission, learned Addl. Advocate General has stated to the Court that state Government was ready and willing to hold election of the Councillors in the four Municipal Corporations at the earliest and that it is not averse to any reasonable direction of this Court in that regard though he himself was ready and willing to inform to the Court the date when such polling could take place. Consistent with the said request, the learned counsel of the parties were called in Court on 9/07/1993 and an attempt was made to ascertain from the Addl. Advocate General as to when the Government could hold election. The learned Addl. Advocate General with a view to soliciting the information from the State Government went on requesting for time upto 12/07/1993. On 12/07/1993, he stated to the Court that the Government would agree to issue notification authorising the Municipal Commissioner to commence the process of election after 24th of September, 1993. A serious objection was taken by the Counsel appearing for the petitioner stating that the Government, any how, wanted to delay and postpone the holding of election upto 31/10/1993 and that even thereafter also Government has no desire to hold election soon. We, thereupon, suggested to the Addl. Advocate General that the Government should be persuaded to hold election on or before 31/08/1993 and addl. Advocate General with a view to consult his clients, sought adjournment upto 13th of July, 1993. On 13/07/1993, he stated to the Court that his clients were considering the proposal of the Court and matter was adjourned to l 4/07/1993. On 14/07/1993, to the surprise of all, he produced in the Court a printed notification of Urban Development and Urban Housing department dated 13/07/1993, bearing No. KV 135/1993 AMN 7292. By the said notification in the purported exercise of its power conferred by sec. 4. On 14/07/1993, to the surprise of all, he produced in the Court a printed notification of Urban Development and Urban Housing department dated 13/07/1993, bearing No. KV 135/1993 AMN 7292. By the said notification in the purported exercise of its power conferred by sec. 4. the Postponement of Elections Act (impugned Act), the State government notified 24/09/1993 as the date for the purpose of making arrangements by Municipal Commissioner and other concerned authorities for constituting or reconstituting Municipal Corporations of the cities of Ahmedabad, Baroda, Rajkot and Surat. The said notification was produced before the Court and it was submitted that since the notification is now already issued by the State Government, the Court should not undertake the exercise of issuing any direction for holding election. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 43 ) ). It is in this state of affairs that we are also required to consider as to whither the aforesaid notification should deprive the Court of its power to issue directives in the nature of mandamus. We must state we have extensively heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as learned Addl. Advocate General on this notification as it was tendered in the Court on l 4/07/1993. In fact, the same notification is taken on record and oral request of the petitioner to challenge the same is entertained. In our opinion, the notification in question dated 13/07/1993 is a direct inroad 01 the exercise of judicial power by the respondent state. In the context of the fact situation stated herein-above, the Court was also seized of the matter and petition was finally heard and decision was to be pronounced on 16/07/1993. In fact, the Court through advocate General wanted to know through him from the State Government the date on which or by which the elections of the Councillors of the four Corporations at the earliest could be held. The respondents and its officials fully knew that the Court was thinking on that line. The respondents also knew that the Court was thinking that holding of election of any date subsequent to 30/09/1993 would amount to unreasonably and unjustifiably delaying the election. The Addl. Advocate general. The respondents and its officials fully knew that the Court was thinking on that line. The respondents also knew that the Court was thinking that holding of election of any date subsequent to 30/09/1993 would amount to unreasonably and unjustifiably delaying the election. The Addl. Advocate general. stated to the Court that the feeling of the Court will be definitely communicated to the State and he would try his level best to persuade the State to agree to hold the election on some earlier date. In such a situation, it was improper for the Addl. Advocate General to come with a notification dated 13/07/1993, which seeks to take away or unduly restrict the power of the Court to issue direction for holding of election on a date prior to one stipulated in the notification. ( 44 ) ). It is in this situation that it shall have to be decided as to whether such a notification issued on 13/07/1993 can be permitted to stand. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid notification shall have to be voided and set aside by this Court for the following reasons : (I) It is issued by the State Government at a time when the matter was adjourned for pronouncement of judgment and when through Additional advocate General necessary information was solicited from the State as to when at the earliest it could hold election, so that appropriate direction can be given by this Court. Having known the possibility or otherwise of any direction by this Court, the State has tried to overreach the jurisdiction of this Court by issuing the notification so as to make it impossible for the Court to exercise its judicial powers. In our opinion, issuance of this notification is a direct inroad on the exercise of judicial power of this Court as held by various decisions of the Supreme Court referred to in paras 30 to 35 hereinabove. (II) The issuance of the notification is an exercise of administrative power and in our opinion, in the facts of the present case, power is exercised on factors which are irrelevant, extraneous and non-germane to the exercise of power. In fact, issuance of notification at this stage is nothing but an instance of tainted or colourable exercise of power by the executive. In fact, issuance of notification at this stage is nothing but an instance of tainted or colourable exercise of power by the executive. The State Government, in fact, by issuing the notification wanted to forestall issuance of any direction by this Court for holding of election. Exercise of executive power conferred by Sec. 4 of the impugned Act at this stage for such a purpose, in our opinion, is vitiated as it seriously interfered with the exercise of judicial power and as it was intended at overreaching the judicial decision and for that purpose also the notification is required to be quashed and set aside. (Ill) It is pertinent to note that by the impugned notification the State government has notified 24/09/1993 as the date, beyond which arrangements are to be made by the Municipal Commissioners of the respective Corporations. It is required to be noted that on the facts stated hereinabove excepting notifying the date of polling, no other step was required to be taken by the Municipal Commissioner and in fact no further arrangements were required to be made. We are of the opinion that it was for the Municipal Commissioner to fix the date of polling and such power could have been reasonably exercised by the Municipal Commissioner, but for that purpose to notify the date for preparation of arrangement as on 24/09/1993 is solely with a view to delaying the holding of election upto the month of October, 1993. Since there is no justification for delaying the holding of election any further, we are of the opinion that the notification is also not issued in good faith and is issued in colourable exercise of power with a view to seeing that the deadline of 31/10/1993 is reached and no fruitful or meaningful direction is issued by the Court. To that extent, the impugned notification seeks to overreach the exercise of judicial power by this court and therefore, also the same is required to be invalidated and is hereby declared to be null and void and ineffective. ( 45 ) ). In the result, this petition shall have to be partially allowed. As far as the relief about constitutionality of Sec. 3 (a) of the impugned act is concerned, we do not decide the question of constitutionality of the said provision. However, we issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents Nos. ( 45 ) ). In the result, this petition shall have to be partially allowed. As far as the relief about constitutionality of Sec. 3 (a) of the impugned act is concerned, we do not decide the question of constitutionality of the said provision. However, we issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 to hold election of Municipal Corporations of city of Ahmedabad, Baroda, Surat and Rajkot on or before 12-9-1993, by further directing the respondents Nos. 2 to 5 to make necessary arrangements including fixing the date of polling for holding election before the aforesaid date. We also quash and set aside the notification issued by the first respondent dated 13/07/1993 which was produced in the Court on 14/07/1993. ( 46 ) ). Before we conclude we cannot resist reminding the State government and all concerned memorable words of Justice I. D. Dua (as His Lordship then was) in the case of Suraj Prakash v. State of punjab, reported in AIR 1968 Del 30 and we hope that directions of this Court will be understood in the aforesaid spirit by the State, its officials and Officers. ". . . . . . It is in the end hoped that speedy and effective steps would be taken for holding fresh elections so that the electorates of Simla are not deprived, for a day longer than is absolutely necessary of the exercise of their cherished democratic right to franchise to elect their representatives to manage their own local affairs. Arbitrarily depriving them on this right, seems to me to be a grave violation of their basic statutory right, tolerated only in the States which pay mere lip homage to democracy. Such violations in this Republic are an affront to the wisdom and labour of the framers of our Constitution. Mere drafting of constitution, if may be remembered, does not make the State democratic. It is the people who have to exert themselves to enforce the Constitution and to adopt the principles enshrined therein in their day-to-day life. To this end, the government Departments, the local bodies as well as very patriotic citizen must strive, if we have to survive as a free democratic nation. " ( 47 ) ). Rule is made absolute accordingly to the aforesaid extent. There shall be no order as to costs. .